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Interviews Note:  
Non~attributable sources 
 
While researching for this study, over 60 (elite) interviews [i] were conducted in the 
UK and US. In a variety of ways, at least a further 60 prominent people were 
consulted [c], and kindly provided helpful insights and guidance in varying forms. 
Several meetings and conferences were also attended across the UK, and in the US, 
Italy and Canada. Naturally, due to the sensitive nature of this subject, the majority 
of these interactions took place ‘off the record’ and/or under the Chatham House 
Rule. Therefore, names cannot be provided in this study in order to respect the 
continued protection of identities.1 In this study, the label ‘non-attributable source’ is 
used in endnotes to identify contributions from these sources. 
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Abstract 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’: 
UK-US intelligence relations &  
wider reflections on international intelligence liaison 
 
 
Since 9/11, intelligence liaison has increased exponentially. Yet, both in international affairs 
and within the academic fields of international relations (IR) and intelligence studies, the 
phenomenon of intelligence liaison remains under-researched and under-theorised. 
Moreover, intelligence studies remain remarkably disconnected from IR. Accordingly, this 
study attempts to advance a timely understanding of both international intelligence liaison 
generally, and UK-US intelligence liaison specifically, in a contemporary context. 
Methodologically, this is accomplished through conducting a qualitative analysis of UK-US 
intelligence liaison focussed on two ‘critical’ and ‘intensive’ case studies. These represent the 
key issues over which the UK and US have liaised, namely counter-terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) non-/counter-proliferation.  
 
In practical terms, the ‘rise’ of intelligence liaison can be substantially explained. However, 
the phenomenon itself can only be ‘theorised’ so far. Intelligence is, by its very nature, a 
fragmented subject. Accordingly, cascades of complexities increasingly enter, especially at the 
lower/micro levels of analysis - where the details and specifics concerning particular sources 
and operations matter further. Therefore, intelligence liaison effectively represents the concept 
of ‘complex co-existence plurality’ in action. This is both at and across all its different, yet 
closely interrelated, levels of analysis, and also when broken down into eight systemic 
variables or attributes. Notwithstanding this complexity, wider conclusions can be drawn, 
allowing this thesis to advance the proposition that we are now witnessing the globalisation 
of intelligence. Overall, this trend is facilitated through the developments occurring in a 
web of overlapping international intelligence liaison arrangements, which collectively span 
the globe. Reflective of a continuously evolving attempt for ‘optimum outreach’, these intra-
liaison developments include: firstly, the establishing of frameworks and defining of 
operational parameters for the intelligence liaison arrangements, and then their subsequent 
consolidation (or normalisation) and optimisation over time. These wider trends are 
simultaneously observable in the microcosm of UK-US intelligence liaison relations, which 
are also on ‘a continuum with expansion’ as the UK and US remain broadly exemplary 
‘friends and allies’. 
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Preface 
‘So What?’ The rationale for this study 
 
‘The modern security environment (terrorism, nuclear proliferation, cross-national drugs and 
crimes – all occurring during unprecedented globalization) has brought about calls for 
stronger intelligence activities while at the same time it has created concerns about the 
unintended consequences of intelligence activities.’ 
- Professor Stan A. Taylor, US intelligence scholar2 
 
 
[1.0]: Why intelligence matters today 
 
Today, intelligence is especially key. This is together with its study to further 
enhance our understanding of the phenomenon. As former UK intelligence officer 
Michael Herman has observed: ‘The main change has been the dramatic increase in 
intelligence’s own importance after September 11, 2001.’3 Intelligence is central to the 
doctrine of pre-emption, a trend now dominant in the security and foreign policies of 
several countries, most notably the United States (US) and the United Kingdom 
(UK).4 Part of what Canadian intelligence has dubbed a ‘New Intelligence Order’5, 
this trend has been ascendant especially since the 11 September 2001 (9/11) attacks in 
the US and during the subsequent so-called ‘War on Terror’/‘Long War’. Intelligence 
often dominates the headlines in a context where ‘new’ terrorism and associated 
global security challenges, such as the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD), sit at the top of national agendas.6  
In the early twenty-first century, there have also been several high-profile 
inquiries into intelligence ‘failure’.7 These publicly emphasise the central importance 
of intelligence, as well as the other activities of states’ secret services, to wider 
political processes. Arguably, intelligence has changed from being a supporting 
activity (delivering an intelligence-informing contribution) to being more of a 
centrally involved activity (performing an intelligence-leading role, encapsulated by 
the phrase ‘intelligence-led’). As a result, intelligence has moved increasingly out of 
the shadows and into the spotlight. Moreover, reflecting its enhanced status, today 
within the academe, intelligence is no longer so confined to being a niche area of 
study. Instead, it must be considered more widely and form a greater part of any 
consideration of mainstream government.8 
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[2.0]: Why intelligence liaison (co-operation) matters  
 
In the current context, the ‘hidden hand’ of intelligence liaison9 has emerged as the 
most significant dimension of intelligence. As an article in Jane’s Intelligence Digest 
noted: ‘Since the terrorist attacks of [9/11] made Al-Qaeda’s global reach evident, 
much attention has focused on improving intelligence sharing and law enforcement 
co-operation…’10 These actions have primarily been effected to help contribute 
towards enhancing the responsive reach of intelligence and security agencies. 
Generally, the intention is for this to be implemented across all the areas where 
intelligence operates and in which it has an interest. Occurring in both the domains 
of domestic and international affairs, including within intelligence and security 
organisations themselves, the ‘reach-enhancement’ process manifests itself more 
specifically: (i) in terms of the scale and persistence of intelligence and security 
activities/investigations, simultaneously ushering in related questions of 
proportionality; and (ii) it is ideally implemented in a directly competitive, as well as 
ultimately ‘winning’, manner versus targets and vis-à-vis risks. This is an approach 
that is characteristic of trying to be ‘ahead of the curve’ of events and developments, 
rather than instead being ‘behind’ that dynamic.11  
Moreover, the importance of liaison can be readily highlighted. Contemporary 
intelligence and security practitioners frequently refer to liaison and its utility. In 
April 2008, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director, Robert S. Mueller, 
acknowledged that:  
 
The essential components to confronting [terrorist] threats are intelligence 
and partnerships… Today, … the vast majority of the FBI’s terrorism cases 
originate from information developed by our partners overseas — even 
those cases in which the suspected terrorists and the potential targets are all 
on American soil.12  
 
More widely, as was emphasised by the Office of the US Director of National 
Intelligence (ODNI) in 2007: ‘The IC [US intelligence community] cannot win against 
our adversaries on its own … its necessary work with foreign intelligence and 
security services must proceed on a planned and prudent basis.’13  
Clearly that work had already been central. In 2005, in testimony to a closed US 
Congress committee session, the CIA deputy director of operations reportedly 
revealled that ‘virtually every capture or killing of a suspected terrorist outside Iraq 
since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks -- more than 3,000 in all -- was a result of foreign 
intelligence services’ work alongside the agency.’14 In evidence for the UK 
Intelligence and Security Committee’s Renditions report of June 2007, Sir David 
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Pepper, the Director of the UK Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ), succinctly remarked: ‘When we talk about use of intelligence, that would 
include passing it to liaison services…’15 As former US Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence, Mark Lowenthal, has also observed: ‘When assessing different 
intelligence services, keep in mind that most have liaison relationships with other 
services, thus increasing their capabilities. The degree to which these relationships 
complement or overlap one another is important.’16  
The centrality of liaison to contemporary intelligence is thus firmly 
demonstrable. Indeed, networks – whether they are composed of intelligence officers 
and/or (their) agents – as well as the process of networking, have always been key to 
intelligence, as well as representing how intelligence is organised.17 Furthermore, 
liaison is what those networks do, including how they can pursue it. In the 
contemporary globalised era, and undoubtedly continuing into the future, these 
networks need to be better connected and exploited through their enhanced 
facilitation. This is both at the human and technical levels. As an integral part of 
these overall processes, the significance of liaison is simultaneously further elevated. 
Subject to some similar trends, a ‘softer’ form of liaison, featuring as outreach, has 
also flourished in parallel in the open source (OS) or overt intelligence realm.18  
Rarely probed in detail and frequently remaining highly secret, intelligence 
liaison has increased exponentially. This is albeit if unevenly at times. Traditional, 
bilateral international intelligence liaison has increased particularly rapidly. This has 
brought with it a diverse range of new and sometimes non-traditional partners, 
including Libya and Sri Lanka.19 As former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard 
Armitage observed:  
 
Probably the most dramatic improvement in our intelligence collection and 
sharing has come in bilateral cooperation with other nations – those we 
considered friendly before 9/11, and some we considered less friendly. 
This is a marked change, and one that I believe results not just from 
collective revulsion at the nature of the attacks, but also the common 
recognition that such groups present a risk to any nation with an 
investment in the rule of law.20  
 
Interestingly, some greater multilateral intelligence liaison has also been witnessed. 
This has been seen within regional frameworks such as the European Union (EU) 
and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) – representing the 
regionalisation of intelligence – as well as between them, allowing the discussion of 
the globalisation of intelligence.21 Multilateral intelligence liaison has also been 
increasing, but more incrementally. Furthermore, developments occurring at the 
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plurilateral level focussed on counter-terrorism, such as between the US and EU, and 
the US and ASEAN, can be cited.22 Frequently, the concept of ‘uneven and combined 
development’ is effectively reflected. Perhaps more remarkably, post-9/11 direct 
linkages between the local and international levels are coming to the fore.23 This 
simultaneously points towards identified phenomena such as ‘glocalisation’.24  
 
[2.1]: International intelligence liaison as increasingly an ‘end’: 
Some recalibration has occurred. This has involved some increased ‘strategising’ of 
liaison. Whereas previously international intelligence liaison played more of a 
supporting role in overall intelligence activities (as a ‘means’ at the 
operational/tactical level), today it is evidently playing an ever-more central and 
directing role (as an ‘end’/‘solution’ at the strategy/policy level).25 For instance, 
liaison relationship considerations formed a concern for the UK Secret Intelligence 
Service (SIS/MI6) in its increased withdrawal from involvement in managing certain 
operations targeted against organised crime. As the Chief of SIS, Sir John Scarlett, 
remarked in testimony to the ISC in early 2007:  
 
We [SIS] have become deeply involved in the setting up and management 
of quite complex… operations. Now these have been established, there 
clearly is an argument for saying “well, the management and running of 
these is not something which naturally falls to SIS. It is certainly something 
which could in theory be done by SOCA [the Serious Organised Crime 
Agency].” At the same time, they are so important, they achieve such 
results, they have such a strategic impact, and therefore they have such a 
political profile that they are not just police operations. They have real 
political and strategic significance. For us to just pull out of them would 
risk … undermining the bilateral relationship quite seriously…26 
 
In an increasingly globalised context, intelligence is becoming a greater actor in its 
own right. Self-evidently, this enhances its importance. Thus it requires ever-greater 
macro- extending to micro-management.27 The ISC Annual Report 2006-2007 again 
emphasised the importance of liaison, particularly where it noted the direction of 
(still classified) expenditure flows:  
 
Much of the £*** additional funding allocated to SIS in the 2005 Pre-Budget 
Report was used to enhance front-line counter-terrorism operations 
overseas … and to develop the capacity of liaison services in priority 
countries. This work has continued through 2006/07 and has included 
projects in ***, ***, ***, ***, *** and *** with further capacity-building work 
planned in key areas of the *** region and the ***. The funding has also 
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enabled SIS to put more personnel on the ground in areas where British 
forces are operating.28  
 
Again, driving these developments is the security and intelligence need for enhanced 
reach. This is as well as there being a persisting legitimate need for new insights into 
traditionally more closed-off and sensitive realms.29 Not least, this includes 
intelligence reach into various communities, foreign countries’ domestic spheres, and 
indeed even into individuals’ own homes and lives. In an era of increasing 
globalisation (writ large), these pressures occur to a considerably greater degree. This 
results from an erosion of traditional distinguishing categories (internal/external or 
domestic/foreign) and from increasingly porous conventional barriers, such as 
states’ borders.30 
 
[2.2]: Increasing international intelligence liaison: 
Liaison is on an upward trajectory. Undeniably some rhetoric is present in public 
pronouncements and surrounding discourse concerning the increase in international 
intelligence liaison. However, operationally there genuinely is a substantial increase. 
For instance, in 2005 it was authoritatively reported in The Washington Post that: ‘The 
CIA has established joint operation centers [Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers 
(CTICs)] in more than two dozen countries where U.S. and foreign intelligence 
officers work side by side to track and capture suspected terrorists and to destroy or 
penetrate their networks…’31 Moreover, highlighting the increase in intelligence 
sharing, these CTICs reportedly include ‘secure communications gear, computers 
linked to the CIA’s central databases, and access to highly classified intercepts once 
shared only with the nation’s closest Western allies.’32  
The liaison has also become more regularised. This is with ‘daily decisions 
[being made] on when and how to apprehend suspects, whether to whisk them off to 
other countries for interrogation and detention, and how to disrupt al Qaeda’s 
logistical and financial support.’33 Other countries, such as Denmark, have similarly 
witnessed a growth in their international intelligence liaison relationships in recent 
years.34 In the covert intelligence realm, intelligence liaison is the central mechanism 
contributing to the increasing ‘regionalisation’ and eventual ‘globalisation’ of 
intelligence.35 Alongside the outreach developments occurring in parallel in the overt 
intelligence realm, these evolutionary processes are underway for a range of reasons. 
In summary, they reflect a growing recognition of essential collective and co-
operative security means as an adaptive response to the notoriously difficult 
globalised security threats of the early twenty-first century.36 Moreover, they are 
emergent so that, in harmony with a doctrine of pre-emption, more comprehensive 
pictures of the challenges confronted can be constructed in a more timely manner. 
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Yet, despite these observed developments, considerable shortcomings remain in our 
understanding. Both in wider public international affairs and within the academic 
fields of inquiry of international relations and intelligence studies, the intelligence 
liaison phenomenon remains under-studied and under-theorised. Indeed, as 
Swedish intelligence scholar Wilhelm Agrell has argued: ‘…there is no generally 
established theory of intelligence and hence no given theoretical framework for the 
analysis of intelligence liaison.’37 Efforts contributing towards the addressing of these 
observed paucities require their extension. 
Intelligence liaison needs to be both better and more widely understood. This 
is because intelligence liaison now concerns not just intelligence ‘specialists’, but all - 
including the wider public. With the increasing emphasis on infrastructure 
protection, individuals in private companies - such as airlines - can be consumers 
and indeed providers of intelligence. Today, the onus on intelligence generally, and 
on intelligence liaison specifically, has been significantly increased in an era of a 
doctrine of preventative pre-emption in states’ foreign and security policies. 
Furthermore, as Canadian intelligence scholar Professor Martin Rudner has 
remarked: ‘The imperative for intelligence co-operation can sometimes make strange 
international bedfellows, and can have profound implications for foreign policy, civil 
society and human rights.’38  
Arguably the acceleration of liaison is leading to an imbalance. Intelligence 
liaison is now being used more extensively across the globe, it is playing an ever-
greater pivotal role in international relations as a whole, as well as featuring more 
centrally in states’ and the private sector’s foreign and security policies. Alongside, 
however, we have seen the emergence of a correspondingly large, and indeed 
continuing to burgeon, intelligence liaison accountability and oversight deficit.39 
Prominent events in the early twenty-first century have served to further emphasise 
the need to better understand the phenomenon of intelligence liaison. Recent 
significant episodes closely involving intelligence have also underlined the need to 
communicate that understanding more widely in the mainstream of academic and 
public inquiry. Notably the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and in Iraq (2003), the 9/11 
and WMD intelligence inquiries and surrounding controversies - ethical and 
otherwise - including concerning ‘torture’ allegations and CIA secret prisons and 
‘extraordinary renditions’, have significant implications to impart. Intelligence 
liaison, whether it is conceptualised broadly (as in this study) or more narrowly, 
requires to be better understood beyond solely the niche field of intelligence studies. 
Moreover, it needs to find its place in the broader schema of international relations. 
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[3.0]: Where the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship features 
 
Amid the developments charted above, the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship is 
of vital importance. As FBI director, Mueller has claimed:  
 
… the partnership between the United States and the United Kingdom is 
among the strongest in the world. I am particularly grateful for the 
relationship between the FBI and our British counterparts. It remains a 
model of international intelligence and law enforcement cooperation.40 
 
Through: (i) the modus operandi of their close intelligence liaison relationship; (ii) the 
modus operandi of their international intelligence liaison relationships with other 
partners across the world; and (iii) including outreach activities in the overt 
intelligence realm via both these routes, the UK and US intelligence communities 
contribute towards the overall gradual greater globalisation of intelligence.41 
Sometimes this is done perhaps enthusiastically, at other times more reluctantly. 
Notably officials seek to accomplish this within UK-US terms or ‘rules of 
engagement’. These conditional movements help enable UK and US-led (and 
favourable) ‘best practices’ and frameworks to be established. Essential security and 
counter-intelligence considerations can then be better addressed with adherence to 
an increased commonality of standards. This provides a firm foundation for greater 
and deeper international intelligence liaison in the future, in an ‘end’/‘solution’ 
modus vivendi form.42 
 
[3.1]: Establishing frameworks and defining operational parameters: 
Several developments are contributing to ‘homogenisation’ and ‘international 
standardisation’ processes. In summary, these include: (i) trends apparent in 
intelligence, law enforcement and security sector reform (SSR)43 - involving the 
provision of training and other assistance to foreign intelligence services by Western, 
and in particular by UK and US, intelligence services on key issues, such as on 
terrorism and WMD proliferation;44 (ii) the UK-US encouraging of greater 
accountability systems and legal frameworks - such as for former-Communist 
Eastern European countries’ intelligence services;45 as well as (iii) the encouraging of 
‘good practice’ in intelligence communications/information security and 
‘information assurance’ (COMSEC/INFOSEC) – such as at the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) level, and NATO members becoming NATO Security and 
Evaluation Agency (SECAN) compliant.46 These multiple and wide-ranging 
‘homogenisation’ and ‘international standardisation’ processes (or at least their 
attempts) represent ‘part one’ contributing towards the increasing international 
interconnectedness and, with it, interdependence, of intelligence through 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Preamble 
P : xix 
international intelligence liaison.47 These processes help to establish the intelligence 
liaison arrangement frameworks and to define their operational parameters. In a 
multiplier-effect manner, they create a growing patchwork of over-lapping 
facilitators. Simultaneously, occurring in parallel in the overt intelligence world, 
greater outreach efforts are discernable. Thereby they also contribute to the overall 
globalisation of intelligence trends. Essentially, as time progresses, these trends are 
in harmony with being on ‘a continuum with expansion’. 
 
 
[4.0]: The globalisation of intelligence & its ‘location’ 
 
The globalisation of intelligence can be readily characterised. When the above trends 
are confined to solely geographic regional bases, the mere increasing regionalisation of 
intelligence is observed. When these trends extend beyond the confines of regional 
bases, and are more ‘out-of-area’, the increasing globalisation of intelligence is 
witnessed.48 To varying degrees, the regionalised intelligence arrangements 
contribute to the overall globalisation of intelligence. This is especially apparent 
when different regionalised and/or other forms of intelligence liaison arrangements 
overlap across the globe through commonly linked participants. An example is the 
UK - which is a party in European region and EU intelligence arrangements, NATO, 
as well as UKUSA, and which enjoys extensive bilateral arrangements with countries 
in Africa and Asia.49  
Furthermore, when exploring the globalisation of intelligence, the main 
focus is most appropriately placed on the key UKUSA countries. These include the 
‘five-eyes’ of the UK, US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. Particular 
concentration should be on the UK and US.50 As Professor Stan A. Taylor notes: ‘In 
the contemporary world, only the US, UK, and Russian services [(and possibly those 
of China51)] can claim to have truly global intelligence coverage and activities.’52 
Significantly, the UKUSA countries are instrumental in leading the discernable 
regionalisation and globalisation of intelligence developments. This is the case both 
within and beyond the confines of the exclusive multilateral UKUSA arrangement, 
as well as through other regional groupings, such as the EU and NATO, and 
through close co-operation with other regional groups - for example, ASEAN. 
Valuable contributions from other Western countries, such as the Netherlands, 
France, Germany and Sweden (with the Swedish Ministry of Defence’s 
‘Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information Sharing 
[M4IS]’53) simultaneously figure. In short, the most effective international 
intelligence sharing takes place within trusted and exclusive bilateral and, more 
occasionally (though increasingly), multilateral intelligence liaison arrangements. To 
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date, within the covert realm of intelligence, the exclusive intelligence liaison 
arrangements therefore represent the sites where the greatest regionalisation 
extending to the overall globalisation of intelligence has occurred, and is continuing 
to develop. 
 
[4.1]: The optimisation of intelligence liaison arrangements: 
Further developments are apparent. Building on ‘part one’, the establishing of 
frameworks and the definition of operational parameters, ‘part two’ contributing 
towards the overall globalisation of intelligence can be facilitated. Part two consists 
of the optimisation of the intelligence liaison arrangements. This involves the greater 
‘flattening’ of hierarchies.54 This occurs within the now ‘exclusive’ arrangements, 
following – albeit perhaps paradoxically - greater inclusion through exclusivity on 
the basis of the ‘best practices’. In turn, these best practices address the security and 
counter-intelligence concerns, by becoming increasingly consolidated or 
‘normalised’ in operations. Necessarily, a degree of the compartmentalisation of 
intelligence for security purposes is continued. These are intended for maintaining a 
degree of counter-intelligence protection and associated intelligence control through 
regulation.55 Although, arguably this compartmentalisation of intelligence is less 
pressing than witnessed during the Cold War because the threat from high-grade 
hostile state-actor intelligence services is lower (though not completely removed56). 
Instead, the compartments now tend towards being larger and broader in their 
scope.  
Part two is gradually implemented over time. The central condition for 
intelligence liaison, trust, is incrementally built up through these ‘confidence-
building’, then maintaining, stages.57 Once these relationships are being conducted 
and over time are subject to being increasingly ‘optimised’, intelligence can then be 
shared in a more regularised manner. This follows more of a routine ‘need to 
share/pool’ rationale, which is based more on institutionalised values. This is rather 
than sharing taking place so much on a more restrictive, particular episodic or 
investigation-confined ‘need to know’, or quid pro quo basis.  
 
[4.2]: ‘Uneven and combined development’: 
Different interpretations of the trends persist. How evenly the globalisation of 
intelligence extends enduringly remains more debatable. These factors vary 
extensively from specific case-to-case. The final evaluation depends on which 
international intelligence liaison relationship is under scrutiny, at which point in 
time and in which context. The current degree of globalisation of intelligence 
appears to be very haphazard. This is both in terms of the speed at which it is 
happening and how far it extends, and it certainly is not uniform. However, while 
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trends can be mixed, they are not ambiguous - especially in terms of arrangements 
widening. The ‘globalisation of intelligence’ trends appear to be taking place most 
markedly at the macro levels of relations, and within the overt intelligence realm. 
Today, the micro levels, and the covert intelligence realm, are also increasingly 
included as previous hierarchies involved are increasingly ‘flattened’. 
The overall globalisation of intelligence is multi-causal. Significantly, the 
several pressing contemporary threats and issues being regularly confronted are 
asymmetric, global and transnational in their nature and scope. They are, therefore, 
increasingly difficult to target, requiring ever-more sophisticated responses.58 Many 
of the driving pressures come from below. This is both from the publics and 
operators who are directly and individually experiencing the driving factors on the 
‘front-/fault-lines’.59 
Together with the development of responses generated from below, a whole 
range of top-down reactions are prompted. These feature in the form of national, 
through to regional, extending to global, responses spearheaded by states. This is 
particularly the case if an overall goal of ‘public safety’ is the main driver. Some of 
these top-down responses observed in the intelligence and security sector realm 
form the main focus of inquiry in this study. As the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service (CSIS) noted in 2002: ‘In the era of globalization, isolation is not an option 
for the intelligence service of a democratic country, but rather a recipe for failure.’60 
Observations, such as this one, have not gone unnoticed. They have fed directly into 
activities witnessed in the intelligence, security and law enforcement sectors during 
the early twenty-first century. 
 
 
[5.0]: The centrality of the United States 
 
The US role is pivotal in the above processes. The US global hegemony in the realm 
of intelligence power is substantially maintained in this novel arrangement of 
increasingly globalised intelligence. This is accomplished by attempting to steer 
these processes through international intelligence liaison, extending to including 
participating in outreach efforts. As a result, what Michael Herman has perceptively 
termed ‘intelligence power’ is prevented from becoming completely devolved and 
freely pooled amongst other countries.61 The purpose is to ensure that as many of the 
positive attributes of intelligence protectionism as possible can be maintained in 
conjunction with the gradual introduction of the more positive attributes of 
increased intelligence co-operation. Simultaneously, these trends reveal that the US 
has developed enhanced dependence upon international intelligence liaison with 
intelligence partners spread widely across the globe.62 These include some new and 
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non-traditional ones, who are regarded as essential contributors to US and global 
security, particularly post-9/11. Again according to the findings of US journalist 
Dana Priest, ‘Today’s CIA is desperately seeking ways to join forces with other 
governments it once reproached or ignored to undo a common enemy.’63 Naturally 
these changes, together with some added diversification to help maintain agility, 
have entailed some nuanced adjustments - some of which can be observed in this 
study.64 Not least, strengthened links to domestic security services, both at home and 
in countries abroad, are emergent. 
Collectively, what transpires is complex. There is an interconnected 
overarching web consisting of a plethora of various intelligence liaison 
arrangements. These arrangements, extending to including other forms of outreach, 
provide a form of global intelligence coverage. This is especially true for the US, 
which remains more or less at the top, continuing to perform (with varying effect) its 
pivotal ‘hub’ role.65 A range of ad hoc and informal through to regularised, 
institutional, and formal agreements - including those associated with UKUSA – 
governs and/or establishes the overarching tone for these arrangements. Frequently, 
they substantially overlap in state capitals, forming hubs - notably in London and 
especially in Washington. They also seek fusion within national intelligence, security 
and law enforcement agencies, which are intended to act as nodes, both domestically 
and internationally.66 In the overt intelligence realm, transnational ‘knowledge 
network’ clusters - consisting of complex potent mixes of public and private, 
commercial and non-profit sector, academic, government and non-government 
organisation (NGO) stakeholders - then form around these points of contact, 
participating variously.67  
Through the close UK-US alliance, the UK is closely associated with all of 
these developments. Beneficially, it is also able to tap significantly into, as well as 
contribute towards, the US resource of global hegemony of intelligence power across 
all these strata. Over time, other close UK-US intelligence partners, notably Australia 
(due to its close involvement in both Afghanistan and Iraq operations, similarly to 
the UK) and Canada (due to its involvement in Afghanistan and its shared 
‘continental security’ with the US), can be observed as being increasingly included. 
Indeed, here, the globalisation of intelligence can be argued as being synonymous 
with the ‘Americanisation’/‘Westernisation’ of intelligence. This is rather than it 
representing a ‘purer’ form of globalisation per se. Yet, just as ‘Americanisation’ and 
‘Westernisation’ trends writ large variously feed into overall globalisation 
developments, in a similar manner so too do those in this more specific domain of 
activity. 
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[6.0]: Anglo-Americana: UK-US intelligence liaison relations 
 
The UK-US intelligence liaison relationship is of further significance. It is the focus of 
this study as it is widely recognised as being one of the ‘best’ examples of an 
international intelligence liaison relationship. Alongside the nuclear relationship, it 
has supplied one of the key ‘pillars’ for the overall UK-US relationship and ‘special’ 
relations for over 60 years.68 While being conventionally regarded as sui generis, in 
fact this relationship can provide us with some considerable insights concerning the 
international intelligence liaison phenomenon, as is demonstrated in this study. Also 
the UK-US intelligence relationship is already, to date, the most ‘globalised’, 
‘homogenised’ and ‘internationally standardised’ intelligence liaison relationship. 
This is in part determined by the terms of the patchwork of agreements that 
collectively compose (update and upgrade) the UKUSA Agreement and the 
numerous parallel agreements relating to human intelligence and defence 
intelligence dating from the same era. These facilitate the extent of international 
intelligence liaison that exists today, as well as demonstrating the potential optimum 
form of international intelligence liaison that can currently be achieved. This is at 
least in terms of function, if not also in terms of intelligence and security reach. By 
closely studying the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, several insights into the 
multiple attributes composing a leading international intelligence liaison relationship 
can be gained. This includes valuable insights into its operating dynamics and key 
drivers. As the UK ISC argued:  
 
Our intelligence-sharing relationships, particularly with the United States, 
are critical to providing the breadth and depth of intelligence coverage 
required to counter the threat to the UK posed by global terrorism. These 
relationships have saved lives and must continue.69  
 
Indeed, the exceptionalism and ‘unique’ nature of this relationship can be 
instructive. Its exceptionalism can be seen as serving as an inspirational ‘model’ 
which others seek to emulate in the operation of their international intelligence 
liaison relationships. Although, of course, it is not a perfect relationship, with critics 
particularly emphasising some shortcomings. Some regard it as inappropriately 
‘cosy’, particularly in an era of globalisation.70 Others regard it as locking the UK into 
an Atlanticist frame of reference at the expense of European opportunities. 
Simultaneously, while they are generally outweighed, the ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ elements 
of relations co-exist alongside the ‘good’ dimensions, effectively demonstrating the 
pluralistic qualities involved. 
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[7.0]: Presenting the key themes 
 
Throughout this study, three themes are prominent:  
 
(1) In an era of ‘globalisation writ large’, both UK-US intelligence liaison relations 
specifically, and the phenomenon of international intelligence liaison more generally, 
are evolving in harmony with the trend of being on ‘a continuum with expansion’. 
This is so that multi-dimensional intelligence and security reach across and into 
multiple domains of operation and human activity at home and abroad can be 
enhanced, as well as extended into ‘new’ areas - ideally in an appropriately 
proportional, yet succeeding, manner to that of the targeted threat. In the process, 
this opens up a whole range of intelligence and security ‘reach dynamics’ to being 
worthy of consideration. When comprehensively explored, collectively these provide 
a powerful explanatory prism through which intelligence and its related phenomena, 
such as intelligence liaison, can be understood;  
 
(2) In the early twenty-first century, the UK and US continue to be broadly 
exemplary intelligence ‘friends and allies’. Essentially, they effectively navigate the 
‘good’, the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’ in their own relations. Together they also continue to 
attempt to navigate those aspects - namely the fruits of the impact of ‘globalisation on 
intelligence’ - in the wider world beyond, thereby helping to contribute towards the 
observable general trends;  
 
And (3), as a response to ‘globalisation writ large’ and the impact of ‘globalisation on 
intelligence’, the ‘globalisation of intelligence’ can be discerned. This is emergent 
through the mechanism of enhanced international intelligence liaison, together with 
being facilitated by the developments occurring within those arrangements - 
including concerning factors such as reach dynamics. These key closely inter-related 
themes will now be explored further as this study progresses. 
 
Adam Svendsen 
School of Politics and International Studies (PaIS), 
The University of Warwick, 
July 2008 
 
• • • 
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to the world that this is something that must be fought by all of us together. [(Emphasis 
added)] So whatever initial gaps there may have been with the United States responding 
perhaps more forcefully than anyone else because of what happened to us on 9/11, I 
think the other nations of the world are now recognizing, hey, this is our problem too. 
Moscow has had terrorist incidents. Everybody at this table has experienced terrorism in 
one form or another… 
 
See also J.S. Porth, ‘Like-Minded States Must Work Together To Thwart Terrorist Agenda’, The 
Washington File/USINFO (24 April 2006) - via URL: <http://london.usembassy.gov/terror659.html> 
(accessed: 09/04/2007); see also Sir David Omand - Coordinator of Security and Intelligence & 
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Director, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) (1996-7); Policy Director, Ministry of 
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terrorism so that people can go about their normal business freely and with confidence… “Working 
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(Broadcast date: 19/04/2007). 
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the European Union Counter-Terrorism Policy Setting’, Baltic Security & Defence Review, 8 (2006), 
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Europe in the early 21st century: Counter-terrorism as the lead issue’, paper delivered at the UACES 
Student Forum Eighth Annual Conference, held at the School of Politics and International Relations, 
University of Nottingham, UK (April 2007). For the ASEAN dimension, see, for example, ‘ASEAN 
Efforts to Counter Terrorism’, ASEAN website - via URL: <http://www.aseansec.org/14396.htm> 
(accessed: 06/01/2007) and J.T. Chow, ‘ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11’, Asian 
Survey, 45, 2 (March/April 2005), pp.302-321. Meanwhile, for some of the contemporary limitations 
on multilateral defence co-operation, with some associated implications for intelligence/information 
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only go so far: Regional Eurasian organisations are increasing the scope and size of military exercises. 
However… internationally weak Central Asian partners and fraying members' relations are likely to 
prevent the groups forming an Asian NATO’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 June 2007). For EU-
ASEAN co-operation, see, for instance, ‘15th ASEAN-EC Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) Joint 
Press Release, Jakarta’, ASEAN website (26 February 2005) - via URL: 
<http://www.aseansec.org/17279.htm> (accessed: 02/11/2006); see also ‘ASEAN Efforts to Counter 
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via URL: <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/asean/intro/index.htm> (accessed: 
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<http://www.nysun.com/article/38151> (accessed: 20/06/2007); B. Nussbaum, ‘Protecting Global 
Cities: New York, London and the Internationalization of Municipal Policing for Counter Terrorism’, 
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‘Intelligence liaisons can become the primary channel of communications between two governments, a 
function that is supposedly reserved for embassies, ambassadors, and heads of state.’ 
26 Chief of SIS, quoted in ISC, Annual Report 2006-2007 (January 2008), p.12. 
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International, 2007), pp.111-120. 
28 ISC, Annual Report 2006-2007, p.11, para.31. 
29 See also M. Herman, ‘11 September: Legitimising Intelligence?’, International Relations, 16, 2 
(2002); for a greater exploration of the ‘reach dynamics’ involved, see, Chapter 1: Introduction [9.2], 
below. 
30 See also for an example of the US trying to extend its ‘reach’ further, W. Pincus, ‘Agency Seeks 
Greater Surveillance Power Overseas’, The Washington Post (28 July 2007). 
31 Priest, ‘Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fight’. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid. 
34 See, for example, K. Tebbit, Benchmarking of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service: Introduction 
and Summary (Copenhagen: April 2006), p.v, no.15; see also S. Fidler, ‘The human factor: “All is not 
well in clandestine intelligence collection” In the second instalment of a two-part series, Stephen Fidler 
discusses how the Iraq war has demonstrated the continued importance of MI6 to the CIA, despite the 
UK’s reliance on America’s investment in technology’, The Financial Times (07 July 2004) - ‘Since 
the end of the 1990s, [according to Dutch intelligence scholar Cees Wiebes], co-operation between the 
monitoring services of France, Germany and the Netherlands has grown and the countries exchange 
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35 For definitions of these terms in this study, see Chapter 1: Introduction [7.0], below. 
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including, for example: -- U.S. intelligence collection facilities in foreign countries ••• -- 
Relations with foreign governments in SIGINT and other intelligence activities… The 
State Department is particularly conscious of the foreign policy costs of intelligence – 
e.g. the need to preserve installations abroad, the fall-out from disclosure, •••… [p.6]  
P.83: A paragraph should be added to reflect the role of the State Department and the 
missions abroad in dealing with the foreign affairs aspects of liaison with foreign 
intelligence services. Proposed wording: “The role of the DCI is also affected by the 
interests of the Department of State and the Ambassadors in foreign intelligence liaison 
and exchange. Intelligence arrangements with foreign governments often have 
significant implications for foreign affairs, and these aspects need to be closely 
coordinated by the State Department in consultation with the Ambassadors 
concerned.”… The last sentence on the page obscures the point that there are some 
arrangements ••• in which NSA is the designated agent for the conduct of SIGINT 
liaison. 
 
39 See also T. Shorrock, ‘The corporate takeover of U.S. intelligence: The U.S. government now 
outsources a vast portion of its spying operations to private firms -- with zero public accountability’, 
Salon.com (01 June 2007) - via URL: 
<http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/06/01/intel_contractors/print.html> (accessed: 05/06/2007). 
40 Mueller, ‘From 9/11 to 7/7: Global Terrorism Today and the Challenges of Tomorrow’, p.7. 
41 For some ‘top-down’ impetus, see also, for instance, US Government, National Strategy for 
Information Sharing, pp.12-13 – where it notes:  
On December 16, 2005, in accordance with section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the President issued a Memorandum to Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies prescribing the guidelines and requirements in 
support of the creation and implementation of the ISE [Information Sharing 
Environment]… Guideline Four: • the President recognized the imperative for the ISE 
to facilitate and support the appropriate exchange of terrorism information with our 
foreign partners and allies and, toward that end, directed the development of 
recommendations to achieve improved sharing in this area. 
 
42 Sharing can also include intelligence access, for example in physical arrangements, such as in 
Sensitive Compartmentalised Information Facilities (SCIFs) or ‘skiffs’ – see, for example, A. Huslin, 
‘If These Walls Could Talk…: SCIF Rooms Play It Safe With U.S. Secrets’, The Washington Post (28 
May 2006). 
43 N.B: [please see over page ] 
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The use of the phrase ‘intelligence and security sector reform (SSR)’ deployed in this 
study refers to (1) national interest-led/driven/related initiatives in this area - that is, those 
geared towards developing and building up countries’ intelligence and law enforcement 
capabilities, particularly concerning the key issue areas of counter-terrorism, organised 
crime, and counter-proliferation. This is rather than referring to (2) international 
development/aid-led/driven initiatives.  
Concerning (2), this is the strand to which the phrase SSR is commonly linked in the 
literature on this subject, especially in the field of international development literature, and 
where initiatives are instead done more in the country-being-developed’s interest, such as 
the democratisation of police/military, rather than in the national interests of the countries 
doing the developing. (This is at least the case in relation to the UK’s international 
development/aid-led/driven initiatives, such as laid out in the UK’s International 
Development Act of 2002 - effective 17 June 2002, and replacing the Overseas 
Development and Cooperation Act of 1980). For details concerning this act, see 
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/devact2002overview.asp>, accessed 15 March 2007.) 
However, because of globalisation in wider international affairs, at times convergence, and 
equally clashes, between these two different (officially at least purportedly disconnected) 
intelligence and security sector reform drivers, whether explicitly or not, naturally can 
occur.  
 
See also, for example, G. Hannah, K.A. O’Brien, A. Rathmell, ‘Intelligence and Security Legislation 
for Security Sector Reform’, RAND Technical Report (Cambridge, UK: RAND EUROPE, June 2005), 
p.iii - particularly where they note: ‘As the security sector reform (SSR) agenda has developed over the 
last decade, intelligence has been the most oft-overlooked element. Increasingly, however, intelligence 
is being included as a key element of SSR. Intelligence can both support SSR and be the target of 
reform activities… Intelligence services can make a significant contribution…’ This RAND report was 
‘Prepared for the United Kingdom’s Security Sector Development Advisory Team’; P. Wilson, ‘The 
contribution of intelligence services to security sector reform’, Conflict, Security and Development, 5, 
1 (April 2005), pp.87-107; Wilson, ‘Preparing to Meet New Challenges’, pp.111-120. For more on the 
UK’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) activities, see, for example, Understanding and Supporting 
Security Sector Reform (London: [UK Government] DFID Department for International Development, 
?2005) - PDF via URL: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/supportingsecurity.pdf> (accessed: 
01/12/2006); see also the ‘Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform’ website via URL: 
<http://www.ssrnetwork.net/> (accessed: 28/01/2007); for further background on SSR, see Global 
Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, A Beginner's Guide to Security Sector Reform - PDF 
via URL: <http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/GFN-SSR-
ABeginnersGuidetoSecuritySectorReform.pdf> (accessed: 20/02/2007); see also ‘The Security Sector 
Development Advisory Team (SSDAT)’, UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) - via URL: 
<http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/WhatWeDo/SecurityandIntelligence/SSDAT/> 
(accessed: 20/02/2007); for the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) coverage of SSR, see 
URL: 
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=10
62157719739> (accessed: 28/01/2007); see also the Centre for Security Sector Management, via URL: 
<http://www.ssronline.org/> (accessed: 19/02/2007); for SSR in post-conflict Afghanistan and the 
concept of ‘lead nations’ in such initiatives, E. Sky, ‘The Lead Nation Approach: The Case of 
Afghanistan’, RUSI Journal (December 2006), pp.22-26. For international organisations’ roles in 
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course on protecting human rights in fight against terrorism’, OSCE [(The Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe)] Press Release (08 March 2007), via URL: 
<http://www.osce.org/item/23540.html> (accessed: 10/03/2007); ‘Progress on intelligence sector 
reform’, NATO Update (30-31 January 2008). 
44 See also the content of texts such as D.H. Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic 
Police Abroad (Oxford University Press, 2006) for similar SSR and ‘best practice’ developments in the 
police sector; for a review of ibid., see R. Lippert’s review in Law & Society Review, 40, 4 (2006), 
pp.963-965; see also ‘US counter-terrorism assistance programmes’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (14 
September 2007); N. Hodge, ‘Training programmes signal deepening US ties with West Africa’, 
Jane’s Defence Weekly (12 September 2007). 
45 For further background on this issue, see for example, L.L. Watts, ‘Conflicting Paradigms, 
Dissimilar Contexts: Intelligence Reform in Europe’s Emerging Democracies’, Studies in Intelligence, 
48, 1 (2004) – via URL: <https://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no1/article02.html> (accessed: 
04/09/2006); see also Roberts, Blacked Out, pp.129-131; A.S. Roberts, ‘Entangling Alliances: NATO’s 
Security of Information Policy and the entrenchment of State Secrecy’, Cornell International Law 
Journal, 36, 2 (November 2003), pp.329-360.  
46 For other related NATO Security Sector Reform (SSR) efforts, see also C. Morffew, ‘NATO 
Defense Reform and Reconstruction’, chapter 9 in J. Dufourcq and D.S. Yost (eds), NATO-EU 
Cooperation in Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Italy: NATO Defense College, May 2006), pp.48-51. 
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operational parameters’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21, 1 (March 2008), pp.129-144. 
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the Post-9/11 International Security Environment’, Comparative Strategy, 27, 1 (2008), pp.65-78. 
49 See, for example, ‘15th ASEAN-EC Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) Joint Press Release, 
Jakarta’; see also documents/links on the European Union website concerning ‘ASEAN, a key partner 
for Europe’. In terms of ‘North-South’ relations, see, T. Barkawi, ‘FOCUS: Transnational Terrorism: 
Terrorism and North-South Relations’, RUSI Journal (February 2006), pp.54-58. In Iraq, for the role of 
‘reconstruction teams’, see, for example, R. Perito, ‘Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams’, 
United States Institute of Peace (March 2008). 
50 As they both constantly evolve, for a snapshot of the UK’s intelligence community as at 2002-03, 
see, for example, ‘United Kingdom (Britain)’ in R.D’A. Henderson, Brassey’s International 
Intelligence Yearbook - 2003 Edition (Washington, DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2003), pp.207-215; for a 
snapshot of the USA’s intelligence community at the same time, see ibid., pp.217-234. 
51 For some background on Chinese intelligence, see Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.294-296; see also 
‘China and Russia avoid intelligence co-operation’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (25 March 2008). 
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199; T. Farrell, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Peace Operations’, chapter 15 in in J. Baylis, et al. 
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long-term nature of the relationship, J. Beach, ‘Origins of the special intelligence relationship? Anglo-
American intelligence co-operation on the Western Front, 1917-18’, Intelligence and National 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction:  
Unpacking intelligence liaison 
 
 
‘Now some of this information came from liaison. And the history of our Service [the CIA], 
from its first feeble squirming in the arms of its old British aunt, has been dominated in many 
ways by liaison. Indeed, we have created whole national services, internal and external, from 
one end of the world to the other, trained them, vetted them, funded them, in order to be able 
to conduct liaison in their countries, and to get them to do work that we, though expending 
vast sums in training and subsidy of operations, thought we were too small or too poor to 
handle ourselves.’ 
- W.R. Johnson, US intelligence practitioner1 
 
 
[1.0]: Introduction 
 
Liaison is central to intelligence. In seeking to evaluate ‘liaison’ it is most helpful to 
start by delineating some parameters for this study. This introductory chapter, 
therefore, begins with some definitions. Firstly, what is meant by ‘intelligence’ and 
‘liaison’, and their fusion in the distinct phenomenon of ‘intelligence liaison’, is 
clarified. This chapter then continues by presenting some generalisations about 
intelligence liaison. Thereafter, the phenomenon is broken down into eight attributes 
or variables, followed by an explanation of how it works and its rationale. In the final 
portion of this chapter, some initial insights into UK-US intelligence relations, 
including why and how the UK and US co-operate, are tabled. The general 
proposition that runs throughout this study, that they are broadly exemplary 
intelligence ‘friends and allies’, emerges in the following pages.  
 
 
[2.0]: A definition of ‘intelligence’ – ‘cloak, dagger… and skulduggery?’ 
 
What is precisely meant by the word ‘intelligence’ is still widely contested.2 This 
study focusses on the Anglo-Saxon (UK-US) understandings. However, even here 
differences are detectable. UK intelligence scholar Philip H.J. Davies argues that: 
‘The difference between British and US concepts of intelligence is that the US 
approaches information as a specific component of intelligence, while Britain 
approaches intelligence as a specific type of information.’3 Much energy has been 
spent on frequently defining ‘intelligence’. Ultimately, the final definition depends 
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on how far and in which direction the definition is taken. As CIA historian Michael 
Warner argues: ‘the term is defined anew by each author who addresses it, and these 
definitions rarely refer to one another or build off what has been written before.’4  
In 1987, UK intelligence academic Ken Robertson declared that: ‘A 
satisfactory definition of intelligence ought to make reference to the following: 
threats, states, secrecy, collection, analysis and purpose…’5 It is also worth noting 
former UK intelligence officer Michael Herman’s comment that: ‘…“intelligence” in 
government usually has a more restricted meaning than just information and 
information services. It has particular associations with international relations, 
defence, national security and secrecy, and with specialised institutions labelled 
“intelligence”.’6 Warner’s own definition of intelligence - ‘Intelligence is secret, state 
activity to understand or influence foreign entities’7 - will be added, with slight 
modification,8 as it brings in more of the important ‘intelligence’ as a form of power 
dimension – since ‘knowledge is power.’9 Indeed, the interesting notion of 
intelligence as a form of power, akin to economic power, derives from the work of 
Michael Herman.10 Neither is intelligence solely concerned with secrets, with the 
‘familiar secrets/mysteries dilemma’ often featuring.11 
Intelligence comes in a myriad of forms. These range from technical 
(TECHINT) - including signals intelligence (SIGINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), 
communications intelligence (COMINT), measurement and signature intelligence 
(MASINT)12, imagery intelligence (IMINT), and geospatial intelligence (GEOINT),13 
namely the ‘scientific’ dimension of intelligence - via human intelligence (HUMINT), 
notably the ‘artistic’ dimension of intelligence, to open source intelligence (OSINT).14  
Intelligence is also conceptualised as a process. Commonly known as the 
‘intelligence cycle’, this process in its narrowest and supposedly most perfect 
conception consists of the steps of ‘determining the information intelligence 
consumers require [tasking]; collecting the data needed to produce this intelligence 
[collection or harvesting]; and analysing the collected data [analysis or packaging] 
and disseminating the resulting intelligence [now in product form embodied in 
assessments/estimates] to consumers [dissemination, delivery, marketing or 
producing].’15 Added to this can be the step of ‘re-evaluation’, for example if new 
intelligence has since emerged during the process. Although in reality the 
intelligence cycle is often more complex, the concept still captures much of what 
intelligence professionals seek to achieve.16  
Intelligence product again takes many different forms. The ‘finished’ 
assessments/estimates, essentially arising out of the analysis ‘stage’ of the 
intelligence cycle, can range from being single-source to being all-source. They also 
sit on a spectrum of being tactical to strategic.17 Intelligence product in tactical form 
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is arguably ‘rawer’, and figures as the most actionable and operationally viable 
intelligence. Hence, it tends to be tightly controlled and is made available for 
dissemination on restricted bases. Strategic intelligence meanwhile consists of 
slightly more ‘sanitised’ product therefore it has some greater potential for wider 
dissemination. This is due to particular sensitive sources, methods and their 
provenance being less explicitly revealed in the information communicated, thus 
helping to contribute to the mitigation of counter-intelligence and other security 
concerns (see below).18 
When produced, intelligence then has to be transferred. How intelligence is 
securely conveyed from A ‡ B, and is otherwise shared/accessed, draws us into the 
domain of Communications Security (COMSEC) or Information Security (INFOSEC). 
Common standards in this area are often the bedrock of formal liaison. Officially, 
according to the US Government, COMSEC consists of ‘measures and controls taken 
to deny unauthorized persons information derived from telecommunications and 
[to] ensure the authenticity of such telecommunications’, and includes the four 
categories of: (i) ‘cryptosecurity’ - resulting ‘from the provision of technically sound 
cryptosystems and their proper use’; (ii) ‘emission security’; (iii) ‘physical security’ – 
‘The component of [COMSEC] that results from physical measures necessary to 
safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or 
observation thereof by unauthorized persons’; and (iv) ‘transmission security’.19  
 Intelligence is also institutionalised. In institutional terms, intelligence 
services can be both ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ in their deployment, encompassing 
‘covert action’. Arguably the ‘dagger’ wielded by the ‘hidden hand’, RAND analysts 
Hannah et al observe that: ‘while not an actual category of intelligence, covert action 
should also be considered as part of intelligence activities, as it is generally 
undertaken (in this context) for intelligence purposes (i.e. either driven by or 
attempting to generate intelligence).’20 Denial, disruption, deception, disinformation, 
misinformation and propaganda activities - more popularly known as ‘spin’ - can 
also be added.21 In parallel exists the ‘psychological dimension’ of intelligence, which 
includes information and psychological operations (PSYOPs), intended to win over 
‘hearts and minds’.22 
‘Covert action’ can be further explained. Drawing on the definition frequently 
cited: ‘“Covert action” is defined by US law as activity meant “to influence political, 
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the 
United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.” Covert 
actions are thus distinct from clandestine missions: whereas the term “clandestine” 
refers to the secrecy of the operation itself, “covert” refers to the secrecy of its 
sponsor; the action itself may or may not be secret…’23  
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Typically, the UK definition is more obscure. Over time it has moved ‘from 
“special operations” to “special political action” to “disruptive action”.’24 Often 
‘covert action’ is carried out in the form of paramilitary activities usually conducted 
by some type of ‘special’ military or civilian-quasi-military units. There are the US 
Army’s ‘Special [Operations] Forces’ (SOF) and the ‘CIA Paramilitary Operations’25, 
and, in the UK case, the Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) - 
closely guided by intelligence from, and feeding back intelligence to, the Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6).26 Frequently UK Special Forces teams consist of a 
mixture of personnel from different units, including participants from SIS and the 
UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), depending on what 
expertise and skill-sets are required for the particular operation to be undertaken. 
Currently, ‘covert action’ is very much back in fashion. It is being employed in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, due to the current so-called ‘War on Terror’/‘Long 
War’.27 Some widely publicised ‘extraordinary renditions’ have involved CIA 
(paramilitary) Special Forces following up the leads fed from the CIA’s 
Counterterrorism Center (CTC).28 
A final category of intelligence is ‘counter-intelligence’ (CI). This is defined in 
short as: ‘intelligence activities concerned with identifying and counteracting the 
threat to security posed by hostile intelligence organizations or by individuals 
engaged in espionage or sabotage or subversion or terrorism.’29 Or, in the rather 
grand UK definition, it is ‘the defence of the realm.’30 Here, too, liaison can perform 
an important role.31 Since 1989, efforts to thwart economic espionage by states have 
figured strongly in this area.32  
 Former US intelligence oversight practitioners, Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. 
Schmitt, provide a helpful summary of ‘intelligence’. This features in their book on 
Understanding the World of Intelligence, where ‘intelligence’ is characterised as: ‘certain 
kinds of information, activities, and organizations.’33 Standing on the shoulders of 
Sherman Kent, the traditional US doyen of philosophising about intelligence, 
subsequently they elaborate upon their definition: ‘The word “intelligence” is used 
to refer to a certain kind of knowledge, to the activity of obtaining knowledge of this 
kind (and thwarting the similar activity of others), and to the organizations whose 
function is to obtain (or deny) it.’34  
Meanwhile, former US Assistant Director of Central Intelligence, Mark 
Lowenthal, has defined ‘intelligence’ as: ‘… the process by which specific types of 
information important to national security are requested, collected, analyzed, and 
provided to policy makers; the products of that process; the safeguarding of these 
processes and this information by counterintelligence activities; and the carrying out 
of operations as requested by lawful authorities.’35 
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Accordingly, after this brief survey of ‘intelligence’, the definition that will be 
drawn upon in this study is:  
 
the collection and processing (analysis) of information that is particularly of 
military and/or political value, and which especially (and purposefully) relates to 
international relations, defence and national (extending to global, via regional) 
security (threats). It is also usually secret (covert and/or clandestine), state activity 
conducted by specialised “intelligence” institutions to understand or influence 
entities. 
 
Most comprehensively, ‘intelligence’ can be best summarised as being: (i) a process 
(‘… the means by which certain types of information are required and requested, 
collected, analyzed, and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of 
covert action are conceived and conducted.’); (ii) a product (‘… the product of these 
processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operations themselves.’); as well as 
being (iii) institutionalised or an ‘organization’ (‘… the units that carry out its various 
functions.’).36 
 
 
[3.0]: A definition of ‘liaison’ 
 
Definitions of ‘liaison’ are less contested. It is often characterised as a ‘relation, link’, 
stemming from the French language and the original ‘Latin ligationem … “a 
binding”…’37, and as an ‘illicit intimacy… (mil.) co-operation of forces.’38 ‘Liaison’ 
perhaps also implies an element of prohibited courtship, something a bit mysterious, 
maybe even risqué, a private link. Here, the full intimacies, indeed the fact of the 
connection itself and whom it may be with, is not intended to be revealed to a wider 
audience. In the military context, as agreed by the US Department of Defense (DoD) 
and NATO, ‘liaison’ is defined more precisely as: ‘That contact or 
intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces to ensure 
mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.’39 Optimally shared perceptions 
in a ‘milder’ incarnation are acceptable. However, over-shared perceptions are not. 
This is especially the occasions when the sharing of perceptions extends too far, to 
what can be regarded as a ‘groupthink’ extent, simultaneously representing a form of 
overreach. Questions concerning sustainability are also ushered in. Elsewhere, 
‘liaison’ has been denoted more officially in the CIA Insider’s Dictionary as:  
 
(1) in governmental, military and intelligence usage, close and regular 
contact between counterpart units, organizations or agencies having 
complementary, supplementary or overlapping functions, responsibilities 
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and areas of interest, usually on a lateral level, with a view toward 
facilitating and enhancing communications, coordination and effective 
cooperation in pursuit of common or similar goals; (2) in the intelligence 
and security sectors, international intelligence liaison between the 
intelligence and security agencies of the two nations or between two 
component agencies of the same national intelligence community. N.B. 
Liaison, especially for the purpose of exchanging sensitive information, is 
ideally, but not exclusively, maintained through cross-assignment of liaison 
officers (LOs), q.v.40 
  
While the LO role has been defined in the following terms: ‘in governmental, 
military and intelligence usage, an officer of one agency, organization or unit who is 
assigned to a counterpart entity for the purpose of serving as the focal point of 
contact.’41 But, ‘liaison’ is not solely about communication. It also has other aspects, 
as noted in a US Army definition dating from 1951: ’13. Foreign liaison – Provides 
the official channel of liaison between the Army and foreign military representative 
on duty, visiting or training in the United States.’42  
Liaison has had some further analysis. The American intelligence scholar, H. 
Bradford Westerfield, provides a useful insight into ‘liaison’ in the intelligence 
context, by listing its functions. He describes ‘liaison’ as comprising ‘a wide range of 
forms and degrees of collaboration, across international boundary lines, between 
intelligence services governmental and/or nongovernmental. In the cross-national 
liaison, these services may share information and operations, provide support 
(training, advice, and supplies) and access to or for facilities, and participate in 
crypto-diplomacy – any of these functions.’43  
Officially, in the UK, ‘liaison’ is referred to as: ‘Foreign intelligence services 
with which SIS cooperates.’44 In the Butler Report, ‘liaison’ is defined as: ‘the term 
used to indicate a collaborative relationship between the intelligence services of 
different countries, as in “liaison service” or “liaison source”.’45 In the US, ‘foreign 
liaison’ has been defined by the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 
2001 as: ‘Efforts to work with foreign government intelligence services, including law 
enforcement agencies that gather or carry out intelligence-related activities. 
Examples of foreign liaison include sharing information, joint collection efforts, and 
the arrest of suspected terrorists by foreign governments using US-supplied 
information…’ And demonstrating its extent of use: ‘Every major US intelligence 
agency has some form of liaison relationship with foreign governments.’46 The depth 
of liaison can vary, but it is often characterised by a formal agreement. In this respect, 
intelligence services often behave like mini-states, negotiating their own treaties and 
sending out their own ‘intelligence ambassadors’. Formal liaison is also the mode of 
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liaison that can be most effectively investigated.47 The manifestation of this type of 
liaison will next be examined. 
 
 
[4.0]: The etymology & history of liaison in the intelligence context 
 
The word ‘liaison’ entered the intelligence context via the military route. It came 
from French, the nineteenth century military and diplomatic language, entering 
similarly to the words bloc, attaché, démarche, chargé d’affaires, détente and so on. It is 
closely associated with the history and professionalisation of intelligence institutions, 
as well as with the job-function of military and defence attachés – where conducting 
liaison was, and remains, a central role.48  
Prominent intelligence texts, including those of Michael Herman, UK 
intelligence scholar Christopher Andrew and UK journalist/writer Michael Smith, 
are especially insightful here. They provide useful in-depth insights into the history 
of UK intelligence institutions, particularly the ‘professionalisation’ and 
‘institutionalisation’ processes that occurred during the Victorian era and beyond.49 
As Andrew notes: ‘the first hesitant steps towards the creation of a professional 
intelligence community were taken … by the Victorian War Office.’50 The first 
intelligence agencies gradually emerged from the military and contained military 
personnel. For example, the first Chief (‘C’) of what was to become SIS (MI6) was a 
Naval Commander, Sir Mansfield Cumming, and the first head of what was to 
become MI5 (the British Security Service) was an Army officer, Major Vernon Kell. 
Naturally, they brought military terminology and practices with them, and ‘liaison’ 
was no exception.  
In the intelligence context, liaison can be seen as a technical term and indeed 
as part of the specialist vernacular of alliances. It is a term associated with the 
continuing ‘professionalisation’ and ‘epistemologisation’ of the intelligence 
community throughout the twentieth century and to date. During these processes, 
intelligence evolves from its origins as an ‘amateur’ practice to a more distinct, 
respected, even legitimate, civilianised, business-like, institutionalised and official 
activity. Simultaneously, intelligence’s military and defence connections are 
highlighted, and, by association, so is the utility and value of intelligence.  
The roots of liaison can be effectively traced. Early developments in the realm 
of liaison owed much to security intelligence co-operation against anti-colonial 
agitators and the revolutionaries of the late nineteenth century.51 However, in the 
twentieth century, defence and strategy have been the main drivers. Increasingly 
regularised liaison has come with the rapid growth and development of SIGINT. 
This trend is particularly notable from the First World War onwards, when ‘the 
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emergence of radio as a primary means of communication [together with an early 
lack of communications security (COMSEC)] … resulted … in the development of 
communication intelligence and security as we know them today.’52 During the 
1940s, and particularly due to the emergency conditions engendered by the Second 
World War, SIGINT became increasingly ‘scientifically’53 managed and 
‘industrialised’ in scale and collection. Sharing and joint exploitation on an industrial 
scale became a military necessity. Through agreements, such as BRUSA (Britain-
USA) of 1943, SIGINT became increasingly pooled and shared, especially between 
the UK, US and the other English-speaking countries.54 This type of arrangement was 
most immediately spurred on by the Allies’ now well-known successes at breaking 
the Axis enemy’s codes, ULTRA (Germany) and MAGIC (Japan).55  
Intelligence liaison officers (ILOs) soon emerged. This was notably from the 
early-1940s onwards, with the specific role of these exchangeable ‘authorised’ and 
‘declared’ intelligence officers being related to the wartime agreements. Indeed, 
intelligence and liaison appeared to become substantially more formalised during 
this epoch. This came with the explicit development of the intelligence liaison officer 
(ILO) role. Traditionally, the roles of the ‘intelligence officer’ and of the ‘liaison 
officer’, at least in the UK military context, were conceptualised as being more 
distinct from one another.56 When ILOs started to be introduced, intelligence duties 
were more explicitly fused with liaison tasks. Usually one ILO from each service was 
posted abroad to close intelligence partner countries, essentially as intelligence 
attachés. Perhaps the most (in)famous British ILO was Kim Philby, posted to 
Washington in October 1949, and who was later exposed as one of the ‘Cambridge 
Five’.57 In postwar London, an official US liaison office was opened, continuing the 
‘formalising’ and ‘regularising’ processes of SIGINT sharing. While between 1946-8 a 
range of agreements forming the UKUSA arrangement were negotiated and signed.58  
The intensified intelligence sharing process developed during wartime 
continued during the Cold War. This was further enhanced by the advent of nuclear 
weapons and the need for joint warning systems.59 It also rode on the back of the 
twentieth century’s accelerating communications, information (including the 
Internet) and technology (including computer) revolutions.60 Together with these 
developments is the intimately associated rise of the increasingly sophisticated 
COMSEC/INFOSEC dimension, also managed by the SIGINT agencies. For example, 
‘information assurance’ (IA) is currently maintained by groups, such as the 
Communications-Electronics Security Group (CESG), an ‘arm’ of the UK’s 
Government and Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).61 In the commercial 
world, alongside the above developments has been the flourishing of ‘private’ and 
‘business intelligence’.62 As Canadian intelligence scholar Wesley Wark notes: ‘the 
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“open source” revolution has also led to a previously unthinkable privatisation of 
assessment, with a plethora of private sector companies offering expertise in global 
risk analysis…’63 These developments also include ‘private intelligence’ burgeoning 
in other areas - for instance, including within companies with global interests, such 
as Wal-Mart.64 Interestingly, these risk analysis enterprises tend to form parallel 
transatlantic intelligence structures, often including former UK and US defence and 
intelligence practitioners. Going beyond more ‘formal’ liaison practices (even 
informal liaison), the open source revolution has also allowed the growth of 
‘outreach’ between various different entities. Notably this has been most focussed on 
improving intelligence analysis.65 In the 1998 CIA Annual Report, the importance of 
outreach and what it could offer was recognised: ‘CIA increased outreach to identify 
and communicate on a regular basis with outside experts to fill information gaps and 
to challenge and test analysis.’66 Later by 2007, the importance of outreach was again 
clearly stressed by General Hayden, the Director of the CIA:  
 
As the DNI has made clear in his remarks today, we operate in an unstable 
and dangerous world where international terrorism, the rise of new 
powers, and the accelerating pace of economic and technological change 
are placing strains on the ability of states to govern and increasing the 
potential for strategic surprises… The complexity and interdependence of 
these issues demands nothing less than the very best analysis. To achieve 
this we are pursuing a number of initiatives to continue to enhance analytic 
tradecraft, strengthen strategic analysis, and expand our analytic outreach.67  
 
Although the emphasis of outreach is on (or for) improving analysis, 
naturally it also has implications for collection. Moreover, again according to the 
CIA: ‘The [US] National Intelligence Council (NIC) has made outreach a central tenet 
of its efforts to improve the quality of its product.’68 Other sources can be exploited 
which can then be subsumed into the overall intelligence efforts. Interestingly, 
outreach also features more explicitly with regard to intelligence training 
programmes.69 The power of the concept of outreach stems from its capacity to be 
broadly defined (see below [5.0]). This allows for essential agility and flexibility, 
offering a wide range of adaptable tools and several modes that can be applied. 
Indeed, it allows for the ingestion and infusion of information, with the contextual 
details and specifics again determining the precise form it adopts and how far it 
extends.70 
During the twentieth century, the professionalisation-process of intelligence 
overall was further consolidated. The ‘liaison’ dimension, alongside the handling of 
intelligence in all its diverse forms, was closely associated with these developments. 
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(See Appendix 1, at the end of this study, for some of the declassified CIA archival 
documents, which demonstrate at the micro level the gradual ‘professionalisation’ 
process of liaison and its management over time, along with the ever-present 
bureaucratic factors involved in such processes.) There was the provision of specific 
educational and training programmes, and the introduction of legal frameworks 
within which intelligence agencies have to operate.71  
Legal frameworks have been especially important in Europe since the late 
1980s. For the UK intelligence services, this includes having to adhere to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).72 Several ‘legitimisation’ processes 
were witnessed. These most obviously involved special Parliamentary legislation – 
notably the UK Security Service Act (1989), the Intelligence Services Act (1994) and 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000).73 The latter has also incorporated 
sections of ECHR. This type of embodiment helps to contribute towards delineating 
legally acceptable parameters for intelligence operations. Namely these operational 
parameters affect the scale and scope of intelligence operations, how sources can be 
exploited, as well as help to define what intelligence opportunities can be seized. 
Naturally, implications flow from the presence of these types of legal operational 
parameters when conducting relations with foreign liaison intelligence partners. 
Most recently, these considerations have surfaced vividly vis-à-vis the controversial 
issue of ‘extraordinary renditions’.74 At junctures, by adhering to these legal 
stipulations, liaison (at least in its formal incarnation) can be more challenging to 
conduct. At other times, the legal stipulations can be empowering. This is especially 
in terms of helping to contribute towards the UK not forfeiting the moral high 
ground in its intelligence operations, as well as helping to clarify for staff what is 
legally permissible (see below [10.0]).75 
Another symptom of these legal developments has been the creation of 
legislative accountability mechanisms and an oversight body, the UK Intelligence 
and Security Committee (ISC).76 Limited executive accountability of the UK 
intelligence services has always occurred at the ministerial (Secretary of State) level – 
for instance, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) comes under the Defence Secretary, 
the British Security Service (MI5) comes under the Home Secretary, while the SIS 
(MI6) and GCHQ both come under the Foreign Secretary. Judicial accountability has 
also emerged, although this has been eroded through the creation of a separate 
Intelligence Services Commissioner and the Interception of Communications 
Commissioner - posts established by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 
(RIPA) in 2000.77 Alongside this, there has been the introduction of ‘democratisation’ 
processes and greater ‘openness’. The increasing ‘openness’ has been most noticeable 
with the intelligence agencies being given a presence online, including SIS in October 
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2005.78 In 2002, the ISC declared: ‘Oversight of the intelligence and security Agencies 
is now regarded as an important part of democratic society and any future 
developments will be based on the foundations created by the ISC.’79  
 
[4.1]: Liaison and oversight – ‘In all cases that the Committee is aware of…’: 
Intelligence liaison, however, remains ‘fenced-off’. It rests firmly in the centre of the 
closed ‘inner ring(s) of secrecy.’80 In both the UK and the US, the greatest 
accountability and oversight of international intelligence liaison appears to occur 
internally. This is within the intelligence agencies themselves and/or touched upon 
during episodes, such as ad hoc and/or annual reviews conducted by their respective 
parent departments. An insight into some of the UK intelligence agencies’ internal 
UK-US intelligence liaison-associated review processes, or indeed equally an absence 
of these, was provided by the UK Government itself. Responding to the ISC’s report 
on rendition it stated that: ‘The Government accepts that, with hindsight, an 
emerging pattern of renditions during 2002 can be identified but notes that… at the 
time the Agencies’ priorities were correctly focused on disrupting attacks rather than 
scrutinising U.S. policy.’81 Indeed, through the declassified CIA archival documents 
(such as those cited in Appendix 2, below), we can garner considerable insights into 
the types of reviews, reports and other management tools being employed to try and 
internally manage US foreign intelligence liaison relationships at the highest levels 
within the CIA.82  
Similar trends are apparent in the UK context. When undertaken, the 
evaluations of the liaison processes can be either ad hoc or ongoing. The nature of 
these evaluations is subject to change and re-tasking according to the prevailing 
shifting circumstances and priorities.83 Unsurprisingly, these are considerations that 
vary intimately from specific relationship to specific relationship. As Peter Wilson 
has argued: ‘Trusting intelligence relationships cannot simply be switched on at will, 
but are established over long periods by officers who are knowledgeable about the 
political and cultural context in which they operate…’84 Meanwhile, the sensitive 
details of intelligence liaison (essentially) remain protected from the eyes of any 
‘external’ body, including the ISC. Although by mid-2007 at least some changes were 
apparent. This development came with the ISC examining the issue of renditions. 
However, this seems more of a temporary anomaly, essentially following close on 
the already aired findings of journalists and non-governmental organisations.85 In his 
letter dated 28 June 2007, to the new UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, the Chair of 
the ISC, the Hon. Paul Murphy MP, outlined the remit of the ISC’s report Renditions: 
‘Our inquiry has considered whether the UK intelligence and security Agencies had 
any knowledge of, and/or involvement in, rendition operations, and also the 
Agencies’ overall policy for intelligence sharing with foreign liaison services.’86 (Emphasis 
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added). This neatly reflects the ‘rise’ of intelligence liaison and its increasing 
centrality in overall intelligence affairs, as well as in wider international affairs. 
However, eventually how routine and regularised - and indeed how wide and/or 
deep - this type of probe of intelligence liaison becomes remains to be seen.  
As a standalone, the ISC Renditions report has shortfalls. In its assessment, it 
does not move much beyond already established facts. It asserts that the overarching 
US intelligence dimension is very important to the UK, and that difficulties are 
currently being encountered in this relationship, which the British have to work 
around. According to the ISC report, when giving evidence, ‘The Chief of SIS told the 
Committee of the immense value to the UK of his Service’s relationship with U.S. 
intelligence agencies.’ This was along with the revealing claim that: ‘The knowledge 
of the U.S. rendition programme, as it evolved over time, has altered the manner in 
which intelligence is shared with the U.S. …’87 Sir John Scarlett continued: ‘So we 
find ourselves in a position where we share with *** key [counterterrorism] interests, 
objectives and many techniques, but where we have some different methods and a 
quite different legal framework, specifically but not only on the issue of rendition.’ 
Delving into some further detail, in the process highlighting some of the safeguard 
caveats involved, he noted: ‘… it does mean that we have for a long time been aware 
that sharing what I would call “actionable intelligence”, leading to a possible 
rendition, would require very careful internal consideration and Ministerial 
approval.’88 In his evidence to the ISC, the Director of the UK Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), Sir David Pepper, went further. He 
remarked that ‘GCHQ had “never knowingly provided support to a U.S. rendition 
operation and we would not authorise the use of intelligence for that purpose… and 
we have never been asked to do so”.’89 Distinct caps on the UK’s liaison with the US 
are suggested. Yet, how far these consistently extend in practice is perhaps more 
open to debate. This is not least when ‘informal’ interactions can also be involved.90 
Elsewhere, liaison, as an entity worthy of being subject to regular exploration 
through an accountability and oversight lens, appears to be more overlooked. This 
includes by the narrowly drawn remits of the RIPA Commissioners, which is the 
routine case perhaps unless particular circumstances arise whereby the 
Commissioners are specially and specifically tasked to probe liaison interactions. By 
being categorised in the Intelligence Services Act (1994) as ‘sensitive information’, 
that is essentially only releasable for scrutiny by the ISC on authorisation from the 
Secretary of State responsible, several important aspects of intelligence liaison 
relationships in fact remain deeply hidden.91 From the Act, it appears that the ISC is 
only just located on the inside fringe of the ‘ring of secrecy’ and, therefore, ‘to an 
extent has to believe what it is told.’92 Notably, the ISC Intelligence Oversight brochure 
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does not refer directly to the oversight of ‘liaison’. Naturally, the ISC’s overall 
effectiveness at overseeing and probing the deepest depths of intelligence liaison is 
called into question. Indeed, Glees et al note that: ‘…there are still four main no-go 
areas for the ISC: It has no right to receive information on intelligence sources and 
operational methods, intelligence operations or foreign liaisons…’93 The so-called 
‘third party rule’94 governing intelligence liaison can also effectively prevent 
disclosure of the details of international intelligence liaison relationships to anyone 
investigating and/or researching them. This is whereby a second party without the 
permission of the first party cannot pass details of the liaison onto a third party. 
The US intelligence oversight and accountability system also suffers from 
similar crippling curbs on its ability to police the depths of ‘foreign liaison 
relationships’.95 This is highlighted in the ‘Appendix’ of the US Joint Inquiry into the 
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001:  
 
The DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] refused to allow the Joint Inquiry 
to have access to a series of reports that had been prepared within CTC 
[(CIA’s) Counter-Terrorism Center] regarding the strengths and 
weaknesses of the CIA’s liaison relationships with a variety of foreign 
governments. This decision affected the Inquiry’s ability to determine the 
extent to which some foreign governments had or had not cooperated and 
shared information with the United States in countering Bin Ladin and al-
Qa’ida prior to September 11.96  
 
While such long-term restrictions may be reassuring to US intelligence liaison 
partners, the lack of oversight regarding liaison is worrying.97 This is particularly in 
the context of enhanced US (and other countries’) dependency on intelligence liaison 
in the post-9/11 security environment in international affairs. 
 Ultimately, a multi-dimensional intelligence liaison accountability and 
oversight deficit exists and persists. In the process, this raises a number of concerns. 
These include pertinent questions surrounding the extent of review to which these 
relationships are subjected. Questions are also asked regarding the types of 
international interactions open to other governance and/or management 
considerations, such as how could they potentially be better optimised into the 
future? There are few clear answers to these questions. Significantly, this is occurring 
in a context where the intelligence liaison accountability and oversight deficit can 
have important ramifications – for instance relating to the observance of major 
treaties on human rights. This has been starkly demonstrated regarding recent 
’torture’ allegations, CIA secret prisons and ‘extraordinary renditions’. It has also 
emerged in episodes associated with 9/11 and the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq 
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intelligence controversies. Therefore, in both the UK and US, there is ample scope for 
enhanced intelligence liaison accountability and oversight.98 Arguably, this is 
simultaneously matched by the increased need for greater intelligence consultancy 
and strategy in, at least, the UK. 
Similar questions persist surrounding the issue of ‘openness’. In the so-called 
‘War on Terror’ context, government leaders asserted that a higher degree of 
accountability deficit would have to be accepted by the public. Soon after 9/11, US 
Vice-President Dick Cheney remarked that: ‘We’ll have to work the dark side, if you 
will. We’re gonna spend time in the shadows of the intelligence world. A lot of what 
needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, without any discussion…’99 At 
least some of the greater ‘openness’ that governments claimed in the 1990s would be 
curtailed.100 Unsurprisingly, given the various constraints upon the UK and US 
intelligence oversight committees, this accountability deficit would be most marked 
in relation to intelligence liaison, making it enduringly the ‘most secret’ dimension of 
intelligence.101 In the following sections, attempts are made to address that deficit, 
beginning in the conceptual domain with a definition of ‘intelligence liaison’. 
 
 
[5.0]: Defining the ‘double-edged sword’ of intelligence liaison 
 
‘By combining their intelligence efforts with those of their allies, nations are able to trim 
intelligence costs and compensate for gaps in their own surveillance; yet fear that the other 
service has been penetrated by a common foe, and an awareness that the ally (however close) 
is likely to have some divergent objectives, keep the romance at arm’s length. The proposition 
warrants a corollary: the greater the perceived common danger, the more likely an effective 
liaison.’ 
- L.K. Johnson, US intelligence scholar and former Church Committee staffer102 
 
The term ‘intelligence liaison’ is expansive. It can be seen as synonymous with, and 
is often used - for example in the media - interchangeably with the terms ‘intelligence 
co-operation’, ‘intelligence sharing’, ‘intelligence pooling’, ‘intelligence alliance’, 
‘intelligence integration’ and ‘intelligence exchange’. As a useful starting point, the 
nature of intelligence liaison is intrinsically diverse and can be characterised as 
being: ‘simple and complex’, ‘symmetric and asymmetric’, ‘adversarial’, ‘bilateral or 
multilateral’.103 
In this study, ‘intelligence liaison’ is a direct composite of the words 
‘intelligence’ + ‘liaison’ as defined above. It means communication, co-operation and 
linkage between a range of actors, usually at (but not limited to) the official 
intelligence agency level, on intelligence matters - essentially exchanging/sharing 
information, particularly of military and/or political value, and which especially 
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(and purposefully) relates to national security. It also includes usually secret (covert 
and/or clandestine), state activity conducted by specialised ‘intelligence’ institutions 
to understand or influence entities. The presence and preservation of secrecy 
surrounding the liaison, particularly of the details, is regarded as essential. This is 
particularly if there is an associated illicit or risqué element and an intimacy to it that 
needs to remain hidden away, even from internal authorities.  
Arguably, intelligence liaison can be conceptualised as being a covert form of 
‘outreach’. Interpreted as ‘soft liaison’ - and hence less encumbered with the 
necessary operating restrictions and constraints of ‘hard liaison’ - ‘outreach’ is 
defined as: ‘… reach further than … the extent or length of reaching out… an 
organization’s involvement with the community.’104 Therefore, the phenomenon of 
liaison is subject to some of the traits associated with the phenomenon of outreach, 
such as overreach and under-reach. But arguably (at least in theory) by figuring in its 
harder form, the outreach behind the cloak of liaison can be more formal and tightly 
controlled. These qualifiers reflect the requirements stipulated by the 
‘professionalisation’ of liaison processes articulated throughout this chapter. How 
effectively these requirements are implemented in reality across all levels of 
interaction remains debatable. For instance, as Robert David Steele has claimed 
critically: ‘Professionalism and “foreign liaison” constitute an inherent oxymoron.’105 
This is a tension not least apparent in a context where a plethora of informal 
arrangements exist in parallel - often outside/beyond the authorities that are 
technically supposed to ‘govern’ intelligence liaison relationships. Crucially, this 
allows for some more essential flexibility of operation.  
Intelligence liaison has multiple characteristics. For instance, there can be a 
single link (‘simple’), a network or matrix of links (‘complex’). The links can be of a 
formal (regulated), informal, ad hoc, continuing or temporary, enduring or brittle, 
institutional and/or personal nature.106 The links can also be deeper, acquiring 
relationship attributes, extending to a ‘special’ relationship nature – depending on 
the extent of conditional factors, such as trust.107 The link(s) may also be regulated - 
that is, subject to some form of internal108 self-oversight or accountability mechanism.  
Depending on the actors or parties involved, a broader definition can be 
tabled. On an expanding continuum, this includes liaison between law enforcement 
(police) forces, between embassies’ and armies’ legal/defence/military attachés, and 
can include cross-sector/level/organisation contacts.109 It can range from a shared 
and pooled database to people merely talking. Intelligence liaison can be extended 
into the domain of diplomacy, such as being a form of readily deniable ‘clandestine 
diplomacy’ or ‘crypto-diplomacy’ through using ‘back channels’.110 It can be 
regarded as a form of covert action,111 or, adopting a yet wider focus, it can even 
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include essentially any form of cross-boundary contact where intelligence is 
exchanged - for example also featuring in the important intelligence community 
(producer) and user (customer/consumer) relationship.112 
Liaison has much relevance in relation to all stages of the ‘intelligence cycle’. 
This includes the collection and processing (analysis) of material. However, 
intelligence liaison is simultaneously not neatly or easily categorisable in generic 
terms without a degree of distortion. For instance, as it takes place in multiple 
locations, it cannot be sited in a specific stage in the ‘intelligence cycle’.113 The range 
of subjects or issue-areas covered by the liaison, and the extent they are interacted 
over, can also vary. Here, intelligence liaison often works on a quid pro quo basis.114 
Intelligence liaison can additionally operate at the national and international 
(bilateral through to pluri- and multilateral) levels.115 It can take place between both 
friends and allies and, perhaps more controversially, foes. As Jane’s Islamic Affairs 
Analyst notes, the ‘intelligence relationship with Syria [(see below)] is an example of 
“adversarial liaison”.’116 Intelligence liaison is a useful mechanism for keeping tabs 
on friends as well as foes - as the ‘friends’ may be simultaneously regarded as a 
competitor, for instance in the economic arena117 - granting an insight into their 
activities, their future intentions, whether they are adhering to treaty obligations and 
so forth. Here, the frequently quoted maxim of Lord Palmerston that essentially 
‘nations do not have friends, only interests’, and the similar observation along the 
lines that: ‘There are no friendly intelligence services, only the intelligence services of 
friendly powers’, resonate. This is together with the debates surrounding these 
observations: ‘All true’ argued the Dutch intelligence scholar Cees Wiebes in an 
internet forum posting; ‘I do not believe this’, so claimed the then Director General of 
MI5, Dame Stella Rimington, in her Dimbleby Lecture in 1994.118  
Intelligence liaison or its cessation, or the threat thereof, can be used as a 
‘bargaining chip’. This is in order to help try and persuade a rethink or change of 
policy at the highest government level of a current, former or potential intelligence 
partner. For example, in May 2005, Syria announced that it was ending military and 
intelligence co-operation with the US to underline its objections to US policy.119 Other 
examples include the ‘withholding’ of some intelligence on Bosnia by the US over 
UK-US differences on the issue during the 1990s,120 as well as the (brief) official US 
withdrawal of the supply of US SIGINT to UKUSA partner New Zealand after 
differences over nuclear matters in 1985.121  
Intelligence liaison can raise some awkward ethical and moral questions. 
These require compromises on one or both sides in order to work most effectively.122 
The British may reluctantly have to put aside human rights concerns regarding 
intelligence material liaised over that may have been obtained through the use of 
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unsavoury and controversial methods. Arguably, these dubious methods can extend 
to being counterproductive and unlawful, notably torture, and include 
‘extraordinary renditions’ and unpleasant ‘intensive interrogation’ techniques, such 
as ‘waterboarding’.123 Regarding UK-US intelligence relations, in their Renditions 
report the ISC wistfully noted: ‘What the U.S. rendition programme has shown is 
that these ethical dilemmas are not confined to countries with poor track records on 
human rights – the UK now has some ethical dilemmas with our closest ally.’124 The 
liaison may equally be with an unpalatable person or organisation, introducing the 
concept of so-called ‘dangerous liaisons’.125 Moreover, in order to liaise effectively, 
the intelligence officers involved have to be ‘declared’ or ‘authorised’. Thus they 
reveal their identity to another party, increasing the chances of being exposed as a 
spy or being otherwise compromised.126 Both cultural and structural obstacles can 
feature. As the ISC Renditions report remarked:  
 
Despite the value that intelligence sharing can bring, working with a 
foreign intelligence service is not always straightforward for the UK 
Agencies. Other countries have different legal systems and different 
standards of behaviour to the UK, and their intelligence and security 
services have varying levels of capability, capacity and professional 
standards. These factors must be taken into account when working with 
foreign liaison services.127 
 
Realist perspectives tend to compare the intelligence liaison process with a 
professional business relationship. Here intelligence, as a commodity or product, is 
carefully negotiated and traded over.128 The control and ownership of the intelligence 
liaised over, and of the source originating that intelligence, can be contentious and 
complicated. This is to varying degrees, depending on a complex mixture of 
circumstances and the terms of the liaison ‘deal’ struck.129 Similarly to any business 
deal, the final agreement under some circumstances is occasionally evaded, with 
details being interpreted slightly differently by each party involved.130 Insights into 
some of the micro-intelligence management controls in UK-US intelligence liaison 
relations can be glimpsed in ISC reports: ‘The sharing of intelligence with foreign 
liaison services on suspected extremists is routine. There was nothing exceptional in 
the Security Service notifying the U.S. of the men’s arrest and setting out its 
assessment of them. The telegram was correctly covered by a caveat prohibiting the U.S. 
authorities from taking action on the basis of the information it contained.’131 Ultimately, 
each of the interactions outlined above generates its own politics. These warrant 
further in-depth exploration, particularly at this current juncture when there is 
quantitatively more intelligence liaison underway.132 
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[5.1]: Exploring the depths of intelligence liaison: 
This study argues that intelligence liaison is a form of what can be termed ‘overt-
covert action’. Or, to borrow Michael Herman’s phrase, actually used in relation to 
how diplomats view intelligence generally, it is ‘a slightly fenced-off mystery’.133 The 
iceberg analogy resonates. The aspects describable as ‘hidden dynamics’ are rarely 
revealed, or at least tend not to be probed until after a significant passage of time. 
Even then, accounts can be constrained, in part because of the methodological 
problems.134  
Intelligence liaison, therefore, continues to be an under-researched area. The 
writing on intelligence liaison in all mediums, from media articles to the academic 
and (former-) practitioner literature, can be described as diverse and mainly 
historically orientated. It offers an almost exclusive empirical evaluation of liaison, 
contributing towards an overall dearth of theory in this area of contemporary 
intelligence studies. As UK intelligence scholar Len Scott notes: ‘Clandestine 
diplomacy [an aspect of intelligence liaison] is a neglected area of enquiry…’135 In the 
following pages, with particular focus on international (or foreign) intelligence liaison, 
this study aims to contribute towards addressing that shortcoming.136 As Scott 
concludes: ‘The problems of learning about covert action (and clandestine diplomacy 
[and, by implication, intelligence liaison]) will nevertheless persist, as the need to 
evaluate and judge them will undoubtedly grow.’137 A useful place to begin is by 
attempting some generalisations, the focus of the next section. 
 
 
[6.0]: Intelligence liaison generalisations 
 
Generalising about intelligence liaison presents multiple challenges. Yet, despite 
confronting these generalisability issues, some attempts to this end are still worth 
trying.138 Several generalisations concerning intelligence liaison can readily be made. 
Intelligence liaison is important to various processes.139 Indeed, it is one of the most 
effective modus operandi in order to help successfully achieve desired ends in politics 
and international relations. For instance in the US military context, as the US Joint 
Chiefs of Staff noted while emphasising the utility of liaison: ‘Robust liaison 
facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.’140 Intelligence 
liaison also featured prominently in General Michael Hayden’s US Congressional 
confirmation hearing for the post of the head of the CIA in May 2006.141 In the UK, a 
substantial amount of the Cabinet Office Permanent Secretary (Intelligence, Security 
and Resilience)’s,142 and the heads of the intelligence agencies’, time is expended on 
managing liaison. These relationships are all deemed to be extremely valuable.143 
Intelligence liaison takes place in multiple locations. Indeed, even ‘everywhere’, 
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depending upon how far and broadly it is conceptualised. It offers decision-makers 
an extensive range of options of deployable types and forms and functions.144  
Intelligence liaison can be the ultimate enabler. Often it is cloaked in intense 
secrecy staying hidden in the background, away from scrutiny and accountability. 
This feature adds to its appeal as a tool, according it more flexibility and dynamism 
of operation. As John Bruce Lockhart, former deputy Chief of the UK SIS/MI6, 
declared: ‘The essential skill of a secret service is to get things done secretly and 
deniably.’145 Intelligence liaison can be one of the key means of acquiring and 
communicating knowledge, as well as conveying knowledge’s associated power. 
Intelligence liaison can also be a means for using that resulting ‘intelligence 
power’.146 Therefore, in the post-11 September 2001 (9/11) and increasingly 
globalised security environment, it is unsurprising that to a greater degree than 
previously, countries are increasingly reliant upon intelligence liaison.147 
Hegemony over intelligence is vital. For the US, the hegemony is essential for: 
(1) acquiring and maintaining primacy; (2) persuading other parties into a collective 
and co-operative orbit; and (3) helps to provide for leadership and effective global 
management in international affairs. It increases the potential for a ‘rapier’, rather 
than a ‘bludgeon’, to be applied,148 significantly assisting in the calculation regarding 
the potentially most advantageous deployment of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power.149 
Currently, a global hegemony of intelligence power and resources is central to 
helping sustain the multi-challenged status quo of Pax Americana. 
Despite the positive attributes of intelligence liaison, it involves potential 
pitfalls. This was shown by the recent intelligence controversies concerning the 9/11 
attacks and supposed Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).150 Intelligence 
liaison can be a powerful tool, but it is only as effective as those who use it. Equally, 
the effects and outcomes of intelligence liaison can be complicated and ambiguous.151 
This prompts the recommended essential qualification: ‘proceed with caution.’152 As 
US intelligence practitioner Warren Mulholland noted: ‘…on balance we benefit from 
liaison with other services, and that although we use great caution in what we teach 
and give to them, we must face the fact that even the simplest and most basic of 
clandestine techniques can be used against us just as readily as against a common 
adversary…’153  
Despite its importance, intelligence liaison should not induce over-
dependence. For example, international intelligence liaison arguably works best 
when deployed in a complementary fashion, in a supporting role, alongside other 
unilateral intelligence efforts.154 Intelligence liaison also contributes towards the 
generation of shared perceptions. Ironically, if international intelligence liaison is too 
close, or if a particular intelligence liaison relationship becomes too much of an ‘end’ 
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in itself, then intelligence ‘reach’ excesses and deficits become more pronounced. 
Episodes of ‘intelligence liaison blowback’,155 namely ‘groupthink’,156 can result, as 
well as at least contributing to other intelligence analysis-related ‘flaws’, such as 
‘mirror-imaging’.157 In a ‘traditional liaison’ context, there can also be concerns about 
participants going too ‘native’, suggesting the issue of ‘split loyalties’.158 These issues 
can increase the likelihood of some form of ‘intelligence failure’ emerging.159 
However, the absence of intelligence liaison, together with the lack of the 
communication of knowledge, resulting in ignorance, is worse. Not infrequently, risk 
management considerations emerge. This is typically where foreign services are 
given permission to carry out an operation on sovereign national territory.160 
Intelligence liaison involves risk, but its absence would involve greater risk. 
   
 
[7.0]: Establishing the operational parameters 
 
International intelligence liaison can be demanding. For it to function, at least an 
element of ‘homogenisation’ and ‘international standardisation’ needs to be present. 
Usually conceptualised as some form of agreement established between all parties 
involved in the liaison,161 this arrangement helps to foster a foundation level of 
trust.162 This is the essential enabling condition for substantial liaison to take place. 
Trust, too, allows the prospect of increased liaison and related phenomena, such as 
‘jointery’,163 in the future.164 In the case of the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, 
this process is formally achieved by agreements including those associated with the 
UKUSA arrangement. More widely, as Michael Herman stresses: ‘This importance of 
standards spreads well beyond the English-speaking communities and applies to 
intelligence’s internationalisation.’165 While in the rapidly growing peacekeeping 
intelligence (PKI) context, PKI ‘…seeks to establish standards in open-source 
collection, analysis, security, and counter-intelligence and training, and produces 
unclassified intelligence useful to the public.’166 
In this study, the term ‘homogenisation’ means making ‘of the same kind… 
consisting of parts all of the same kind; uniform…’167 or, at least, approaching that 
condition. The term ‘international standardisation’ has a similar meaning, although it 
is not quite the same as ‘homogenisation’. This is because at its most formal and in its 
most pure form, it can correspond to the work undertaken by the International 
Organization for Standardisation (ISO),168 with ‘the ISO’ of intelligence having 
already been suggested.169  
The term ‘globalisation’ enjoys several potential meanings when employed in 
relation to intelligence. Three particularly standout: (1) the ‘globalisation of 
intelligence’, (2) the impact of ‘globalisation on intelligence’, and (3) ‘globalisation 
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writ large’.170 Developed in response to (2) and (3), the focus of this study, (1) the 
‘globalisation of intelligence’, essentially refers to the greater interconnectedness 
and interdependence of intelligence and its institutions, as well as intelligence 
exchange occurring more widely and in greater depth.171 This includes intelligence 
sharing taking place beyond solely bilateral and regional bases, extending to 
occurring on a global basis, often with improbable partners. Greater connectivity 
between the various internal/domestic security agencies, which now enjoy liaison 
networks as comprehensive as their counterparts focussed on exploiting foreign 
intelligence, simultaneously figures. Elsewhere, ‘globalisation’ has been defined 
relevantly as: ‘A historical process involving a fundamental shift or transformation in 
the spatial scale of human organisation that links distant communities and expands 
the reach of power relations across regions and continents…’172, and the ‘de-
territorialization – or… the growth of supraterritorial relations between people.’173 In 
the intelligence realm, overall the complex processes create a web of intelligence 
liaison arrangements that collectively provide a form of global intelligence coverage. 
These then work by overlapping in key metropolitan centres, and by being governed 
by a mosaic of agreements ranging in nature from formal to informal.174 To extend 
our understanding of intelligence liaison further, some disaggregation of the 
phenomenon is now valuable. 
 
 
[8.0]: The components of intelligence liaison  
 
Intelligence liaison can be readily disaggregated. The anatomy of intelligence liaison 
can be conceptualised as having eight closely interrelated, systemic attributes or 
variables. These are: (1) internal influences/factors; (2) rationale; (3) types and forms; (4) 
conditions and terms; (5) trends; (6) functions; (7) external influences/factors; and (8) effects 
and outcomes. More fundamentally, these eight attributes or variables provide useful 
criteria that can be employed for benchmarking in this study.175 These are used to 
accept and/or reject at least aspects of the other bodies of theory consulted. This is in 
order to try and better explain the phenomenon of intelligence liaison (see below 
[9.1]). 
 
[8.1]: Unpacking the eight attributes of intelligence liaison: 
The internal influences/factors are extensive. Primarily, they include the specific 
countries or actors/agents involved in the intelligence liaison. This is along with all 
the associated factors they bring, for example: (i) the nature and culture of the 
intelligence communities and agencies involved;176 (ii) their modi operandi and their 
intended ends; (iii) the people involved – their personalities, their interpretations, 
philosophies, ideologies, and roles (including as liaison officers and defence/military 
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attachés) – as well as (iv) organisational, managerial, structural, and bureaucratic 
factors – such as inertia and ‘red-tape’. As an example of organisational factors 
having an impact with regard to intelligence liaison, overlapping lines of command 
can be unhelpful. This generates tensions as people can clash, making ‘proper liaison 
impossible’, as seen at times in Bletchley Park during the Second World War.177 For 
the purposes of this study, the UK and US are the main focus as the key actors. Here, 
the ‘agency-structure’ debate in international relations (IR) theory arguably has its 
most relevance in relation to intelligence liaison.178  
The rationale behind intelligence liaison usually operates at several levels. 
These range from the generic to particular participant specific. For example, 
intelligence liaison figures as the mechanism (in both a ‘means’ form and ‘end’ or 
‘solution’ form) for responding to the current global security concerns; being the 
mechanism for fulfilling and managing coerced, mutual or similar aims and 
interests; being the supplement to intelligence collection or analysis weaknesses or 
limitations, filling knowledge gaps; being a mechanism for widening access; and 
being a mechanism for implementing the functions and for achieving means and 
desired ends - perhaps on a financially cheaper basis than if it had to be done alone. 
Throughout, the driving desire for enhanced intelligence and security outreach is 
central. This in turn contributes towards trying to attain greater optimised balances 
both in terms of overarching intelligence and security (general) reach and (more 
specific) outreach. This is notably in a directly ‘winning’, and ideally proportionate, 
manner against threats in the form of targets and risks. 
The types and forms of intelligence liaison are again numerous. They can be 
broken down into: (1) domestic – intelligence liaison between (i) the intelligence 
agencies within one country’s intelligence community - essentially more intelligence 
liaison between these leads to greater integration within the intelligence community 
or the nationalisation of intelligence;179 and (ii) between intelligence agencies and 
users, for example, politicians and businesses – and (2) international. International 
intelligence liaison can be further divided into (i) bilateral - two parties involved; (ii) 
trilateral - three parties involved; (iii) multilateral – when four or more parties are 
involved; and (iv) plurilateral – which can be bilateral to multilateral, but between 
different forms of parties, such as the European Union (EU) and US. As well as being 
a form of integration and interdependence, facilitating collective and common 
security, intelligence liaison also involves a business-like relationship. Intelligence 
liaison can be selective or a partnership. It can espouse other characteristics as 
outlined throughout this chapter – often determined by the conditions and terms.  
The conditions and terms determine when intelligence liaison takes place. 
This is done through establishing the frameworks for the arrangements and defining 
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the operating parameters for the intelligence liaison. They are set up when the 
rationale for the intelligence liaison is present. The central condition forming the basis 
for intelligence liaison is ‘trust’. As seen earlier, trust is established when an 
agreement, which is acceptable to all the parties involved, has been adopted, thus 
allowing for confidence building over time. This contract establishes the standards, 
rules and guidelines for the process and/or for the use of the product of intelligence 
liaison.180 In the case of substantial liaison, the agreement is usually formal and 
written (see types and forms). In the case of this study, the UKUSA agreements and 
other memoranda of understanding (MoU) can be cited. The contract is arrived at 
through the processes of bargaining and negotiation. The contract determines and 
regulates the functions of the intelligence liaison, their nature, and establishes the 
various quid pro quos, as well as forms the framework for the homogenisation and 
(international) standardisation processes. Meanwhile, in the defence realm, as 
Alasdair Roberts notes, the ‘conditions that govern the handling of shared 
information are laid out in bilateral Security Of Information Agreements, or SOIAs… 
The practice of negotiating SOIAs was formalized in the United States in 1971 by 
National Security Decision Memorandum 119, which prohibits the sharing of 
military information with a foreign government that has not signed a legally binding 
SOI agreement.’181 Additionally, alongside these formal/regulated arrangements, 
governed by rules, can also co-exist more informal arrangements. This includes those 
more loosely governed by guidelines, which can potentially allow some greater room 
for careful individual interpretation depending upon factors such as precise 
circumstances.182 
The trends range from revealing and understanding the history of intelligence 
liaison through to thinking about possible future directions and scenarios. They 
include lessons learnt from a range of sources.183 They also allow for 
conceptualisation, hypothesis formulation and the posing of questions, such as: ‘is 
the British Empire/Commonwealth intelligence system witnessed in the past a 
useful model for effective globalised and multilateral intelligence liaison in the 
future?’184 
The functions detail some of the operating dynamics of intelligence liaison.185 
Functions include: influence or control of overall policy; the sharing of information, 
operations and facilities; support through training, advice and supplies; clandestine 
or crypto-diplomacy;186 evading national and/or international restrictions; and 
monitoring. Including the controversial ‘friends spying on friends’ dimension,187 
monitoring: (i) ensures that neither side has broken any agreements - for instance, 
through foreign intelligence partners conducting black/unilateral (especially active) 
intelligence operations sans permission on the host country’s territory, and thus 
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making them persona non grata188 - (ii) offers reassurance against penetration;189 (iii) 
grants insights into future intentions of ‘allies’ and ‘foes’; and (iv) allows for the 
managing of an internal oversight, self-policing, self-regulation and accountability 
system – that is, using intelligence liaison to oversee other areas of the intelligence 
liaison, for instance. 
The external influences/factors contribute towards establishing the operating 
context for the intelligence liaison. This includes anything ‘external’ to the 
intelligence liaison, and includes other relationships, such as the overall political, 
economic, and defence relationships. In this study, the focus is on the Anglo-
American relationship, therefore the overall UK-US alliance, and its associated 
dynamics, figures centrally. External influences/factors also include: circumstances, the 
wider international affairs context and its impacts - such as currently globalisation, 
the so-called ‘War on Terror’/‘Long War’, and previously the Cold War; ‘domestic’ 
politics and their influence on the intelligence agencies/communities conducting the 
liaison; foreign policy influences, for example the UK trying to play its Atlantic 
‘bridging’ role and treading a fine balance between maintaining closeness to both 
Europe and the US; the media, domestic and international public opinion, and any 
form of external190 oversight, regulation and accountability system of intelligence 
generally; as well as relationships with other countries and, closely related to this, 
other countries’ influence(s). 
What results from the intelligence liaison is identifiable as the effects and 
outcomes of the intelligence liaison. In analyses of the observed and recorded effects 
and outcomes of intelligence liaison, a form of risk assessment is undertaken. The 
effects and outcomes can also have an impact on the other attributes/variables - for 
example, if an outcome affects the linked external influences/factors or the internal 
influences/factors in any manner.191 
Normally, the influence of each of the eight attributes/variables on one 
another is seen as being essentially about the same. A particular attribute/variable, 
or part of an attribute/variable, only gains ‘special’ or more influence or is 
particularly expressed on the overall intelligence liaison ‘system’ or modus vivendi at 
a particular time and/or in particular circumstances. The issue of ethics can enter the 
equation at several points by being attached to several different parts of the different 
attributes/variables, such as relating to the modi operandi deployed during the 
intelligence liaison.192  
 
[For further explanation, and for how all the eight attributes/variables interact, see figure 1 
below]193 
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[Figure 1]: An international intelligence liaison relationship in operation in theory, 
contributing towards the ‘globalisation’ of intelligence. 
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[9.0]: Analytical frameworks for explaining intelligence liaison 
 
‘This topic is a very interesting one. While it can be demonstrated that “Intelligence Liaison” 
is imperative, it can be shown equally well that it is [no] substitute for other, more traditional 
defensive and offensive source programs and operations.’ 
- Rocco Rosano, commentator on US intelligence194 
 
An analysis of intelligence liaison can be extended further. Intelligence liaison in all 
its myriad of forms reflects the chaotic ‘real’ and ‘constructed’ worlds in which we 
live. It also effectively represents concepts such as ‘complex interdependence’.195 
Furthermore, its spread can in part be explained by the influence of a pragmatic 
‘problem-solving’ and ‘risk management’ mentality.196 As the UK Government’s 
response to the ISC’s Renditions report highlighted: ‘...the [UK intelligence] Agencies 
have adapted their procedures to work round problems and maintain the exchange 
of intelligence that is so critical to UK security.’197 However, the presence of these 
factors alone does not offer the fullest explanation for why and how intelligence 
liaison occurs, as is demonstrated below. 
 
[9.1]: Intelligence liaison and theory, and why it needs its own theory: 
Theory can have some utility in explaining intelligence liaison. Several different 
bodies of pre-existing theories appear to contain significant analytical potential for 
explaining intelligence co-operation. Mainstream theories of alliance and balance of 
power, of bureaucratic politics and securitisation, together with theories concerning 
business, risk and negotiation – even cybernetics - can all be drawn upon in relation 
to the phenomenon of intelligence liaison.198  
However, what is also clear is that individually each of these theories is 
inadequate. While aspects may fit, alone these theories fail to capture precisely 
enough the full complexities observed within and surrounding the intelligence 
liaison phenomenon. This is particularly evident when it is broken down into its 
different systemic attributes or variables (see above [8.0]), and when it is analysed at 
and across all its different identified levels of analysis (see Chapter 2 [4.1]). 
Therefore, to start explaining the phenomenon of intelligence liaison more 
comprehensively with these other theories, they need to be employed in a condition 
of ‘complex co-existence plurality’.  
We can then try to go beyond this characterisation. Once the parameters and 
limitations of these other bodies of theory have been ascertained, we can attempt to 
refine our understanding of the intelligence liaison phenomenon yet further. The 
way is now paved for some more detailed attempts at more directly theorising the 
phenomenon of intelligence liaison itself.199  
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[9.2]: ‘Reach dynamics’: An ‘intelligence paradigm’ that also explains liaison? 
When explaining intelligence liaison, ‘reach dynamics’ also have relevance. Due to 
perceived threats and risks, enhanced intelligence and security reach is frequently 
demanded as a solution.200 Indeed, arguably the craft of ‘doing’ intelligence as a 
whole can be best explained by a generic theory of optimised reach. The power of this 
theory reveals itself in several respects. Not least, by thinking of intelligence in terms 
of its functional reach - and by association ‘reach dynamics’, namely concerning reach 
factors and calculations201 - all the stymying definitional problems and disagreements 
associated with trying to precisely define ‘intelligence’ can be escaped. Thinking of 
intelligence in terms of reach and its dynamics also allows the provision of a domain 
where intelligence and related concepts, such as surveillance, can closely and 
appropriately connect.202 Furthermore, when conceptualised in terms of reach, the 
overall ‘holy grail’ goal of intelligence - or the ‘intelligence paradigm’ - emerges as 
being one of trying to acquire optimum reach. This is frequently characterised (albeit 
perhaps misguidedly) as attaining ‘the truth’ - something that can ideally then be 
‘spoken unto power.’203 
However, some limits are distinct. Due to the nature of the world, at most 
realistically only an optimised reach balance in the overall condition of ‘intelligence 
and security reach’ can hope to be attained. This condition arises as ‘reach 
requirements’ constantly fluctuate over time, and particularly markedly in extreme 
times of war, for instance. Although, the quest for trying to attain the loftier (ideal) 
goal of optimum reach should be the case both for the driving and steering of the 
intelligence collection and analysis processes: It should figure as the central ‘holy 
grail’ to be kept constant by intelligence and security services over time in all of their 
interactions. This is so that ultimately in practice they can most expeditiously 
facilitate the best fulfilment of their core requirements. Indeed, the continuous quest 
for optimum reach should feature largely in all intelligence activities, as well as 
across and within all the domains in which those activities occur (physical and/or 
virtual). This is whenever and wherever intelligence is operating. Not least, this is 
crucial with regard to sensitive surrounding issues, such as civil liberties and human 
rights. This is in order to help towards the retention of the moral high ground, whose 
sacrifice is inimical to any wider and longer-term enduring intelligence and policy 
efforts; and especially to their operation, as well as to any opportunity generation 
and exploitation.204  
Striving for optimum reach has added merit. This core driving rationale of 
intelligence increases leverage and negotiation possibilities across many domains of 
activity. When on outreach bases, this is not least with regard to relations and 
interactions with intelligence ‘friends and allies’, and with other countries that 
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require consulting for assistance purposes – such as either for the outflow or inflow 
of information, expertise or training. Moreover, as an article published in Jane’s 
Islamic Affairs Analyst commented: ‘[a]lthough intelligence links are often conducted 
independently of broader foreign relations, they cannot ignore the realities of state 
interests.’205 Such an overarching rationale again helps to explain the duality of the 
co-operative (‘altruistic’) and competitive (‘egotistic’) dimensions found within 
intelligence - and more specifically in intelligence liaison interactions - as well as 
those associated with the (albeit haphazard) ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ trends.206  
At least in theory, the ‘optimised reach’ balance contributes to intelligence 
‘success’. Meanwhile reach flaws emerge to the fore, for example, through the neglect 
and/or the bypassing of the goal of an optimum reach balance (albeit 
unconsciously). This is notable in ‘cherry-picking’ situations, for instance.207 The 
‘reach flaws’ in turn contribute to intelligence ‘failure’ - either in particular domains, 
at specific levels of analysis, or even overall and more systemically. The most 
prominently recognised failure includes the concept of ‘strategic surprise’208 - for 
instance, due to under-reach in an intelligence collection area. Discernable within 
intelligence failure are two notable reach flaws: (1) Too much reach, namely 
overreach, reflective of reach excess(es); and (2) Too little reach, namely under-reach, 
representative of reach deficit(s). Both intelligence and security reach excesses and 
deficits demonstrably feature centrally in intelligence analysis and assessment 
shortcomings – mirror-imaging and groupthink - as well as figuring in collection 
limitations – blind spots, a form of under-reach – and in data/information-overload 
situations - for example, resulting in what can be termed ‘blanch spots’/‘white-outs’, 
a form of overreach. Phenomena, such as intelligence and security overstretch, can 
also be directly mapped vis-à-vis the reach flaws, and thus can be seen to be closely 
associated. 
An important question now comes to the fore: how can we best benchmark 
the intelligence and security ‘reach’ condition, or determine whether the reach is 
excessive and/or deficient? The most compelling answer is that there are no rigid or 
generic criteria that can be universally applied. Therefore, measuring intelligence 
and security ‘reach’ and agreeing on its extent (width and depth), can remain 
ambiguous and hotly contested. This simultaneously resonates with the ambiguities 
that can be empirically discerned within intelligence liaison interactions.  
In short, the criteria for measuring the intelligence and security reach that 
should be most appropriately applied vary on a case-by-case basis. These are 
determined according to the particular entity being evaluated and its operating 
parameters. Again, the importance of details and specifics is highlighted. This is 
together with the requirement that these need to be effectively represented or 
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reflected in some form - such as caveats or footnotes - in the final/overall products 
(that is, assessments or estimates) that are synthesised. If these details and specifics 
are lost, evaluations unravel; if they are subsumed or buried, they cease to inform. 
Presenting a portfolio that demonstrates the fullest range of the mix of insights - for 
instance through using a greater ‘scenarios methodology’209 - can capture the 
ambiguity involved in the overall case. This is in order to have a greater opportunity 
to inform. Arguably a form of under-reach figures, if the ambiguity is persistently 
too deep and/or is too wide. In summary, there is not enough (nor compelling 
enough) data to sufficiently underpin the triumvirate of a ‘final’ judgement, overall 
consensus, and the decision-cut-off and/or tipping point – especially that sited at the 
policy level.  
Thinking in terms of ‘reach’ and its dynamics in the intelligence and security 
context can be instructive. Some diversification into its descendent phenomena of 
‘inner-reach’ and ‘outreach’ is allowed. Again these closely concern both the 
collection and analysis domains of intelligence. These can be evaluated as follows: (1) 
‘inner-reach’ - that is, ‘know thy self’, which is internal – for example, figuring in the 
intelligence world as any form of internal intelligence management, including 
concerning how data/information-overload issues are handled within intelligence 
and security organisations;210 while (2) ‘outreach’ denotes ‘know others – thy friends, 
allies, opponents, enemies’. In contrast, outreach is concerned with the external – for 
example, figuring in the intelligence world as intelligence liaison (at least in the 
covert/clandestine intelligence world), and as outreach (in the overt/open source 
[OS] intelligence world).211 A form of outreach is also involved in any ‘external’ 
intelligence management, such as in human-to-human interactions. Significantly, 
both reach ‘excesses’ and ‘deficits’ (as outlined above) feature in ‘inner-reach’ as well 
as ‘outreach’.  
Simultaneously, employing an ‘optimised reach theory lens’ overall helps to 
resolve ‘puzzles’ that can be empirically observed concerning the intelligence world. 
For instance, it helps to answer the question of why frequently in the wake of an 
‘intelligence failure’ instead of cutbacks more resources are devoted to the 
intelligence and security sector. This is in order to better address the perceived reach 
mis-configurations/mis-calibrations present at various levels and junctures, in turn 
frequently ascertained by some form of inquiry/review. Furthermore, this 
adjustment is done to attempt to strike a better balance in terms of the discernable 
intelligence and security reach ‘deficits’ and ‘excesses’ - for instance, including those 
evident in intelligence and security investigations/activities and where they extend 
in terms of their width, depth and direction. The intelligence budget cuts of the early 
1990s can also be explained in such ‘reach-scale’ terms. This is not least as they came 
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in the wake of an ‘intelligence success’, namely claimed ‘victory’ in and the end of 
the Cold War.212 Human-to-human spy interactions and their dynamics can also be 
viewed through the prism of the intelligence and security reach theory lens. 
Some conclusions readily emerge. Working on the premises discussed above, 
the drivers behind international/foreign intelligence liaison can, therefore, be 
explained comprehensively by a descendent or related theory of optimised outreach. 
More arguably, in the contemporary early 21st century context, that optimised 
outreach features as occurring on an exponential basis. Especially in the post-9/11 
security environment, enhanced intelligence and security outreach is similarly 
demanded. This is in order to try and strike a better-optimised balance in terms of 
the overall (and general) intelligence and security reach present across and into the 
multiple domains of operation and human activity. Particularly prior to 9/11, some 
of these domains were hitherto deemed more sensitive and ‘closed off’. Hence, they 
were treated more carefully with a greater ‘hands-off’ approach. No longer is this 
type of approach so acceptable in an era of (at least perceived) heightened risks and 
threats, where preventative pre-emption is the dominant mode. 
The trends outlined here can simultaneously trigger concerns. For instance, in 
a disproportionate manner, the intelligence and security reach - extending to 
outreach - could extend too far. In the process, this exacerbates all the associated 
risks of such a scenario. Some of these have already been discussed in this chapter.213 
Furthermore, methodologically, while the extent of its predictive utility might be 
contested, the resulting ‘theory’ that can be constructed surrounding intelligence and 
security reach - and by association through the phenomenon of related outreach, 
intelligence liaison - can still be valuably instructive. This is albeit the presence of 
some informing hindsight being required in some form or other, such as in the form 
of adopting and adapting insights from ‘lessons learnt from history’.214 In this study, 
the theory development process samples from a range of what can be termed most 
fittingly as ‘empirical and interpretive extrapolations’. This allows both the scientific 
and artistic capture of intelligence-related phenomena – in the process appropriately 
reflecting the nature of intelligence itself, as well as helping to dilute any overly-
positivist rendering. During the course of this study, the range of hypotheses raised 
in this section will be subjected to empirical testing through the material presented in 
the case studies in Chapter 5. Due to its nature, the UK-US intelligence liaison 
relationship emerges as a useful example of where to begin locating the types of 
trends and dynamics that this study seeks to explore. 
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[10.0]: UK-US intelligence liaison – exemplary ‘Friends & Allies’? 
 
‘Whilst the fact that the UK has a general intelligence relationship with the US is in the 
public domain, the detailed nature of that relationship, particularly in relation to sources of 
intelligence, is classified and cannot be openly disclosed. To do so, would jeopardise that 
relationship and could lead to those sources being denied to the UK…’ 
- UK House of Commons Select Committee on Defence215 
 
The focus of this study is on UK-US intelligence liaison for several reasons. By 
closely examining this bilateral international intelligence liaison relationship, 
important insights can be obtained. These extend into the multiple attributes 
composing an apparently leading - even ‘model’ - international intelligence liaison 
relationship and its operating dynamics, including what drivers are involved. 
Whether the exact configuration at the relationship’s core is thought to be wrong, 
particularly in an era of globalisation; whether the relationship is deemed to be so 
‘special’ and/or ‘unique’ that it cannot be replicated elsewhere (that is, it is sui 
generis); or whether these lines of argument are agreed with or not - for all its positive 
and negative traits, the UK-US intelligence relationship is certainly worthy of 
exploration. Broadly, they are exemplary ‘friends and allies’, and this can be 
instructive for the purposes of further generalisation. 
While there are naturally some sceptics in the UK and US and elsewhere, the 
UK-US intelligence liaison relationship is generally (and indeed conventionally) 
recognised as being on the whole very close and enduring.216 The sharing of UK-US 
knowledge being hailed, as has been highlighted in Professor Harold Shukman’s 
volume, as the ‘jewel in the crown of British intelligence.’217 Ultimately, in various 
ways it is (and continues to be) worth the effort and investment for both sides and 
their own self and mutual interests. Alongside the nuclear dimension, the 
intelligence pillar is often credited with making the overall UK-US relationship 
‘special’.218  
The centrality of the intelligence dimension in UK-US relations is frequently 
officially acknowledged.219 As Canadian intelligence scholar Professor Martin 
Rudner argues: ‘To some, [the UKUSA] hub-and-spokes pattern of liaison 
relationships exemplified the configuration of capability in the UKUSA alliance, with 
Britain and the United States comprising core contributors, despite an unequal 
availability of resources, and the other partners who served more like auxiliaries at 
the periphery of global SIGINT operations.’220 Therefore, despite some asymmetry, 
the UK-US intelligence relationship is arguably one of the ‘best’ examples of an 
effective international intelligence liaison relationship. At least to some, it faithfully 
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represents the optimum that can currently be achieved in contemporary 
international affairs – in function, if not also in reach.221  
However, the UK-US intelligence liaison is not boundless. In common with 
all other international intelligence liaison relationships, it too is subject to caveats and 
limitations. These set the operational parameters, and at least at junctures also the 
safeguards, for the liaison (conditions and terms). Indeed, these types of safeguards 
and their nature within the domain of liaison were again pertinently revealed in the 
ISC Renditions report: ‘… These safeguards take the form of conditions which restrict 
the use that a liaison partner may make of UK intelligence. We have been told that 
such conditions are understood by intelligence and security services globally, as they 
all use similar conditions to ensure that one agency does not endanger another 
agency’s sources through their incautious use of intelligence … failure to [observe 
these conditions] would mean that they might not be trusted to receive intelligence 
in the future.’222  
Some further insights into the safeguards were provided as the report 
continued: ‘Since 2004, SIS and the Security Service have revised their guidance to 
staff on the use of these safeguards to ensure that no mistreatment to individuals 
arises from the sharing of intelligence, and joint guidance [entitled Guidance on 
dealing with liaison services: Agency policy on liaison with overseas security and intelligence 
services in relation to detainees who may be subject to mistreatment], approved by 
Ministers, was issued to all SIS and Security Service staff in 2006…’ Furthermore, 
demonstrating a need to meet role and case-specific requirements, ‘There is separate 
guidance for staff involved in questioning detainees in the custody of foreign liaison 
services…’223 Vis-à-vis liaison, ‘At the outset the guidance makes it clear that, whilst it 
is necessary for the UK Agencies to work with foreign liaison services to counter 
terrorism, the UK Agencies will not condone the use of torture or mistreatment.’ To 
work around such parameters, the report continued: ‘When a risk of mistreatment is 
foreseen, then caveats and assurances are used to minimise the risks… [If] there is 
still considered to be a risk of mistreatment, senior managerial or Ministerial 
approval is required.’224 
Other qualities of UK-US intelligence relations emerge. Due to the already 
advanced processes of ‘homogenisation’ and ‘international standardisation’ in this 
relationship (when compared vis-à-vis other existing international intelligence liaison 
arrangements), the traditional dividing and compartmentalising national intelligence 
lines can be seen as increasingly blurred. A greater degree of ‘exclusivity’ has been 
introduced over time. Essentially, alongside the bilateral relationship, these changes 
and their stipulations are enshrined in the multilateral UKUSA Agreements and the 
other subsequent aggregated memoranda of understanding (MoU) that establish the 
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contemporary UKUSA framework, and which help to define its current operating 
parameters.225 Therefore, in an arguably ‘post-modern’226 ‘dissolving’ of traditional 
national intelligence community identities and boundaries, the UK-US intelligence 
community goes substantially down the road towards an increasingly fused entity. It 
can be characterised as being exceptional, ‘networked’,227 as well as at least quasi-
epistemic228 in nature (internal influences and factors).229  
Further exchanges take place. There is also the identifiable, at times 
considerable, borrowing of each other’s institutional/intelligence community 
‘intellectual and practical capital’. Practices, techniques, structures, ideas of 
bureaucratic organisation, and lessons learnt from their own, and equally one 
another’s, experience over time (trends), can all be included.230 Indeed, it has even 
been claimed that the CIA is ‘not the brainchild of a lone bureaucratic gunslinger 
[William ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan] but the off-spring of an Anglo-American liaison.’231 
Although, the extent of UK influence here is perhaps overstated. Others claim that 
when times are good, relations are like those of older (UK) and younger (US) sibling 
relations; while, when not so good, the relations are more akin to relations between 
cousins.232 In November 1944, in a memorandum to US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, William Donovan scotched other prevailing rumours regarding the 
relationship between British intelligence and the OSS:  
 
Your correspondent suggests that OSS has been penetrated by the English 
Intelligence Service. If by penetration is meant that we have worked closely 
together with that Service in the spirit of cooperation that you have urged 
upon us, then the statement is true; but if more than that is meant, the 
statement is not true and on the contrary we have greatly profited by our 
working with the British and at the same time we have maintained the 
integrity of our organization. In point of fact you would be interested to 
know that both our Allies and our enemies know less about our inner 
workings than we do about theirs.233 
 
Relinquishing the relationship is not an option. It is an intelligence liaison 
that (perhaps especially) the British are keen not to give up - either for quantitative 
(the volume of intelligence exchanged) and/or qualitative reasons.234 This is while it 
is simultaneously an intelligence liaison relationship that does somewhat complicate, 
arguably even often to the point of thwarting: (i) the UK’s Atlantic-‘bridging’ ability; 
(ii) the European aspects of British foreign policy; and (iii) further closer European 
intelligence, security and defence integration.235 Some Americans, in particular – at 
least at the operational level - believe that the ‘Europe question’ will come to more of 
a head for the UK in the not-too-distant future, thus forcing some tough choices to be 
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made by the UK.236 Others, however – at least at the policy level - dismiss this type of 
‘choice’ as a ‘false choice’ and see it as potentially damaging to all parties.237  
The asymmetric UK-US intelligence liaison crucially nets several benefits for 
the UK. It allows the middle-power-sized UK much-appreciated and privileged 
access to the US hegemony over Pax Americana-sustaining intelligence power. It also 
facilitates substantial access to the vast intelligence resources of the US, most notably 
in the domains of SIGINT and IMINT.238 Consequently, the UK is able to continue its 
post-Empire role in international affairs, essentially allowing it to continue to wield 
some significant power and for it to exert some influence by ‘punching above its 
weight’. As Whitehall official Sir Burke Trend noted: ‘After the Second World War, it 
became apparent that we should henceforth have to make our way in the world by 
influence rather than by power and that political intelligence would henceforth be at 
least as important as military intelligence, if not more so.’239 
From the US perspective, continuing to be closely tied to the ‘junior’ partner 
of the UK on intelligence matters also still has its merits. By contrast to the UK, for 
the US this is particularly the case for qualitative reasons more than for quantitative 
reasons. Most importantly, the US values a partner that has an analytical world-
view. No other western ally offers this quality, as they tend to be more regionally 
focussed. Alongside, there are numerous operational considerations. These include 
access to particular language skills, which are especially essential in the domains of 
HUMINT and SIGINT.240 At least in some areas, the UK and US are one another’s 
most important international intelligence stakeholder. This undoubtedly helps to 
concentrate minds in both London and Washington, and naturally those areas will be 
subject to some ebbs and flows in their importance as time progresses. UK assets to 
the US can be summarised as follows: 
 
Firstly, the ties provide the US hegemony of intelligence power much needed 
access to the UK’s own intelligence power. This is so that the US can continue 
to sustain its approach to the ideal of having a more consolidated hegemony 
of intelligence power, which is global in scope. This emerges as essential for 
underpinning the desired preventative and pre-emptive foreign and security 
policies, as well as helping to potentially best maintain primacy in 
international affairs.241  
  
Secondly, on the HUMINT front, UK HUMINT complements US HUMINT 
collection efforts.242   
  
Thirdly, on the SIGINT front, there is an element of UK-US dependency,243 
and the UK is especially helpful to the US as a ‘back-up’ in times of ‘crisis’. 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 1: Introduction 
I : 35 
This was particularly witnessed in January 2000, when the UK GCHQ stepped 
in to assist the US National Security Agency (NSA) during a period of 
computer ‘outage’.244  
  
Fourthly, the UK helps provide US intelligence with a useful OSINT service 
through the close partnership between the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) part-funded BBC Monitoring and the US (CIA’s) Foreign 
Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) – re-named and re-packaged as the 
(ODNI’s) Open Source Center (OSC) in November 2005.245  
  
Fifthly, the UK remains consistently and enduringly interested in Weltpolitik. 
Mindful of its Commonwealth and other obligations to ‘friends and allies’, the 
UK intelligence and foreign policy perspectives and observations continue to 
operate on a global scale, rather than on a narrower merely regional basis. 
This allows for the frank UK-US exchange and analysis of global views, and, 
for better or worse, the generation of at least some shared UK-US 
perceptions.246 
 
For both the US and the UK, economic considerations simultaneously figure. Taking 
the above factors into consideration, the UK-US intelligence relationship and what 
drives it appears to be easily reduced to the ‘economic reductionist’ position.247 
However, while perhaps a useful starting point, when striving for a fuller 
understanding of the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, this position is an 
unhelpful over-simplification. It ultimately fails to capture the full complexities and 
dynamics inherent in the UK-US intelligence relationship. The UK-US intelligence 
relationship consists of more substance than merely ‘balance sheet’ considerations 
and the narrow quid pro quo basis. 
All, however, is not easily won. Despite all the ties and conduits for UK-US 
intelligence liaison, the relationship does not always flow smoothly. On occasions, it 
can be subject to some tidal ebbing. While there exist broadly agreed UK-US ‘ends’, 
at times different ‘styles’ and ‘methods’ of reaching those ends can generate some 
tensions of differing degrees of intensity over time. This has been underlined by 
recent controversies over counter-terrorism and ‘extraordinary renditions’.248 Yet, 
these tensions are arguably kept ‘contained’ through their management. For 
example, this was seen during the Katharine Gun GCHQ-‘whistleblower’ affair in 
2003-4.249 As former CIA operative Fred Hitz has noted: ‘Aren’t the CIA’s supposed 
relations with liaison services like… the British more important than one spy?’250 Hitz 
continues by concluding about intelligence liaison relationships generally that: 
‘Relations between “friendly” intelligence services will blow hot and cold, 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 1: Introduction 
I : 36 
depending on the times and the issues in play.’251 This generic observation certainly 
resonates at times with episodes in the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship.  
Evaluating the nature of UK-US intelligence relations are never entirely 
divorced from how the broader UK-US relationship can be assessed. Drawing on the 
different ‘schools’ of interpretation present in the literature concerning the nature of 
generic UK-US relations, the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship similarly 
represents a ‘complex co-existence plurality’ of the different positions. UK-US 
intelligence liaison reflects elements of the dominant modes of ‘evangelicalism’ and 
‘functionalism’, and more of a limited, particular episode-linked, minor mode of 
‘terminalism’. Frequently this ‘terminalism’ is most starkly seen when co-operation 
over a specific operation ends, such as over a weapons-system programme, because 
it is discontinued or it has been redirected.252  
Ultimately, however, similarly to that of other ‘core’ areas – such as over 
nuclear weapons - the balance between the different positions struck in the UK-US 
intelligence relationship is of greater importance. Hence they are more carefully 
protected and managed. This in turn accords the intelligence dimension more 
‘specialness’.253 This ultimately stems from there being something specific of greater 
qualitative and quantitative value at stake for both parties involved, namely 
intelligence itself. 
 
 
[11.0]: The design of this study 
 
In this study, international intelligence liaison will be explored further. This will be 
achieved through attempting a qualitative analysis of UK and US intelligence liaison 
focussed on a number of key issue areas. Particularly drawing on examples from the 
years 2000 to the end of 2005, respectively these issues are counter-terrorism and 
WMD counter-/non-proliferation. They have been selected because they represent 
the domains where, both qualitatively and quantitatively, UK and US intelligence 
has been most concentrated during the years under examination in this study. 
Furthermore, as the IISS Strategic Survey 2007 noted: ‘In 2008, managing nuclear 
proliferation and terrorism will remain the priorities.’254 This study also attempts to 
shed some light on the ideological and theoretical, strategy and policy, operational 
and tactical, as well as the individual (as professional) and personal implications of 
international intelligence liaison. These constitute the different levels of analysis 
employed. How this is done methodologically forms the subject of the next chapter. 
 
 
• • • 
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<http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits/ui0202.htm> (accessed: 09/04/2007) - particularly where 
it is noted: ‘Definitions: Some confusion exists surrounding definitions of the terms “information” and 
“intelligence”: information is essentially the passing of knowledge from whatever source to another. 
Intelligence is the end product of a process by which that information is checked and compared with 
other information and is then used to inform decision-making.’; for an earlier definition of 
‘intelligence’ from when it started to be written about publicly as a legitimate subject of inquiry, see, 
for example, D. McLachlan, ‘Preface’ in his Room 39: Naval Intelligence in Action 1939-45 (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), p.xiii. 
3 P.H.J. Davies, ‘Ideas of Intelligence: Divergent National Concepts and Institutions’, Harvard 
International Review, 24, 3 (Fall/September, 2002), p.64. For how the US intelligence community 
defines intelligence, see, for example, URL: <http://www.intelligence.gov/2-character.shtml> 
(accessed: 15/08/2006). 
4 M. Warner, ‘Wanted: A definition of “intelligence”’, Studies in Intelligence, 46, 3, (2002). 
5 ‘What is intelligence?’ in K.G. Robertson, ‘Intelligence, Terrorism and Civil Liberties’, Conflict 
Quarterly, 7, 2 (Spring, 1987), pp.46-8. 
6 M. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.1. 
7 Warner, ‘Wanted: A definition of “intelligence”’. 
8 See also the concerns raised with Warner’s definition of intelligence in ‘A new definition of 
intelligence’ in P. Wilson, ‘The contribution of intelligence services to security sector reform’, 
Conflict, Security and Development, 5, 1 (April 2005), pp.91-92. 
9 See the entry for ‘intelligence’ in G. Evans and J. Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary of International 
Relations (London: Penguin, 1998), p.255. 
10 See, for example, Michael Herman’s book, Intelligence Power in Peace and War. 
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11 See, for example, P. Hennessy, The Secret State: Whitehall and the Cold War (London: Penguin, 
2003 [revised and updated edition]), p.25. 
12 MASINT is intelligence from ‘sensors that measure seismic, acoustic, chemical and biological 
signatures’ – that is those emissions related to WMD – see A. Dupont, ‘Intelligence for the Twenty-
First Century’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (Winter, 2003), p.18; for more background on 
MASINT (as well as the other ‘INTs’ involved), see also ‘Spies, Machines and Libraries: Collecting 
the Data’, chapter 2 in A.N. Shulsky and G.J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of 
Intelligence (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2002 [3ed.]), pp.11-40; see also M.M. Lowenthal, 
‘Collection and the collection disciplines’, chapter 5 in his Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy 
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006 [3ed.]), pp.68-108. 
13 ‘Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) supports joint forces in their ability to rapidly respond to threats 
around the world by providing geo-referenced visual and data products that serve as a foundation and 
common frame of reference for any joint operation. GEOINT is the exploitation and analysis of 
imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and 
geographically referenced activities on the Earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence 
(IMINT), and geospatial information.’ – quoted from ‘Executive Summary’ in US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
‘Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations’, Joint Publication 2-03 (22 March 2007), p.vii - 
via URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2-03.pdf> (accessed: 29/03/2007). 
14 For more background on OSINT, see W. Bowen, ‘International: Open-source intel: a valuable 
national security resource’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 November 1999); see also S. Gibson, ‘Open 
source intelligence: An intelligence lifeline’, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI, UK) Journal 
(February 2004); also related is K. O’Brien, ‘International: Managing information overload: The 
advent of the “information revolution” is changing the relationship between knowledge and 
information, the use of open source intelligence, and the management of knowledge’, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (01 March 2000); see, for the US Army use of OSINT sources, ‘Open Source 
Intelligence’, U.S. Army Field Manual Interim FMI 2-22.9 (December 2006) - via URL: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fmi2-22-9.pdf> (accessed: 24/01/2007); and for the use of OSINT 
by the US intelligence community as a whole, see ‘National Open Source Enterprise’, [US] 
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD 301) (Effective: 11 July 2006) - via URL: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-301.pdf> (accessed: 24/01/2007); ‘US embraces open source 
intelligence’, Jane's Intelligence Digest (11 April 2007). For some of the challenges that can be 
encountered with OSINT, see, for example, B. Tigner, ‘Intel: Oceans of data, no silver bullet: A 
European open-source information forum discusses how to swim through oceans of data without 
forgetting to ask the right questions or focusing on recycled intelligence’, ISN Security Watch (07 May 
2007); see also A. Sands, ‘Integrating Open Sources into Transnational Threat Assessments’, chapter 4 
in J. Sims and B. Gerber (eds), Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2005), pp.63-78; for OSINT in the US intelligence context, see, for example, R.A. 
Best, Jr. and A. Cumming, ‘Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for 
Congress (05 December 2007); R.D. Steele, ‘Open source intelligence’, chapter 10 in L.K. Johnson 
(ed.), Handbook of Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge, 2007), from p.129. 
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15 D. Berkowitz and A.E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence in American National Security (Princeton 
University Press, 1991), p.30; see also, Herman, Intelligence Power, p.39. For the intelligence cycle in 
the US context, see URL: <http://www.intelligence.gov/2-business.shtml> (accessed: 15/08/2006); for 
reservations with the ‘intelligence cycle’ model, see the further discussion of the intelligence cycle and 
the citations presented below, later in this chapter [5.0]. 
16 For a recommended further definition of ‘intelligence’, see G. Hannah, K. O’Brien and A. Rathmell, 
Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform (RAND Europe, June 2005), pp.1-3 - 
via URL: <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/intelligence-security-reform.pdf> (accessed: 
20/01/2006); see also C. Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia 1992-95 (London: Lit Verlag, 
2003), pp.14-6; and M. Herman, ‘Intelligence’s Essence’, chapter 1 in his Intelligence Services in the 
Information Age (London: Frank Cass, 2001), pp.3-28; see also ‘What is Intelligence?’, chapter 1 in 
Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, pp.1-9; ‘What is “Intelligence”?’, chapter 1 in Lowenthal, 
Intelligence, pp.1-10. 
17 See also ‘What does it all mean? Intelligence analysis and production’, chapter 3 in ibid., pp.41-73. 
18 See, for example, A. Svendsen, ‘The globalization of intelligence since 9/11: frameworks and 
operational parameters’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 21, 1 (March 2008), p.134. 
19 Quoted from and for more information regarding these COMSEC categories, see The Institute for 
Telecommunication Services (ITS): ‘ITS is the research and engineering branch of the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), a part of the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (DOC)’ (http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/) - ‘Communications Security (COMSEC)’ (23 August 
1996) – via URL: <http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/dir-008/_1132.htm> (accessed: 20/01/2006). 
20 Hannah, O’Brien and Rathmell, Intelligence and Security Legislation, p.2; see also L. Scott, ‘Secret 
Intelligence, Covert Action and Clandestine Diplomacy’, Intelligence and National Security, 19, 2 
(Summer, 2004), p.323 – ‘For many writers, for example, on British intelligence, special operations are 
integral to the study of the subject. But for others they are not…’ 
21 For further details on deception, see, for example, J.W. Caddell, Deception 101-Primer on Deception 
(December 2004) – PDF via URL: <http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/deception.pdf> (accessed: 
04/07/2006); for an example of an alleged and contested recent episode of ‘disinformation’ by MI6 see 
‘MI6 ran “dubious” Iraq campaign’, BBC News Online (21 November 2003); see also the Butler 
Committee, Report into the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction (14 July 2004), 
pp.120-1 – via URL: <http://www.archive2.official-
documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf> (accessed: 20/01/2006). For a case in relation to 
the 2003 Iraq War featured in this study, and for background on the media and official ‘spinning’, see, 
for example, J. Bamford, ‘The Man Who Sold the War: Meet John Rendon, Bush’s general in the 
propaganda war’, Rollingstone.com (17 November 2005) - via URL: 
<http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/8798997/the_man_who_sold_the_war> (accessed: 
03/02/2007); see also W. Unge and H. Furustig, ‘Unravelling strategies of deception and perception in 
the Iraq crisis: [They] examine the roles played by Iraqi deception strategies and UK and US 
disinformation operations in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and explore the lessons for future 
counterproliferation efforts’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 May 2006); see also D.C.F. Daniel, 
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‘Denial and Deception’, chapter 8 in Sims and Gerber (eds), Transforming U.S. Intelligence, pp.134-
146. 
22 For further information on PSYOPs, see the case studies in Chapter 5, below. For more on the 
‘psychological dimension’ of intelligence, see, for example, I.J. Deary, Intelligence: A Very Short 
Introduction (Oxford University Press, 2001); see also A.C. Grayling, The Heart of Things: Applying 
Philosophy to the 21st Century (London: Phoenix, 2006). 
23 J.D. Kibbe, ‘The Rise of the Shadow Warriors’, Foreign Affairs (March/April 2004) – via URL: 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/> (accessed: 20/01/2006); this definition is also cited in Hannah, 
O’Brien and Rathmell, Intelligence and Security Legislation, p.2; and again cited in Scott, ‘Secret 
Intelligence’, p.324; as well as quoted in ‘Covert Action’, chapter 4 in Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent 
Warfare, p.76; see also ‘Covert action’, chapter 8 in Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.157-173. 
24 ibid., see also p.325 - where Scott states: ‘Lack of clarity about the term disruptive action reflects the 
determination of the British government to avoid disclosure of the activities involved.’ 
25 See R.A. Best, Jr. and A. Feickert, ‘Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary 
Operations: Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress (04 January 2005) - via URL: 
<http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS22017.pdf> (accessed: 21/01/2006); A. Feickert, ‘U.S. Special 
Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress (updated: 
25 January 2008); for US Special Operations Command website, see URL: <http://www.soc.mil/>. 
26 For reference to the SAS and SBS, see R.J. Aldrich, ‘The Secret State’, chapter 19 in P. Addison and 
H. Jones (eds), A Companion to Contemporary Britain 1939-2000 (London: The Historical 
Association/Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp.341-2; see also the UK Special Forces’ webpages at URL: 
<http://www.army.mod.uk/uksf/index.htm> (accessed: 05/11/2007); for the importance of intelligence 
to Special Forces’ operations, see ‘Intelligence’, chapter VI in US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Joint Special 
Operations Task Force Operations’, Joint Publication 3-05.1 (26 April 2007), pp.VI-1-VI-15 - via 
URL: <http://www.fas.org/> (accessed: 05/2007). Especially noteworthy is ‘9. Multinational 
Intelligence Operations’, in ibid., p.VI-15; see also US Special Operations Command, USSOCOM 
Posture Statement 2007 (2007) - via URL: <http://www.fas.org/> (accessed: 05/2007). 
27 See D. Waller, ‘The CIA’s Secret Army’, Time Magazine (03 February 2003); Scott, ‘Secret 
Intelligence’, p.323 and p.337; see also Kibbe, ‘The Rise of the Shadow Warriors’; J.D. Kibbe, ‘Covert 
Action and the Pentagon’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 1 (February 2007), pp.57-74. For 
updates on US SOF and their usage, as they are deployed more widely in the current so-called ‘Long 
War’ context, see, for example, S. Aftergood, ‘Covert Action Policy may need updating, says CRS’, 
FAS Secrecy News, 2006, 116 (06 November 2006); A. Cumming, ‘Covert Action: Legislative 
Background and Possible Policy Questions’, CRS Report for Congress (02 November 2006); S. 
Aftergood, ‘A glimpse of Army Special Operations Forces’, FAS Secrecy News, 2006, 117 (08 
November 2006); Headquarters, Department of the [US] Army, Army Special Operations Forces (20 
September 2006) - fm3-05-overview.pdf via URL: <http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/> (accessed: 
08/11/2006). 
28 See, for example, D. Priest, ‘Intelligence Officials Defend Secret Overseas Prisons’, The Washington 
Post (02 November 2005), p.A12. 
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29 Definition from URL: <http://wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn?s=counterintelligence> (accessed: 
22/01/2006); for more detail, see also ‘Spy versus Spy: Counterintelligence’, chapter 5 in Shulsky and 
Schmitt, Silent Warfare, pp.99-127; ‘Counterintelligence’, chapter 7 in Lowenthal, Intelligence, 
pp.145-156. 
30 M. Smith, The Spying Game (London: Politico’s, 2004), p.11. 
31 For the utility of liaison to counter-intelligence efforts, see, for instance, the section on ‘Liaison’ in 
A.C. Wasemiller, ‘The Anatomy of Counterintelligence’, in Studies in Intelligence, 13, 1 (Winter 
1969), pp.15-16, see also pp.22-24 – via CREST – CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010005-7 
(2005/04/28). 
32 See, for example, as discussed in the literature, below, in Chapter 3 [4.0]. 
33 Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, p.1. 
34 ibid., p.169. 
35 Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.9. 
36 ibid. 
37 E. Klein, A Comprehensive Etymological Dictionary of the English Language, Volume II, L-Z 
(London: Elsevier, 1967), p.885. 
38 C.T. Onions, et al., The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford University Press, 1966). 
39 NATO Standardisation Agency (NSA), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and 
French) (AAP-6(2006)), p.2-L-3. (Emphasis added). This is also the same definition as that cited in US 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms’, Joint 
Publication 1-02 ([12 April 2001] updated 17 September 2006), p.312. 
40 L.D. Carl, CIA Insider's Dictionary (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Book Center, 1996), 
p.348. 
41 ibid. 
42 Department of the [US] Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Intelligence, 
‘Organization and Functions’, Special Regulations: No.10-120-1 (10 October 1951), p.4 – via CREST 
– CIA-RDP57-00384R001000020004-7 (2001/08/23); see also the reference to ‘Liaison’ in Records 
Management Program: Survey Report of the Office of the Director (April 1953) – via CREST – CIA-
RDP57-00042A000100320001-2 (2006/11/08). 
43 H. Bradford Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 11, 3 (July 1996), p.523; see also the further insights into ‘liaison’ he provides in his (ed.), 
Inside CIA’s Private World (Yale University Press, 1995) – particularly the chapter on ‘Clandestinity’: 
‘The Sun never sets on liaison’. (Some other fleeting references to liaison are scattered throughout this 
book). 
44 Entry for ‘liaison’ in the ‘Glossary’ - via URL: <http://www.sis.gov.uk/output/Page59.html#L> 
(accessed: 21/01/2006). 
45 From the Butler Committee, Report, p.xi. 
46 [US] House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (PSCI) and the Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence (SSCI), Report of the Joint Inquiry into the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 
(December 2002), p.428. 
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47 See, for example, as discussed in Chapter 2 [2.1.ii], below. 
48 Since the Second World War, military/defence attachés have been added to, with today other 
specialist attachés conducting forms of international intelligence and/or law enforcement liaison, such 
as ‘Legal Attachés’ – or ‘legats’ – US FBI agents based abroad in US embassies to ‘liaise with foreign 
law enforcement agencies’ and to assist with criminal investigations concerning the US in the host 
country – see Federal Bureau of Investigation, Legal Attaché Program (March 2004) - via URL: 
<http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0418/index.htm> (accessed: 19/01/2006). For contemporary 
FBI worries about military attachés over-stepping their ‘legitimate’ remit, see ‘Testimony of Robert S. 
Mueller, III, Director FBI, before the [US] Senate Committee of Intelligence’ (16 February 2005) - via 
URL: <http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller021605.htm> (accessed: 23/01/2006); see also 
P. Williams, ‘The Changing Face of Military Liaison’, Parallel History Project on Cooperative 
Security (PHP) (2007) [originally published in the British Army Review, Autumn 2003.] - via URL: 
<http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_brixmis/military_liaison.cfm?navinfo=27752> (accessed: 
10/04/2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘It can be seen … that ‘military liaison’ has undergone some 
remarkable changes during the last one hundred years or so. In addition to continuing to be a tactical 
level activity, it has been adopted by and adapted to the requirements of the politico-military level. At 
what was perhaps its nadir, military liaison served during the Cold War as a ‘fig leaf’ for some very 
non-traditional liaison activities. It then evolved in the 1990s to meet the varying demands within the 
operational theatres in the Western Balkans. No doubt, similar challenges are also now being faced in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and other theatres where crisis response operations are being conducted. Finally, as 
the new century began military liaison underwent its latest metamorphosis…’ For management 
controls and instructions issued for the attention of an official of the US Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) Foreign Liaison Section before a meeting with a foreign attaché, see US DIA, ‘Instructions for 
DIA Meeting with Soviet Attaché’ (Undated/c.1977-78) - accessed on 13/06/2007 via US Declassified 
Documents Reference System (DDRS) via Georgetown University Library. 
49 See, for example, Herman, Intelligence Power; C. Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British 
Intelligence Community (London: Heinemann, 1985); and Smith, The Spying Game. Meanwhile, for 
US Intelligence history, see, for a concise overview, ‘The development of U.S. Intelligence’, chapter 2 
in Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.11-29; see also J.M. Tidd, ‘From Revolution to Reform: A Brief History 
of U.S. Intelligence’, SAIS Review, XXVIII, 1 (Winter–Spring 2008), pp.5-24. 
50 Andrew, Secret Service, p.7. 
51 See, for example, R.J. Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence: British Intelligence and the 
Defence of the Indian Empire, 1904-24 (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p.5 – especially where he notes: 
‘…the British were able to defeat the Indian revolutionaries only by developing a complex intelligence 
network on a global scale…’ 
52 ‘History of Security Monitoring: WWI to 1955’, declassified by the NSA 21/4/1982, PDF, p.001 – 
via URL: <http://comsec2.home.att.net/wsb/html/view.cgi-home.html-.html> (accessed: 18/01/2006); 
see also the opening paragraphs of M. Streetly, ‘Alive and kicking: ground-based SIGINT proves its 
adaptability’, Jane’s International Defence Review (01 September 2006). 
53 ‘History of Security Monitoring: WWI to 1955’, p.007. 
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54 The UKUSA arrangement includes the ‘five eyes’ of the UK, the US, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand. For more detail, see J.T. Richelson, The US Intelligence Community (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 2008 [5ed.]), p.342; see also D. Ball and J. Richelson, The Ties that Bind (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1990 [2ed]), pp.1-8; on BRUSA, see: P. Radden Keefe, Chatter: Dispatches from the world of 
global eavesdropping (London: Random House, 2005), pp.17-8; for ‘The Path to UKUSA’ and an in-
depth history of UK-US SIGINT developments and relations, see M. Rudner, ‘Britain Betwixt and 
Between: UK SIGINT Alliance Strategy’s Transatlantic and European Connections’, Intelligence and 
National Security, 19, 4 (Winter, 2004), pp.572-5; see also C. Andrew, ‘The Making of the Anglo-
American SIGINT Alliance’, in H.B. Peake and S. Halpern (eds), In the Name of Intelligence: Essays 
In Honor of Walter Pforzheimer (Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994); C.M. Andrew, ‘The Growth of 
Intelligence cooperation in the English Speaking World’, Wilson Center Working Paper, 83 
(November, 1987); see also C.J. Jenner, ‘Turning the Hinge of Fate: Good Source and the UK-U.S. 
Intelligence Alliance, 1940–1942’, Diplomatic History, 32, 2 (April 2008), pp.165-205. 
55 See W.K. Wark, ‘Introduction: “Learning to live with intelligence”’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 18, 4 (Winter, 2003), p.3. 
56 See, for example, G.A. Wade, Liaison and Intelligence (Aldershot, UK: Gale & Polden Limited, 
?1942) - part of the ‘Gale & Polden training series’, located in the special Bowen collection held at 
Georgetown University, Washington, DC. 
57 Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the Director-General of the UK Security Service (MI5) from 2002 
to 2007, in one of her previous jobs was a ‘senior [intelligence] liaison officer’ in Washington during 
the early-1990s. Meanwhile, Barbara McNamara, formerly the Deputy-Director of the US NSA, was 
‘Senior United States [intelligence] Liaison Officer’ in London from 2000 until her retirement in 2003; 
see also P. Heap, ‘Comment: The truth behind the MI6 façade’, The Guardian (20 October 2003), 
where he states: ‘The role of MI6 officers was to develop contacts…’, highlighting the centrality of 
liaison to their job function. 
58 Richelson, The US Intelligence Community, pp.342-346; see also Ball and Richelson, The Ties that 
Bind, pp.1-8; the BRUSA Agreement was declassified by the NSA in 1995, the UKUSA Agreements 
remain classified to date; see also, particularly for the Canadian dimension, ‘The UKUSA Community’ 
- via URL: <http://www.tscm.com/cseukusa.html> (accessed: 08/11/2006); M. Rudner, ‘Canada’s 
Communications Security Establishment, Signals Intelligence and counter-terrorism’, Intelligence & 
National Security, 22, 4 (August 2007), pp.473-490. 
59 For this period, see R.J. Aldrich, ‘British intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special 
Relationship” during the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 24 (1998); see also Hennessy, 
The Secret State. 
60 See Wark, ‘Introduction: “Learning to live with intelligence”’, from p.1; see also O’Brien, 
‘International: Managing information overload’. 
61 For more on CESG (Communications-Electronics Security Group), see URLs: 
<http://www.gchq.gov.uk/about/cesg.html> and <http://www.cesg.gov.uk/>; for its official history, 
see: <http://www.cesg.gov.uk/site/about/index.cfm?menuSelected=5&displayPage=5> (accessed: 
21/01/2006). 
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62 For more on ‘business intelligence’, see (US) Joint Military Intelligence College, ‘Intelligence 
Essentials for Everyone’, Occasional Paper Number Six (June, 1999), from p.1. 
63 Wark, ‘Introduction: “Learning to live with intelligence”’, p.2. 
64 See, for example, M. Kabel, ‘Wal-Mart recruits intelligence officers’, The Associated Press (24 April 
2007) and J. Goodwin, ‘Wal-Mart defends itself with new intel unit’, GSN: Government Security News 
(c.25 April 2007); see also T. Shorrock, Spies for Hire: The Secret World of Intelligence Outsourcing 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008); see also ‘Government-Private Partnership Key to Defeating 
Terrorism’, The Washington File/USINFO (20 April 2006) - via URL: 
<http://london.usembassy.gov/terror658.html> (accessed: 09/04/2007); see also, for instance, S. Barr, 
‘A Challenge to Esprit at Army Corps’, The Washington Post (26 April 2007); T. Shorrock, ‘The 
corporate takeover of U.S. intelligence: The U.S. government now outsources a vast portion of its 
spying operations to private firms -- with zero public accountability’, Salon.com (01 June 2007) - via 
URL: <http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2007/06/01/intel_contractors/print.html> (accessed: 
05/06/2007); P. Radden Keefe, ‘OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR: Don’t Privatize Our Spies’, The New York 
Times (25 June 2007); see also S. Fainaru and A. Klein, ‘In Iraq, a Private Realm Of Intelligence-
Gathering: Firm Extends U.S. Government’s Reach’, The Washington Post (01 July 2007); see also 
‘Pentagon bans Google map-makers: The US defence department has banned the giant internet search 
engine Google from filming inside and making detailed studies of US military bases’, BBC News 
Online (07 March 2008); see also A. North, ‘Iraqis use internet to survive war: Google is playing an 
unlikely role in the Iraq war. Its online satellite map of the world, Google Earth, is being used to help 
people survive sectarian violence in Baghdad’, BBC News Online (13 February 2007). Insurgents also 
use the maps, see, for example, L. Howey, ‘Satellites track “removed” Burma villages’, BBC News 
Online (17 November 2007). Although the intelligence gleaned from such sources is arguably minimal. 
65 Based on paraphrased information from a non-attributable source [i-22]; see also where Dr. Thomas 
Fingar, Deputy Director for National Intelligence for Analysis and Chairman of the US National 
Intelligence Council (NIC), has noted: ‘We have in final stages a draft Intelligence Community 
directive, the rules we live by, that mandates that agencies enable analysts to reach out beyond, to 
simplify the procedures for doing this, reward people who do it. It ought to be a normal part of what we 
do…’ - quoted in ‘5. TRANSCRIPT: Speech by Dr. Thomas Fingar at the Council on Foreign 
Relations’, Media Highlights (Wednesday, 19 March 2008 [UNCLASSIFIED]), p.21. 
66 CIA, ‘Program Accomplishments’, Annual Report (1998) - via URL: 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/ann_rpt_1998/program-
accomplishments.html> (accessed: 28/06/2007). 
67 Gen. M.V. Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Analysis’, Statement for the Record to 
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (11 January 2007) - via URL: <https://www.cia.gov/news-
information/speeches-testimony/statement_011107.htm> (accessed: 28/06/2007) – emphasis added. 
68 Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Reports: Chapter 7: External Analysis’, CIA website (06/2007) - via 
URL: <https://www.cia.gov/> (accessed: 06/2007). 
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69 See, for example, ‘Education, Training and Outreach Programs’, Program for International & 
Homeland Security - Ohio State University (2007) - via URL: 
<http://homelandsecurity.osu.edu/education.html> (accessed: 28/06/2007). 
70 For examples of outreach events, see ‘Events: INSA Events’, Intelligence and National Security 
Alliance (2007) - via URL: <http://www.insaonline.org/?page=event-ondiit> (accessed: 28/06/2007); 
see also D.E. Kaplan, ‘Hey, Let’s Play Ball: The insular world of intelligence reaches out for a few 
new ideas’, US News & World Report (29 October 2006); ‘U.S. Intelligence’s big analysis outreach’, 
United Press International - UPI (29 October 2006). The US Air Force even has a specific role 
devoted to intelligence outreach - see ‘Biography’, United States Air Force (January 2007), especially 
where it notes: ‘Mr. James J. Kren, a Defense Intelligence Senior Level executive, is Director, 
International Intelligence Outreach, Intelligence Systems Support Office, Office of the Secretary of the 
Air Force, Washington, D.C.’  
71 W.R. Mulholland, ‘Trials, tribulations and some lingering doubts: Liaison Training’, Studies in 
Intelligence, 17, 2 (Summer 1973), p.24 – especially where he notes: ‘Training by itself will not 
necessarily make a better service… The Agent and Liaison Training Branch (ALT) of the Office of 
Training should participate in such planning, although of coursed the decision whether to train is one 
which is the responsibility of the operating division. One of the first questions that arises after this 
decision has been made is, where should the training take place. Instructors from ALT, most of them 
operations officers on rotation, have some strong opinions here… Weighing the pros and cons usually 
leads to the decision to train abroad. More than two-thirds of all liaison training programs are done in 
the country of origin…’; for an earlier insight into how the UK used to be regarding the researching of 
intelligence and its institutions, see, for example, C. Andrew, ‘Whitehall, Washington and the 
Intelligence Services’, International Affairs, 53, 3 (July 1977), pp.390-404. 
72 See, for example, URL: <http://www.gchq.gov.uk/about/index.html> (accessed: 20/01/2006); for 
SIS see URL: <http://www.sis.gov.uk/output/Page3.html> (accessed: 21/01/2006), and for MI5 see 
URL: <http://www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page21.html> (accessed: 21/01/2006). 
73 For official information on the UK Acts/legislation, see URL: 
<http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/legislation/index.asp> (accessed: 15/08/2006). 
74 See below [4.1], for example; see also the implications flowing from the findings of reports, such as 
the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the 
International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention 
Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 66th 
Plenary Session (Venice, 17-18 March 2006) – as discussed in Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.ii], below; 
for an evaluation of law impacting on military operations, in this instance, see, for example, C.P.M. 
Waters, ‘Is the Military Legally Encircled?’, Defence Studies, 8, 1 (2008), pp.26-48. 
75 For an example of this type of guidance in such operations, see, for example, OSCE, Countering 
Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights: A Manual (Warsaw: Organization for Security Cooperation 
Europe [OSCE]/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [ODIHR], 2007). 
76 For more background on the ISC, see, for example, A. Glees, P.H.J. Davies and J.N.L. Morrison, 
The Open Side of Secrecy: Britain’s Intelligence and Security Committee (London: Social Affairs Unit, 
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2006); see also P. Gill, ‘Evaluating Intelligence Oversight Committees: The UK Intelligence and 
Security Committee and the “War on Terror”’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 1 (February 
2007), pp.14-37; M. Phythian, ‘The British Experience with Intelligence Accountability’, in ibid., 
pp.75-99; on this and related issues, see also P. Gill and M. Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World 
(Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2006); I. Leigh, ‘The accountability of security and intelligence 
agencies’, chapter 5 in Johnson (ed.), Handbook of Intelligence Studies, from p.67; see also the 
chapters in ‘Part 6: Intelligence accountability’ in ibid., from p.301. 
77 See, for example, URL: <http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/accountability/commissioners.asp> 
(accessed: 01/12/2006); see also ‘The Investigatory Powers Tribunal’ website at URL (and links via): 
<http://www.ipt-uk.com/default.asp?sectionID=8&chapter=0> (accessed: 02/12/2006). 
78 The UK intelligence community online can be found at URL: <http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/> 
(accessed: 14/08/2006). The US intelligence community online can be found at URL: 
<http://www.intelligence.gov/> (accessed: 14/08/2006). 
79 UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), Intelligence Oversight (July 2002) – PDF via URL: 
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/intelligence/>. For official information on accountability and 
oversight of UK intelligence, see URL: <http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/accountability/index.asp> 
(accessed: 14/08/2006). For official information on accountability and oversight of US intelligence, see 
URL: <http://www.intelligence.gov/1-relationships.shtml> (accessed: 15/08/2006). 
80 M. Hollingsworth and N. Fielding, Defending the Realm: Inside MI5 and the War on Terrorism 
(London: André Deutsch, 1999), p.305. Incidentally, the edition of this book cited mistakenly displays 
Vauxhall Cross, the MI6 headquarters, on its front cover instead of the MI5 headquarters in Thames 
House; see also ‘The “Ring of Secrecy” and the concept of “oversight”’ in Glees, et al., The Open Side 
of Secrecy, pp.128-130; for the US, see ‘Oversight and accountability’, chapter 10 in Lowenthal, 
Intelligence, pp.191-219; see also ibid., pp.292-3 – especially where he notes: ‘The [UK Intelligence 
and Security Committee] considers the budget, administration, and policy of MI5, MI6, and GCHQ, 
but its oversight function is not as powerful as that exercised by U.S. congressional committees.’ 
81 HMG, Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Report on Rendition (July 
2007), p.3. (Emphasis added). 
82 For details, see Appendix 2, below (at the end of this study). 
83 This passage is also based in part on information from a non-attributable source [i-4]. 
84 Wilson, ‘The contribution of intelligence services to security sector reform’, p.101. 
85 For some of the findings by journalists and NGOs, see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.ii], below. 
86 ‘From: The Chairman, The Rt Hon Paul Murphy MP’, ISC 160/2007 (28 June 2007) – letter 
reproduced at the front of (UK) Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), Renditions (June 2007), 
87 ISC, Renditions, p.52. 
88 Sir John Scarlett, Chief of SIS (MI6), quoted in ibid., p.52. 
89 ISC, Renditions, p.55.  
90 See, for instance, the episode involving Katharine Gun, as covered in Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.4], 
below. 
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91 See the UK Intelligence Services Act (1994), especially ‘Schedule 3, paragraphs 3 and 4’ – via URL: 
<http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1994/Ukpga_19940013_en_5.htm#sdiv3> (accessed: 03/02/2006). 
For more on the role of ministers, see official information at URL: 
<http://www.intelligence.gov.uk/ministers/index.asp> (accessed: 14/08/2006). 
92 See R.J. Aldrich, ‘Whitehall and the Iraq War: The UK’s four intelligence enquiries’, Irish Studies in 
International Affairs, 16 (2005), p.82; for the limits on UK ISC oversight ability, see also P. Gill, 
‘Democratic and Parliamentary Accountability of Intelligence Service After September 11th’, Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Working Paper No. 103 (Geneva: 
January 2003).  
93 Glees, et al., The Open Side of Secrecy, p.179 (emphasis added) – they continue: ‘… Note that ISA 
[Intelligence Services Act] 1994 does not say that the Committee may not have access to such 
information, only that the agency heads may refuse to grant it. By contrast, some other countries’ 
oversight bodies have a statutory right to complete access. The agency heads appear to have clung 
grimly to their prerogative of silence about these core subjects, and there is no evidence from its reports 
that the ISC has pressed the issue by appealing to the relevant secretary of state (who could override an 
agency head if he or she so wished).’ 
94 From a non-attributable source [c-2]; see also J.E. Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals 
and Details’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19, 2 (Summer, 2006), 
p.205 – where she notes that: ‘The best that most services can arrange in a formal liaison arrangement 
is agreement on instituting the “third-party rule,” which requires each party to check with the originator 
of data before passing intelligence to a third party…’ 
95 For background on the US oversight of intelligence, see F.M. Kaiser, ‘Congressional Oversight of 
Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives’, CRS Report for Congress (updated 15 February 
2007). Interestingly, in this document the term ‘liaison’ does not feature at all. See also ‘Intelligence 
oversight in the new US Congress’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (19 January 2007); see also the sources 
from the CIA archive presented in Appendix 3, below (at the end of this study). 
96 ‘Appendix: Access Limitations Encountered by the Joint Inquiry’, p.2 of appendix to the PSCI and 
the SSCI, Report of the Joint Inquiry. For the lack of ‘internal’ as well as ‘external’ 
accountability/oversight of intelligence liaison, see also Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, p.207 – 
where she notes: ‘At present, few oversight mechanisms exist in the U.S. government to relieve the 
CIA of the burden of self-monitoring its liaison relationships…’; see also the sources from the CIA 
archive presented in Appendix 4, below (at the end of this study). 
97 See, for instance, J.S. Warner, ‘The Watchdog Committee Question’, Studies in Intelligence, 10, 3 
(Summer 1966), p.38 – via CREST – CIA-RDP78T03194A000200040001-9 (2005/02/10) – 
particularly where he notes: ‘It has been mentioned that the creation of a new joint committee might 
have adverse effects on liaison relationships with foreign intelligence services. Some liaison services 
have exhibited apprehension about our relationships with the Congress under the present system, but 
when the situation has been explained to them their fears appear to be allayed. No doubt the same thing 
could be done if a new joint committee were established…’ 
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98 See also, for example, Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, p.211 – where she argues that: ‘…the 
U.S. government oversight of complex intelligence liaison needs to be improved.’ 
99 US Vice-President Dick Cheney quoted in L. Wiley, Jr., ‘FRONTLINE – The Dark Side – Tuesday, 
Jun. 20 at 9pm on PBS’, FRONTLINE Bulletin (18 June 2006) - via e-mail. See also A. Sampson, 
‘Secret Services: Security v. Accountability’, chapter 11 in his Who Runs This Place? The Anatomy of 
Britain in the Twenty-First Century (London: John Murray, 2004 [Updated Edition]), from p.148; 
Another argument used to defend (at least some of) an accountability deficit in the domain of ‘national 
security’, includes: ‘…Benjamin Franklin once said that, “[t]hey that can give up essential liberty to 
obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.” I note that Franklin narrowed the 
coverage of his maxim to only “essential” liberty on the one hand, and “temporary” safety on the other. 
But even if we read his aphorism as broadly as possible, we must remember that, despite his 
extraordinary scientific vision, Franklin never foresaw the advent of nerve gas, weaponized anthrax 
and nuclear weapons.’ - S. Harris, ‘The First Amendment and Dangerous Information: Restrictions are 
justifiable’, The National Law Journal (07 December 2006) - via URL: <http://www.nlj.com/> 
(accessed: 03/01/2007); for another area where there is arguably (at least a public) accountability 
‘deficit’, see B. Sweetman, ‘US Black Programmes: Funding the Void: Classified projects form a large 
and increasing proportion of the US defence budget’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (12 April 2006); see also 
C.D. Leonnig and E. Rich, ‘U.S. Seeks Silence on CIA Prisons: Court Is Asked to Bar Detainees From 
Talking About Interrogations’, The Washington Post (04 November 2006). For concerns about a lack 
of accountability in the world of diplomacy generally, see, for example, C. Ross, Independent 
Diplomat: Despatches from an Unaccountable Elite (London: Hurst, 2007); see also P. Wilson, 
‘Dealing with the pressure for accountability’ in his ‘Preparing to Meet New Challenges’, chapter 9 in 
S. Tsang (ed.), Intelligence and Human Rights in the Era of Global Terrorism (London: Praeger 
Security International, 2007), pp.116-117; see also ‘Be better at oversight’ in ibid., p.119; see also 
‘EDITORIAL: Dick Cheney Rules’, The New York Times (03 June 2007); ‘EDITORIAL: Presidential 
Stone Walls’, The New York Times (17 June 2007); ‘EDITORIAL: White House of Mirrors’, The New 
York Times (24 June 2007); P. Baker, ‘Cheney Defiant on Classified Material: Executive Order Ignored 
Since 2003’, The Washington Post (22 June 2007); S. Shane, ‘Agency Is Target in Cheney Fight on 
Secrecy Data’, The New York Times (22 June 2007); for more on Dick Cheney and his style of 
governing, see, for example, The Washington Post series: ‘Angler: The Cheney Vice Presidency’ (June 
2007); J. Becker and B. Gellman, ‘'A Different Understanding With the President'’, The Washington 
Post (24 June 2007); see also their ‘Pushing the Envelope on Presidential Power’, The Washington Post 
(25 June 2007); ‘A Strong Push From Backstage’, The Washington Post (26 June 2007); and ‘Leaving 
No Tracks’, The Washington Post (27 June 2007); M. Isikoff, ‘A New Dick Cheney-Alberto Gonzales 
Mystery’, Newsweek (02-09 July 2007); B. Gellman, ‘The Cheney Vice Presidency’ (Online discussion 
transcript), The Washington Post (25 June 2007); T. Jones, ‘Short Cuts’, London Review of Books 
(LRB), 29, 15 (02 August 2007). 
100 ‘Intelligence data pulled from websites’, BBC News Online (05 October 2001); see also N. Hentoff, 
‘The dark Bush legacy on secrecy’, The Washington Times (25 February 2008); see also S. Aftergood, 
FAS Secrecy News, 2006, 119 (15 November 2006) - particularly where he notes: ‘The ill effects of too 
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much transparency are still a rather hypothetical problem, since national and international efforts to 
control disclosure of information persist and in some cases are growing… In another recent book, 
author Alasdair Roberts identifies several factors that are inhibiting transparency, including… the 
growing international collaboration of security agencies.’; see A.S. Roberts, Blacked Out: Government 
Secrecy in the Information Age (Cambridge University Press, 2006); see also on this issue, A-M. 
Slaughter, ‘Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government 
Networks’, Government and Opposition, 39, 2 (Spring 2004), pp.159-190. In some other areas, 
however, the interaction between the intelligence services and the public on the issue of terrorism has 
been extending over time, see, for instance, ‘MI5 to send e-mail terror alerts: A system sending e-mail 
terror alerts to the public is being launched by security chiefs at MI5’, BBC News Online (09 January 
2007); for a document contributing towards the debate on ‘openness’ and the controlling of its extent, 
see, for instance, G.J. Knezo, ‘“Sensitive But Unclassified” Information and Other Controls: Policy and 
Options for Scientific and Technical Information’, CRS Report for Congress (Updated 29 December 
2006); see also M. Welch, ‘Sovereign impunity in America’s war on terror: examining reconfigured 
power and the absence of accountability’, Crime Law and Social Change, 47, 3 (2007), pp.135-150. 
For more detail on this issue, see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.i], below. 
101 For other oversight criticisms, see, for example, J. Solomon, ‘In Intelligence World, A Mute 
Watchdog: Panel Reported No Violations for Five Years’, The Washington Post (15 July 2007). 
102 L.K. Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence’, Comparative Strategy, 22, 1 (2003), 
p.17. 
103 See Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, pp.196-202. 
104 Definition via askOxford.com (the Oxford English Dictionary online edition). This 
conceptualisation of intelligence liaison as a covert form of outreach is also present in at least one 
national intelligence community – from a non-attributable source [i-22]. 
105 Quoted from the response to the author’s question – ‘Do you think that it is reasonable to claim that 
there has been a professionalisation of liaison during the 20th Century, and that it is continuing 
today?’; see also ibid., where Robert David Steele argued: ‘Absolutely not. An Australian journalist 
said it better: “giving more money to spies is like pouring gasoline on a fire.” Bilateral secret liaison is 
history. The future lies with multinational, multiagency, multidisiplinary, multidomain information 
sharing (M4IS), a Swedish concept I have adopted…’ - from an e-mail communication with Robert 
David Steele, CEO of OSS.Net, Inc. and the new non-profit Earth Intelligence Network, and a former 
US spy, conducted on Monday, 2 July 2007; see also the discussion of the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war 
in Chapter 5: Case Study 2, below. 
106 For more on the ad hoc nature of the so-called ‘War on Terror’, see, for example, ‘Friends like 
these’, Jane’s Foreign Report (21 August 2003).  
107 For more on ‘trust’, see, for example, under the subheading ‘Trust’ in J.O. Zinn and P. Taylor-
Gooby, ‘The Challenge of (Managing) New Risks’, chapter 3 in their (eds), Risk in Social Science 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.61-63; see also the references to trust presented 
throughout this chapter. 
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108 That is, within and by the participating intelligence agencies, both jointly and individually 
nationally. 
109 For police (law enforcement) liaison, see, for example, L. Clutterbuck, ‘Developing A Counter 
Terrorism Network: Back to the Future?’, chapter in P. Katona, J. Sullivan, M.D. Intriligator (eds), 
Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a global counter terrorism network (London: Routledge, 
2006); see also texts, such as P. Andreas and E. Nadelmann, Policing the Globe: Criminalization and 
Crime Control in International Relations (Oxford University Press, 2006); for a history of Police 
liaison, see M. Deflem, Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police 
Cooperation (Oxford University Press, 2002); see also on the issue of police liaison, for example, 
J.W.E. Sheptycki, In Search of Transnational Policing: Towards a sociology of global policing 
(London: Ashgate, 2002); K.G. Robertson, ‘Practical police cooperation in Europe: The intelligence 
dimension’, chapter 6 in M. Anderson and M. den Boer (eds), Policing across national boundaries 
(London: Pinter, 1994), pp.105-18; see also N. Gerspacher, ‘The history of international police 
cooperation: a 150-year evolution in trends and approaches’, Global Crime, 9, 1-2 (February–May 
2008), pp.169-184. On the military attaché role, see, for example, A. Vagts, The Military Attaché 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967). 
110 See Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, pp.523-60; for more on the 
‘clandestine diplomacy’ aspect, see Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.330 – especially where he states: 
‘Conceptually, there may be an overlap between diplomacy and liaison where relations between the 
actors are in part antagonistic… There may also be overlap between conducting clandestine diplomacy 
and gathering intelligence.’; see also H.H. Saunders, INR, US Department of State, ‘Subject: 
Comments on PRM-11 Task 2 Draft Paper’, Memorandum to: ••• (5 May 1977) – via CREST – CIA-
RDP79M00095A000300020009-1 (2002/09/03) – particularly where he notes: ‘We have two other 
general comments on the draft… -- Somewhere the paper should point out that much of the information 
the intelligence community needs is readily available on the public record, and that telegrams between 
the Department and posts abroad provide a wealth of extremely useful information on the interests of 
policymakers and on matters under discussion or negotiation with other governments. – In several 
places the paper gives the impression that intelligence is an end in itself. Thus, that the need for 
intelligence is limitless is stated axiomatically on pages 10 and 33, with reference both to range of 
subjects and quality of analysis, and on page 92, in terms of “sufficiency” as an aspect of the 
policymaker’s dilemma in dealing with an uncertain world. The tendency to regard the need for 
intelligence as having no theoretical limits must be resisted. The policymakers and the intelligence 
community should not be exempted from the need to sort out their problems at least according to a 
rough standard of useful applicability of intelligence information. Top policymakers must recognize 
that there [are] uncertainties unsusceptible to any feasible intelligence source or method, and the 
intelligence community must acknowledge that some things are beyond its capabilities. A disturbing 
aspect of this problem results from the thirst of analysts for ever more input of information and 
analytical comment. The intelligence community must realize that it cannot have a blank check, that its 
consumers can use only a finite amount of information, that there are foreign policy as well as 
monetary costs to intelligence gathering, an that its demands for data are properly subject to an internal 
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standard of reasonableness.’ For the importance of ‘back channel’ diplomacy and these types of 
interactions, see Wilson, ‘The contribution of intelligence services to security sector reform’, p.93. 
111 See Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.324. 
112 ‘Users’ are also frequently referred to as ‘consumers’, ‘customers’ and/or ‘clients’ - see Herman, 
Intelligence Power, p.44; H. Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change: Intelligence Services in the Twenty-
First Century (London: St Ermin's Press, 2000), p.xix; Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar’, p.1; for more on 
the intelligence-policymaker relationship and politicisation within it, see P. Pillar, ‘Intelligence, Policy, 
and the War in Iraq’, Foreign Affairs, 85, 2 (March/April 2006); see also the issues pertinently raised 
for consideration in ‘Guarding the Guardians: The Management of Intelligence’, chapter 6 in Shulsky 
and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, pp.129-158; see also ‘The intelligence process – A macro look: Who does 
what for whom?’, chapter 4 in Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.54-67 and ‘The role of the policy maker’, 
chapter 9 in ibid., pp.174-190. 
113 For other reservations and flaws with the ‘intelligence cycle’ model, see A.S. Hulnick, ‘What’s 
Wrong with the Intelligence Cycle’, Intelligence and National Security, 21, 6 (December 2006), p.959 
- particularly where it is noted in the ‘abstract’ that: ‘… the cyclical pattern does not describe what 
really happens… The Intelligence Cycle also fails to consider either counter-intelligence or covert 
action. [Liaison can also be added here to this list.] Taken as a whole, the cycle concept is a flawed 
model…’ 
114 For more on the quid pro quo aspect, see C. Clough, ‘Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of 
International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation’, The International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 17, 4 (2004); see also F.P. Hitz, The Great Game: The Myths and Reality of 
Espionage (New York: Knopf, 2005), p.157 – ‘Except between the oldest and most interdependent 
allies, the working principle will most often boil down to a quid pro quo exchange in the context of 
“what have you done for me lately?”’; see also D.S. Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-
Sharing in the War on Terror’, Orbis (Summer, 2006), p.467 – where he argues: ‘Intelligence-sharing 
is asymmetrical, not necessarily a quid pro quo, equal exchange.’ However, does a quid pro quo 
always have to be ‘equal’? 
115 See M. Rudner, ‘Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism’, The 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17, 2 (2004). 
116 ‘INTERNATIONAL: US-Arab intelligence co-operation’, Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst (01 July 
2007). 
117 For ‘friends spying on friends’, see P. Schweizer, Friendly Spies (New York: Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 1993); M.S. Alexander, ‘Introduction: Knowing your friends, assessing your allies – 
perspectives on Intra-Alliance Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 13, 1 (Spring, 1998); 
see also references to this issue in the Literature Review (Chapter 3 [4.0]) below; see Shukman (ed.), 
Agents for Change, p.xviii – where he states ‘… new intelligence services have been created by most 
of the former Soviet republics, and Western agencies believe they require some monitoring.’; see also 
D. Campbell and P. Lashmar, ‘US Spy Agencies Now Probing British & Euro Industry: Documents 
shed light on US policy of covert surveillance of British and European industry’, The Independent (07 
March 2000); G. Miller, ‘U.S. spies on Iraqi army, sources say: Satellites are allegedly being used to 
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track the American-backed force after breakdowns in trust and coordination’, Los Angeles Times (02 
July 2008). 
118 Cees Wiebes’ claim is from his posting on ‘intelforum’ (23 January 2000) – via URL: 
<http://archives.his.com/intelforum/2000-January/msg00145.html> (accessed: 06/11/2005); Dame 
Stella Rimington, ‘Security and Democracy – is there a conflict?’, Transcript of the Richard Dimbleby 
Lecture by the Director General of the Security Service (12 June 1994) – via URL: 
<http://www.mi5.gov.uk/print/Page212.html> (accessed: 19/01/2006). 
119 R. Watson, ‘Syria ends co-operation with US’, BBC News Online (24 May 2005). Arguably, this 
change in the state of intelligence relations with Syria has been counterproductive for the US – see, for 
example, Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, p.466 – especially where he argues (as during 2003/04): 
‘…Syria has become one of the CIA’s most effective and prolific sources of intelligence on Al Qaeda 
and has provided hundreds of files on its cells throughout the Middle East and in Muslim communities 
in Europe…’ 
120 Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, pp.59-60. Simultaneously, in such circumstances, 
‘…[w]ith new allies in mission-specific roles, the United States found it necessary to shift from 
producing classified information at the NOFORN [no foreigner or US eyes only] level to UN-
releasable.’ – see Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, p.465. 
121 S. Fidler and M. Huband, ‘A Special Relationship? The UK and US spying alliance is put under the 
spotlight’, The Financial Times (06 July 2004). 
122 See, for example, J.J. Wirtz, ‘Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension’, 
The Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 6, 1 (1993); see also L.K. Johnson, ‘Strategic 
Intelligence: The Weakest Link in the War Against World Terrorism’, chapter 16 in C.W. Kegley, Jr. 
(ed.), The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 2003), pp.251-2; see also ‘Ethical and moral issues in intelligence’, chapter 13 in Lowenthal, 
Intelligence, pp.255-273. 
123 ‘MI5’s “torture” evidence revealed’, BBC News Online (21 October 2005); for an argument that 
torture is a form of verification of information, see J. Walker, with F. de Vivo and J. Shaw, ‘A 
Dialogue on Spying in 17th-Century Venice’, Rethinking History, 10, 3 (September 2006), p.333 - 
particularly the references to (Cohen, 1998); see also D. Riechmann, ‘Bush to Veto Bill Banning 
Waterboarding’, The Huffington Post (08 March 2008). 
124 ISC, Renditions, p.13, para.34. 
125 See, for example, G.F. Treverton, The Next Steps in Reshaping Intelligence (RAND, 2005), p.25; 
R.J. Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances’, Harvard International 
Review, 24, 3 (Fall, 2002). 
126 See Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.331; S. Lefebvre, ‘The difficulties and dilemmas of international 
intelligence cooperation’, The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 16, 4 
(2003); see also B. Raman, former additional secretary in the Cabinet secretariat, Government of India, 
‘The dangers of intelligence cooperation’, rediff.com (18 July 2002) - via URL: 
<http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/jul/18raman.htm> (accessed: 07/04/2007); E. Stables, ‘Alleged 
Plot in U.K. Highlights Improved Intelligence-Sharing With U.S.’, Congressional Quarterly - CQ.com 
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(10 August 2006) - via URL: <http://public.cq.com/public/20060810_homeland_stables.html> 
(accessed: 07/04/2006) - see particularly where the article notes: ‘…Jamal Ware, spokesman for House 
Intelligence Committee Chairman Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich., said leaks are “one of the greatest threats” 
to intelligence cooperation with countries that do not want to be public about the cooperation. 
[However, despite these risks,] Hoekstra “firmly believes that we should work to expand intelligence 
sharing cooperation with other foreign governments as appropriate and necessary” and that’s 
something the United States is “continually working on.”…’ 
127 ISC, Renditions, p.12, para.29. 
128 Herman, Intelligence Power, p.217-8; Intelligence is also marketed, bartered and bargained over. In 
such circumstances, the vernacular and practices of the world of business are employed. See also Sims, 
‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’, p.196 – where she states: ‘Although sometimes equated with 
intelligence sharing, intelligence liaison is actually better understood as a form of subcontracted 
intelligence collection based on barter.’ 
129 See, for example, the Butler Committee, Report, p.101 - where it is stated that: ‘In oral evidence to 
our Review in May [2004], the Chief of SIS said that this source’s reports had been received through a 
liaison service and that he had not therefore been under the control of SIS. SIS had been able to verify 
that he had worked in an area which would have meant that he would have had access to the sort of 
information he claimed to have. But they had not been able to question him directly until after the war.’ 
130 See, for example, the Norwegian and Dutch episodes detailed in C. Wiebes’ post ‘intelligence 
liaison’ on the ‘intelforum’, at URL: <http://archives.his.com/intelforum/2000-
January/msg00144.html> (accessed: 06/11/2005). 
131 ‘Conclusion: Q.’ from ISC, Renditions, quoted in HMG, Government Response to … Rendition, p.5. 
132 See, for example, Hitz, The Great Game, p.156; see also K. Tebbit, Benchmarking of the Danish 
Defence Intelligence Service: Introduction and Summary (Copenhagen, April 2006), p.v, no.15 - 
especially where he notes: ‘I also comment, in Chapter 4, on the high quality of the DDIS’s [Danish 
Defence Intelligence Service] liaison office and the way it manages relations with foreign intelligence 
partners. These have grown in number in recent years – a mark of DDIS’s standing – and are 
important, both in terms of the need for closer international cooperation and information exchange for 
collective safety and to fill in gaps in national intelligence collection. The DDIS manages partner 
relationships in a way which is a source of strength for Danish intelligence rather than a dependency. I 
have recommended some strengthening of this role, possibly to cover PET’s [Danish police 
intelligence service] interests abroad as well.’ 
133 Herman, Intelligence Power, p.215. 
134 For more detail on these ‘methodological problems’, see Chapter 2 [2.0/3.0], below. 
135 Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.330; see also Chapter 3, below.  
136 See Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’; see also the analysis produced by B. Raman, ‘When 
spooks of the world unite: The Intelligence game’, rediff.com (21 February 2003) - via URL: 
<http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/feb/20spec.htm> (accessed: 09/01/2006). 
137 Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.338. 
138 See, for example, the reasons outlined in the Preface to this study, above. 
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139 In its fullest form, intelligence liaison can be extended to include information sharing, information 
exchange, information access, and so forth.  
140 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Joint Operation Planning’, Joint Publication 5-0 (26 December 2006), 
p.II-7; see also ibid., p.II-8 - where it notes: ‘Continual liaison and sharing of information… will be 
instrumental in accomplishing US national objectives.’ The Japanese have also recognised the 
significance of international intelligence liaison – see, for example, R. Karniol, ‘Japan to set up liaison 
office in Washington’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (04 October 2006): ‘This will mark Tokyo’s first 
overseas intelligence presence in the modern era…’; see also ‘Japan launches new spy satellite: Japan 
has launched a rocket carrying its third spy satellite, increasing its ability to monitor North Korea’, 
BBC News Online (11 September 2006). 
141 See, for example, ‘Transcript: CNN LIVE EVENT/SPECIAL: Hayden Hearing’, CNN.com (18 May 
2006) - via URL: <http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0605/18/se.01.html> (accessed: 
28/05/2007) - particularly where General M. Hayden remarked: ‘To begin, I'd focus significant 
attention, under the direction of Ambassador Negroponte, the DNI, on the handling of intelligence 
relationships with foreign partners. As this committee well knows, these relationships are of the utmost 
importance for our security, especially in the context of the fight against those terrorists who seek to do 
us harm. These sensitive relationships have to be handled with great care and attention, and I would, if 
confirmed, regard this responsibility as a top priority. International terrorism cannot be defeated 
without international cooperation. … For the same reason I'd push for greater information sharing 
within the United States, among the intelligence community and with other federal, state, local and 
tribal entities. There are a lot of players out there on this one: the DNI, the program manager for the 
information sharing environment, the intel community's chief information officer, other agencies like 
FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. The CIA has an important role to play in ensuring that 
intelligence information is shared with those who need it. When I was at NSA, I focused my efforts to 
make sure that all of our customers had the information they needed to make good decisions. In fact, 
my mantra when I was at Fort Meade was that users should have access to information at the earliest 
possible moment and in the rawest possible form where value from its sharing could actually be 
obtained. That's exactly the approach I would use if confirmed at CIA. In my view, both of these 
initiatives, working with foreign partners and information sharing within the U.S., require that we 
change our paradigm from one that operates on what I've called a transactional basis of exchange -- 
they ask; we provide -- in favor of a premise of common knowledge commonly shared, or information 
access. That would entail opening up more data and more databases to other intel community agencies 
as well as trusted foreign partners, restricting the use of what I think is an overused originator-
controlled caveat, and fundamentally embracing more of a risk management approach to the sharing of 
information…’; see also A. Ward and J. Hackett (eds), ‘Cooperative intelligence’, IISS Strategic 
Comments, 12, 4 (May 2006); C. Jones, ‘Intelligence Reform: The Logic of Information Sharing’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 22, 3 (June 2007), pp.384-401. 
142 The post that replaced the ‘Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator’ role in the Cabinet Office, in the 
wake of the recommendations made by the 2004 Butler Review. The Permanent Secretary 
(Intelligence, Security and Resilience) also now chairs the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and is in 
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charge of the UK’s Central Intelligence Machinery. Although, by the end of 2007, with the retirement 
of Sir Richard Mottram from that post, the separation of these two roles has again been undertaken - 
for further background on these changes, see ‘Security Structures in the Cabinet Office’, CAB/067-07 
(25 July 2007) - via URL: 
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/newsroom/news_releases/2007/070725_security.aspx> (accessed: 
05/11/2007); for more on the Permanent Secretary, Intelligence, Security and Resilience role, see, for 
example, ISC, Annual Report 2006-2007 (January 2008), p.22. 
143 Based on paraphrased information from a non-attributable source [c-8]; see also D.I. McKeeby, 
‘International Intelligence Exchange Top Priority, Says Hayden’, The Washington File/USINFO (18 
May 2006) - via URL: <http://london.usembassy.gov/terror668.html> (accessed: 09/04/2007); see also 
G. Tenet (with B. Harlow), At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA (New York: 
HarperCollins, 2007), p.34 – particularly where he noted: ‘Another big part of the DCI’s [Director of 
Central Intelligence] role was to maintain contact with the heads of foreign intelligence services. I met 
with visiting senior security officials from just about every country imaginable. Most countries had 
multiple intelligence services, and so I would need to be in touch with various sets of people from the 
same country… [including] the British MI-5 and MI-6…’ 
144 See below [8.0] for a breakdown of the intelligence liaison phenomenon into its eight components, 
of which types and forms, and functions are two. 
145 Quoted in Scott, ‘Secret Intelligence’, p.322; see also Sir David Omand: ‘…there is no way that you 
can have effective secret agencies if you allow their sources and methods to become publicly 
known…’, quoted from Presenter: (Professor) Peter Hennessy, ‘Analysis: Secrets and Mysteries’, BBC 
Radio 4 Current Affairs (Broadcast date: 19/04/2007); see also the essays in P. Hennessy (ed.), The 
New Protective State: Government, Intelligence and Terrorism (London: Continuum, 2007); for an 
example of similar political equality and accountability conundrums faced in other areas of politics, see 
H. Agné, ‘A Dogma of Democratic Theory and Globalization: Why Politics Need not Include 
Everyone it Affects’, European Journal of International Relations, 12, 3 (2006), pp.433-458. 
146 For ‘intelligence power’, see former UK intelligence practitioner Michael Herman’s book 
Intelligence Power in Peace and War. 
147 For increased US dependence on intelligence liaison, see, for instance, ‘Secretary Rice Interview 
with James Rosen of Fox News Channel’, States News Service [information released by the US 
Department of State] (10 July 2005) - particularly where it is noted: ‘QUESTION: How extensive has 
North Korea's provision of nuclear technology to Iran been? SECRETARY RICE: Well, I can’t really 
answer that with any precision. I think it’s well known that we have concerns about North Korea’s 
provision of certainly missile technology broadly across the world, and worries about what else may be 
transferred. But this is the reason that we need to enhance our intelligence cooperation with others, 
that we do need to rely on the Proliferation Security Initiative, and that it has been useful to have the 
A.Q. Khan network wrapped up…’ (Emphasis added). 
148 See, for example, D. Omand, ‘Reflections on Secret Intelligence’, Gresham College Transcript (20 
October 2005). 
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149 For more on ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power, and the importance of ‘soft’ power, see R.O. Keohane and J.S. 
Nye, Jr., ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’, Foreign Affairs, 77, 5 
(September/October 1998); J.S. Nye, Jr., ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science 
Quarterly, 119, 2 (2004); and J.S. Nye, Jr., ‘The Decline of America’s Soft Power’, Foreign Affairs, 
83, 3 (May 2004); J.S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (NY: 
PublicAffairs, 2004); see also the definition ‘Hard/Soft Power’ in A. Mooney and B. Evans (eds), 
Globalization: The Key Concepts (London: Routledge/Key Guides, 2007), p.120. On ‘hard power’, see 
M. O’Hanlon and K.M. Campbell, Hard Power: The New Politics of National Security (NY: Basic 
Books, 2006). 
150 For further detail, see the case studies in Chapter 5 below. 
151 See Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar’, p.17; see also Lefebvre, ‘The difficulties and dilemmas of 
international intelligence cooperation’. 
152 See also Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, p.468 – especially where he notes: ‘Nowhere is “trust, 
but verify” as important as in intelligence-sharing relationships.’  
153 Mulholland, ‘Trials, tribulations and some lingering doubts: Liaison Training’, p.23. 
154 See the ‘recommendation’ made in the US National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States of America, 9/11 Commission Report (22/07/2004), p.415 – PDF via URL: 
<http://www.9-11commission.gov/> (accessed: 09/2005); for intelligence gathering efforts see, for 
example, K. O’Brien and J. Nusbaum, ‘Intelligence gathering on asymmetric threats – PART ONE’, 
Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 October 2000) and ‘Intelligence collection for asymmetric threats – 
PART TWO’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 November 2000), particularly the sub-sections titled ‘Co-
operative intelligence’ and ‘A joint effort’; see also under the heading ‘Counter-HUMINT’ in 
Counterintelligence Capabilities (c. 1 March 1978) – via CREST – CIA-
RDP83M00171R000200070003-6 (2005/03/30) – especially where it notes: ‘Foreign liaison – 
exploitation of friendly services to support our operations.’ 
155 ‘Blowback’ can be readily defined: 
The word ‘blowback’ originally stems from poison gas warfare, covering the times when, 
for example, there was a sudden unforeseen change in the uncontrollable wind direction 
that would blow back the poison gas onto the side that had deployed the gas in the first 
place. Had the decision-makers foreseen the fuller scope, extent and (at least in some cases) 
enduring nature of the negative consequences, and had a better understanding of, or had 
taken into account more fully, the action’s highly complex operating context and its 
controllable and uncontrollable parameters, all these factors might have helped change their 
mind as to whether or not to pursue or continue pursuing the action.  
‘Blowback’ includes the unforeseen, certainly unintended, even opposite to what 
was intended, negative consequences – at times stemming from earlier actions carried out 
in a context where detrimentally the operational parameters were little understood or 
acknowledged - and their return and ‘dividend’, and the negative repercussions and fallout 
from all these shortcomings and ‘mistakes’, that can now be seen to be being revisited upon 
those who initiated the action in the first place.  
‘Blowback’ is additionally seen as cumulative over time, and in the intelligence 
liaison context can include episodes of ‘group-think’, when it can be argued that sharing is 
sometimes detrimentally too complete and unquestioning goes too far. ‘Blowback’ also 
includes episodes when intelligence from ‘A’ saying ‘x’ is shared with ‘B’, who then shares 
it with ‘C’, who then in turn shares it back with ‘A’. If ‘A’ is not fully aware of the origin 
and path of the intelligence saying ‘x’ obtained from ‘C’, ‘A’ might mistakenly think that it 
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has another collaborating source confirming ‘x’. ‘Blowback’ is most closely associated with 
the ‘covert action’ element of intelligence generally and the ‘covert action’ characteristic of 
intelligence liaison.  
 
For more on ‘blowback’ (especially in a foreign policy context), see C. Johnson, Blowback: The Costs 
and Consequences of American Empire (London: Time Warner Paperbacks, 2002); also for the 
‘dangers of a debased collective mentality, tenuous grasp of history’ and related issues, see Wark, 
‘Introduction: “Learning to live with intelligence”’; for more on the importance of knowing history in 
the intelligence context, see C. Andrew, ‘Intelligence analysis needs to look backwards before looking 
forward’, History & Policy (June 2004); R. Popplewell, ‘“Lacking Intelligence”: Some Reflections on 
Recent Approaches to British Counter-Insurgency, 1900-1960’, Intelligence and National Security, 10, 
4 (October 1995), pp.336-52. 
156 The term ‘groupthink’ dates from 1972 and is attributed to the psychologist Irving Janis. ‘The 
“group think” theory of error defines a form of decision making characterised by uncritical acceptance 
of a prevailing point of view. Contradictory evidence is often discarded and the group’s policies are 
rationalised collectively…’ – see I. Davis and A. Persbo, ‘After the Butler Report: Time to take on the 
Group Think in Washington and London’, BASIC Papers: Occasional Papers on International 
Security Policy, 46 (July 2004) – via URL: <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Papers/BP46.htm> 
(accessed: 07/04/2006); see also C. Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003), pp.115-116. 
157 For more on ‘mirror-imaging’, see, for instance, under sub-heading ‘Averting Strategic Surprise 
through Alternative Analysis’ in J. Davis, Sherman Kent Center, ‘Improving CIA Analytic 
Performance: Strategic Warning’, Occasional Papers, 1, 1 (The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence 
Analysis, September 2002), particularly where the article notes: ‘One of the main cognitive traps 
analysts must overcome is mirror-imaging—estimating the risk-benefit calculations of a foreign 
government or non-state group based on what would make sense in a US or Western Europe context…’ 
- via URL: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/strategic_warning_kent.htm> (accessed: 
02/03/2007); see also as characterised by former US Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for 
Analysis and Production, Mark Lowenthal in his Intelligence, p.8. 
158 See, for example, the concerns raised in US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Electronic Warfare’, Joint 
Publication 3-13.1 (25 January 2007), p.V-2 - via URL: <http://www.fas.org/> (accessed: 14/06/2007). 
159 On ‘intelligence failure’, see, for example, ‘Think Point 14.1: Intelligence failure or policy failure?’ 
in Taylor, ‘The Role of Intelligence in National Security’, p.256 – especially where he notes: ‘The 
phrase “intelligence failure” is widely used but minimally understood. One of the frustrating facts of 
life faced by intelligence agencies in any country is that they are, in one sense, always in a “lose-lose” 
situation. The phrase “policy failure” is seldom heard, while the phrase “intelligence failure” is heard 
with increasing frequency…’; see also ‘What does it all mean? Intelligence analysis and production’, 
chapter 3 in Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent Warfare, pp.41-73; see also ‘Analysis’, chapter 6 in 
Lowenthal, Intelligence, pp.109-144. 
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160 See also, for instance, some of the points raised in B.J. Gerber, ‘Disaster Management in the United 
States: Examining Key Political and Policy Challenges’, The Policy Studies Journal, 35, 2 (2007), 
pp.227-238. For more on the ‘risk’ factor, see below. 
161 See, for example, Rimington, ‘Security and Democracy – is there a conflict?’ – where she stated 
that: ‘We developed links with a number of countries in the former Warsaw Pact – once we were 
satisfied that democracy had taken hold and espionage against us had ceased. Together with our sister 
service SIS, we provided advice and support for the reorganised and reoriented security services, 
particularly to help them establish a democratic framework for their work. We also began to exchange 
information on areas where there were shared concerns – crucially in countering terrorism…’ 
162 ‘Trust’ has an expansive definition, being deployable as a noun or a verb, engendering a broad 
meaning - see, for example, R. Allen (ed.), The Penguin English Dictionary (London: Penguin, 2002), 
p.960. ‘Trust’ is also highly ‘subjective’, relying heavily on the interpretation of those parties involved 
in the relationship. ‘Trust’ is in turn generated by the presence of the existence of specific ‘objective’ 
criteria or ‘conditions’ essentially addressing security and counter-intelligence anxieties – for example, 
as laid out in a ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ (MoU) and/or a logically named ‘security agreement’ 
- and their agreed observation by all parties involved during a particular set of circumstances or 
activities – such as intelligence sharing. ‘Trust’ can instantly be broken, while it takes a longer time 
period to become gradually established, as the assessment of the degree of ‘risk’ involved through 
interactions with the other party or parties has to be more clearly tested and ascertained over time. 
Meanwhile, in the world of business, that also has relevance to the intelligence world: ‘Trust has been 
defined as the willingness to become vulnerable to the actions of another party... In general, when 
individuals and organizations have trust in their partners, they become willing to engage in 
collaborative action with them despite the presence of risk that is contingent on the other party’s less 
than fully controllable behaviour. The need for risk-taking and trust are central to all business 
activities.’ - A.K. Gupta and M. Becerra, ‘Impact of Strategic Context and Inter-Unit Trust on 
Knowledge Flows within the Multinational Corporation’ chapter 2 in B. McKern (ed.), Managing the 
Global Network Corporation (London: Routledge, 2003), p.25; see also M. Lubell, ‘Familiarity Breeds 
Trust: Collective Action in a Policy Domain’, The Journal of Politics, 69, 1 (February 2007), pp.237–
250; see also see also C. Black, ‘The importance of independence: Trust is crucial in intelligence work 
- and trust is what the intelligence services have forfeited as a result of the Iraq fiasco’, commentisfree, 
The Guardian (16 November 2006) - via URL: 
 <http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/crispin_black/2006/11/post_642.html> (accessed: 06/02/2007); 
see also ‘Conceptualising Trust’ in I. Van der Kloet, ‘Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon 
Against Terrorism?’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 17, 4 (December 2006), p.424; for more on the 
issue of trust, see also, for example, A. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton 
University Press, 2005); see also US Government, National Strategy for Information Sharing (October 
2007), p.10 - where it refers to the ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Among 
other things, the law called for the creation of the ISE [Information Sharing Environment] to enable 
trusted partnerships among all levels of government, the private sector, and our foreign partners, in 
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order to more effectively detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the effects of terrorism against 
the territory, people, and interests of the United States.’ 
163 The term ‘jointery’ is used to describe the joining up of the three UK military services – the army, 
air force, and navy – in response to the trend that ‘military power has been increasingly recognised as a 
unity…’ - see M. Herman, ‘Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology and Intelligence Change’, 
Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (Winter, 2003), p.51. 
164 See, for example, Sqn Ldr S. Gardner, ‘Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – Coalition Operations’, 
Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, 36 (2006), p.30 – particularly where she notes: ‘… the 
sharing of information is at the centre of the relationship of trust that is needed in a coalition…’ 
165 M. Herman, ‘Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001’, chapter 12 in L. Scott and P.D. Jackson 
(eds), Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows (London: 
Routledge, 2004), p.187; see also, for example, under heading ‘Sharing Information with Foreign 
Partners’ in US Government, National Strategy for Information Sharing, pp.25-26 - where it states: 
‘The strategic objectives for sharing information with foreign partners can be broadly 
summarized as follows: 
•  Expanding and facilitating the appropriate and timely sharing of terrorism-related 
information between the United States and our foreign partners; 
•  Ensuring that exchanges of information between the United States and foreign 
governments are accompanied by proper and carefully calibrated security requirements; 
•  Ensuring that information received by Federal agencies from a foreign government 
under a sharing arrangement: (1) is provided to appropriate subject matter experts for 
interpretation, evaluation, and analysis; and (2) can be disseminated and used to 
advance our Nation’s counterterrorism objectives; 
•  Refining and drawing upon sets of best practices and common standards in negotiating 
sharing arrangements with foreign governments; and 
•  Developing standards and practices to verify that sharing arrangements with foreign 
governments appropriately consider and protect the information privacy and other legal 
rights of Americans.’ (p.26). 
 
166 Quoted from opening paragraphs of D. Carment and M. Rudner (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence: 
New Players, Extended Boundaries (London: Routledge, 2006); see also ibid., p.1 - where they state: 
‘PKI is fundamental because, for the past five decades, peacekeeping and peace enforcement 
operations have represented the predominant international deployment of most armed forces.’; see also 
the Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada, ‘Peacekeeping Intelligence (PKI)’ website via URL: 
<http://www.carleton.ca/csds/pki/> (accessed: 05/01/2007); see also A.M. Fitz-Gerald, ‘Linkages 
between Security Sector Reform and Peacekeeping Intelligence’, Journal of Security Sector 
Management, 1, 1 (March 2003); see also R.D. Steele, ‘Foreign Liaison and Intelligence Reform: Still 
in Denial’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 20, 1 (2007), p.167 – where 
he states: ‘Bottom-up collective public intelligence is here to stay, and the new standard, defined by the 
Swedish Ministry of Defence, is Multinational, Multiagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain 
Information Sharing (M4IS). As I note in on the inside flap of my latest book, “Sharing, not secrecy, is 
the operative principle.”…’; for another argument concerning the importance of standards, and their 
maintenance generally in the intelligence and security domain, see the evidence to the ISC from the 
former DG of MI5, Eliza Manningham-Buller, especially where she noted: ‘[Maintaining standards] is 
incredibly important because people get access to secrets and responsibility and the capacity to make a 
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major [mistake] very early on…’ - quoted in ISC, Annual Report 2006-2007 (January 2008), p.8; for 
the importance of standards and their utility across the US intelligence community, see, for example, 
ODNI, ‘Common Terrorism Information Sharing Standards (CTISS) Program’, Information Sharing 
Environment Administrative Memoranda (31 October 2007). 
167 J. Swannell (ed.), Oxford Modern English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.508; see 
also the definition provided in Mooney and Evans (eds), Globalization, pp.123-4. 
168 For more information, see the ISO website at URL: <http://www.iso.org/>. 
169 See R.D. Steele, ‘Information Peacekeeping & the Future of Intelligence: “The United Nations, 
Smart Mobs, & the Seven Tribes”’, chapter 13 in B. De Jong, et al. (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence: 
Emerging Concepts for the Future (Oakton, Virginia: OSS International Press, 2003), p.201, p.208; for 
an updated version of this chapter, see R.D. Steele, ‘Information Peacekeeping and the Future of 
Intelligence’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 17, 2 (2004), pp.265-285. 
170 For further detail on each of these, see, for example, A. Svendsen, ‘Connecting intelligence and 
theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations’, Intelligence and National Security 
(forthcoming, 2009). 
171 The literature on globalisation is extensive and rapidly continues to grow. Some useful texts 
include: R. Scruton, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (London: 
Continuum, 2002); J. Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents (London: Penguin, 2002); A. Giddens, 
Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping Our Lives (London: Profile, 2002); D. Held and A. 
McGrew, Governing Globalization: Power, Authority and Global Governance (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell, 2002); A. McGrew, ‘Globalization and global politics’, chapter 1 in J. Baylis and S. Smith 
(eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford 
University Press, 2005 [3ed.]), p.19; J.A. Scholte, Globalization: A critical introduction (London: 
Palgrave, 2005 [2ed – revised & updated]); see also the texts cited in ‘footnote 10’ in F.B. Adamson, 
‘Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security’, International Security, 31, 1 
(Summer 2006), p.168. 
172 McGrew, ‘Globalization and global politics’, p.24. 
173 J.A. Scholte, Globalization – a critical introduction (London: Macmillan, 2000), p.46 – quoted in 
‘Box 1.2’ in ibid. 
174 See also D. Held and A. McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007 [2ed.]). 
175 Naturally, these ‘benchmarks’ are not too dissimilar to those found in mainstream foreign policy 
analysis studies, see, for example, how Hill has structured his The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy. 
176 For more on ‘intelligence culture’ see, for example, P.H.J. Davies, ‘Intelligence Culture and 
Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3 
(October 2004); see also ‘C. People and Culture’ in ‘The Changing Face of Intelligence: NATO 
Advanced Research Workshop – Report’, The Pluscarden Programme for the Study of Global 
Terrorism and Intelligence, St Antony’s College, Oxford (09-10 December 2005), p.3. 
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177 Frank Birch quoted in a memo to Denniston, Head of Government Communications & Cipher 
School (GC & CS), in C. Grey and A. Sturdy, The Organisation of Bletchley Park 1939-1945 (2006), 
p.15. 
178 Evans and Newnham, Dictionary of International Relations, p.9; see also A. Bieler and A.D. 
Morton, ‘The Gordian Knot of Agency-Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian 
Perspective’, European Journal of International Relations, 7, 1 (2001); Hill, The Changing Politics of 
Foreign Policy, pp.25-30. 
179 See, for example, the sentiments articulated in ODNI, ‘Transformation through Integration and 
Innovation’, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America (October, 2005) - via 
URL: <http://www.odni.gov>. 
180 For an example of US intelligence guidelines in relation to international (foreign) intelligence 
liaison, see ‘Security Classification Guidance on Liaison Relationships with Foreign Intelligence 
Organizations and Foreign Security Services’, Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/10 
(effective 14 December 1982 – approved for release, May 2002) - via URL: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid1-10.htm> (accessed: 06/11/2005); see also US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, ‘Joint Operations’, Joint Publication 3-0 (17 September 2006), pp.II-7-8 – where it states:  
‘(7) Information and Intelligence Sharing. The success of a multinational operation hinges 
upon timely and accurate information and intelligence sharing. As DOD [US Department of 
Defense] moves toward a net-centric environment, it faces new challenges validating 
intelligence information and information sources, as well as sharing of information required to 
integrate participating multinational partners. This information sharing can only occur within a 
culture of trust, based upon an effective information-sharing environment, that uses the lowest 
classification level possible, must support multilateral or bilateral information exchanges 
between the multinational staff and forces, as well as the military staffs and governments for 
each participating nation. Actions to improve the ability to share information such as 
establishing metadata or tagging standards, agreeing to information exchange standards, and 
using unclassified information (e.g., commercial imagery) need to be addressed early (as early 
as the development of military systems for formal alliances). SecDef [Secretary of Defense], 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CCDRs [combatant commander] play an important role 
determining and providing disclosure criteria guidance early in the planning process for a 
multinational operation. JFCs [Joint Force Commanders], in accordance with national 
directives, need to determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations 
early in the planning process. To the degree that security permits, the limits of intelligence 
sharing and applicable procedures should be included in disclosure agreements with 
multinational partners. These agreements should incorporate limitations imposed by US law 
and/or the US National Disclosure Policy; which promulgates specific disclosure criteria and 
limitations, definitions of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance. It also establishes 
interagency mechanisms and procedures for the effective implementation of the policy. In the 
absence of sufficient guidance, JFCs should share only that information that is mission 
essential, affects lower-level operations, facilitates CID [combat identification], and is 
perishable.’ 
 
181 Roberts, Blacked Out, p.132; see also ibid., particularly where he notes: ‘Tracking the number of 
SOIAs that have been negotiated by the [US] Department of Defense is difficult, because the very 
existence of the agreements themselves may not be acknowledged… For forty years, the British and 
American governments refused to divulge the content of the bilateral SOIA signed in 1961. This 
agreement was finally declassified in 2001…’ Other formal arrangements involved include the US 
National Disclosure Policy (NDP), such as NDP-1 National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure 
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of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations, overseen 
by the US National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC) - see, for example, d523011p.pdf (16 June 
1992) - PDF via URL: <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/html/523011.htm> (accessed: 
27/11/2006). 
182 For a discussion of the presence of ‘rules’ and ‘guidelines’ governing intelligence liaison in the 
intelligence world, see Rimington, ‘Security and Democracy – is there a conflict?’; see also Director of 
Central Intelligence Directive 1/10. 
183 See also, for example, for the importance of heeding some of the lessons from history in particular: 
Wark, ‘Introduction: “Learning to live with intelligence”’; Andrew, ‘Intelligence analysis needs to look 
backwards before looking forward’; and Popplewell, ‘“Lacking Intelligence”’. 
184 See, for example, Popplewell, Intelligence and Imperial Defence.  
185 Several of these ‘functions’ are based on those identified in Westerfield, ‘America and the World of 
Intelligence Liaison’, from p.523. 
186 See for examples of ‘covert diplomacy’ by intelligence agencies, S. Shpiro, ‘Intelligence Services 
and Political Transformation in the Middle East’, International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 17 (2004), pp.575-600. 
187 For a recent example of ‘friends spying on friends’, namely Israel allegedly ‘spying’ on the US, see, 
for example, ‘Allies and espionage’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (15 March 2002); see also ‘British 
M.P.’s Link 10 Attaches to C.I.A.’, The New York Times (20 March 1975) and UPI, ‘There Are No 
Friends In World of Spying’, Baltimore News American (16 March 1975) – particularly where it notes: 
‘Do our friendly allies spy on Americans in the United States? They often do. And we spy on them in 
their home countries. Intelligence gathering knows neither friend nor foe. In many intelligence areas, 
allies cooperate and exchange information. But on some delicate subjects, particularly advance 
information on dramatic policy or strategic changes affecting another country and in technology and 
weapons, it’s every spy for himself…’ – both articles reproduced in CIA, News, Views and Issues (c. 
April/May 1975) – via CREST – CIA-RDP77-00432R000100360006-2 (2001/08/08). 
188 See N. Paton Walsh et al., ‘The Cold War is over, but rock in a park suggests the spying game still 
thrives’, The Guardian (24 January 2006); see also former CIA operative, Bob Baer’s account of a 
walk he took around London in his See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s 
Counter-Terrorism Wars (New York: Crown, 2002), pp.xv-xvi - especially where he notes: ‘… the 
CIA was prohibited by British authorities from recruiting sources, even Islamic fundamentalists, in 
[Britain]…’; for a discussion of this theme see also Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.5. 
189 In fact, the fear of ‘penetration’ of a liaison service by an enemy is today arguably a lesser 
intelligence liaison-obstructing factor (risk) in the current so-called ‘War on Terror’ context than 
during earlier periods in history. This is due to the nature of the primary threat that is being faced being 
‘terrorists’ rather than a particular hostile intelligence agency, such as the KGB during the Cold War. - 
From a well-placed non-attributable source [c-2]. During the Cold War there was additionally Western 
intelligence agency liaison, involving regular meetings, on the issue of intelligence agency 
‘penetration’ and other counter-espionage issues. Notably, this was between Britain, America, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, the CAZAB link. For more information, see, for example, S. Rimington, 
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Open Secret: The Autobiography of the former Director General of MI5 (London: Hutchinson, 2001), 
pp.206-8. However, ‘penetration’ remains a significant enough risk that still needs to be considered – 
see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.iii], below, for more details; see also ‘US security clearance reform 
worries: Securing appropriate security clearances has been a long-standing problem within the US 
intelligence community, however the post-11 September 2001 increase in the volume of sensitive 
information has required a corresponding increase in the number of cleared people. For example, 
heightened worries about the vulnerability of the US homeland to terrorism and the creation of the new 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has necessitated governors, mayors and other local officials 
gaining access to sensitive information useful for protecting local critical infrastructure and 
populations’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (11 March 2008). 
190 That is, operating outside of the intelligence agencies/communities participating in the intelligence 
liaison. 
191 For a fuller explanation, see Chapter 6 [6.1] below. 
192 Including the use of ‘extraordinary renditions’ and torture evidence. 
193 For an outreach process flow chart, see, for example, ‘Planning and Evaluating Outreach’, US 
National Network of Libraries of Medicine website, p.1 - PDF via URL: 
<http://nnlm.gov/evaluation/guide/introduction.pdf> (accessed: 06/2007). 
194 Commentator Rocco Rosano in posting ‘intelligence liaison’ from ‘intelforum’ (12 November 2000) 
– via URL: <http://archives.his.com/intelforum/2000-November/msg00130.html> (accessed: 
06/11/2005). 
195 Keohane and Nye, Jr., ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’. 
196 On ‘problem-solving’, see, for example, C.E. Lindblom, ‘The Science of “Muddling Through”’, 
Public Administration Review, 19 (Spring, 1959), pp.79-88; see also C.E. Lindblom, ‘Still Muddling, 
Not Yet Through’, Public Administration Review, 39 (1979), pp.517-26. On the ‘risk management’ 
dimension see, for instance, S.D. Gibson, ‘In the Eye of the Perfect Storm: Re-imagining, Reforming 
and Refocusing Intelligence for Risk, Globalisation and Changing Societal Expectation’, Risk 
Management: An International Journal, 7, 4 (2005), pp.23-41; see also S. Bell, ‘The UK’s Risk 
Management Approach to National Security’, RUSI Journal, 152, 3 (June 2007), pp.18-22; see also 
M.V. Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); see also the other references to ‘risk 
management’ in this study, below. However, it is worth noting that these methodologies again have 
their limitations in entirely explaining the intelligence liaison phenomenon at its fullest. For further 
elaboration on this, see below. 
197 HMG, Government Response to … Rendition, p.6. 
198 On ‘problem-solving’ and risk, see, for example, the sources cited above. On a ‘pact of restraint’ 
idea, see J. Elie, ‘Intelligence and the Cold War’, SAIS Review, XXIV, 1 (Winter/Spring, 2004), p.174; 
see also P.W. Schroeder, ‘Alliances, 1815-1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management’ in K.L. 
Knorr (ed.), Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems (Kansas University Press, 1976), 
pp.227-62. More specifically on ‘alliance theory’, see G. H. Snyder, ‘Alliance Theory: A Neorealist 
First Cut’, Journal of International Affairs, 44, 1 (Spring 1990), p.103 – particularly where he claims: 
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‘One of the most underdeveloped areas in the theory of international relations is alliance theory.’ This 
is arguably due to the phenomenon of alliances not fitting neatly into one international relations theory 
position, as is suggested in this article. For the importance of alliances to the US and its national 
security in the 21st Century context, see, for example, E. Sherwood-Randall, Alliances and American 
National Security (October 2006) - PDF via URL: <http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/> 
(accessed: 06/11/2006); for another in-depth recent study of alliances, see, for example, P.A. 
Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War (Stanford University Press, 
2004); see also J.J. Wirtz, ‘Book Review: Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of 
War. By Patricia A. Weitsman. (Stanford University Press, 2004.)’, The Journal of Politics, 69, 1 
(February 2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘According to Weitsman, theorists have missed an 
important part of the alliance puzzle by concentrating on external threat as an indicator of alliance 
cohesion; internal factors also govern the ability of allies to undertake coherent and constructive 
initiatives.’ For an insight into bureaucratic theory and politics, see B.G. Peters, ‘The Politics of 
Bureaucracy’, chapter 6 in his The Politics of Bureaucracy (London: Routledge, 2001 [5ed.]). For 
another insight into the limitations of bureaucracy theory in the intelligence context, see A. Dupont, 
‘Intelligence for the Twenty-First Century’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (Winter, 2003), 
p.34 – where he argues that ‘… the bureaucratic walls which once separated the providers and users of 
intelligence are coming down at a rapid rate, removing the artificial and dysfunctional distinctions 
between strategic, operational and tactical intelligence assets…’; for an argument that bureaucratic 
management is not suited to the intelligence profession, see Steele, ‘Information Peacekeeping & the 
Future of Intelligence: “The United Nations, Smart Mobs, & the Seven Tribes”’, p.201. For security 
and securitization, see P. Hough, ‘Security and securitization’ and ‘Towards global security’, 
respectively chapters 1 and 11 in his Understanding Global Security (London: Routledge, 2004); see 
also B. Buzan et al, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Riemmer, 1998). 
For the connection between intelligence and cybernetics, see S.A. Taylor, ‘The Role of Intelligence in 
National Security’, chapter 14 in A. Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), p.250; for international political economy (IPE) theories and their contribution, see, for 
example, R. O’Brien and M. Williams, Global Political Economy: Evolution and Dynamics 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2007 [2ed. – revised, expanded and updated]). 
199 For a greater development of this section, see Svendsen, ‘Connecting intelligence and theory’. 
200 See also, for example, G. Corera, ‘MI5 expanding outside London’, BBC News Online (11 
December 2007); G. Corera, ‘Real spooks with new role after 9/11’, BBC News Online (04 December 
2007). 
201 See also, for example, J. Sims, ‘Understanding Friends and Enemies: The Context for American 
Intelligence Reform’, chapter 2 in her and B. Gerber (eds), Transforming U.S. Intelligence 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005), p.17 - especially where she notes: ‘Protecting 
the intelligence infrastructure for tomorrow’s decision makers also means, however, that intelligence 
professionals must try to prevent the kind of blowback that occurs when the intelligence business goes 
awry – as a result of either substandard performance [e.g. in the form of under-reach] or overreach. 
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This point is particularly important for democracies such as the United States during periods of high 
threat and aggressive intelligence reform.’ – emphasis added. 
202 For further background information on the ‘surveillance dimension’ see, for example, D. Lyon, 
Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); for some more ‘surveillance’ literature, 
see, for example, K. Ball and F. Webster (eds), The Intensification of Surveillance: Crime, Terrorism 
and Warfare in the Information Age (London: Pluto Press, 2003).  
203 See, for example, Lowenthal, Intelligence, p.7 – particularly where he notes: ‘Upon entering the old 
entrance of the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters, one will find the following inscription on the 
left-hand marble wall: “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” – John VIII-
XXXII. It is a nice sentiment, but it overstates and misrepresents what is going on in that building or 
any other intelligence agency.’ 
204 See, for instance, the comments of Sir Richard Dearlove, the former ‘Chief’ (‘C’) of the UK Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6), reproduced below in Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [5.0]. 
205 ‘INTERNATIONAL: US-Arab intelligence co-operation’. 
206 For more on ‘altruism’ and ‘egoism’, see S.T. Thomas, ‘Assessing Current Intelligence Studies’, 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2, 2 (1988), pp.233-5. 
207 See, for example, as illustrated in Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.7], below. 
208 See also R.K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defence Planning (Washington, DC: Brookings, 
1982). 
209 See, for instance, Chapter 6: Conclusion [2.4], below. 
210 See, for example, J. Sims, ‘Understanding Ourselves’, chapter 3 in her and Gerber (eds), 
Transforming U.S. Intelligence, from p.32; see also P. Gill, ‘“Knowing the self, knowing the other”: 
the comparative analysis of security intelligence’, chapter 6 in Johnson (ed.), Handbook of Intelligence 
Studies, from p.82. 
211 Sims, ‘Understanding Friends and Enemies…’, chapter 2 in ibid., from p.14; see also B. Hoffman, 
‘We Can't Win If We Don't Know the Enemy’, The Washington Post (25 March 2007). 
212 For more on this issue, see Chapter 3: Literature Review [4.0], below; see also Chapter 6 [1.0], 
below. 
213 See also news reports, such as ‘Councils warned over spying laws: Councils in England have been 
urged to review the way they use surveillance powers to investigate suspected crime’, BBC News 
Online (23 June 2008). 
214 For the importance of knowing history in the intelligence context, see Andrew, ‘Intelligence 
analysis needs to look backwards before looking forward’; see also, for example, for the ‘dangers of a 
debased collective mentality, tenuous grasp of history’ and related issues, see Wark, ‘Introduction: 
“Learning to live with intelligence”’; Popplewell, ‘“Lacking Intelligence”’, pp.336-52. 
215 Quoted in UK House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, ‘Further Evidence relating to the 
Fifth Report from the Committee, session 1999-2000’, Fourteenth Special Report (c.14 November 
2000) - via URL: <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/> (accessed: 25/01/2006). Interestingly, the 
last sentence of this quotation compellingly shows characteristics concerning the UK-US intelligence 
relationship as an ‘end’ and not just solely a ‘means’. 
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216 See, for example, ‘In many respects, UK and US [intelligence] co-operation represents the most 
significant aspect of the so-called special relationship’ in Fidler and Huband, ‘A Special Relationship? 
The UK and US spying alliance’; K.A. O’Brien, ‘Europe weighs up intelligence options’, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (01 March 2001) and A. Whittam Smith, ‘It’s France that has a special relationship 
with America’, The Independent (21 February 2005); see also content in Chapter 3: Literature Review 
[4.0], below. For the long-term nature of the UK-US intelligence relationship, see also, for example, J. 
Beach, ‘Origins of the special intelligence relationship? Anglo-American intelligence co-operation on 
the Western Front, 1917-18’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 2 (April 2007), pp.229-249. 
217 See Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change, p.xxii; see also R. Niblett, Director Chatham House, ‘What 
Bush might make of Brown’, The Financial Times (07 February 2007) - via URL: 
<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/ArticeFT070207.doc> (accessed: 07/04/2007) - particularly 
where he notes: ‘[UK-US] Bilateral intelligence co-operation on counter-terrorism, for example, is 
more important than ever, as Mr Brown has noted in recent speeches…’ 
218 See, for example, R.J. Aldrich, ‘The UK–US Intelligence Alliance in 1975: Economies, Evaluations 
and Explanations’, Intelligence and National Security, 21, 4 (August 2006), pp.557-8. 
219 ISC, Annual Report, 1999-2000 (2000), paragraph 64; see also ‘Annex F – What happened in the 
SIS’ in ISC, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report (2000), para.4, via URL: <http://www.archive.official-
documents.co.uk/document/cm47/4764/4764-axf.htm> (accessed: 29/12/2006) – particularly where it 
is stated: ‘In the early stages, the highest priority was given to processing material bearing on UK and 
US interests…’ 
220 Rudner, ‘Britain Betwixt and Between’, p.575. 
221 See, for example, some of the criticisms of the close UK-US intelligence sharing tabled below. 
222 ISC, Renditions, p.53. 
223 ibid. 
224 ibid. 
225 To date, these documents remain classified. 
226 See A. Rathmell, ‘Towards Post-modern Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 17, 3 
(Autumn, 2002), p.95. 
227 That is, arguably very marginally moving away from being so firmly tied to ‘the state’ – see R.J. 
Deibert, ‘Deep Probe: The evolution of network intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 
(Winter, 2003); see also J. Arquilla and D. Ronfeldt (eds), Networks and Netwars: The Future of 
Terror, Crime and Militancy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001); and see ‘Opaque Networks’, chapter 
6 in Roberts, Blacked Out, pp.127-149; see also Clutterbuck, ‘Network forms of Organisation in 
Terrorism and Counter Terrorism’ in his ‘Developing A Counter Terrorism Network’. Warfare is also 
moving more towards network centric operations, see, for example, C. Wilson, ‘Network Centric 
Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress’, CRS Report for Congress (Updated 15 
March 2007); L. Freedman, ‘The Transformation of Strategic Affairs’, IISS Adelphi Paper, 379 (2006). 
228 For more on ‘epistemic communities’, see Evans and Newnham, Dictionary of International 
Relations, pp.150-1; see also the discussion contained in D. Stone, ‘Introduction: Global knowledge 
and Advocacy Networks’, Global Networks, 2, 1 (2002), p.1-11; related, see also J. Sugden, ‘Security 
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Sector Reform: the role of epistemic communities in the UK’, Journal of Security Sector Management, 
4, 4 (November 2006); see also P.M. Haas, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination’, International Organization, 46, 1 (Winter, 1992), pp.1-35; for a case study, see, 
for instance, E. Adler, ‘The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the 
International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control’, International Organization, 46, 1 
(Winter, 1992), pp.101-145; P. Zelikow, ‘Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and 
Back Again’, International Security, 18, 4 (Spring, 1994), pp.143-171. 
229 See also P. Knightley, The Second Oldest Profession: The Spy as Bureaucrat, Patriot, Fantasist, 
and Whore (London: Deutsch, 1986), p.5 – where he argues: ‘… one of the curious features of 
intelligence agencies is that they gradually grow to resemble one another…’ (emphasis added), not 
least when carrying out matching functions. See also Smith, The Spying Game, p.25 – where he argues: 
‘The relationship between the various American spy organisations has been so bad at times during the 
past 50 years that they have had far better relations with their British counterparts than they have 
enjoyed with each other.’ 
230 For an example of this type of exchange, see T. Harnden, ‘US may set up MI5-style spy agency in 
security shake-up’, The Daily Telegraph (31 October 2002); see also: ISC, Annual Report, 1999-2000, 
paragraph 38(b) – ‘We recommend that a more co-ordinated and rigorous project-based approach is 
adopted, building on US experience…’; T. Masse, ‘Domestic Intelligence in the United Kingdom: 
Applicability of the MI-5 Model to the United States’, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report 
(19 May 2003); J. Burns and M. Huband, ‘US considers security reforms along UK lines’, The 
Financial Times (05 May 2003); G. Corera, ‘USA studies UK security service’, Jane’s Intelligence 
Review (23 January 2003). 
231 Critic identified only as ‘Morley’ quoted at URL: 
<http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/T_folder/troy.html> (accessed: 20/01/2006). 
232 Based on information from various non-attributable sources [e.g. i-37 + i-30]; see also texts, such as 
N. West, The Friends: Britain’s Post-War Secret Intelligence Operations (London: Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, 1988). 
233 William J. Donovan, Director, Memorandum for the President 2/8/52-ABD (07 November 1944) – 
via CREST – CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090008-3 (2006/02/07); see also Interpretive Notes of 
Memorandum for the President (18 November 1944) – via ibid. – especially where it notes (p.8): ‘The 
British Government is not to be condemned when high American commanders in Europe lean heavily 
upon British strategic and policy intelligence. There exists no American agency wholly competent to 
prepare or responsible for furnishing intelligence of American origin. Intelligence staffs in the various 
military commands may satisfy combat demands, but policy intelligence from American sources is 
inferior. Hence it is supplied largely by the better developed British system.’; see also T.F. Troy, 
Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, 
DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1981) – via CREST – CIA-RDP90-00708R000600120001-0 
(2000/04/18). 
234 See, for example, UK Intelligence and Security Committee, Annual Report 2001-2002 (07 June 
2002), p.13, paragraph 36 – where it reveals that ‘The Chief Secretary [to the Treasury] concurred with 
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the Committee that the UK/US collaboration is highly valuable and remarked that it “is obviously a 
very important factor in relation to our thinking”…’; see also Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change, p.xxii 
– where he states: ‘The UK-US nexus is viewed by the UK as a precious asset…’; see Fidler and 
Huband, ‘A special relationship? The US and UK spying alliance’; for importance of UK-US 
intelligence liaison to Britain see also J. Freedland, ‘Comment & Analysis: Time for Tough Love: 
Gleneagles gives Tony Blair a chance to demand from Bush a relationship that’s a bit more special for 
Britain’, The Guardian (06 July 2005). 
235 For example, see M. Dejevsky, ‘Comment: Now is the time to push for a European Army’, The 
Independent (22 October 2003). 
236 Based on information from non-attributable sources [e.g. i-30]; see also, for example, R. Norton-
Taylor, ‘Intelligence test: After the rapid reaction force, the logical step is an EU intelligence policy – 
and that would be the ultimate test of mutual trust between allies’, The Guardian (20 December 2000); 
see also the sentiments expressed in G. Poteat and W. Anderson, ‘A Declaration of Interdependence: A 
second letter from America to our British friends’, The Daily Standard (03 May 2007) - via URL: 
<http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/562ahjrw.asp?pg=1> 
(accessed: 06/11/2007); see also J. Bolton, ‘Britain cannot have two best friends’, The Financial Times 
(01 August 2007); see also ‘New EU treaty worries US intel services’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (15 
January 2008) - particularly where it notes: ‘As EU governments focus on securing ratification of the 
proposed Lisbon Reform Treaty in 2008, United States policymakers are concerned its provisions 
could present serious challenges to transatlantic intelligence and homeland security co-operation. The 
main US reservation is that by transferring additional law and justice functions from the individual EU 
member states to EU institutions, the treaty could disrupt existing bilateral relations between US and 
EU governments without establishing anything better…’ 
237 See, for example, Secretary James Baker, III talk at Chatham House on Monday 29 October 2007, 
especially where he noted: ‘Some have advocated the idea that the United Kingdom must somehow 
choose between the United States and the European Union. That is both misleading and dangerous. It is 
misleading because it fails to recognize the unique and productive role that London can play in both 
Washington and Brussels. And it is dangerous because it could lead to international divisions injurious 
to the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union. Let me be blunt. The conduct of 
foreign policy is hard enough without creating false choices.’ - Secretary James Baker III, ‘The 
Whitehead Lecture – The West and the World: A Question of Confidence’, Chatham House meeting 
transcript (29 October 2007), p.5. 
238 See, for example, ISC, Annual Report, 1999-2000, paragraph 14 – ‘The quality of intelligence 
gathered clearly reflects the value of the close co-operation under the UKUSA agreement…’ 
239 Quoted in Hennessy, The Secret State, p.13. 
240 See, for instance, Stables, ‘Alleged Plot in U.K. Highlights Improved Intelligence-Sharing With 
U.S.’: ‘…Increased intelligence-sharing and cooperation with foreign countries, especially Britain, has 
been “one of our biggest accomplishments since 9/11,” [House Homeland Security Chairman Peter T. 
King, R-N.Y.] said. Not only do the British coordinate well with Americans on intelligence, they might 
be better at some aspects of it. William Rosenau of the Rand Corporation said the British are better at 
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human-source intelligence and “they’ve been willing to make investments in language skills that we 
haven’t been willing to make. … The British trump us in their use of police in counterterrorism,” while 
in the U.S., police are viewed largely as first-responders… The police are integrated into the 
intelligence community in Britain in ways they aren’t in the U.S., except perhaps in New York, L.A., 
and Chicago, Rosenau said….’ 
241 On 11 September 2001, the US arguably did not have hegemony of intelligence power. This was for 
a variety of reasons, such as ‘information overload’ – see, for example, the 9/11 Commission Report, 
pp.275-6 and references to the information ‘logjam’; see also Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.i], below. 
242 For more on the US and HUMINT, see also B. Gerber, ‘Managing HUMINT: The Need for a New 
Approach’, chapter 11 in Sims and Gerber (eds), Transforming U.S. Intelligence, pp.180-197; see also 
J. MacGaffin, ‘Clandestine Human Intelligence: Spies, Counterspies, and Covert Action’, chapter 5 in 
ibid., pp.79-95; see also D.C. Gompert, et al., ‘War by Other Means: Building Complete and Balanced 
Capabilities for Counterinsurgency’, RAND Counterinsurgency - Final Report (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2008 [Prepared for the Office of the (US) Secretary of Defense]), p.231 – particularly where 
the report notes: ‘The surprise attacks of 9/11 and flawed intelligence about Iraq illuminated acute U.S. 
weaknesses in HUMINT.’ 
243 Smith, The Spying Game, p.432. 
244 See, for example, ‘UK spied for US as computer bug hit’, The Times (26 April 2000); Keefe, 
Chatter, p.109; ISC, Annual Report, 1999-2000, paragraph 14. 
245 See, for example, ISC Annual Report, 2003-04 (June 2004), p.45, paragraph ‘J’. 
246 This is reflected by American intelligence officials being allowed to attend some of the UK Joint 
Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessment meetings; see also S. Lander, ‘International Intelligence 
Cooperation: An Inside Perspective’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3 (October 2004); 
see also Chapter 4 [7.0], below. 
247 See, for example, the earlier references to the reduction of financial costs to all parties through 
having intelligence liaison [8.1]. 
248 For further details, see, for example, the ISC, Renditions report; see also Chapter 5: Case Study 1 
[4.2.ii] of this study, below; see also A. Svendsen, ‘“Friends and Allies” like these: UK-US 
intelligence relations in the early 21st Century’, paper presented at the annual British International 
Studies Association (BISA) conference, University of Cambridge, UK (December 2007). 
249 For more background detail on the ‘Katharine Gun affair’ see Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.4], below; 
see also Keefe, Chatter, p.29. 
250 Hitz, The Great Game, p.152. 
251 ibid., p.157. 
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Chapter 2 
Study Design: 
Research practice, methodology & orientation 
 
 
‘Anyone who sets out to write seriously about Intelligence has to accept in advance certain 
limitations. Because it has been surrounded with secrecy, which has generated myth, the 
subject is ill defined. The very word provokes in different people completely different 
expectations. Because it has to do with methods and tricks which may be needed again, some 
think it wise to remind enemies as little as possible of past triumphs and failures. Because so 
much of the work goes unrecorded on paper, lost forever in scrambled talk and burnt 
teleprinter flimsies, any account must be incomplete. One runs, therefore, the risk of arousing 
the historian’s interest without fully satisfying his curiosity. I accept that shortcoming 
because the British… are good at Intelligence and the advantage that this gives them in a 
world of hostile nation-states should not be discarded. It is one of the qualities which makes us 
“alliance-worthy”.’ 
- Donald McLachlan, UK journalist and former intelligence officer1 
 
 
[1.0]: Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive insight into how this 
study has been constructed. This chapter consists of three main sections: Firstly, the 
research practice and approach adopted are evaluated; followed, secondly, by an 
analysis of the methodology utilised; and then, finally, there is an assessment of the 
macro-orientation of this study, including which school of Anglo-American relations 
literature the study fits most appropriately. 
 
 
[2.0]: Research practice & approach 
 
[2.1]: Limitations when researching ‘intelligence’: 
Several challenging limitations confront any scholar researching ‘intelligence’. 
Starting with (i) the problems encountered when researching intelligence generally, 
this section will then go on to examine (ii) the specific problems encountered when 
researching intelligence liaison, and (iii) the problems associated with researching 
intelligence liaison in a contemporary historical context.  
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[2.1.i]: Problems encountered when researching ‘intelligence’ generally: 
The problems encountered when researching intelligence generally are mainly due 
to its highly secretive nature.2 As will be seen in Chapter 3, these have arguably 
contributed towards deterring researchers.3 This in turn has partly helped contribute 
towards ‘intelligence studies’ being less ‘mainstream’ and more of a ‘niche’ subject. 
Simultaneously, it is a ‘spin-off’ from fields such as international history to strategic 
and security studies. This explains why intelligence studies is attractive to academics 
and to (usually former) practitioners alike, who are keen to adopt an 
interdisciplinary approach; and who are not simply confinable to the traditional or 
conventional categories of scholarship – that is, being solely a historian or a political 
scientist/theorist, or coming from one particular fixed theoretical position.4 Because 
of the nature of intelligence studies, several areas, such as the focus of interest in this 
study - intelligence liaison – are, at the least, under-researched and under-theorised, 
or, at most, they are haphazardly so.5 Increasingly, today, this condition is now at 
least beginning to be seriously addressed - although there is much scholarship still to 
be undertaken. The problems encountered, however, should not be discouraging to 
researchers. Researching intelligence is indeed a difficult and challenging task, but it 
is by no means impossible - as this study helps to demonstrate.6 
Intelligence is not impossible to research for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
there is a plethora of open sources, which can be utilised by the intelligence scholar 
similarly to how open source intelligence (OSINT) is drawn upon by the intelligence 
practitioner. Often the same (or at least similar) sources are drawn upon – such as 
drawing on media reporting and commentary, or on BBC Monitoring output. 
Moreover, the number of open sources available for exploitation is proliferating 
exponentially as time progresses. 
Secondly, potential sources have become more accessible, and increasingly 
instantly. In recent years there has been the continuing trend towards greater 
‘openness’ and ‘transparency’ in government affairs and elsewhere.7 The intelligence 
agencies themselves have not been immune – even partaking in so-called ‘PR’ (public 
relations) activities themselves to communicate their message in the public domain. 
These trends have been aided by the rapid technological developments of recent 
years, such as the Internet revolution. Today, anyone can be an online publisher and 
communicate their ‘Googleable’ message, such as through a ‘blog’. This vexes 
governments, who are increasingly anxious about the ability of their personnel to 
undertake these activities.8 
Intelligence is still challenging to research because the ‘openness’ remains 
governed by differing rules and guidelines. These are always subject to one of the 
greatest of all fallibilities, human interpretation. The rules and guidelines stipulate 
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when archives are released, ‘weeded’, or whether they are destroyed.9 An episode in 
2000, involving The Guardian newspaper’s security and intelligence affairs journalist 
Richard Norton-Taylor, effectively illustrates the impact of differing states’ 
‘openness’ rules and guidelines. This episode also provided some interesting insights 
into the interpretation, as well as the determination, of what is made available. 
Norton-Taylor revealed that: 
  
[The Guardian] asked the [UK Ministry of Defence (MoD)] if it would 
release at least some of the information it insisted must remain officially 
secret (including information since released by Washington and Nato about 
the number of tanks it did, or did not, destroy in Kosovo). In an episode 
which would have delighted Kafka, MoD officials decided to claim they 
could not release the information since the [Commons defence committee] 
had agreed to suppress it. Once evidence is provided to a Commons 
committee it becomes subject to “parliamentary privilege”, we were told. It 
was therefore up to the committee and not the MoD to decide whether and 
how it was published. … The committee eventually recorded (dryly): 
“After a somewhat drawn-out exchange of correspondence between this 
committee, the MoD and Mr Norton-Taylor, the MoD did review its 
classification and derestricted some further information.”10   
 
Significantly, this episode involved the UK-US intelligence relationship, 
hence the appropriateness to cite it here. Norton-Taylor continued, by noting that 
more recently:  
 
The MoD has agreed to disclose part of an answer given by Group Captain 
Stephen Lloyd, who was asked how dependent the ministry was on 
military intelligence provided by the US. We are now allowed to know that 
Lloyd told the committee that Britain's military intelligence relationship 
with the US “dates back to the period of 1943. So it is a very strong and 
very long relationship.” He adds: “***.” We are still not allowed to know 
officially what kind of intelligence we provide to the US. A question to 
Lloyd about that remains ***. Yet it is widely known that we give the US a 
broad range of intelligence, not least through the electronic eavesdropping 
agency GCHQ, and US intelligence bases in Britain…11 
 
This episode also neatly ties in with the general observation that the US is more 
‘open’, if not transparent, than the UK. See the case studies presented below in 
Chapter 5, for differing UK and US publicising activities and (albeit arguably slightly 
more converging over time) philosophies concerning the issue.  
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[2.1.ii]: Further problems encountered when researching ‘intelligence liaison’: 
Intelligence liaison is the ‘most secret’ area of intelligence and is conducted in an 
‘invisible world’.12 These observations form the bedrock of the closely interrelated 
further problems encountered when researching intelligence liaison. There are at 
least five problems that feature prominently:  
Firstly, there is the active official discouragement of the investigation of 
intelligence liaison. For instance, the entry for ‘liaison’ on the ‘glossary’ page of the 
British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) website reveals this official discouragement 
where it states: ‘It is SIS policy not to comment on its relationships with liaison 
services.’13 While in the US, according to Steven Aftergood, the author of the 
Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) Secrecy News, ‘Liaison relationships between 
US intelligence agencies and their counterparts in other countries are typically 
among the most important and the most secretive of intelligence activities. 
Questioned about them in public, the CIA can hardly be bothered to respond even 
with a “no comment”.’14 Therefore, an unsanctioned independent analysis, such as 
this study, might not be entirely welcomed. There are dilemmas, including those of 
an ethical nature.15 For instance, this study may in itself contribute towards revealing 
something that complicates the liaison relationship. Whenever complex and intricate 
trade-offs are involved, such as when conducting intelligence liaison relations, 
ideally further impediments to the smooth management of the liaison relationship 
want to be contained, rather than highlighted.  
Secondly, when actually undertaking the task of analysing intelligence 
liaison, the analyst is confronted by a ‘practical’ research problem that needs 
mitigation. Frequently there is a lack of sources showing intelligence liaison 
underway in its fastest ‘real-time’ action form. Informal ‘cocktail party’, ‘café’ or 
‘sofa’ interactions (such as in the form of fleeting conversations) go unrecorded.16 
Occasionally, a publicly available recorded glimpse of intelligence liaison in action - 
but in more of a ‘slow-motion’ form (such as preserved in the form of a document or 
e-mail communication) - can be captured. These, however, are usually only ‘released’ 
into the public domain through the outlet of the media, and due to ‘leaking’ and/or 
‘whistleblower’ activities. Therefore, they are a rarity.17 
Thirdly, there is obfuscation during the intelligence process. This includes the 
intentional manipulating or unintentional (accidental) obscuring of the background 
history and origin of the intelligence liaised over. These processes or procedures 
(including misinformation and/or disinformation activities18) can significantly 
complicate the process of source verification - both for intelligence ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’. This is especially apparent when the source is ‘incomplete, both shorn of 
time or place or origin…’19 Any research leads can be muddied. There is also the 
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abdication of individual responsibility and accountability, as old boundaries are 
blurred and new ones are constructed.  
Fourthly, information management issues exist. There is the determination 
and selection carried out by the intelligence service participants themselves - or by 
those closely guided by them - of what content is released and disseminated in the 
final resulting intelligence product outputted to ‘users’ and/or to the public and 
archives.20 This forms part of the management of ‘openness’, as already briefly 
discussed above in relation to the episode experienced by Norton-Taylor. 
Fifthly, again closely related to the management of ‘openness’, there is a 
persisting lack of declassification of official documents in and/or related to 
intelligence liaison.21 This is especially acutely the case if the specific liaison under-
scrutiny is still ongoing, and long-term, enduring, conditional promises have been 
made to the actor (or any related parties) being liaised with that either the very fact 
of the liaison and/or any of its details would not be revealed.22 This situation often 
continues long after the conclusion of the liaison, in case any ‘spin-offs’ or 
‘descendants’ from that liaison also may potentially become compromised by 
disclosure.23 
 
[2.1.iii]: Researching ‘intelligence liaison’ in a contemporary historical context: 
The contemporary context makes several of the above restrictions even more acute. 
In a contemporary historical context, scholars do not have access even to a few 
selectively declassified primary source ‘official’ documents and papers available in 
the UK and US National Archives.24 This helps to explain why most literature on the 
intelligence liaison subject is longer-term historically-orientated (see Chapter 3). The 
contemporary historian becomes increasingly dependent upon sources such as 
official strategy documents released for public consumption, the media output and 
their own semi-structured (elite) interviews they have conducted. A quick foray into 
the endnotes in the case studies of this study (Chapter 5) reflects those trends. 
Interestingly, but unsurprisingly given the reconstructions attempted here, the 
challenges experienced by the contemporary historical researcher closely reflect 
those encountered on a daily basis by intelligence officers in the real intelligence 
world. This is along with undertaking the functions of source assessment/analysis 
and protection, as well as carrying out some of the more mundane tasks, such as data 
processing vast quantities of material.25  
Additionally, compared to other fields of study, the veracity gap encountered 
is arguably somewhat wider. When studying intelligence, epistemological problems 
are enhanced and tend to be more persistent. Therefore, naturally some of the 
conclusions drawn have to be tentative. This is understandable, particularly when 
trying to study a subject where several of the key documents have not yet been 
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released - such as those composing the UKUSA agreements. In such circumstances, 
informed insights are somewhat emasculated. While the conclusions might be 
arguably less definitive in ‘ground-breaking’ terms, they can certainly compensate 
by being explorative and more discussion or debate provoking. Thus, useful ‘spring-
boards’ for further research are provided. Arguably more contemporary historical 
studies are less rigidly tied to specific sources. This allows them to be more flexible 
and for the thinking within them to be ‘softer’ and ‘broader’ in terms of the nature of 
interpretation. Being less firmly rooted in particular sources may have an added 
benefit. It may prevent a particular interpretive slant or framing from having an 
overwhelming effect on the study. For instance, one that is trying to be officially 
disseminated through what is (eventually) released. As there is less to already 
conform to, perhaps this situation allows a greater scope for independent originality 
by the analyst. 
 
[2.2]: Approaches this study adopts: 
This study adopts a conventional interdisciplinary hybrid approach. The approaches 
of a modern to contemporary international historian and an international relations-
orientated political scientist/theorist are combined. As Mark Trachtenberg argues: 
‘…the key thing is to do the sort of work that can draw theory and history 
together.’26 All four approaches towards the study of intelligence, as identified by 
Stafford Thomas, are employed throughout: ‘(1) historical/biographical; (2) functional; 
(3) structural; and (4) political’.27 A relatively ‘broad’ approach has also been adopted. 
This is justifiable and defensible for several reasons:  
Firstly, a major objective of this study is to bridge and ‘join-up’ in an 
ambitious manner several issues and concepts. The main intention is to attempt to 
connect intelligence studies with international relations (IR) theory. Along with 
intelligence studies as a whole, intelligence liaison is remarkably disconnected from 
IR theory. This appears most puzzling - not least because of the presence of 
international intelligence liaison relationships in international affairs. Moreover, 
palpable is the fact that they perform an important, indeed essential, role in that 
context, within international relationships, as well as in relation to states’ wider 
foreign and security policies. Intelligence liaison relationships constitute the 
international relationships of national intelligence agencies. The subject of 
international intelligence liaison is therefore the best domain in which to connect IR 
theory with the wider discipline of intelligence studies. Furthermore, international 
intelligence liaison involves and includes intelligence alliances, clandestine 
diplomacy, transnational relationships, and other characteristics, which fit (to 
varying degrees) into the domain of international relations. This study also seeks to: 
(i) connect IR theory with contemporary international history; (ii) connect an 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 2: Study Design 
II : 77 
analysis of UK-US intelligence liaison with the wider, well-established literature on 
generic Anglo-American relations – for example that ‘schoolified’ by Alex Danchev 
and used by John Baylis (see below [4.1]); and (iii) connect (at a minimum as 
beginning efforts) theories of alliance, bureaucracy and ‘securitisation’ with 
international intelligence liaison, showing where they fit into the intelligence liaison 
‘system’; and (iv) equally demonstrating, more significantly, why individually they 
are inadequate to explain the amalgamated intelligence liaison concept.28 This 
necessitates attempts at the theorisation of intelligence liaison itself. Adopting an 
arguably ‘broad’ approach helps attain this overall objective. 
Secondly, another key ‘added value’ purpose of this study is to serve as a 
useful, long-term enduring and connective reference text, accessible to as wide a 
readership as possible. It aims to provide an in-depth and a sustained scholarly 
analysis of UK intelligence in the contemporary context in the form of a full and 
well-researched academic study. It also intends to demonstrate that this approach is 
a feasible one to adopt. Such attempts to evaluate UK intelligence in the 
contemporary context have barely been attempted before, and then frequently do not 
go substantially beyond figuring in the form of shorter journal or newspaper articles. 
These only offer occasional and more fragmented insights into contemporary UK 
intelligence.29 Wherever possible, well-stocked endnotes have been provided 
throughout this study to further support its aim of being a work with reference 
utility. Again, the adoption of a relatively broad approach allows the effective 
conveying of some general observations and lessons. How this study constructs 
these will now be explored. 
 
 
[3.0]: Methodology 
 
[3.1]: Methodology deployed: 
This study attempts to advance an understanding of (international) intelligence 
liaison generally and UK-US intelligence liaison specifically in a contemporary 
context. This is accomplished through attempting a qualitative analysis of UK-US 
intelligence liaison focussed on a number of key issue-areas from 2000 to the end of 
2005. The issue-areas are represented in the study as two case studies, focussing on 
UK-US intelligence liaison concerning: (i) counter-terrorism and (ii) WMD non- and 
counter-proliferation efforts. Drawing on the results of the full panoply of 
methodologies employed throughout, this study also advances some empirically 
underpinned theoretical observations. These are both deductive and inductive in 
nature. They also concern the possible theorisation of intelligence liaison, as well as 
how this might be connected to the more developed literature on the nature of UK-
US relations.30 
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Canadian intelligence scholar Wesley Wark has identified eight 
methodologies, which are deployed throughout intelligence studies. This study also 
uses some of those methodologies, notably adopting: ‘(1) the research project – 
utilizing primary source archival evidence; (2)… the historical project – essentially the 
production of case-study based accounts; (3) the definitional project… concerned with 
the foundation of intelligence studies… it attempts to define the subject [in the case 
of this study, unpacking the phenomenon of intelligence liaison]; (4)… building on 
[(3)] … the fourth perspective – that is using the case studies to test the theoretical 
deliberations… [extending to using the methods of] (7) investigative journalism – 
typically these are on topics for which there are no historical archives available [for 
example, due to research being undertaken on and in the contemporary context]; … 
[and] (8) [the] popular culture project… [which] considers … topics such as the politics 
of James Bond [and the insights the wider spy fiction genre can offer].’31 
 
[3.2]: Methodological components: 
The methodological components of this study can be summarised as follows: A 
qualitative analysis based on case studies, with some small-N (small sample) 
comparison elements figuring. The case studies are intensive and critical, and are 
composed of the results from semi-structured (elite) interviews and the outcome 
from text/documentary analysis.32 The semi-structured interviews are particularly 
useful for accessing the micro/lower levels of intelligence liaison, notably the 
operational/tactical and individual (as professional)/personal levels. Furthermore, 
the interviews can have some added importance. They bring some heuristic value by 
helping to fill in ‘gaps’ or ‘missing dimensions’ present in the files or documentary 
record alone.33 Meanwhile, the text/documentary analysis is particularly useful for 
introspection into the macro/higher levels, such as the ideological/theoretical and 
strategy/policy levels. Combining both of these methodologies therefore allows the 
capture of insights into all the levels of intelligence liaison. This in turn also may 
have at least some relevant strategy and policy implications.34 
 
[3.3]: Awareness of drawbacks: 
The qualitative analysis, small-N comparison approach to research is not universally 
popular. This methodology has some ‘generalisability limits’. Sometimes analysts 
argue that conclusions that are too ‘big’ are reached from too small a sample.35 This 
shortcoming is accepted, but arguably it is offset by the possibility to encompass 
many variables. Nevertheless, the inferences drawn, no matter how potentially valid 
they may actually be, must not become unhinged from their supporting evidence 
and thereby compromised. As Todd Landman argues, ‘the substantive conclusions 
and inferential aspirations of a particular comparative study should not go too far 
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beyond the scope of its sample… comparative scholars must recognise the limits of 
their own enterprise in making generalizations about the political world they 
observe.’36 Ideally, ‘grand’ and widely acceptable theories require a sizeable to large 
reservoir of both qualitative and quantitative data on which to be well built.37 
In addition, frequently the small-N methodology is juxtaposed against large-
N (large sample) research. But rather than being opposed, these different 
methodologies should complement - just as quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies should complement. As US political scientist Michael Coppedge has 
argued: ‘No camp needs to demean the work of the others; all make useful 
contributions to the big picture. Those who specialize in small-N studies should not 
take offense at a division of labor that assigns them to the outliers. This is in part 
because the outliers are the most interesting and challenging pieces, the ones with 
the greatest potential to innovate and challenge old ways of thinking.’38 Being 
thought provoking is also one of the purposes of this study. 
 Another concern is that adopting a comparative analysis methodology means 
that a researcher’s mind is ‘closed-off’ too early in the research process. For example, 
‘the need to forge comparisons tends to mean that the researcher needs to develop an 
explicit focus at the outset, whereas it may be advantageous to adopt a more open-
ended approach in many instances.’39 In the development of the study, this problem 
has been mitigated somewhat by (i) not overly relying solely on, as well as (ii) 
leaving until later, the process of enacting the comparative analysis. This is 
accomplished through it featuring as an integral part of the case studies presented in 
Chapter 5. A broad approach has also been adopted to preserve both ‘open-
mindedness’ and essential contextualisation of UK-US intelligence liaison (see above 
[2.2]). 
There is a further problem with the comparative analysis methodology. 
Again, Landman draws attention to the observation that those ‘studies that compare 
few countries are not able to draw strong inferences owing to problems of selection 
bias both in terms of the choice of countries and the choice of the historical accounts 
used for evidence.’40 Therefore, this study, perhaps rather than seeking to be 
definitive per se, is more a contribution intended to provoke discussion and debate. 
This study’s ‘added value’ is that by building on a wide range of substantial and 
more specific studies dispersed in a fragmented manner, it synthesises an in-depth, 
yet generally educative, connected evaluation of intelligence liaison - a phenomenon 
that is frequently fleetingly referred to, but rarely probed in further detail. One of the 
outcomes of this study should be to encourage greater in-depth research into 
intelligence liaison – of both a qualitative and quantitative nature, empirical and 
theoretical - to enhance our understanding further. 
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Using the case study method, too, is not without its drawbacks. Firstly, as 
Alan Bryman notes, ‘…not all writers are convinced about the merits of multiple-case 
study research. Dyer and Wilkins (1991), for example, argue that a multiple case 
study approach tends to mean that the researcher pays less attention to the specific 
context and more to the ways in which the cases can be contrasted.’41 This can occur 
if a particularly ‘narrow’ approach is adopted, where the more peripherally located, 
yet meaningful, factors in accounts are overly neglected. 
Secondly, as Landman highlights, ‘case selection significantly affects the 
answers that are obtained to the research questions that are posed… In order to 
make stronger inferences, the rule of thumb for political science method is to raise 
the number of observations… which for comparative politics means either a larger 
sample of countries or [pertinent and followed in the case of this study] more 
observations within a smaller sample of countries.’42 The above limitations will now 
be comprehensively addressed. 
 
[3.4]: Why this methodology has been adopted - Positive reasons for selection: 
The methodology adopted in this study has been selected for several positive and 
pragmatic reasons:  
On a pragmatic basis, this study has to be realistically researchable or ‘doable’ 
within the scope of its available resources. Important issues ascribable to 
‘constrained choice’ feature prominently in the selection of the methodology and 
approach. For example, choice is constrained by, firstly, intelligence liaison being the 
‘most secret’ dimension of intelligence, and secondly, due to the ‘language factor’, 
the researcher being limited to just the English language. Fortunately, however, the 
UK-US intelligence liaison relationship is one of the most discussed, already well-
researched and well-known intelligence liaison relationships in the public domain. 
Thus it constitutes the ‘best’ to research, as there are enough sufficiently accessible 
sources to draw upon. This helps to address some of the methodological problems 
faced when researching in this ‘most secret’ and challenging area of intelligence 
studies. Also researching in the subject area of UK-US relations offers the ability to 
draw upon a sizeable and well-established wealth of general UK-US relationship 
literature, as well as theories concerning the nature of generic UK-US relations (see 
below [4.1]).43  
The ‘exceptional’ nature of the UK-US intelligence relationship might be 
invoked negatively. For example, the exceptional qualities may be summoned as a 
reason to dismiss looking at the relationship for ‘generalisability’ purposes, for 
informing readers about intelligence liaison relationships generally. However, often, 
as is the case with drawing upon this example of an international intelligence liaison 
relationship, the ‘exception’ can ‘prove the rule’. At the least, it provides some 
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enlightening insights and suggestions that can be ‘scaled-up’, and which resonate 
more broadly in relation to other intelligence liaison relationships. Furthermore, 
focussing on the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship and adopting the particular 
cases selected allows the ability to concentrate upon so-called ‘knowable episodes’. 
This is essential when, on subjects such as intelligence liaison, the nature of the 
overall evidence is patchy and tends to coalesce around particular episodes. Here, 
adopting the qualitative analysis approach can be most valuable. Such an approach 
allows for the concentrated focussing on the stronger areas contributing towards 
more robust analysis throughout. This is rather than attempting to cover ‘everything’ 
in an over-ambitious, and ultimately ‘undoable’ manner.  
With further reference to the qualitative comparative analysis methodology, 
one of its strengths is that: ‘Comparative design… entails the study using more or 
less identical methods of two contrasting cases. It embodies the logic of comparison 
in that it implies that we can understand social phenomena better when they are 
compared in relation to two or more meaningfully contrasting cases or situations.’44 
By comparing the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, what drives one of the 
leading intelligence liaison relationships, and one that is most accessible to research, 
can be ascertained. 
Additionally, as Landman highlights, ‘there have been a number of 
developments in the world… that are particularly suited to systemic comparative 
analysis… these issues include transnational political influences, the diffusion of 
political ideas and political culture… and the broad category of globalisation.’45 The 
phenomenon of international intelligence liaison is not isolated from these factors, 
and indeed is very much an integral part of them, as can be seen throughout this 
study.  
More broadly, ‘this style of political science concentrates on observable 
political behaviour and events at the individual, group, or national level, and 
assumes that explanations of that behaviour are “susceptible to empirical testing”.’46 
Moreover, by pursuing the qualitative analysis methodology, this study, similarly to 
that of Landman’s intention with his own study, attempts to make ‘statements about 
politics based on the best empirical evidence available… [it also] accepts that these 
statements are imperfect and uncertain, but by advocating systematic and well-
grounded “procedures of inquiry”… it aims to help… make such statements the best 
they can be.’47 This study attempts to set a high standard in order to lend its 
observations greater credibility, as well as to make a valuable contribution to the 
field. 
In addition, this methodology has been chosen because, as Bryman notes, 
comparative design ‘is something of a hybrid… in qualitative research it is 
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frequently an extension of a case study design. It even exhibits certain features that 
are similar to experiments and quasi-experiments, which also rely on the capacity to 
forge a comparison.’48 This allows, in an interdisciplinary manner, the introduction of 
the key components of a ‘political science’ dimension to complement and further 
enhance the contemporary international historical narrative that has been sculpted. 
Moreover, comparative analyses of various aspects of UK and US intelligence 
have been attempted before. Therefore in this field of study, this methodology has 
already been tried, tested and found to be viable and upheld as an appropriate 
methodology to pursue. Five examples, which can be readily cited, include two 
articles by Philip H.J. Davies, a conference paper and a book chapter by Michael 
Herman, as well as a book chapter by John Ranelagh.49 Adopting the comparative 
analysis methodology in this study thus follows the precedent of these earlier studies 
and can also try to successfully build upon them. Finally, as UK intelligence scholar 
Davies argues: ‘The comparative study of British and American intelligence not only 
provides a clear illustration of national intelligence cultures [and intelligence liaison] 
at work, but also provides insight into how intelligence [and intelligence liaison] 
operates in general…’50 
The case studies meanwhile provide the material that supplies the 
foundations upon which this study is constructed. Using case studies, aside from 
them performing an important supporting role, can also help the study provide 
much more ‘added value’. As Bryman states, the ‘main argument in favour of the 
multiple-case study [using more than one case study] is that it improves theory 
building. By comparing two or more cases, the researcher is in a better position to 
establish the circumstances in which a theory will or will not hold… the comparison 
may itself suggest concepts that are relevant to an emerging theory.’51 This study, by 
using just two case studies, effectively avoids the problems associated with having a 
multiplicity of cases. This study can therefore at least attempt to pay sufficient 
attention to the specific context as well as to the points of comparison.  
Attempts at theory building are another important objective of this study. 
Bringing in ‘theory’ can be controversial. As Martin Griffiths and Terry O’Callaghan 
argue: ‘The word “theory” is used in a bewildering variety of ways in the study of 
international relations. It is applied to propositions and arguments at varying levels 
of abstraction, and debates over its most appropriate meaning have proceeded apace 
with little consensus achieved.’52 In form, it can figure on a spectrum ranging from 
‘hard’ theory (more characteristic of that found in the ‘physical sciences’ disciplines) 
through to ‘soft’ theory (more characteristic of that sited in the ‘social sciences’). 
Davies meanwhile argues that the utility of ‘theory’ in this last domain of inquiry is 
limited: ‘…indeed, theory should be avoided wherever possible in the social sciences. 
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Rather, empirical research is essential, but empirical trends and patterns are not 
theories.’53  
However, some theorisation is deployed. This is albeit it perhaps featuring in 
more of a ‘softer’ form as (or more akin to) ‘empirical and interpretive 
extrapolations’. These are intended to respectively capture the ‘scientific’ and 
‘artistic’ dimensions of intelligence as successfully as possible. At a minimum, it is 
from this mode of ‘theory’ that practical ideas for driving intelligence liaison, and the 
directions in which to steer it, stem. Theory generally, and theory concerning 
intelligence liaison specifically in the case of this study, therefore has an important 
value. Thus, it is worth the expending of energy on them, not least in terms of their 
exploration and development. Theory also helps us to be more creative with ideas 
and access realms which solely an empirical approach alone cannot throw into relief. 
By theorising, rather than solely merely observing, some greater scope for attempts 
at generalisation concerning phenomena, such as intelligence liaison, can be 
engendered. What is actually needed – and is attempted by the efforts undertaken in 
this study - are empirical theories that are solidly rooted in and underpinned by the 
empirical research so that the ‘best’ aspects of each of these different approaches 
(theoretical and empirical) can be drawn upon in a synergistic and complementary 
manner. By adopting such an approach, the real ‘added value’ of intelligence studies, 
and studying phenomena such as intelligence liaison, can be presented and 
communicated. 
The case studies are central. They are used to help empirically underpin the 
theorisation efforts. The ‘critical case’ or ‘instrumental case’ methodology selected for 
use in this study allows ‘the researcher’ to have ‘a clearly specified hypothesis, and a 
case is chosen on the grounds that it will allow a better understanding of the 
circumstances in which the hypothesis will and will not hold.’54 
Moreover, as Bryman continues: ‘Case study researchers tend to argue that 
they aim to generate an intensive examination of a single case, in relation to which 
they then engage in a theoretical analysis.’55 That is another intention of this study by 
pursuing the case study methodology. Furthermore, ‘a case study design is not 
necessarily associated with an inductive approach… Thus, case studies can be 
associated with both theory generation and theory testing.’56 Not only does the 
theory become built through using the case studies, but also its veracity is 
simultaneously probed in detail. 
Using the case studies, also allows for in depth ‘contextual [or thick] 
description’.57 In the realm of intelligence, the provision of detailed and substantial 
evidence, where possible, is especially desirable. Therefore, as Landman observes, 
‘comparing few countries can lead to inferences that are better informed by the 
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contextual specificities of the countries under scrutiny.’58 Also, as Landman 
continues, ‘Comparing few countries achieves control through the careful selection 
of countries that fit within either the most similar systems design (MSSD) or the most 
different systems design (MDSD). These types of studies are intensive and are good 
for theory generation.’59 This study follows that advice, partly in order to keep the 
scope of the project within conventionally respected as well as realistic and 
manageable boundaries. 
 
 
[4.0]: The orientation of this study 
 
[4.1]: ‘Schools’ and ‘levels’ in UK-US intelligence liaison relations: 
There are at least three significant schools of thought to which the nature of general 
UK-US relations can essentially be allocated. Developed by Alex Danchev, and also 
used by John Baylis, these schools are termed ‘evangelicalism’, ‘functionalism’ and 
‘terminalism’.60 The role of emotional, personal ties and sentiment are especially 
emphasised in the ‘evangelical’ school. Meanwhile, in the ‘functional’ school, the role 
of sentiment is less emphasised and there are specific functional purposes behind UK-
US relations - such as witnessed during the Second World War and again today in 
the contemporary so-called ‘War on Terror’ and ‘Long War’ context. In contrast, in 
the ‘terminal’ school, ‘endism’ to the ‘specialness’ of UK-US relations is posited. The 
more specific UK-US intelligence liaison relationship arguably reflects elements of all 
the three schools.  
In the world of intelligence, ‘specifics’ and ‘low politics’ take on greater 
significance. The details and their connection can determine whether there is 
intelligence ‘success’ or intelligence ‘failure’. Because of this, as well as the presence 
of so-called ‘intangibles’61 or ‘personal factors’ - such as concerning the central issues 
of ‘trust’ and ‘betrayal’ - the presence of different ‘levels’ within UK-US intelligence 
liaison relations are suggested. Identifying, codifying and then employing these 
‘levels’ for analytical purposes can facilitate a more sophisticated understanding of 
the nature of UK-US intelligence liaison relations. 
In his discussion of espionage literature, Thomas J. Price usefully identifies 
four ‘levels’ of relations.62 However, most helpfully, these can be extended further 
into eight distinct, but closely inter-related, ‘levels’ of relations for analysis purposes. 
These descend from ‘macro/broad’ and ‘high politics’ (the first ‘quartet’ of levels, i-
iv) to ‘micro/narrow’ and ‘low politics’ (the second ‘quartet’ of levels, v-viii). They 
can be summarised succinctly as:  
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(i) the ideological level; 
(ii) the theoretical level;  
(iii) the strategy level; 
(iv) the policy level; 
(v) the operational level; 
(vi) the tactical level; 
(vii) the individual (as ‘professional’) level; and 
(viii) the  personal level.  
 
The boundaries between these different levels are considerably blurred. Within each 
of these levels, as well as across them, is a ‘complex co-existence plurality’ of 
instances and episodes that can be evaluated as being overall representative of: (1) 
‘evangelicalism’, ‘functionalism’ and ‘terminalism’; and reflective of: (2) optimised, 
non-optimised, or under-optimised ‘reach’ balances. Naturally, the condition that 
emerges as being proportionally the most predominant in the overall mix present at 
that level then emerges as the condition most expressed at that level. 
Much flows from this model. When conceptualised in terms of separate, yet 
closely interrelated, levels, arguably a more powerful explanation of the dynamics of 
intelligence co-operation emerges. This type of explanation helps explain why the 
close UK-US intelligence liaison relationship is often regarded as the most ‘special’ 
and ‘important’ dimension and helps to sustain, wider and overall UK-US relations.63 
Also it accounts for why the low politics of UK-US intelligence relations 
(representative of the lower ‘quartet’ of levels) have endured so well over some 60 
years, despite co-existing times of considerable tension over higher and broader 
policy (representative of the higher ‘quartet’ of levels) - for example, as seen during 
the Suez Crisis in 1956.64 As former Royal Artillery officer, Ronald Lewin has noted: 
‘It is interesting to observe how McLachlan [in his Room 39 (1968)] and Sir Kenneth 
[Strong in his Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer (London: 
Cassell, 1968)] … [b]oth quite firmly place the “agent” or “spy”, the denizens of the 
world of John le Carré, at a very low level in the Intelligence pyramid.’65 Indeed, in 
the world of intelligence, the lower/micro- operational/tactical and individual (as 
professional)/personal levels frequently emerge as the most important. Often they 
constitute the key levels over the other considerations and levels in the intelligence 
liaison relationship. Here, the ‘specifics’, including involving personal reverberating 
issues of ‘trust’ and ‘betrayal’, do matter over ‘broader’ considerations. This situation 
arises not least because a valuable ‘commodity’ for all parties, intelligence itself - 
together with particular sources and operations, as well as the interactions being 
conducted over them - are all at stake in dynamic contexts. 
Ultimately, generally the ideal ‘condition’, ‘status’, ‘balance’ or ‘trade-off’66 
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sought across all these levels of analysis is one of ‘operational policy’ – namely 
policies that function as intended. This figures in the form of a modus vivendi, which 
effectively fuses (or most harmoniously connects) together the identified high and 
low quartets of levels and each of their respective inputs. Indeed, as its name of 
‘operational policy’ suggests, this is also an overall condition that effectively 
demonstrates the primacy and importance of the lower/micro levels, as well as their 
contribution, to that overarching arrangement. For intelligence, the ideal condition of 
‘operational policy’ striven for is that of ‘optimised reach’, encompassing both the 
phenomena of ‘inner-reach’ (internal) and ‘outreach’ (external).67 For intelligence 
liaison, this ideal condition or modus vivendi figures as that of ‘optimised outreach’. 
 
[See figure 2, below, for further explanation] 
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[Figure 2]: Levels of analysis and framework for evaluating relations and analysing key 
trends. 
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[4.2]: Which Anglo-American relations ‘school’ and why? 
Overall, this study is representative of being ‘functionalism’-dominated. 
‘Evangelicalism’ is also present, but, on the whole, it is subordinate. ‘Terminalism’ is 
further subordinate, and only occasionally and fleetingly emerges in more of an 
‘isolated’ form, before being quickly ‘contained’. This appears to be the most 
appropriate general position to adopt, given the ‘functional’-nature of issues 
explored in the case studies – for example, counter-terrorism and WMD non-
/counter-proliferation. In addition, this position directly mirrors/correlates with the 
nature of the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship itself. This study, too, reflects a 
‘complex co-existence plurality’ of the ‘evangelical’, ‘functional’, and ‘terminal’. The 
overall balance between these varies depending on which particular ‘aspect’ of the 
relationship is being scrutinised and at which moment in time. 
 
[4.3]: Which body of theory is most appropriate to draw upon and why? 
As already demonstrated in Chapter 1 [9.1], international intelligence liaison is a 
‘complex co-existence plurality’ of aspects of several different theories. To aid 
understanding, we have to deploy a complicated combination of these aspects both 
at and across all the identified levels of analysis to explain the different dimensions 
of intelligence liaison. This reflects its amalgamated quality.68 The limits of these 
bodies of theory in relation to intelligence liaison have also been demonstrated. 
Where each of the various theories fit into the eight attributes or variables of 
intelligence liaison has been suggested. To further explain intelligence liaison 
comprehensively, attempts towards directly developing an original tailor-made 
theory of its own are useful. In the chapters that unfold later in this study, these 
attempts are presented. First, however, a review of the background literature on 
intelligence liaison generally, and on UK-US intelligence liaison relations more 
specifically, is helpful. This forms the subject of the next chapter. 
 
• • • 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
Intelligence liaison ~ an under~researched subject 
suffering from a dearth of theory? 
 
 
The literature on foreign intelligence liaison – one of the most tightly kept secrets in this 
invisible world – uniformly indicates that intelligence sharing does occur, but within strict 
confines and always laced with ambivalence and caution. 
- L.K. Johnson, US intelligence scholar1 
 
 
[1.0]: Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the diverse literature on intelligence liaison. 
Specific focus is on the writing on one of the better (if not best) known intelligence 
liaison relationships, the Anglo-American (UK-US). This approach with a focus on 
the bilateral level has been adopted, as currently the most effective intelligence 
liaison evidently takes place here. Meanwhile, intelligence liaison is developing more 
slowly and extends less far at the multilateral level – for example, as witnessed in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).2 
 This chapter begins by surveying how UK-US intelligence liaison is 
conceptualised in some of the significant bodies of relevant literature. Firstly, the 
general literature on Anglo-American relations is examined. Secondly, the more 
specialist general literature on intelligence liaison - particularly that which draws (to 
varying extents) on examples and episodes of UK-US intelligence liaison, along with 
more specific research monographs and case study texts, as well as the non-fiction 
literature focussing more on UK-US intelligence liaison, will be scrutinised; thirdly, 
this chapter will focus on how UK-US intelligence liaison is portrayed in fiction and 
popular culture, followed, fourthly, by a brief survey of mainly the UK media (and 
less specialist) literature on UK-US intelligence liaison, which reaches a wider public 
audience. Finally, some concluding observations are presented. An analysis of this 
work also allows us to begin to identify several different ‘schools’, within which to 
start ‘codifying’ some of the different work drawn upon throughout this study. 
Indeed, those schools are used in part to help inform the structuring of this chapter. 
However, before surveying the literature, some contextualisation is helpful. 
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[2.0]: Contextualising the literature 
 
Investigating intelligence liaison requires more research effort. Often and 
persistently the most secret area of intelligence, it needs to be probed in depth.3 This 
is particularly the case as currently intelligence liaison is being used more 
extensively than previously, and as in parallel this trend is generating a substantial 
accountability deficit. As US intelligence scholar Bradford Westerfield argued in 
1995: ‘Liaison stands out as having been one of the least sufficiently studied aspects 
of the entire [intelligence] field.’4 Today in 2008, while that paucity of scholarship has 
been better addressed, there is still plenty of scope for research to be undertaken 
concerning the phenomenon of intelligence liaison. Partly as a consequence of 
intelligence liaison on the whole suffering from a lack of sustained study, currently it 
also remains under-theorised in the field of intelligence studies. Moreover, it 
continues to be remarkably disconnected from international relations (IR) theory. 
This is perhaps most mystifying when the ubiquitous presence, and indeed 
importance, of international intelligence liaison relationships in international affairs 
is considered. The domain of international intelligence liaison therefore emerges as 
the best in which to connect IR theory with the wider discipline of intelligence 
studies. This is not least because, both in theory and practice, international 
intelligence liaison involves a plethora of characteristics that are all closely associated 
with international relations. Significantly, these include intelligence alliances, 
clandestine diplomacy and transnational relationships.  
Around 2003, UK intelligence historian Christopher Andrew judged 
intelligence studies as a whole to be ‘under-theorised’.5 This echoed former US 
intelligence oversight practitioners, Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, who 
observed in 2002, that: ‘If intelligence is becoming a recognized field of academic 
study, especially in the English-speaking world, its theoretical treatment remains 
undeveloped.’6 Andrew continued: ‘But though intelligence theory is thin on the 
ground, the work of at least a handful of scholars, notably in Britain that of Michael 
Herman, gives grounds for guarded optimism…’7 Added to Herman’s efforts,8 as 
well as those of US intelligence scholars Michael Handel and Richard K. Betts, are 
also the recent attempts at addressing the thinness of theory in intelligence studies 
by Loch K. Johnson and several others.9 Such efforts have prompted another UK 
intelligence scholar, Philip Davies, to argue more recently that: ‘Intelligence studies 
are not “under-theorized”…’10  
Indeed, what we see here is unevenness in the theoretical realm. Therefore, it 
is arguably most appropriate to judge the overall field of intelligence studies as being 
essentially ‘haphazardly-researched’, and thus, by logical extension, ‘haphazardly-
theorised’. This condition partly stems from intelligence studies being a specialist 
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niche field of study that has emerged out of a wide range of fields of study. These 
include (at a minimum) the fields of strategic studies, international history, law and 
sociology.11 Some dimensions, such as intelligence liaison, are under-theorised. 
Meanwhile, other dimensions of intelligence and closely associated 
phenomena/entities - such as surveillance and the tactics of surprise and deception - 
over time have enjoyed considerably more efforts expended on their study and 
theorising.12 Comparatively, the academic study of intelligence is a new 
phenomenon,13 while comprehensive chapters focussing solely on intelligence are 
still in the early stages of breaking through into more mainstream textbooks.14 As 
Canadian intelligence scholar, Wesley Wark, has helpfully observed about the 
evolution of the literature on intelligence generally:  
 
A substantial literature on intelligence did not begin to emerge until the last 
quarter of the twentieth century. Writing on intelligence began from a 
relatively narrow base. It was sparked in the beginning by a historical 
fascination with newly released documentation on the impact of signals 
intelligence during World War II, the famous story of Ultra, and 
contemporary concerns about intelligence abuses, particularly in the 
conduct of covert operations. Since the mid-1970s, the literature on 
intelligence has grown exponentially and moved well beyond its original 
interests. Intelligence now has at least the outlines of a usable past, with a 
library of case studies, national histories, and synoptic studies waiting the 
reader.15 
 
Intelligence liaison is a further specialist niche sub-field of intelligence 
studies. Therefore, in its current under-studied (albeit beginning to be better 
addressed) and under-theorised condition, it is even less systematically and even 
further haphazardly studied than intelligence as a whole.16 This is also the case when 
it is compared with at least some other specific or associated dimensions of 
intelligence. While frequently referred to in passing, such as in the media, 
intelligence liaison is then rarely probed in further depth. Sensational news stories of 
success, scandal or failure provide the most frequent openings for these generally 
cursory and fragmented empirical references to liaison.17 Moreover, while much 
individual research into the various specific components composing the different 
dimensions of intelligence liaison may have been completed (see below [4.0]), fewer 
efforts at the comprehensive fusion of these under the scope of the intelligence 
liaison phenomenon have subsequently been undertaken. Furthermore, in chapters 
focussing on intelligence, the phenomenon of intelligence liaison is not evaluated 
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separately or highlighted as an entity in its own right. This emphasises its greater 
supporting role, its behind-the-scenes operation, and assumed characteristics.18 
Generally, even intelligence studies texts themselves do not assist in 
addressing the dearth of a systematic focus on liaison. For instance, this is evident in 
volumes such as those edited by US intelligence scholar Roy Godson. These 
essentially emphasise using the intelligence cycle model as the basis for a functional 
approach to the study of intelligence. However, by adopting this approach, they tend 
towards overlooking intelligence liaison as an individual dimension of intelligence 
worthy of having its own chapter. This is because, as already seen in Chapter 1 [5.0] 
of this study, liaison does not neatly fit into a specific category of the intelligence 
cycle. Instead, it is more subsumed throughout. Perhaps unconsciously, through 
their earlier fragmenting and dispersal of the various components of liaison through 
using the framing approach of the intelligence cycle model lens, pioneering works in 
intelligence studies have helped contribute towards shaping a form of orthodoxy in 
the way that intelligence is studied and presented in its literature. More recently, the 
Handbook of Intelligence Studies, edited by US intelligence scholar Loch K. Johnson and 
published in 2007, similarly adopts this approach with an emphasis on the 
intelligence cycle as a way of setting the study’s parameters and priorities. Therefore, 
Johnson’s volume also continues to propagate the observed omission concerning 
liaison in the general intelligence literature. This is perhaps all the more remarkable, 
firstly, given the book’s general strong emphasis on accountability and oversight 
concerns in the world of intelligence; and, secondly, when confronted by the fact that 
in recent years (as is explored by this literature review), a sizeable body of literature 
solely devoted to intelligence liaison as a distinct, and indeed significant, 
phenomenon and dimension of intelligence is now beginning to become increasingly 
emergent.19 
Theories of intelligence liaison are lacking for several reasons. Firstly, this is 
due to intelligence liaison being the most secret area of intelligence conducted in an 
‘invisible world.’20 Rigorous investigation of intelligence liaison is also officially 
discouraged, as is readily apparent from the British Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS/MI6) website (see Chapter 2 [2.1.ii], above).21 Moreover, as UK intelligence 
scholars Len Scott and Peter Jackson note, ‘… despite the valuable start made by 
pioneers, this is a field that has not received systematic study by either political 
scientists or historians.’22 The intense secrecy surrounding intelligence liaison 
arguably contributes towards discouraging scholars from investigating and engaging 
with the often off-putting methodological restrictions associated with researching 
such a phenomenon. Intelligence liaison is also an under-studied sub-field further 
complicated by the fact that on the whole the literature has developed in a 
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haphazard rather than linear fashion. There is an array of different perspectives and 
approaches deployed, ranging from short- to long-term historical to contemporary, 
and insider to outsider. There is additionally little room for consensus as is 
demonstrated by the observation by one of its foremost commentators that 
‘perspectives on the inner workings of intelligence alliances [being only one aspect] 
differ sharply.’23 The research undertaken for this study supports that conclusion. 
Where intelligence liaison figures in the general Anglo-American relations literature 
will now be considered. 
 
 
[3.0]: Intelligence liaison in general Anglo-American relations literature 
 
In the general literature on Anglo-American relations, the writing on the intelligence 
dimension is thin. More specifically, the writing detailing UK-US intelligence liaison 
is much thinner still. This is surprising given the widespread acknowledged 
importance of intelligence to the overall Anglo-American relationship. A comparison 
with the space and depth allocated to other equally specialist issues, such as nuclear 
weapons and relations throws this observation into sharp relief. When the wider 
intelligence dimension does appear, it is usually only covered in a cursory manner, 
and then often subsumed within general discussions of defence relations. In other 
areas it rarely gets featured.24 The thin coverage of intelligence is partly down to 
confronting the well-documented methodological challenges (as discussed in Chapter 
2 [2.0], above).25 However, these methodological concerns alone do not sufficiently 
explain the dearth. This is especially the case more recently when generalists 
themselves can draw upon an increasingly substantial body of specific and specialist 
literature by intelligence experts discussing the Anglo-American intelligence 
dimension.26 Therefore, the neglect and under-emphasis of the intelligence 
dimension in the general studies is likely to be explained, at least in part, by what 
Christopher Andrew terms ‘cognitive dissonance – the difficulty of adapting 
traditional notions of international relations and political history to take account of 
the information now available about the role of intelligence agencies.’ He continues: 
‘One striking example of this conceptual failure concerns SIGINT, a word still 
curiously absent from the great majority of histories of international relations… few 
[historians] stop to consider the influence of SIGINT on the rest of the twentieth 
century.’27  
In Anglo-American relations studies, the importance of the wider intelligence 
dimension is recognised. Still, most references to it remain brief. This trend, to 
varying degrees, is particularly noticeable in the significant works on Anglo-
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 101 
Americans relations.28 All these works, however, say very little about UK-US 
intelligence liaison per se and fail to unravel it in substantial depth.29 
 The subordination of intelligence as a whole in analyses of Anglo-American 
relations may also stem from the observation that intelligence co-operation ‘was 
nevertheless subordinate to themes such as atomic cooperation.’30 It may also reflect 
the fact that intelligence is a ‘specialité’,31 with intelligence liaison being a ‘specialité of 
a specialité’. Simultaneously, intelligence studies is located more marginally on the 
periphery of the mainstream fields of international relations and international 
history, and thus is not so fully integrated with them. This is despite having once 
partly emerged from them, while being fused in an interdisciplinary manner with 
other associated fields of inquiry. 
Furthermore, intelligence as a whole can remain a completely ‘missing 
dimension’ in some works.32 Of course there are exceptions to this overall trend of 
intelligence dimension under-emphasis or absence.33 The works with greater 
emphasis on the intelligence dimension help contribute towards counterbalancing 
and beginning to reverse the general observed scenario as the 1990s progressed. 
Albeit unevenly, the underemphasised intelligence dimension gradually does feature 
more substantially. It gets some more commensurate space allocated in the Anglo-
American relations literature. This trend can be seen as following closely behind the 
trend of intelligence studies as a whole beginning to flourish more during the 1990s 
and into the new millennium. Thus ‘generalists’ can now draw upon an increasing 
wealth of gradually joining-up and connective specialist intelligence literature, which 
offers more substantive insights and sustained analyses. This also aids the beginning 
of the formulation of generalisations and the recognition of trends relating to the 
intelligence dimension.34 Although here it can also be argued that the sections 
devoted solely to intelligence in the general Anglo-American relations literature 
continue to remain relatively brief and fragmentary. They could be extended further, 
exploring the themes in greater depth. Consequently, UK-US intelligence liaison in 
all its complexity continues to be under-studied. 
After 9/11 and the subsequent greater prominence of intelligence issues, the 
intelligence dimension could no longer be overlooked in general studies. The 
specialist area of intelligence moved into the mainstream. In John Dumbrell’s article, 
‘The US-UK “Special Relationship” in a World Twice Transformed’, the intelligence 
dimension undeniably gets a higher profile in his analysis. It moves out from more 
special, self-contained sections into featuring regularly and interspersed throughout 
the main body.35 This change is hardly surprising. The article addresses the recent 
inescapable experience of the contemporary early twenty-first century period. Here, 
in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US and during subsequent events in 
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the so-called ‘War on Terror’, key intelligence issue areas - such as terrorism and 
WMD proliferation concerns - have featured largely. Empirically, prominent 
intelligence issues have been unable to be missed and hence unable to be ignored. In 
this context, intelligence has moved out from the secret hidden periphery and more 
to the centre. It has undeniably been placed under a greater spotlight. Furthermore, 
as the official historian of the JIC Michael Goodman notes, these events ‘have 
ensured that intelligence is now taken as part and parcel of government.’36 Yet, again 
UK-US intelligence liaison more specifically remains essentially unexplored in any 
greater depth. Interestingly, even in the second edition of Dumbrell’s book, A Special 
Relationship, published in 2006, the section focussing specifically on ‘intelligence co-
operation’ still remains in a comparatively minor key. It figures merely as a small 
subsection in chapter 7, presented in compound with ‘Nuclear Defence’.37 Works that 
adopt this approach can be appropriately categorised as being located within a 
‘superficial’ sub-school of the ‘characterisation’ school of literature (summarised as 
‘superficial-characterisation’) covering the theme of UK-US intelligence liaison.38 
The particular school of thought relating to the status and ‘specialness’ of 
Anglo-American relations also has relevance here. The schools of ‘evangelicalism’, 
‘functionalism’ and ‘terminalism’, as identified by Alex Danchev in his On 
Specialness, and to which writing in this field can be assigned (see Chapter 2 [4.0]), are 
useful indicators of the importance and space allocated to the intelligence dimension 
in the general studies. The intelligence dimension is often perceived as being the 
most ‘special’ aspect of the overarching UK-US alliance, contributing to the 
importance accorded to it throughout the literature, whatever the medium.39 In the 
‘terminal’ school, where ‘endism’ to ‘specialness’ is argued, it is observed that the 
role of intelligence is underplayed or absent. Here, Coker’s 1992 article would fit.40 
By contrast, in the writing assignable to the other schools, the wider intelligence 
dimension enjoys increasing emphasis and a higher profile. This is discernable in 
namely the ‘evangelical’ school - where the role of emotional, personal ties and 
sentiment are especially emphasised - and the ‘functional’ school – where there were 
specific functional purposes behind Anglo-American relations (such as during the 
Second World War when staving-off the Axis Powers and during the Cold War, 
when confronting the Soviet/Communist threat), and where the role of sentiment is 
less emphasised. This trend is also seen in ‘functional’ works such as those by John 
Dumbrell and David Reynolds.41 Yet, despite acknowledging the undeniable 
importance of the UK-US intelligence links, their treatment of that dimension 
continues to remain largely fragmentary and terse at best. Frequently, it, too, soon 
merges with, and becomes overtaken by, their exploration of the nuclear dimension 
of UK-US relations.42 Again, these works can be seen as effectively reflecting the 
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‘superficial-characterisation’ school of the literature on UK-US intelligence liaison. 
Overall, for a more in-depth and ‘joined-up’ analysis of UK-US intelligence liaison, 
the specialist literature on intelligence liaison relationships has to be consulted. 
 
 
[4.0]: General intelligence liaison literature & its portrayals of UK-US interactions 
 
There is a small body of specialist literature that explores intelligence liaison 
generally. This body of literature is gradually growing and to varying degrees it 
draws upon examples and episodes of UK-US intelligence liaison. It is this literature 
that starts to provide a fuller and more substantial discussion of UK-US intelligence 
liaison in all of its differing guises. Also through the literature examined here, the 
full range of different perspectives and approaches begin to emerge. 
In the early 1990s, the study and understanding of the sub-field of 
intelligence liaison as a whole was still in the early stages of development. This was 
especially so when compared to the studies of particular intelligence communities 
themselves that had been published.43 Therefore, the sub-field’s ability to impart 
substantial ‘knowledge’ and even suggest policy-orientated solutions was arguably 
distinctly minimal. In the autumn of 1990, US national security scholar Jeffrey T. 
Richelson helped to address the dearth of understanding. He accomplished this by 
examining when intelligence liaison takes place.44 A more ‘substantive’ sub-school 
was emerging in the ‘characterisation’ school of literature. In his article, Richelson 
takes a general approach to examining intelligence liaison, by drawing upon several 
different intelligence liaison relationships. This article serves as a useful introduction 
into the major themes relating to intelligence liaison, through particularly 
introducing ‘types’, as well as potential ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’.  
Shortly afterwards, articles by US authors Arthur Hulnick and James Wirtz 
were also published.45 They, too, added valuably to the ‘substantive-characterisation’ 
school. All these early-Post-Cold War works can be seen as relatively pioneering, as 
they focussed more specifically and systematically on intelligence liaison as a sub-
field of intelligence studies. They also provided more of a contemporary perspective 
and some future insights, albeit dominated by the US angle. This stands in contrast 
to being overwhelmingly historical in their focus, or else involving mere fleeting 
references to intelligence liaison – those that are scattered more widely and buried in 
general intelligence studies texts or various memoirs, such as in Joseph Burkholder 
Smith’s Portrait of a Cold Warrior and Ray S. Cline’s Secrets, Spies and Scholars: 
Blueprint of the Essential CIA.46 We might add that especially others ‘in-the-know’ do 
not always universally welcome these exposés.47 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 104 
Hulnick’s article is a useful contribution to the literature. It brings to the fore 
the importance of intelligence liaison and asks the question of ‘what next for 
intelligence liaison?’ in the wake of the Cold War. It can also be identified as an early 
contribution from a US intelligence practitioner, providing an analysis from an 
‘insider’ perspective. Moreover, it arguably provides some authoritative testimony in 
the general spirit of the ‘greater openness of US society with regard to intelligence 
matters.’48 As a result of his position as an intelligence officer, Hulnick is naturally 
unable to confirm or deny or reveal inner, classified and detailed specifics.49 Instead 
he only reveals essentially generic insights into intelligence liaison and its associated 
concerns. In the article, Hulnick articulates the wider and very public prevailing 
concerns of the time, those of the early-Post-Cold War era and their arguably 
disproportionate fascination with matters of ‘economic espionage’.50 He begins to 
address the controversial issue of ‘friends spying on friends’.51 Once the 
Soviet/Communist threat of the Cold War era had eroded and before the plethora of 
more pressing amorphous Post-Cold War era security concerns had filled up 
agendas by the mid-1990s onwards, Peter Schweizer noted that economics had 
become the new focus of concern: ‘Economic strength is increasingly seen by US 
officials as a critical measure of national power and an important determinant of 
national security…’ and, raising the theme of ‘friends spying on friends’, he argued 
that: ‘Espionage between friends is likely to continue to grow as long as economics is 
seen as an aspect of national security because technology is becoming the new 
determinant of national power.’52  
Wirtz’s article is similarly a helpful contribution to this new wave of 
literature. It partly addresses how the intelligence community will adjust to the new 
context of the Post-Cold War era. This was then an issue of much concern, especially 
within intelligence communities, as Cold War budgets and staffing levels were being 
heavily cut.53 He also provides some further insights into the complexities of 
intelligence liaison and into a few of the controversies it can engender, especially at 
the domestic level. The constraints these can impose upon the modus operandi of 
intelligence agencies in the future are simultaneously presented. These issues are still 
very relevant and resonate today. This is amid the concerns surrounding the use of 
intelligence material obtained by ‘intensive/enhanced interrogation’ techniques, 
alleged to be ‘torture’, and through the use of ‘extraordinary rendition’ tactics.54 By 
focussing more closely on the domestic constraints on intelligence collaboration, he can 
explore this dimension of intelligence liaison in some greater depth than the 
previous authors, who adopted more of a general approach. In the process, the 
related question of how far such modus operandi can be opportunistically exploited is 
also valuably suggested. He concludes that: ‘intelligence collaboration is no 
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panacea… [particularly guarding] against the domestic political backlash that 
cooperative arrangements can generate…’55 if uncovered. Again, another insight is 
offered into why this area of intelligence continues to be shrouded in intense secrecy, 
as well as why the maintenance of caution is essential, especially when dealing with 
‘unsavoury’ intelligence partners. Later, in 2002, UK scholar Richard Aldrich raised 
this last theme vividly in an article on ‘dangerous liaisons’ during the ‘War on 
Terror’ (see below). 
During 1996, the subfield of intelligence liaison was more fully established. In 
that year, there were two significant publications: (i) H. Bradford Westerfield’s article 
‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’56 and (ii) a chapter examining 
‘intelligence cooperation’ in a book by retired UK intelligence practitioner Michael 
Herman.57 Both these works can be seen as adopting ‘functional’ approaches, and 
emphasise that intelligence liaison is more akin to a business relationship, where the 
role of sentiment is less stressed. They can also be seen as early, although limited, 
attempts to theorise intelligence liaison. These texts similarly extended the quality of 
texts that can be seen as appropriately belonging to the ‘substantive’ vein of the 
‘characterisation’ school. In this manner, together with their sustained analysis of 
liaison, they contributed significantly to the further enhancement of the overall body 
of literature examining intelligence liaison. 
From the outset, Westerfield makes more of a concentrated attempt than the 
previous authors to define ‘liaison’ clearly and precisely. This aids subsequent 
analysis efforts, as well as our understanding of intelligence liaison as more of a 
distinct phenomenon.58 He also notes the under-studied status of liaison,59 and 
emphasises its importance.60 Significantly, he identifies and lists eight ‘forms and 
risks of liaison collaboration’, which, though by no means exclusive, helps the 
process of starting to ‘codify’ and categorise the different characteristics of liaison 
more precisely than earlier works. Westerfield also briefly touches upon the 
contemporary concern of ‘liaison and “spying on friends”’, playing down the role of 
sentiment in his analysis. In his conclusion, Westerfield notes that international 
intelligence liaison is essentially a form of ‘secret international relations’ and 
captures a significant, yet at times overlooked, feature of intelligence liaison, namely 
that it: ‘…deserves attention as an important component of all parts of a broad 
spectrum of policy instruments, except open diplomacy.’61 However, Westerfield’s 
article is constrained by the process of merely listing the ‘functions’ of liaison. These 
are only partially helpful when trying to explain comprehensively the fuller question 
of why intelligence liaison occurs. The what and how dimensions are effectively 
explained in some detail, but in this article, Westerfield goes no further than 
supplying a superficial insight into the underlying and deeper rationale for American 
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intelligence liaison. This article provides the closest we have to a ‘definition’ of 
liaison, although it is more akin to a functional typology. Therefore, while a good 
starting point, further efforts are required to expand upon his findings.62 
Similarly to Westerfield, Herman’s analysis of intelligence liaison has some 
discernable shortcomings. While undoubtedly a valuable contribution to the 
literature, it does lack some dimensions of intelligence liaison. These deserve to be 
explored. Other than reference to ‘intangibles’, most notably absent appears to be an 
explicit exploration of the dimension of sentiment, personal relations and bonhomie. 
Undeniably, these do have a role to play in intelligence liaison, particularly when it is 
considered in its most ‘informal’ incarnation. Although, to what extent does vary 
according to circumstances, and - similarly to when analysing the impact of cultural 
factors - is difficult to evaluate precisely, and so remains extensively debated.63 
Instead, Herman highlights the easier to capture and more ‘formal’ business 
relationship characteristic, even deploying the vernacular of business. He comes to a 
conclusion that: ‘For most powers – including even the US superpower – part of the 
national intelligence effort is the quid pro quo for what is received from partners and 
clients.’ Aspects of this conclusion would later be echoed and explored partially 
further by the more recent work of Lefebvre and Clough in 2003 and 2004 (see 
below).  
Herman continues his evaluation of intelligence liaison with the assertion 
that: ‘Cooperation with foreign agencies is often rooted in historical links [as 
explored by the historical bodies of work on intelligence liaison64] and other 
intangibles, but there is usually a bottom line of national professional-technical self-
interest. Overseas liaisons are ultimately sets of professional bargains…’65 This 
observation also suggests that intelligence is a product or commodity which can be 
traded through the carefully negotiated business-like intelligence liaison. Also, 
unlike Westerfield, according to UK scholar Martin S. Alexander, the theme of 
‘economic and industrial intelligence and spying upon friends… is fascinatingly and 
strikingly absent…’66 However, it can equally be argued that Herman and his 
contribution were unusually ‘ahead of the curve’ of the rest of the existing literature. 
His contribution appears to be more focussed on the plethora of ‘higher’ Post-Cold 
War security concerns that were beginning to bite by the mid-1990s. This included 
the very real prospect of WMD terrorism, vividly witnessed with the Tokyo 
underground Sarin attack in 1995.67 
By 1998, more of a descendant ‘critical’ school was beginning to emerge from 
the ‘substantive-characterisation’ school of literature. Martin S. Alexander et al,68 
focussed more specifically and systematically on the ‘friends spying on friends’ 
dimension of intelligence liaison. This was a theme more briefly dealt with in some 
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of the earlier work.69 Alongside his own useful survey of the literature in this sub-
field, Alexander declares that: ‘a major objective of the present collection is to 
promote the examination and understanding of what may still reasonably be termed 
the “missing dimension to the missing dimension”.’70 Here, a ‘French school’, namely 
an additional and ‘French perspective’ on liaison, consisting of Le Goyet, is 
identified.71 This helps to bring into the discussion on intelligence liaison more 
under-considered ideas. The perhaps often overlooked role of military/defence 
attachés is brought in by the ‘French perspective’, reminding us that intelligence 
liaison is multifaceted and considerably more than the commonly assumed links 
solely at the intelligence agencies’ level.72 Another interesting insight is provided into 
the plethora of conceptual problems - ‘…is intelligence collection and assessment 
against one’s friends and allies mostly subsumed in activities that would not be 
immediately considered intelligence as such?’73, and thus lower on intelligence 
agency agendas? There is also substantial consideration of several methodological 
problems that challenge researchers studying in this sub-field of intelligence studies - 
notably concerning a lack of sources to trace, and the consideration that those that do 
exist are less likely to be declassified.74  
The early years of the twenty-first century have seen the proliferation of 
literature on intelligence liaison. This mirrors the exponential growth in intelligence 
liaison witnessed after the 9/11 attacks and during the ‘War on Terror’. Significantly, 
the authors of the more recent articles agree that intelligence liaison is important, 
echoing the earlier authors’ assertions. There is also a consensus that further 
intelligence liaison is needed to help tackle the global security challenges. They also 
add that there already is, and that there is likely going to be into the future, 
quantitatively more intelligence liaison taking place. However, they add that 
vigilance simultaneously needs to be maintained.75 In terms of schools of literature 
focussed on UK-US intelligence interactions, within the ‘critical’ school, a sub-school 
that can be readily described as being ‘advocate/optimistic’ in its reflective nature 
was now beginning to flourish. 
Towards the end of 2002, a substantial addition to this latter dimension of the 
literature emerged. There was the publication of a short but wide-ranging article on 
intelligence liaison by Richard J. Aldrich in the Harvard International Review.76 He 
begins by highlighting that: ‘intelligence alliances are often highly secretive and 
consequently poorly understood...’, and, through adopting a critical approach, he 
cautions that some of the post-9/11 intelligence alliances during the ‘War on Terror’ 
could be considered ‘dangerous liaisons’.77 This arose as ‘September 11 blurred the 
boundaries between friends and enemies even more, as Western agencies have now 
teamed up with unlikely partners…’ Aldrich conveys a substantial contemporary 
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perspective on and evaluation of post-9/11 intelligence alliances, as well as 
attempting to look beyond the intense secrecy surrounding them. He concludes with: 
‘Perhaps the world of intelligence alliances constitutes a place where ideas and 
knowledge have real power and where cooperative exchange has always been 
viewed as a public good.’78 In the process, the potential value of greater intelligence 
liaison is emphasised, while simultaneously reminding us of the potential pitfalls. 
This article is a further significant development in the literature as it offers the first 
attempt to connect intelligence liaison with international relations (IR) theory. 
Intelligence liaison as consisting of a ‘duality’ of ‘realism’ and ‘liberal 
institutionalism’ is posited. 
Alongside, former Canadian defence analyst Stéphane Lefebvre’s article 
published in 2003 further adds to expanding the ‘critical’ yet ‘advocate/optimistic’ 
dimensions of the literature. Similarly to the former Director General of the British 
Security Service (MI5), Sir Stephen Lander, and other authors writing on 
contemporary issues in the intelligence liaison sub-field, he stresses that the nature of 
al-Qaeda and the related global security threats ‘implies that their detection, 
disruption, and elimination can succeed fully if done globally.’79 He, too, emphasises 
that ‘although intelligence liaison activities are rarely discussed, their importance 
needs to be recognised.’80 Overall, Lefebvre provides another detailed contemporary 
insight into intelligence liaison. He demonstrates that writing on this topic has now 
matured sufficiently to start allowing the tabling of viable policy-orientated 
solutions. His article concludes by highlighting that international intelligence liaison 
- in both bilateral and multilateral forms - will be deployed widely during the ‘War 
on Terror’, while: ‘the key for US intelligence agencies, as well as for other agencies 
involved in the worldwide fight against terrorism, will be to find the right quid pro 
quo…’81 
In 2004, the ‘advocate/optimistic’ vein of the ‘critical’ school was enhanced 
further. Building on Lefebvre’s contribution, Canadian intelligence scholar Martin 
Rudner’s article took this approach further. He enhances the literature by raising the 
little considered ‘question of probity’, hinting at the often absent theme of 
intelligence liaison oversight and accountability. He additionally emphasises a core 
paradox that continually vexes intelligence liaison, namely that ‘the secrecy that 
cloaks intelligence cooperation can also pose dilemmas for national sovereignty and 
cooperative security’.82 This manifests itself particularly during the critical times 
when transparency is needed, not least to facilitate the successful sharing and 
exchange of information and intelligence. Throughout the article, in great depth, 
Rudner focusses specifically on one of the key contemporary rationales for 
intelligence liaison: namely the hunt for al-Qaeda and related jihadist terrorist 
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groups.83 He concludes by tabling the ‘Asymmetric Warfare Risk Paradigm… [which 
is seen as] especially conducive to international cooperation…’84 In the process, he 
presents an effective tool for helping conceptualise the ways intelligence liaison can 
address the security problems currently faced. Rudner also exposes other forms of 
international intelligence liaison arrangements. The multilateral level is 
disaggregated, distinguishing between those and other more ‘plurilateral’ 
arrangements.85 This serves to highlight further the levels of complexity of the 
several overlapping and intricately intertwined international intelligence liaison 
arrangements that currently exist. 
The ‘advocate/optimistic-critical’ school in the literature meanwhile received 
a further contribution. In an article in the July 2004 issue of International Affairs, 
Aldrich presented another argument worthy of consideration. He argued that 
despite the acute importance of intelligence liaison, ‘transatlantic intelligence 
cooperation continues to present awkward challenges… because there is a 
fundamental tension between an increasingly networked world … and highly 
compartmentalised national intelligence-gathering…’, which ultimately slows down 
the process of greater intelligence liaison.86 In his conclusion, Aldrich also underlines 
the acute significance and relevance of intelligence liaison today. He highlights why 
it needs to be better understood, and why it deserves further attention from scholars 
adopting a contemporary approach, including those who are more willing to battle 
the methodological challenges.87 Simultaneously, he questions whether greater 
sharing of intelligence between states generates convergent policy. This effect is often 
assumed by politicians, but does not appear to be born out in practice.88 
The impact of the European dimension on UK-US intelligence liaison is 
noteworthy. Contemporaneously with and partly due to the European Parliamentary 
inquiry into ‘ECHELON’, there were some UK-US-Europe tensions concerning UK-
US intelligence liaison. These were exposed most starkly around 1999-2001. Some of 
these tensions were captured in the literature in UK researcher Charles Grant’s 
Intimate Relations.89 Grant highlighted a key dilemma: the UK’s European or US 
dimension thwarting the other, in an ‘either/or’ manner.90 Furthermore, Grant 
argued that officials essentially perceived that there was not a Europe or US ‘choice’ 
to be made by the UK: ‘But some continental officials are convinced that if Europe 
becomes a significant player in foreign and defence policy, Britain will eventually 
have to confront a painful strategic dilemma…’ He added woefully: ‘But, the British 
are too insouciant…’91 Through such contributions, a ‘sceptical/pessimistic’ sub-
school was beginning to be added to the increasingly emergent ‘critical’ school of 
literature drawing on the subject of UK-US intelligence liaison. 
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These important contributions to the literature on intelligence liaison are not alone. 
Complementing the various ‘outsider’ and ‘external’ contemporary perspectives are 
two further key articles. These emerged during the early years of the twenty-first 
century, and instead provided significant ‘insider’ contemporary perspectives. 
Again, both contributed to the contemporaneous general trend in the literature - that 
of further expanding the ‘advocate/optimistic-critical’ school. 
Royal Navy Officer, Chris Clough’s central argument hangs on the phrase 
quid pro quo. This ‘…is often used within intelligence agencies to describe the 
exchange of information or analysis, implying perhaps that such exchanges are 
rarely even or equitable, but that mutual benefit will be gained over the length of a 
liaison.’92 He also underscores the importance of intelligence liaison today, arguing 
that ‘international cooperation demonstrably plays an essential role in the targeting 
and analysis of common, multinational threats.’93 Clough sees intelligence liaison as 
increasing in the future, but cautions that it is a double-edged sword. When 
compared to the work of the other contemporary authors explored, he appears to be 
somewhat more sceptical of both bilateral and multilateral intelligence 
arrangements, arguing that ‘the business of strategic intelligence will remain firmly 
wedded to national decision-making and military planning and operations.’94 
Clough’s article again refers to the familiar secrecy and methodological challenges of 
researching in the intelligence liaison sub-field. He then sets out to analyse strategic 
intelligence co-operation ‘from several perspectives.’95 Overall in the article, 
however, the multiple beneficial ‘rationales’ for intelligence liaison particularly come 
through, notably when dealing with the ‘multinational threats’ of ‘global terrorism’ 
and ‘WMD’, as well as economic factors such as ‘the cost of modern technology’. 
Some of the costs of collaboration are additionally highlighted with ‘a few negatives’, 
while more co-operation is expected. This builds on his observation that ‘intelligence 
cooperation has increased since the end of the Cold War and is likely to become 
more significant.’96 When concluding he argues that ‘Intelligence relationships will 
continue to proliferate, in both depth and breadth, adding to the many potential 
benefits of liaison, but also increasing the possibility of compromise.’97 
Sir Stephen Lander, the non-executive chair of the UK Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA) and the former DG of MI5 (1996-2002), similarly contributes a 
useful contemporary ‘insider’ perspective in his article.98 This contribution helps to 
reduce the imbalance of analyses being entirely dominated by an ‘external’ 
perspective and from being excessively academic. In his article, Lander stresses that 
‘there is a poverty of accurate public comment about intelligence sharing (or the 
alleged lack of it)…’99 He analyses international intelligence liaison from the ‘UK 
security professional’ perspective. To conclude, he makes a call for more and better 
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Western multilateral intelligence liaison arrangements, building on bilateral 
intelligence liaison arrangements: ‘I believe that the threats faced by the West are 
such that a step change in multilateral cooperation is necessary, at least on those 
issues of collective security where all are affected by the same threats.’ He also tables 
an interesting policy-orientated solution for enacting his call, a ‘new treaty for a new 
century’. Essentially, he proposes extending the UKUSA agreements to include other 
countries, notably those in Europe.100 The tone he adopts suggests one of ‘quiet 
optimism’ concerning future intelligence liaison developments. 
 
Within the overall body of literature focussing on intelligence liaison generally, the 
‘advocate/optimistic-critical’ school can be seen as being well on the ascendancy. 
Two further notable articles were published in the summer of 2006. Both focussed 
specifically on intelligence liaison. Again providing a strong US perspective, these 
articles were by US intelligence experts, Jennifer E. Sims and Derek S. Reveron. The 
first article, by Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’,101 
focusses specifically on international intelligence liaison, both the bilateral and 
multilateral varieties. With reference to the recent intelligence controversies 
surrounding 9/11 and supposed Iraqi WMD, and the associated problems and 
drawbacks observed with regard to intelligence liaison, she poses the question: ‘Is 
there reason for alarm, then, that experts continue to suggest that the principal 
means for augmenting U.S. intelligence collection on al-Qaeda should be enhanced 
reliance on liaison with foreign intelligence services?’102 Her article sets out to explore 
that question. While building on the already existing literature on intelligence 
liaison, Sims attempts to go beyond it by offering a ‘framework… [to] help 
governments manage the costs, risks and gains of intelligence operations among 
states.’103 She begins by providing a useful breakdown of the nature of the 
phenomenon.104 Again demonstrating how rapidly the literature on intelligence 
liaison has developed in recent years, especially in terms of being able to offer viable 
policy suggestions, Sims presents a section towards the end of her article offering 
‘Recommendations for U.S. conduct of the War on Terror’.105 Similarly to other 
authors, she concludes by signalling a warning concerning the ‘disadvantages of 
sharing’. She also notes that: ‘… the US government needs to balance its dependency 
with a renewed commitment to collection assets in which it has a comparative 
advantage, such as space-based platforms, and new initiatives to develop unilateral 
human sources as well.’106 Sims finishes by asserting the trend towards the greater, 
but not unbounded, sharing of intelligence.107  
Equally informative and educative is Reveron’s article. This also examines 
intelligence liaison in the ‘War on Terror’ context.108 His article and its contribution to 
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the literature, however, is much more focussed on practically assessing ‘the state of 
bilateral intelligence-sharing relationships and the challenges that need to be 
overcome.’109 Together with his generic observations concerning intelligence liaison, 
throughout his article, he, too, asserts the importance of intelligence in efforts against 
terrorism, and scrutinises the central issue of ‘Relationship management’. In his 
analysis he provides insights into ‘technical details’, the physical mechanisms 
facilitating how the observed liaison takes place - such as the presence of the Secret 
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) - as well as presenting the familiar 
overarching considerations.110 In his conclusion, Reveron rightly stresses the 
importance of ‘trust, but verify’ in intelligence liaison relationships. The powerful 
potential of well-adjusted intelligence liaison is additionally presented in the so-
called ‘War on Terror’ context, where he notes: ‘…there will always remain 
“unknown unknowns,” but intelligence cooperation should be able to expose some 
of the unknowns.’111 The idea of liaison as a constantly evolving work-in-progress in 
relation to its understanding and its use, as well as striking ‘right’ (optimised) 
balances in the highly intricate and complex trade-offs involved, is again suggested.  
The upward trajectory of the ‘advocate/optimistic-critical’ school was not 
completely hegemonic, however. The work of Alasdair Roberts constituted a 
significant and distinctive contribution to the liaison literature in 2006. More 
specifically, it enhanced the range of texts figuring in the more 
‘sceptical/pessimistic-critical’ school. In Roberts’ book, Blacked Out,112 chapter 6 on 
‘Opaque Networks’113 is especially useful to further understand international 
intelligence liaison, aspects of UK-US intelligence liaison, and the different types of 
networks that exist, such as defence networks. There is also a short subsection 
focussing on ‘International intelligence networks’.114 Although this subsection is less 
helpful for insights into the specific UK-US intelligence liaison relationship - as the 
focus is on Canada and the Arar case as an illustrative example of an international 
intelligence network in operation - it still helps to communicate the views and the 
interactions of a key UKUSA ally regarding the topic of intelligence sharing. 
Perceptively, he highlights the presence of ‘A new security architecture’ where: 
‘…there undoubtedly is a new global architecture – a new set of networks among 
national security and intelligence agencies – and this architecture includes a set of 
rules on the exchange of information that is intended to ensure that work within the 
networks cannot be easily observed by people or organizations outside the 
networks.’115 This observation helps to feed into the arguments that the overall 
greater globalisation of intelligence in the twenty-first century is tangible. 
Simultaneously, the presence of the ‘accountability deficit’ as a burgeoning and 
negative parallel is re-emphasised. 
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These were among some of the themes that were raised slightly earlier in 
2003 by Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, in their insightful book Global Intelligence.116 
Herein the ‘sceptical/pessimistic-critical’ school of literature had received another 
valuable contribution. Although now seeming a little dated in places,117 overall this is 
an interesting concise background text. Within its pages, some time-honoured trends 
that are now expanding can be readily discerned. These include training activities 
and the growth of the private sector in intelligence and security related activities.118 
Some of their conclusions, particularly ‘intelligence and accountability – bucking the 
trend?’ continue to resonate. These remain themes of enduring interest and relevance 
as the trade-offs charted continue to be acutely experienced and encountered.119 
Indeed, due to its comprehensive scope, their book forms a useful introduction to the 
subject of the globalisation of intelligence, as well as elucidating some of the complex 
connections that exist. Accordingly, their text provides a valuable starting basis from 
which to develop some aspects of this study. The globalisation-related findings of 
this study can elaborate upon Todd and Bloch’s recent historical findings, drawing 
out some of the familiar and shared themes. Moreover, this allows for the facilitation 
of a greater in-depth exploration of the phenomenon of international intelligence 
liaison and its lower levels, including the impact of globalisation on intelligence. 
 
Research monographs or specific case study texts also come to the fore. They, too, 
can contribute significantly to the literature on UK-US intelligence liaison. These 
possess a narrower focus than the wider general studies, thus allowing the more 
comprehensive covering of specialist areas, such as intelligence.120 When these 
studies examine intelligence, normally the less emphasised aspects tend, and have 
the greater potential, to emerge in the overall analysis.121 Two recent studies on 
‘peacekeeping intelligence’ can also be included in this category. Effective 
multinational intelligence liaison is essential in the peacekeeping context, and many 
practical lessons can be learnt from several episodes in the 1990s, such as Bosnia and 
Rwanda.122 Indeed, the globalised intelligence liaison required to tackle the global 
security concerns faces exactly the same challenges that peacekeeping intelligence 
has to confront. Therefore, much can be learnt from this area. Again contributing 
towards the ‘sceptical/pessimistic-critical’ school, in Dutch scholar Cees Wiebes’ 
study, a section of particular interest is focussed on ‘the problems surrounding 
intelligence liaison in Western intelligence services’. This catalogues some of the 
tensions involved in intelligence liaison relationships. A useful, concise mini-
discussion of and introduction to UK-US intelligence liaison, such as where and how 
it takes place is included, together with identifying the key trends that are observed 
in the relationship, as well as drawing on some recent commentary and valuable 
confidential interviews he has conducted.123 Some of the disadvantages and limits of 
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intelligence liaison are highlighted: notably, the ‘reliability of the information from 
the partner…’ and that ‘even within certain long standing intelligence alliances, such 
as… UKUSA… not all intelligence is automatically shared.’124 The issue of how 
dependent the UK is on the US is also addressed, with the varying claims on this 
debated issue being presented.125 
 
[4.1]: Turning the spotlight onto UK-US intelligence liaison: 
The literature that focusses more specifically and in greater depth on UK-US 
intelligence liaison will now be briefly discussed. Here the literature is sparser. 
Significantly, many of the detailed, scholarly studies are mainly historical in nature. 
In 1990, contributing to the then burgeoning ‘substantive-characterisation’ school of 
literature, the few key texts that had pioneered the more specific addressing of the 
UK-US intelligence liaison relationship could be counted on one hand. These 
essentially included: US journalist James Bamford’s The Puzzle Palace, published in 
1982; a working paper by Professor Andrew from 1987; and US national security 
scholar Jeffrey T. Richelson and Australian national security scholar Desmond Ball’s 
The Ties that Bind, which was just running to a second edition.126 It is worth noting 
that by 1998 Aldrich could still claim without exaggeration - even despite the work 
of these ‘usual suspects’ in any bibliography focussing on UK-US intelligence 
liaison127 - that: ‘… our present understanding of … [British] intelligence “liaison” 
with the United States in the postwar period leaves much to be desired.’128 Since 
then, this particular ‘gap’ has been addressed. This has been accomplished directly 
with historical work allowing greater and more holistic insights into UK-US 
intelligence liaison in the past.129 In part, the Post-Cold War opening of archives in 
London, Washington and Moscow has facilitated this development.130 In terms of 
representing the schools of literature, these different evaluations ranged across the 
full spectrum. 
Other texts have some more distinct limitations. This consideration concerns 
those that focus more specifically and in greater depth on UK-US intelligence liaison, 
and which can be well sited within the ‘substantive-characterisation’ school. 
Arguably they have become somewhat outdated by rapid developments during the 
Post-Cold War era, or are texts whose ‘accuracy’ has been challenged. For example, 
Hulnick in footnote ‘9’ of his article questions Ball and Richelson’s detailed book on 
UK-US intelligence liaison, The Ties That Bind: ‘Readers should note that … citations 
are drawn from such spurious sources as the Covert Action Information Bulletin, a 
vehicle for disinformation about US intelligence, as well as from other authors whose 
anti-CIA biases are well known.’131 UK Eyes Alpha by the BBC journalist Mark 
Urban132 - which also draws heavily on the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship 
for examples – has also been subject to some scepticism from intelligence 
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professionals concerning some of the conclusions drawn.133 How much faith, then, 
should be put into some of the more dramatic arguments made in the book, 
including: ‘More than anything else, British intelligence is a system for repackaging 
information gathered by the USA…’?134 For GCHQ this might be true, but further 
supporting evidence for such claims thus has to be garnered from elsewhere. 
More recent additions to the literature in this area include US scholar Patrick 
Radden Keefe’s book, Chatter, which focusses on the UKUSA SIGINT (signals 
intelligence) dimension of the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship,135 and UK 
journalist Michael Smith’s books The Spying Game and Killer Elite.136 The ‘added 
value’ of both Keefe’s book and those of Smith is that these works make an effort to 
bring more up-to-date, in an in-depth form, the reader’s understanding of the 
contemporary UK, US and UKUSA intelligence worlds, as well as charting their 
historical origins.  
The limitations with all these works can be readily illustrated, however. For 
example, when reading about the SIGINT relationship, a key question always 
presents itself regarding how up-to-date, accurate and insightful is the material 
divulged? Being aware of the plethora of exceedingly rapid developments in the 
computer, information technology (IT) and communications (ICT) sectors over the 
last few decades does nothing to assuage the doubts. Yet, at least arguably an 
element of credibility is present in these works. Current ICT systems and 
architectures tend to be derived from earlier incarnations, and adhere to the same or 
similar underlying thinking, in turn often shared by at least some segments of wider 
and open society as a whole. Perhaps more of a moot point is to what extent is what 
we know about SIGINT what we have been fed by the SIGINT intelligence agencies 
themselves, in order to preserve at least an aura of secrecy?137 While the exact 
accuracy of these contributions to the literature is thus questionable, on balance they 
can still be seen as having some use and value. They do offer some reflection of 
various framings of ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. The wealth of diverse sources consulted by 
these studies, the range of interviews conducted, the interview content provided, 
and the insights offered into the many methodological problems encountered when 
undertaking these types of studies, have their utility. They also boast sufficiently 
harmonisable narratives and readings of history, as well as clarifying to the reader 
the limiting parameters with which these often self-aware studies have to contend. In 
short, these texts provide the researcher with useful ‘leads’, which can then be 
followed up in their own study. 
On the whole, however, for a more contemporary insight into UK-US 
intelligence liaison during the late-1990s to date, that void is still waiting to be filled, 
with much that needs to be critically examined. For this more contemporaneous 
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period, we are currently pretty much limited to relying on the snippets and 
references that refer to UK-US intelligence liaison. These appear scattered in the 
more general works on intelligence liaison, such as those discussed above, or are 
those surfacing in the articles and revelations that feature in the media and recent 
retirees’ memoirs.138  
When surveying the specialist literature on intelligence liaison relationships, 
historical writing dominates over contemporary writing. Albeit being assuaged, this 
trend of historical-study supremacy was also highlighted in Hulnick’s article 
(examined above in [4.0]). This parallels the methodological restrictions challenging 
more contemporary analyses. As he observed: ‘…detailing more than the historical 
record is difficult indeed… the [more contemporary] literature becomes somewhat 
less authoritative…’139 Hulnick also noted that: ‘In the literature on intelligence, the 
material concerning relations between services in the West has almost always come 
from outside observers rather than from professionals.’140  
Today, there is at least a partial addressing of these concerns. We do have 
more of a discernable, and increasing, insider view, recently and gradually coming 
through in the literature. This is thanks to the valuable contributions from former 
and serving professionals and practitioners - such as those above from Sir Stephen 
Lander, the former DG of MI5, Commander Chris Clough of the Royal Navy - and 
especially from the books and articles by Michael Herman, formerly of GCHQ and a 
former Secretary to the JIC. Further ‘insider views’ regarding UK-US intelligence 
liaison, helping to remedy the overall balance, can be gleaned directly from ‘primary’ 
source material. This includes from the UK Intelligence and Security Committee’s 
(ISC) reports, available via the Cabinet Office website.141 Significantly, these allow the 
reader an insight into the more rarely seen valuable views and attitudes of 
intelligence ‘consumers’ and ‘customers’. 
Also, today, an authoritative, contemporary perspective and approach can be 
seen as considerably more viable. Recent events in international affairs and factors 
related to the rapid increasing of globalisation and technological developments (writ 
large) have helped. These include: the Internet, a greater role for OSINT (open source 
intelligence),142 and a hand-in-glove trend towards increasing openness in all areas of 
government and society as a whole - including, for example, the UK’s Waldegrave 
Initiative on Open Government from the early 1990s - which have all contributed 
towards eroding some of the methodological restrictions. 
An array of further observations can be tabled. The perspectives and 
approaches on intelligence liaison in the major literature, drawing on the work 
above, are undoubtedly Western dominated. Additionally, within the ‘Western’ 
category, these are UK-US/‘Anglo-Saxon’ dominated and orientated, and within that 
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nexus the US perspective predominates. An exception to this trend, a ‘French 
perspective’, does come through during the examination of the issue of ‘friends 
spying on friends’. This suggests that a wealth of other countries’ perspectives, 
thinking, conceptualisation and knowledge of intelligence liaison – not least those 
from other European countries and the rest of the world, such as South East Asia – is 
yet to be tapped and to make it into the mainstream English-language literature on 
intelligence liaison. For example, what do the world’s most populous countries of 
China or India think and suggest?143 As the globalisation of intelligence emerges as a 
response to the current global security concerns, considerably more ‘globalisation’ of 
the literature on intelligence liaison needs to take place in parallel. 
 
 
[5.0]: UK-US intelligence liaison as portrayed in fiction and popular culture144 
 
From the fiction and ‘popular culture’ medium, much can be garnered. Some former 
‘official’ and ‘insider’ viewpoints (or at least their derivatives) can be discovered, 
offering useful insights into the murky world of intelligence liaison. A wider public 
audience than the specialist non-fiction literature on this topic reaches can then 
access those insights. Notably, much of this work has an informed basis in reality. 
This is particularly valuable vis-à-vis the intelligence world where reality and facts, 
fantasy and fiction all become inextricably intertwined, further emphasising the 
utility of this genre. This scenario is especially apparent if the work by the prominent 
spy-writers - John le Carré, Graham Greene and Ian Fleming – is examined.  
Some substantive insights can be attained through analysing the ‘serious’ spy 
fiction of John le Carré, Graham Greene and, to a lesser extent, Ian Fleming.145 This is 
particularly the case concerning the subject of UK-US intelligence liaison, where 
source material can be difficult to access due to the presence of the many 
methodological challenges. The ‘serious’ spy fiction and popular culture genre shares 
several key themes that are found within the non-fiction literature on intelligence 
liaison. The themes can also be seen as being highlighted at least as effectively in spy 
fiction. The key themes tabled and examined by le Carré, Greene, and (at least at 
times, differently) by Fleming, include: the issues of duplicity between allies and 
‘friends spying on friends’, the central importance of trust in the UK-US relationship, 
and the decline of the UK’s postwar world position in the ‘End of Empire’ context. 
Significantly, these three authors had direct insider experience of the British 
intelligence world, and by association intelligence liaison, which they could draw 
upon. Both le Carré and Greene spent some time in MI6, and Fleming was in Naval 
Intelligence at Bletchley Park during the Second World War.146 Fleming arguably had 
the most extensive experience vis-à-vis UK-US intelligence liaison, as he, so notes 
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Thomas Price, ‘had a role in the creation of the American OSS [Office of Strategic 
Services, a precursor to the CIA during the Second World War].’147 Often their 
insights are well-informed, with quite substantial roots in and reflections of ‘actual-
reality’. The insights frequently range from referring to or echoing familiar episodes 
in actual history, to drawing upon the author’s own personal experiences of the 
British intelligence world. They also draw upon the past and contemporary wider 
socio-political and international affairs contexts surrounding them for plot 
inspiration. 
Le Carré effectively draws the reader’s attention to the centrality of so-called 
‘intangibles’ or ‘personal factors’. These exist at the lower/micro 
‘operational/tactical’ and ‘individual (as professional)/personal’ levels of analysis 
and relations. Notably, the ‘intangibles’ or individually experienced ‘personal 
factors’ are often overlooked and are difficult to encompass in the non-fiction 
literature on this topic.148 Le Carré, too, captures the central importance of the key 
themes that constantly or repeatedly feature prominently in UK-US intelligence 
relations. He effectively portrays the decline of the UK’s world position and power 
during the post-Second World War ‘End of Empire’ context. He rolls out from a 
range of perspectives, and through different attitudes, how the UK deals with this 
shift vis-à-vis the Americans, and equally vice versa. Throughout, le Carré’s portrayals 
of UK-US relations are assignable to the positions of ‘evangelicalism’, ‘functionalism’ 
and ‘terminalism’. 
Similarly to le Carré, Graham Greene taps into such key themes. However, 
the contrasts between the UK and US are particularly articulated. In The Quiet 
American, the ‘realists’ are juxtaposed opposite the ‘idealists’. There is the interplay 
between the practice-experienced, ‘old’, colonial and ebbing powers versus the naïve, 
book-inspired, inexperienced, rising ‘new’ power. Greene, too, exposes some of the 
operational parameters and limits of UK-US intelligence liaison relations. This is 
notably in Our Man in Havana. The positions of ‘functionalism’ and ‘terminalism’ are 
especially laid bare in Greene’s exploration of UK-US intelligence liaison relations. 
Meanwhile, Ian Fleming in the James Bond novels tends to be more 
celebratory of UK-US intelligence relations (than both le Carré and Greene). The 
importance of the presence of close friendship within the UK-US partnership with 
the oft teaming up of Bond and his CIA counterpart Felix Leiter is highlighted. The 
positions of ‘functionalism’ and ‘evangelicalism’ in UK-US intelligence relations are 
particularly pronounced in Fleming’s novels. 
There is some mileage in the famous cliché ‘art imitating reality and reality 
imitating art’. As illustrated here, this is especially apparent when looking at Anglo-
American intelligence liaison relations and its portrayal in the knowledgeable fiction 
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and ‘popular culture’ medium. As Christopher Hitchens states: ‘it is difficult to think 
of any more harmonious a collusion between unequals, or any more friendly rivalry, 
than that existing between the American and British “cousins” [during the Second 
World War]… It is the foundation of James Bond’s husky comradeship with Felix 
Leiter, and of numerous if slightly more awkward episodes in the works of John le 
Carré.’149  
How much mileage, and diversions there are along the route, is, of course, 
more of a moot point. William Hood highlights the complicating query ‘how [could] 
an outsider … possibly distinguish the realistic and informed espionage novels from 
the hundreds of adventure stories tarted up as spy books[?]’150 In addressing this 
query, the respondent declares that ‘“Casual readers … and others seeking plausible 
espionage fiction will find that an occasional whiff of drudgery and a touch of 
humour are the most reliable bench marks of realism…”’151 – two features 
particularly detectable in the works of both John le Carré and Graham Greene. 
Collectively, the fiction and ‘popular culture’ medium reminds us of the 
often close and difficult to unpack blending of fact, fiction and fantasy in the ‘real’ 
world of intelligence. From examining their fiction, the created versions of ‘actual-
reality’ that are portrayed as ‘virtual-reality’ or ‘alternative-reality’ emerge. The 
continuation of a close relationship to at least some elements of readily recognisable 
‘actual-reality’ is essential to maintain at least a hint of plausibility. This technique 
helps to continue to engage rather than alienate the reader. Gravitas and authority is 
lent to the writing.152 Alongside some escapism, readers are given more of an 
intellectual challenge, while the ‘serious’ spy fiction also allows for a more refined 
‘suspension of disbelief’. Ample opportunities for encouraging (even provoking) in-
depth reflection on intense philosophical, moral and ethical questions - such as 
regarding trust and betrayal - are simultaneously provided.  
Ultimately, however, considerable heuristic value is provided by the novels 
and by their associated observations. Through the novels, the alert researcher and 
reader are assisted to access domains where documents in archives tend not to be so 
effective. This is especially the case in relation to the ‘intangibles’. Examining the 
genre of ‘serious’ spy fiction significantly complements the adoption of an archival 
approach, and a more sophisticated and holistic understanding of the intelligence 
world and the nature of intelligence liaison can be attained. 
 
 
[6.0]: UK-US intelligence liaison in the media 
 
Analysis of media material can be similarly useful. Not least, it reaches a wider 
audience than the other mediums of literature hitherto explored. Here, there appear 
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to be two main types of writing on, or coverage of, intelligence liaison. Firstly, there 
are fleeting references in general articles by ‘generalist’ journalists, whose reports 
and commentary tend to be press release or newswire led and dominated, and 
which, in their managed condition, rarely reveal anything substantial (reflective of 
the ‘superficial-characterisation’ school present in the literature); and secondly, more 
in-depth and reflective reports by ‘specialist’ journalists (which are more akin to 
belonging to the ‘substantive-characterisation’ school).153 In both quantitative and 
qualitative terms, this last group provide more useful information, offering some 
distinct added value.154 Thus they provide the public with greater insights into 
intelligence liaison, and into all its complexities, as well as the controversies it can 
engender. Notably the majority of these specialist articles focus on the SIGINT 
dimension of intelligence liaison. This is where the largest exchange of intelligence, 
in the form of vast quantities of data, takes place.155 The other dimensions of 
intelligence liaison, such as concerning the especially highly sensitive and closely 
guarded HUMINT dimension, are covered even more rarely.156  
Six key journalists specialising in security, intelligence and defence issues 
appear to standout in the UK media. They are: Michael Smith157, Richard Norton-
Taylor at The Guardian, Mark Huband at The Financial Times, and Mark Urban158, 
Frank Gardner and Gordon Corera at the BBC.159 Also, both Smith and Corera’s 
writing relating to intelligence liaison has recently featured in more specialist 
publications, such as Jane’s Intelligence Review.160 Meanwhile, in the US media, 
journalists who focus on security, intelligence and defence issues and who 
particularly standout include, Dana Priest and Walter Pincus of The Washington Post, 
Douglas Jehl of The New York Times, and Mark Hosenball, Michael Isikoff and 
Michael Hirst of Newsweek. All of these journalists have good access to sources from 
the various intelligence communities they examine, helping to convey some more 
contemporary insider insights. To what extent media outlets determine the 
journalists’ outlook on the topic of intelligence liaison appears to be more of a 
debatable issue and, again like the influence of cultural factors, difficult to measure, 
at least within the confines of this study. 
In the general media coverage the writing on UK-US intelligence liaison again 
tends to be very thin and superficial. This is often the case in an era of a rapid 
turnover of 24/7 news, which is fleetingly very much ‘in the moment’, rather than 
tending to be more reflective. Writing of this type can also be subject to propaganda, 
mis-/disinformation, psychological/information (management) operations 
pressures, more commonly known as ‘spin’.161 Similarly to the general studies of 
Anglo-American relations, the general media coverage mainly imparts - to varying 
degrees of quality and hence accuracy - the ‘standard’ generic information that: (1) 
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UK-US intelligence liaison exists; (2) it is vitally important; and (3) it is very close; 
and (4) that it does not always go smoothly; and (5) that it can have some drawbacks, 
thus triggering some ambiguity and vigilance. The general media coverage strengths 
can be recognised where revelations surface and there is an attention grabbing ‘news 
flash’ or ‘heads-up’ relating to a particular intelligence liaison development. This 
then allows the ‘specialists’ to later explore that ‘lead’ further in their own more 
investigative research.  
Ultimately, for a deeper analysis and more of a valuable and ‘faithful’ insight 
into intelligence liaison from the media, it is necessary to refer to the more specialist 
articles. These are often by the ‘specialist’ journalists identified above. It is also worth 
consulting the material that features in the more specialist publications, such as in 
Jane’s Intelligence Review.  
 
 
[7.0]: Concluding observations 
 
To conclude, generalisations regarding the literature on intelligence liaison are 
difficult to make. This is due to the haphazard development of and the fragmented 
nature of writing on this subject. This in turn reflects the multifaceted and highly 
complex intelligence liaison phenomenon. However, some observations can be 
confidently presented.  
It is quickly apparent that rather than being undertaken more by ‘generalists’, 
the most revealing literature on intelligence liaison is by ‘specialists’, ‘experts’ and 
intelligence liaison ‘connoisseurs’. These include the academics and journalists 
specialising in the intelligence studies field, as well as the former and serving 
intelligence practitioners and professionals who have experience of the phenomenon. 
As a consequence, this area is still mostly confined to a specialist niche position and 
is still in what can be regarded as the early stages of: (i) breaking through into the 
mainstream of intelligence studies; (ii) being connected to international relations; and 
also, in the specific case of UK-US intelligence liaison, (iii) breaking through into the 
field of general Anglo-American relations studies.  
In addition, the material examined can be characterised as being diverse. It is 
on a spectrum that ranges from the general, at times imparting only superficial 
insights, to the opposite extreme – namely having more constrained parameters and 
dealing with only certain aspects of intelligence liaison. This extensive range of 
output results in a plethora of interpretations from many differing perspectives – a 
trend reinforced by the literature being difficult to ‘schoolify’ neatly. In short, the 
intelligence liaison literature can be best evaluated similarly to how the complex 
globalisation debates are codified.162 This is utilising a combination of horizontal and 
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vertical axes so that there is scope to capture the ‘complex co-existence plurality’, 
that is reflected across the literature when taken collectively. (See as illustrated in 
figure 3, below.) The vertical axis scale portrays the range from ‘hyper-globalists’ (or 
‘advocates’) through to ‘hypo-globalists’ (or ‘sceptics’), while the horizontal axis 
scale represents the spectrum of ‘secret statecraft’ (or national self-interest) to 
‘clandestine kinship’ (or collective interest) drivers.163 Corresponding schools of 
generic Anglo-American relations, and indeed even different international relations 
theories, can then be mapped over these. 
 
[Figure 3]: Schools of International Intelligence Liaison Literature. 
 
 
 
The ‘schoolification’ can be extended further. This can be accomplished by, firstly, 
disaggregating the diverse intelligence liaison literature into various groups. These 
are essentially determined according to what makes that text distinct, namely in the 
form of its overarching theme, main focus or approach - such as representing a 
‘French perspective’, a ‘British perspective’, an ‘American perspective’, a ‘European 
perspective’, concentrating on the European dimension (a ‘European focus’), and 
highlighting UK-US interactions (a ‘UK-US focus’). Although probably not exclusive, 
these are the groups that appear to particularly standout when the literature is taken 
as a whole. Indeed, the last group forms the focus of this literature review, and hence 
supplies the selection criteria for choosing which texts are examined in this chapter.  
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The groups can be further analysed. Within each of these respective groups, 
the ‘schools’ that can be most readily distinguished in their nature range from: (i) a 
school which has the prominent aim of ‘characterisation’ – this is where analyses in 
their impart tend towards being more ‘neutral’ and uncritically accepting of, or (if 
pioneering works) establish, various ‘orthodoxies’; to (ii) the ‘critical’ school. The 
‘characterisation’ school can be further divided into the sub-schools of (i) ‘superficial’ 
and (ii) ‘substantive’. These are determined according to the depth and extent of 
insights provided to the reader. The texts within the ‘characterisation’ school tend to 
sit on, or at least in close proximity to, where the horizontal and vertical axes (as 
described above) cross one another. 
The ‘critical’ school is where quantitatively the majority of the literature is 
sited. Again with reference to the above axes, the literature in this school is located in 
more polarised positions, demonstrating the distinct presence of particular 
interpretive slants. Qualitatively, the literature herein also has more of an ‘agenda’ to 
push, enabling the school to be further disaggregated into the sub-schools of 
‘sceptics/pessimists’ and - albeit with a persistently strong cautious vein – 
‘advocates/optimists’. Texts located within this last category lean towards being the 
more constructive of the two sub-schools in terms of their output. Reflecting the 
diversity and dynamism of the literature on intelligence liaison, some of the texts - 
such as Charles Grant’s Intimate Relations (see above [4.0]) - can be seen as suggesting 
at least a duality in terms of these various ‘schools’ and their sub-variants. Thus, 
frequently these texts are not confined to being placed in merely one group of 
intelligence liaison literature. For instance, this can be especially seen where Grant 
inclines to being ‘sceptical/pessimistic-critical’ towards the UK-US intelligence link, 
while simultaneously leaning more towards being ‘advocate/optimistic-critical’ vis-
à-vis the European dimension. 
Examining intelligence liaison more comprehensively and systematically, 
allowing for greater attempts at theorisation, would help advance rather more 
substantially and qualitatively our understanding. These processes would allow us 
to better understand intelligence liaison in all of its (dis)guises, as well as help us to 
comprehend the nature, full depth and breadth of the dynamics and politics behind 
the phenomenon. This would be particularly useful at this time when there is 
quantitatively more intelligence liaison taking place, and when more of this 
important phenomenon is needed in order to respond effectively to globalised 
security challenges. Indeed, this last significant point can be seen as one recognised 
and agreed upon by the authors of the more recent works in the field. This is 
regardless of their perspective and approach.  
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Arguably, the historical works on intelligence liaison still tend to dominate 
the field. However, more recently, further contemporary contributions can be seen to 
be gradually coming through and making more of an impact. The historical works 
tend to be better at conveying more of a holistic reflective perspective. 
Simultaneously, a more in-depth and inclusive picture of intelligence liaison and its 
closely interrelated, systemic attributes can be aided by the passage of time. This 
helps to erode some of the methodological constraints when researching in this area. 
The often highlighted methodological restrictions, together with some reluctance on 
the part of many scholars to confront those challenges, partly contributes towards 
the under-studied condition of the intelligence liaison sub-field. In addition, apart 
from rare in-depth scholarly books, such as Aldrich’s The Hidden Hand, the majority 
of recent analyses remain curtailed and short in nature, only appearing in article 
form, and then often hidden away in specialist intelligence journals, or featuring as a 
brief chapter buried in a book focussing on intelligence as a whole. Thus intelligence 
liaison and its coverage in greater depth persistently have a quantitatively low-
volume and qualitatively low profile stature. This is also the case at times with some 
of the components/phenomena that collectively compose the intelligence liaison 
phenomenon. For instance, intelligence liaison is also a form of ‘covert action’. Scott 
and Jackson note: ‘Scholars have frequently ignored covert action in their analyses of 
intelligence. As Elizabeth Anderson has argued: “the specific subject of covert action 
as an element of intelligence has suffered a deficiency of serious study.”’164 
Another observation is that other previously witnessed trends are gradually 
eroding. Mainly since around the mid-1990s to date, the ‘one-sidedness’ of the field, 
previously dominated by external and academic writers, is breaking down. More 
internal, intelligence practitioner and professional writers have contributed to the 
overall body of work. In the process, the increasing of the insider perspective has had 
a beneficial effect of helping to correct the imbalances of the past. More recently from 
an official angle, albeit in a constrained manner, the UK ISC Renditions report of June 
2007 discussed the UK’s international intelligence liaison relationships for the first 
time.165  
Drawing on the fiction literature and the portrayals of UK-US intelligence 
liaison in the popular culture medium is additionally helpful to further 
understanding. This genre provides us with some useful insights and perspectives - 
at times well-informed and with quite substantial roots in and reflections of ‘actual-
reality’ - as well as reminding us of the often close and difficult to unpack blending 
of fact, fiction and fantasy in the world of intelligence. The fiction and popular 
culture medium also reaches a much wider audience than the specialist non-fiction 
literature, with the media in turn reaching an even more extensive and less specialist 
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public readership. This helps to enhance its reach and - more debated - influence 
upon popular conceptions of intelligence liaison.  
Concerning the closely associated phenomenon of ‘outreach’, again the 
literature appears to be very diffuse. Indeed, any fusion between intelligence and 
outreach currently appears to surface in official government produced information, 
those sources variously associated with government, and in the media, as a response 
to government-linked events. The fusion of intelligence and outreach appears to be 
more overlooked in the academic literature. Certainly this is an area rich for further 
exploration. At this juncture, perhaps the literature concerning outreach and 
intelligence is also less conscious of the full extent of the ramifications involved with 
such a fusion. Hence currently it barely goes beyond more surface observational 
analyses of the fact that outreach does occur in, and vis-à-vis, the realm of 
intelligence.166 
One symptom of the rise of international intelligence liaison has been a 
tangible accompanying expansion of the academic literature on this subject.167 
However, this recent wave of scholarship offers an almost exclusively empirical 
analysis of the exponential growth of intelligence liaison.168 Therefore, our 
understanding of international intelligence liaison as a general phenomenon remains 
somewhat sparse, with deficiencies apparent in the realm of theory development.169 
This is puzzling when we consider that most other aspects of international co-
operation have attracted considerable theoretical analysis. At least in a preliminary 
manner, this study seeks to address that imbalance. Moreover, this further work on 
international intelligence liaison needs to be given a higher and wider profile. 
 
• • • 
 
 
 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 126 
References 
                                                
1 L.K. Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence’, Comparative Strategy, 22, 1 (2003), 
p.17. 
2 See, for example, J. Kriendler, NATO Intelligence and Early Warning (Shrivenham, UK: Conflict 
Studies Research Centre [CSRC], March 2006); ‘The Changing Face of Intelligence: NATO Advanced 
Research Workshop’, Report, The Pluscarden Programme for the Study of Global Terrorism and 
Intelligence, St Antony’s College, Oxford (09-10 December 2005); see also ‘Intelligence and 
International Agencies’, chapter 5 in H. Shukman (ed.), Agents for Change: Intelligence Services in the 
Twenty-First Century (London: St Ermin's Press, 2000), pp.173-201. 
3 See R.J. Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons: Post-September 11 Intelligence Alliances’, Harvard 
International Review, 24, 3 (Fall, 2002); see also Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar’, p.17. 
4 H. Bradford Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, Intelligence and National 
Security, 11, 3 (July 1996), p.523; see also his earlier (ed.), Inside CIA’s Private World (Yale 
University Press, 1995) – particularly ‘The Sun never sets on liaison’, in the chapter on ‘Clandestinity’. 
(Some other references to ‘liaison’ can be found in the index of this book); see also the original text of 
‘The Sun never sets on liaison’ in W.R. Johnson, ‘Clandestinity and Current Intelligence’, Studies in 
Intelligence, 20, 3 (Fall 1976), pp.56-59 – via CREST – CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010019-1 
(2005/01/26). 
5 See C. Andrew, ‘Intelligence, International Relations and “Under-theorisation”’ chapter 2 in L. Scott 
and P. Jackson (eds), Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in Shadows 
(London: Routledge, 2004), p.32. 
6 A.N. Shulsky and G.J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence 
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2002 [3ed.]), p.xiii. 
7 See Andrew, ‘Intelligence, International Relations and “Under-theorisation”’, p.34. 
8 Retired UK intelligence practitioner Michael Herman is a former senior Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) officer and Secretary to the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC). He is the author of many works including, notably: Intelligence Power in Peace and War 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996); Intelligence Services in the Information Age (London: Frank 
Cass, 2001); ‘Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001’, chapter 12 in Scott and Jackson (eds), 
Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century; ‘Counter-Terrorism, Information Technology 
and Intelligence Change’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (Winter, 2003); ‘Sharing Secrets’, 
The World Today (December 2001); ‘Intelligence after 9/11: A British View of the Effects’, 
Commentary No. 83 [a Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) publication] (17 July 2003) – via 
URL: <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comments/com83_e.html> (accessed: 13/07/2005); and ‘11 
September: Legitimising Intelligence?’, International Relations, 16, 2 (2002). 
9 See, for example, Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar’, p.1; see also G.F. Treverton et al., Toward a Theory 
of Intelligence: Workshop Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006); see also S.A. Taylor, ‘The Role 
of Intelligence in National Security’, chapter 14 in A. Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies 
(Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.248-269; D. Kahn, ‘An historical theory of intelligence’, 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 127 
                                                                                                                                      
Intelligence and National Security, 16, 3 (2001), pp.79-92; ‘How do we understand intelligence?’, 
chapter 2 in P. Gill and M. Phythian, Intelligence in an Insecure World (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
2006), pp.20-38; see also ‘Toward a Theory of Intelligence’, chapter 8 in Shulsky and Schmitt, Silent 
Warfare, pp.169-176. 
10 Quoted in Treverton et al., Toward a Theory of Intelligence, p.27. 
11 For examples of ‘business/management theory’ texts, which have relevance for the phenomenon of 
international intelligence liaison, see B. McKern (ed.), Managing the Global Network Corporation 
(London: Routledge, 2003) and B. Nooteboom, Inter-Firm Collaboration, Learning and Networks: An 
Integrated Approach (London: Routledge, 2004). For more ‘law’-originating/related texts, see, for 
example, H. Born, L.K. Johnson, I. Leigh (eds), Who’s Watching the Spies?: Establishing Intelligence 
Service Accountability (Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, 2005); M. Phythian, ‘The British Experience with 
Intelligence Accountability’, Intelligence and National Security, 22, 1 (February 2007), pp.75-99. 
12 See, for example, M.I. Handel, ‘Deception, Surprise, and Intelligence’, chapter 15 in his Masters of 
War: Classical Strategic Thought (London: Routledge, 2001 [3ed., revised and expanded]), from 
p.215; for texts on surveillance, see, for example, D. Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2007) and K. Ball and F. Webster (eds), The Intensification of Surveillance: 
Crime, Terrorism and Warfare in the Information Age (London: Pluto Press, 2003); see also J.R. 
Beninger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). 
13 See, for example, M.S. Goodman, ‘Intelligence Education: Studying and Teaching About 
Intelligence: The Approach in the United Kingdom’, Studies in Intelligence, 50, 2 (2006). 
14 For an example of a comprehensive chapter on intelligence featuring in a mainstream security studies 
textbook, see Taylor, ‘The Role of Intelligence in National Security’, from p.248. 
15 W.K. Wark, ‘Introduction: “Learning to live with intelligence”’, Intelligence and National Security, 
18, 4 (Winter, 2003), p.11; for some of the earliest books on ‘intelligence’, see, for example, D. 
McLachlan, Room 39: Naval Intelligence in Action 1939-45 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968) 
and Sir Kenneth Strong’s Intelligence at the Top: The Recollections of an Intelligence Officer (London: 
Cassell, 1968). The first book on Ultra was Group Captain F.W. Winterbotham’s The Ultra Secret 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974); see also, for example as part of the wave of literature from 
the mid-1970s, R. Lewin, Ultra Goes to War: The Secret Story (London: Hutchinson, 1978). 
16 For a greater discussion of some of these issues, see, for example, A. Svendsen, ‘Connecting 
intelligence and theory: Intelligence Liaison and International Relations’, Intelligence and National 
Security (forthcoming, 2009). 
17 See, for example, N. Paton Walsh, ‘Ambassador defends diplomat in spying row; British envoy hits 
back over Moscow transmitter; Putin to raise Russian allegations with Blair’, The Guardian (01 
February 2006); see also R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Police raid Riviera home of former MI6 officer’, The 
Guardian (29 June 2006), for a fleeting insight into SIS (MI6) training, including ‘ “…courses for 
liaison officers from other friendly intelligence services.”…’ 
18 See, for example, Taylor, ‘The Role of Intelligence in National Security’. 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 128 
                                                                                                                                      
19 See, for example, R. Godson (ed.), Intelligence requirements for the 1990s: collection, analysis, 
counterintelligence, and covert action (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989); see also L.K. 
Johnson (ed.), Handbook of Intelligence Studies (London: Routledge, 2007), pp.v-vii; see also S.A. 
Taylor, ‘Counter intelligence failures in the USA’, chapter 18 in ibid., pp.248-250 – for an example of 
the level where coverage of dimensions such as ‘co-operation’ figures in the Johnson volume – that is, 
more subsumed as a subsection in a chapter devoted to another leading intelligence theme.  
20 Johnson, ‘Bricks and Mortar’, p.17. 
21 See also URL: <http://www.mi6.gov.uk/output/Page59.html#L> (accessed: 25/06/2008). 
22 Scott and Jackson, ‘Chapter 1 – Journeys in Shadows’ in their (eds), Understanding Intelligence, 
p.20. 
23 Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’. 
24 See, for example, R. Ovendale, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1998), pp.147-8. 
25 See also M.S. Alexander, ‘Introduction: Knowing your friends, assessing your allies – perspectives 
on Intra-Alliance Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 13, 1 (Spring, 1998), p.9. 
26 See, for example, M. Curtis, The Great Deception (London: Pluto Press, 1998), p.27 - where he 
draws upon the work of intelligence historian, Christopher Andrew. 
27 See Andrew, ‘Intelligence, International Relations and “Under-theorisation’, pp.32-3; see also E.R. 
May’s comment made in 1993 that: ‘The revolution in intelligence scholarship, however, has been 
largely self-contained. It has not so far had much effect outside its own inner circle. Writing on 
intelligence rarely appears in other learned journals – even Diplomatic History and World Politics… 
There is clear need to make research on intelligence better known and better understood outside the 
company of intelligence specialists…’ – from E.R. May, ‘The importance of interchange: Studying and 
teaching intelligence’, Studies in Intelligence (c. 01-02 October 1993) – via URL: 
<http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/95unclass/May.html> (accessed: 02/01/2006). Although today (in 
2008) such considerations are undoubtedly more effectively and systematically addressed, they still 
resonate to varying degrees, reflecting effectively the essentially haphazard nature of the overall 
addressing that has been observed above. 
28 See, for example: C.J. Bartlett, ‘The Special Relationship’: A Political History of Anglo-American 
Relations since 1945 (London: Longman, 1992); G. Warner, ‘The Anglo-American Special 
Relationship’, Diplomatic History, 13, 4 (Fall, 1989); J. Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations 
1939-84 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984 [2ed.]); A.P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1995); W.R. Louis and H. Bull (eds), The Special 
Relationship: Anglo-American Relations since 1945 (Oxford University Press, 1986); R. Ovendale, The 
English-Speaking Alliance: Britain, the US, the Dominions and the Cold War, 1945-51 (London: Allen 
& Unwin, 1985); J. Dickie, ‘Special’ No More: Anglo-American Relations - Rhetoric & Reality 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994); J. Hollowell (ed.), Twentieth Century Anglo-American 
Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2001). 
29 See, for example, Hollowell (ed.), Twentieth Century Anglo-American Relations, p.192. 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 129 
                                                                                                                                      
30 R.J. Aldrich, ‘British intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” during the Cold 
War’, Review of International Studies, 24 (1998), p.350. 
31 D. Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the international order since the 
Second World War’, International Affairs, 62 (1985), p.10. 
32 See, for example, C. Coker, ‘Britain and the New World Order: the special relationship in the 
1990s’, International Affairs, 68, 3 (1992), pp.407-21; J. Baylis, Anglo-American Relations Since 
1939: The Enduring Alliance (Manchester University Press, 1997); A.P. Dobson, The Politics of the 
Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988). Less surprisingly, the 
intelligence dimension is additionally missing in the earlier works on Anglo-American relations - 
notably C. Bell, The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in Anglo-American Relations (Oxford University 
Press, 1964) and M. Beloff, ‘The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth’ in M. Gilbert (ed.) 
A Century of Conflict, 1850-1950 – Essays for AJP Taylor (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1967) - when 
the role of intelligence was absent from history and international relations studies as a whole at the 
time, before the ULTRA ‘revelations’ of the 1970s, which helped to usher in the period of more 
specialist intelligence studies beginning to emerge, as well as the very slow beginning of taking 
increasing notice of the intelligence dimension in general histories and international relations works. 
See also C. Andrew and D. Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension: Government and Intelligence 
Communities in the Twentieth Century (London/Champaign, IL: Macmillan, 1984). 
33 See, for example, the chapter entitled ‘The bond of intelligence’ in C. Hitchens, Blood, Class and 
Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies (London: Chatto & Windus, 1990). 
34 Works that can be cited here include that of Mark Curtis - Curtis, The Great Deception, especially 
p.27 - and John Dumbrell in his book A Special Relationship, where the intelligence dimension gets a 
section devoted to itself in the chapter on ‘Nuclear and Intelligence Cooperation’ - again demonstrating 
that when featuring as part of general studies, intelligence remains intimately tied to defence relations – 
see J. Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2001), pp.132-4; see also for an updated edition, J. Dumbrell, A Special 
Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 
2006 [2ed.]), pp.168-172. 
35 J. Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK “Special Relationship” in a World Twice Transformed’, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, 17, 3 (October, 2004), pp.437-50.  
36 Goodman, ‘Intelligence Education: Studying and Teaching About Intelligence’. 
37 See Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, pp.168-172. 
38 For further explanation of these ‘schools’ see the ‘Conclusions’ section [7.0] of this chapter, below. 
39 See, for example, as demonstrated in the Preface [6.0] and Chapter 1: Introduction [10.0] of this 
study, above. 
40 Coker, ‘Britain and the New World Order: the special relationship in the 1990s’, pp.407-21. 
41 For more on the schools of Anglo-American relations, see A. Danchev, ‘On Specialness: Anglo-
American Apocrypha’, chapter 1 in On Specialness (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), from p.1. 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 130 
                                                                                                                                      
42 See, for example, as discussed vis-à-vis Dumbrell above. For David Reynolds’ treatment of 
intelligence, see, for instance, Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”?’, pp.4-5, p.9, pp.10-11, p.16 and 
p.18. 
43 For example, C. Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community 
(London: Heinemann, 1985). 
44 J.T. Richelson, ‘The Calculus of Intelligence Cooperation’, The International Journal of Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence, 4, 3 (Fall, 1990), pp.307-23. 
45 A.S. Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Game Plan?’, The Journal 
of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 5, 4 (Winter, 1991-2); and J.J. Wirtz, ‘Constraints on 
Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension’, The Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence, 6, 1 (1993). 
46 J. Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior (New York: Putnam’s, 1976); R.S. Cline, Secrets, 
Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1976) – offers 
an account of early post-war (1950s) UK-US intelligence liaison by a US intelligence officer. Scattered 
references to (foreign) liaison can also be found throughout the formerly classified literature – see, for 
example, J.P. Dimmer, Jr (aka. F.M. Begoum), ‘Observations on the double agent’, Studies in 
Intelligence, 6 (Winter 1962) and his ‘You And Your Walk-In’, Studies in Intelligence, 6 (Spring 
1962), particularly where he emphasised: ‘Know the liaison equities. Know the do’s and don’t’s with 
respect to the local foreign [liaison] service. How far can you go unilaterally, considering the liaison 
relationship? In what instances do we feel that we must tell them, and when would holding out fall 
within acceptable risk? This applies particularly in our larger stations that tend to be sectionalized: they 
may have an external liaison unit that deals with the local services and an internal unit working on 
other activities. The walk-in may come to this latter, not the one dealing with liaison. Does it know 
what the real equities are? Its initial handling may prejudice the liaison relationship and may hamper 
efficient subsequent handling of the walk-in.’ (pp.54-55) - document accessed via the CIA Freedom of 
Information Act (FoIA) Reading Room, via URL: <http://www.foia.cia.gov/> (accessed: 13/06/2007). 
47 See, for instance, the criticism of J. Burkholder Smith’s book, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, in a book 
review by D.S. Blaufarb, under heading ‘Intelligence Bookshelf… Current books of interest to 
intelligence buffs’ in Periscope: Official Organ of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 3, 2 
(Summer 1977), p.4 – via CREST – CIA-RDP88-01315R000100480001-4 (2005/12/14) – particularly 
where he notes: ‘… The liaison services whose officers it identifies and whose operational activity it 
describes are also undoubtedly smarting. All of this can only harm the goal of an improved and 
tightened American intelligence service which the author claims to support…’ 
48 S. Lefebvre, ‘The difficulties and dilemmas of international intelligence cooperation’, The 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 16, 4 (2003), p.533. 
49 See, for example, footnote ‘10’ in Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era’, 
p.464 – where he states: ‘I must advise readers that the citations given relating to inter-service 
cooperation in no way suggest that I am confirming or denying any of the material contained therein.’ 
50 See Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’; see also, for an example of focus on economic espionage at this 
time, P. Schweizer, Friendly Spies: How America's Allies are Using Economic Espionage to Steal Our 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 131 
                                                                                                                                      
Secrets (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1993); J. Adams, The New Spies: Exploring the Frontiers 
of Espionage (London: Hutchinson, 1994). 
51 Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era’, pp.458-9. 
52 Schweizer, Friendly Spies, p.30. 
53 For more on these Post-Cold War cuts and their unhelpful impact on intelligence see, for example, 
G. Corera, Shopping for bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity and the Rise and Fall of the 
A.Q. Khan Network (London: Hurst & Co., 2006), pp.130-1. 
54 Wirtz, ‘Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension’, pp.85-99. 
55 ibid., p.95. 
56 Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, pp.523-60. 
57 M. Herman, ‘Intelligence cooperation’, chapter 12 in his Intelligence Power in Peace and War 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996), from p.200. 
58 See the definitions of liaison and intelligence liaison in the Introduction (Chapter 1 [3.0/5.0]) of this 
study, above. 
59 Westerfield, ‘America and the World of Intelligence Liaison’, p.523. 
60 ibid., p.524. 
61 ibid., p.552. 
62 See also J.E. Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, International Journal 
of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 19 (Summer, 2006), p.214, reference 8 – where she argues: 
‘Westerfield’s definition is… unsatisfying, as it mixes motives and obscures the measures of value that 
must accompany any long-standing liaison relationship…’ 
63 For the difficulties of measuring the ‘cultural’ dimension, see, for example, S. Murden, 
‘Introduction: culture in human affairs’ in his ‘Culture in world affairs’, chapter 24 in J. Baylis and S. 
Smith (eds), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations (Oxford 
University Press, 2005 [3ed.]), p.540 – particularly where he notes: ‘Culture is … important to human 
beings… but using it as an analytical tool can be problematic. Culture is such a multifaceted concept 
that it may only be possible to apply it in rather vague and intuitive ways.’; see also A.I. Johnston, 
‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, 19, 4 (Spring 1995), p.52 – where he 
argues: ‘One of the problems that has plagued cultural analysis, however, has been precisely the 
difficulty in determining the relationship of attitude to behavior.’; for more on ‘intelligence culture’ 
see, for example, P.H.J. Davies, ‘Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United 
States’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17, 3 (October 2004), p.496 - ‘Theories of culture 
are… difficult to operationalise and test with any real degree of rigour.’; see also ‘C. People and 
Culture’ in ‘The Changing Face of Intelligence’, p.3. 
64 Examples of this historical work include: B.F. Smith, ‘The Road to the Anglo-American Intelligence 
Partnership’, American Intelligence Journal, 16, 2/3 (Autumn/Winter, 1995), pp.59-62; and C. 
Andrew, ‘The making of the Anglo-American SIGINT alliance’, in H.B. Peake and S. Halpern (eds), 
In the name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer (Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 
1994); J. Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human 
Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940–45 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1999). 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 132 
                                                                                                                                      
65 Herman, ‘Intelligence cooperation’, chapter 12 in his Intelligence Power, p.218. 
66 Alexander, ‘Knowing your friends, assessing your allies’, p.7. However, Herman does later draw on 
this theme in his section ‘Spying on friends?’ in his work, ‘Ethics and Intelligence after September 
2001’, chapter 12 in Scott and Jackson (eds), Understanding Intelligence, p.188. 
67 See, for example, Herman, Intelligence Power, p.379. For some first-hand accounts of the 1995 
Sarin attack, see H. Murakami, Underground: The Tokyo Gas Attack and the Japanese Psyche 
(London: Vintage, 2002). 
68 See the journal Intelligence and National Security, 13, 1 (Spring, 1998), from p.1. 
69 See Hulnick and Westerfield’s contributions discussed earlier. 
70 Alexander, ‘Knowing your friends, assessing your allies’, p.2. 
71 ibid., pp.3-4; see also US Army, Special Warfare School, English Translation of ‘Mes Comrades 
Sont Morts’: My Comrades are Dead: Volume III (Fort Bragg, North Carolina: ?c.1945) – via CREST 
– CIA-RDP85-00671R000200090001-2 (2001/09/04). 
72 See also A. Vagts, The Military Attaché (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967). Later 
texts, such as M. Deflem, Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police 
Cooperation (Oxford University Press, 2002), can also be cited here. These texts grant an insight into 
other ‘types’ of liaison, for example liaison between police forces. 
73 Alexander, ‘Knowing your friends, assessing your allies’, p.8. 
74 ibid., p.5, p.7 and p.9. 
75 See also, for example, ‘Intelligence Sharing: Prospective Risks, Potential Rewards’, chapter 5 in J.D. 
Ellis and G.D. Kiefer, Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy (John 
Hopkin’s University Press, 2004), pp.109-144. 
76 Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’. 
77 For an earlier treatment of this theme in the literature see the analysis of the article by J.J. Wirtz 
(Wirtz, ‘Constraints on Intelligence Collaboration: The Domestic Dimension’), above. 
78 Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’. 
79 Lefebvre, ‘The difficulties and dilemmas of international intelligence cooperation’, p.527. 
80 ibid., p.528. 
81 ibid., p.537. 
82 M. Rudner, ‘Hunters and Gatherers: The Intelligence Coalition Against Islamic Terrorism’, The 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17, 2 (2004), p.222; see also for a 
treatment of similar themes, M.M. Aid, ‘All Glory is Fleeting: Sigint and the Fight Against 
International Terrorism’, Intelligence and National Security, 18, 4 (2003), pp.72-120. 
83 Rudner, ‘Hunters and Gatherers’, pp.193-230. 
84 ibid., p.223. 
85 ibid., p.195. 
86 R.J. Aldrich, ‘Transatlantic Intelligence and Security Cooperation’, International Affairs, 80, 4 
(2004), p.732. 
87 ibid., p.752. 
88 ibid., pp.731-53. 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 133 
                                                                                                                                      
89 C. Grant, ‘Intimate relations: Can Britain play a leading role in European defence - and keep its 
special links to US intelligence?’, Centre for European Reform Working Paper (April 2000). 
90 ibid., p.1. 
91 ibid. 
92 C. Clough, ‘Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International Strategic Intelligence Cooperation’, The 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 17, 4 (2004), p.601. 
93 ibid., p.612. 
94 ibid. 
95 ibid., p.601. 
96 ibid., p.607. 
97 ibid., p.612. 
98 S. Lander, ‘International Intelligence Cooperation: An inside perspective’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 17, 3 (October 2004), from p.481. 
99 ibid., p.481. 
100 ibid., p.493; see also Aid, ‘All Glory is Fleeting’, pp.109-111. 
101 Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, pp.195-217. 
102 ibid., p.195. 
103 ibid., p.196. 
104 See, for example, as cited in Chapter 1 of this study. 
105 Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details’, p.208. 
106 ibid., p.212. 
107 ibid. 
108 D.S. Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror’, Orbis 
(Summer, 2006), pp.453-468. 
109 ibid., p.453. 
110 ibid., p.460. 
111 ibid., p.468. 
112 A. Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
113 ibid., pp.127-149. 
114 ibid., pp.135-8. 
115 ibid., p.139; see also ibid., where he notes: ‘Amitai Etzioni has argued that patterns of cooperation 
among security and intelligence agencies born out of the “global war on terrorism” are now so routine 
and institutionalized that they can be described as “a new global architecture,… a de facto Global 
Antiterrorism Authority, formed, led, managed and largely financed by the superpower.” Etzioni is 
probably mistaken to put so much emphasis on the influence of the “war on terror”; there is good 
evidence that the movement toward this new “Authority” began soon after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union… There is also an aspect to this emerging “security architecture” that is overlooked by Etzioni. 
This architecture does not consist only of a thickening web of relationships between the security and 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 134 
                                                                                                                                      
intelligence agencies of different countries. There is a domestic component as well.’; A. Etzioni, From 
Empire to Community (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.103-9. 
116 P. Todd and J. Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World’s Secret Services Today (London: Zed 
Books/Global Issues series, 2003). 
117 For example, the book was published before many of the various significant inquiries into 9/11 and 
supposed Iraqi WMD intelligence had reported. 
118 See, for example, ‘Intelligence in the South: The Growth of the Virtual State’ chapter 7 in Todd and 
Bloch, Global Intelligence, pp.165-206. 
119 ibid., p.209. 
120 See also for a case study on the US-Israeli intelligence relationship, A. and L. Cockburn, Dangerous 
liaison: the inside story of the U.S.-Israeli covert relationship (New York: HarperCollins, 1991). 
121 See, for example, L. Scott , Macmillan, Kennedy & the Cuban Missile Crisis: Political, Military and 
Intelligence Aspects (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 1999), pp.39-41 and pp.54-5; see also W. Scott 
Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the United States & the Suez Crisis (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1991), p.101; see also Corera, Shopping for bombs. 
122 The two studies are: B. De Jong, W. Platje and R.D. Steele (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence: 
Emerging Concepts for the Future (Oakton, Virginia: OSS International Press, 2003) and C. Wiebes, 
Intelligence and the War in Bosnia – 1992-1995 (London: Lit Verlag, 2003). For another volume 
focussing on peacekeeping intelligence (PKI) – not explored in this literature review, due to its main 
focus not being so directly orientated towards UK-US intelligence interactions - see also D. Carment 
and M. Rudner (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries (London: 
Routledge, 2006). 
123 Wiebes, Intelligence and the War in Bosnia, p.57. 
124 ibid., pp.58-9. 
125 ibid., p.60. 
126 See, for example, J. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: America’s National Security Agency and its 
special relationship with Britain’s GCHQ (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983); C. Andrew, ‘The 
Growth of Intelligence in the English Speaking World’, Wilson Center Working Paper, No. 83 
(November 1987); and J.T. Richelson and D. Ball, The Ties That Bind (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990 
[2ed.]); for another text which can be added to this list, see also K.G. Robertson (ed.), British and 
American approaches to intelligence (London: Macmillan/RUSI, 1987); for a review of ibid., see N. 
Clive, ‘Review: British and American Approaches to Intelligence. by K. G. Robertson’, International 
Affairs, 63, 4 (Autumn, 1987), p.647. 
127 See also for a useful ‘critical annotated bibliography’ of the works on ‘ABC’ intelligence, D.M. 
Charles, ‘American, British and Canadian Links: A Critical Annotated Bibliography’, chapter 12 in D. 
Stafford and R. Jeffreys-Jones (eds), American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations 1939-2000 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000). 
128 Aldrich, ‘British intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship”’, p.334. 
129 Examples here include: R.J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret 
Intelligence (London: John Murray, 2001); sections on UKUSA and the UK in J. Richelson, 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 135 
                                                                                                                                      
‘Intelligence Sharing’, chapter 13 in his The US Intelligence Community (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1999 [4ed.]), pp.291-314; ‘Liaison with foreign services’, chapter 13 in J.T. Richelson, The US 
Intelligence Community (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008 [5ed.]), pp.341-366; Stafford and 
Jeffreys-Jones (eds), American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations. 
130 Aldrich, ‘British intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship”’, p.335. For more on 
the opening of archives relating to Second World War UK-US intelligence liaison see also Jakub, Spies 
and Saboteurs, pp.xvii-xx. 
131 Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era’, p.464. 
132 M. Urban, UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence (London: Faber & Faber, 1996). 
133 From private, non-attributable sources [e.g. u-26]. 
134 Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, p.286. 
135 P. Radden Keefe, Chatter: Dispatches from the world of global eavesdropping (London: Random 
House, 2005), p.231. 
136 M. Smith, The Spying Game: The Secret History of British Espionage (London: Politico’s, 2004); 
M. Smith, Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America’s Most Secret Special Operations Team (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2006). 
137 See, for example, the revelations contained within J. Gerstein, ‘Spies Prep Reporters on Protecting 
Secrets’, The New York Sun (27 September 2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘Frustrated by press 
leaks about its most sensitive electronic surveillance work, the secretive National Security Agency 
convened an unprecedented series of off-the-record “seminars” in recent years to teach reporters about 
the damage caused by such leaks and to discourage reporting that could interfere with the agency's 
mission to spy on America's enemies… Dubbed “SIGINT 101,” … the seminar was presented “a 
handful of times” between approximately 2002 and 2004…’ 
138 See Chapter 2 [2.1.iii] of this study for more details on sources.  
139 Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold War Era’, p.457. 
140 See ibid., pp.455-56. 
141 See for example, UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), Annual Report 1999-2000 (2000) 
- via URL: <http://www.archive.official-documents.co.uk/document/cm48/4897/4897-02.htm> 
(accessed: 10/2005). The insights provided by the ISC reports are, however, arguably limited and can 
be regarded as somewhat sanitised so that the report can be released into the public domain. 
142 See S. Gibson, ‘Open source intelligence: An intelligence lifeline’, RUSI Journal (February 2004), 
p.20. 
143 Indeed, as a beginning, some insights into what one Indian commentator on intelligence and 
intelligence liaison thinks can be garnered from sources, such as: B. Raman, former additional 
secretary in the Cabinet secretariat, Government of India, ‘The dangers of intelligence cooperation’, 
rediff.com (18 July 2002) and B. Raman, ‘When Spooks of the World Unite’, rediff.com (21 February 
2003). For bodies of literature examining dimensions of European intelligence co-operation (and 
associated issues) – again not explored in this literature review in depth due to their main focus not 
being more directly orientated towards UK-US intelligence interactions – see, for example, some of the 
sources presented in the footnotes of A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘“On a continuum with expansion”? 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 136 
                                                                                                                                      
Intelligence co-operation in Europe in the early 21st century: Counter-terrorism as the lead issue’, 
paper presented at the UACES Student Forum Eighth Annual Conference, School of Politics and 
International Relations, University of Nottingham, UK (20 April 2007); see also sources, such as B. 
Müller-Wille, ‘EU intelligence cooperation: A Critical Analysis’, Contemporary Security Policy, 23, 2 
(August 2002); L. Lugna, ‘Institutional Framework of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Policy 
Setting’, Baltic Security and Defence Review, 8 (2006); and B. Müller-Wille, ‘The Effect of 
International Terrorism on EU Intelligence Co-operation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46, 1 
(2008), pp.49-73; see also for a discussion of European intelligence studies, D. Kahn, ‘Intelligence 
Studies on the Continent’, Intelligence and National Security, 23, 2 (2008), pp.249-275. 
144 For further exploration of this issue in greater depth, including examples (not reproduced here) from 
the various spy fiction texts consulted, see A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Painting rather than photographing: 
Exploring the genre of spy fiction as a legitimate source concerning UK-US intelligence co-operation’, 
Journal of Transatlantic Studies (forthcoming: 2009). Some of the observations featuring in this 
section were also presented in a paper given by the author at the Transatlantic Studies Association 
(TSA) Conference at the University of Dundee, Scotland, UK, in June 2006. 
145 See the praise for John le Carré’s The Honourable Schoolboy, in a book review by D.S. Blaufarb, 
under heading ‘Intelligence Bookshelf… Current books of interest to intelligence buffs and watchers of 
the world scene. All reviews are by AFIO members’ in Periscope: Official Organ of the Association of 
Former Intelligence Officers, 3, 4 (Winter 1977), p.6 – via CREST – CIA-RDP88-
01315R000100480001-4 (2005/12/14) – particularly where he notes: ‘Granted his sophistication and 
understanding of the mechanics of clandestine operations, his mastery of pace and setting, therein is the 
real secret of Le Carré’s superiority. A pity he choses [sic.] to depict the American “cousins” of SIS 
(i.e., CIA) with a lack of the precise kind of sympathy which makes much of his work memorable. Ah, 
well, you can’t have everything. Read it anyway. You will enjoy it.’ 
146 For Ian Fleming’s experience see D. Cannadine, ‘Fantasy: Ian Fleming and the Realities of 
Escapism’, chapter 12 in his In Churchill’s Shadow: Confronting the Past in Modern Britain (London: 
Penguin, 2002), from p.279; for Graham Greene’s experience see, N. Sherry, The Life of Graham 
Greene – Volume Two: 1939-1955 (London: Random House, 1994), pp.83-183; for John le Carré (aka. 
David Cornwell’s) experience see URL: <http://www.johnlecarre.com/profile.html> (accessed: 
26/11/2005). 
147 T.J. Price, ‘Popular Perceptions of an Ally: “The Special Relationship” in the British Spy Novel’, 
Journal of Popular Culture, 28, 2 (1994), p.55. 
148 See, for example, in Herman, Intelligence Power. 
149 Hitchens, Blood, Class and Nostalgia, pp.332-3. 
150 W. Hood, ‘… or tarted up spy books?’ in Peake and Halpern (eds), In the Name of Intelligence, 
p.293. 
151 ibid., p.295. 
152 J. Heer, ‘The Stock of Bond: Ian Fleming’s literary reputation’, Boston Globe Ideas (20 October 
2002). 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 137 
                                                                                                                                      
153 See also, for example for a general critique of the media, insights provided in N. Davies, Flat Earth 
News (London: Chatto & Windus, 2008); for a detailed review of Flat Earth News, see, for example, J. 
Lanchester, ‘Riots, Terrorism etc’, London Review of Books, 30, 5 (06 March 2008) - via URL: 
<http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n05/print/lanc01_.html> (accessed: 28/02/2008). 
154 See also, for example, the various articles in ‘21st Century Muckrakers’, Nieman Reports, 62, 1 
(Spring 2008) - via URL: <http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/08-1NRspring/index.html> 
(accessed: 17/04/2008). 
155 See also Gerstein, ‘Spies Prep Reporters on Protecting Secrets’. 
156 See, for example, D. Priest, ‘Help from France key in covert operations’, The Washington Post (03 
July 2005); D. Priest, ‘Secret Anti-Terrorism Unit Pairs CIA, Europeans’, The Washington Post (07 
April 2005); D. Priest, ‘Foreign Network at Front of CIA’s Terror Fight: Joint Facilities in Two Dozen 
Countries Account for Bulk of Agency’s Post-9/11 Successes’, The Washington Post (18 November 
2005). 
157 Also author of The Spying Game and Killer Elite. See comments above [4.1]. 
158 Also author of UK Eyes Alpha. See comments above [4.1]. 
159 Gordon Corera is also author of Shopping for bombs. 
160 See, for example, M. Smith, ‘Intelligence-sharing failures hamper war on terrorism’, Jane’s 
Intelligence Review (01 July 2005) and G. Corera, ‘UK makes changes to Secret Intelligence Service’, 
Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 February 2005). 
161 See, for instance, for background on the media and official ‘spinning’, J. Bamford, ‘The Man Who 
Sold the War: Meet John Rendon, Bush's general in the propaganda war’, Rollingstone.com (17 
November 2005) - via URL: 
<http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/story/8798997/the_man_who_sold_the_war> (accessed: 
03/02/2007); see also ‘Press Release: Post-9/11 Secrets, Confidentiality, Control: In a four-hour 
special, FRONTLINE investigates the future of the news: FRONTLINE presents News War’, PBS 
FRONTLINE (11 February 2007) - via URL: <http://www.pbs.org/frontline/newswar/> (accessed: 
12/02/2007); A. Leithead, ‘Media dragged into Afghan conflict: Propaganda has always played an 
important part in war, but in Afghanistan the battles between Nato forces and the Taleban are being 
fought not just in the deserts and valleys but in the media’, BBC News Online (11 March 2007); W. 
Unge and H. Furustig, ‘Unravelling strategies of deception and perception in the Iraq crisis: [They] 
examine the roles played by Iraqi deception strategies and UK and US disinformation operations in the 
run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and explore the lessons for future counterproliferation efforts’, 
Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 May 2006); see also S. Rampton and J. Stauber, Weapons of Mass 
Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq (New York: Tarcher & Penguin, 2003); P. 
Rutherford, Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the War Against Iraq (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2004); J. Western, Selling Intervention & War: The Presidency, the Media, and the 
American Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); M. Isikoff and D. Corn, Hubris: 
The inside story of spin, scandal, and the selling of the Iraq war (New York: Three Rivers Press, 
2007); M. Wheeler, Anatomy of Deceit: How the Bush Administration Used the Media to Sell the Iraq 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 3: Literature Review 
III : 138 
                                                                                                                                      
War and Out a Spy (Berkeley: Vaster Books, 2007); D. Rose, ‘Spies and their lies: How Britain's 
intelligence services manipulate the media’, New Statesman, issue 4864 (2007), pp.30-33. 
162 See, for example, ‘Figure 1.1: The great globalization controversy’ in ‘Introduction’, chapter 1 in D. 
Held and A. McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization: Beyond the Great Divide (Cambridge: Polity, 
2007 [2ed.]), p.5. 
163 See Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’. 
164 Scott and Jackson (eds), Understanding Intelligence, p.3. 
165 See, for instance, (UK) Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), Renditions (June 2007); see also 
Chapter 1 [4.1] of this study.  
166 As an example, see Central Intelligence Agency, ‘Public Affairs’, CIA website (2007) and ‘Science 
& Technology: In the Community & Across the Nation’, ibid. - all these pages are available via URL: 
<https://www.cia.gov/> (accessed: 06/2007); see also ‘USGIF – Outreach’, US Geospatial Intelligence 
Foundation website - via URL: <http://www.usgif.org/About_Committees_Outreach.aspx> (accessed: 
28/06/2007); see also D.E. Kaplan, ‘Hey, Let’s Play Ball: The insular world of intelligence reaches out 
for a few new ideas’, US News & World Report (29 October 2006). 
167 See, for example: Rudner, ‘Hunters and Gatherers’; Lefebvre, ‘The difficulties and dilemmas of 
international intelligence cooperation’; Clough, ‘Quid Pro Quo: The Challenges of International 
Strategic Intelligence Cooperation’; Lander, ‘International Intelligence Cooperation: An inside 
perspective’; Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’; Sims, ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison’; Reveron, ‘Old 
Allies, New Friends’. 
168 Aldrich, ‘Dangerous Liaisons’ is somewhat of an exception from the other studies cited in the 
endnote above. This is because alongside his empirical analysis he introduces some International 
Relations (IR) Theory (see comments above). 
169 See, for example, W. Agrell, ‘Sweden and the Dilemmas of Neutral Intelligence Liaison’, Journal 
of Strategic Studies, 29, 4 (August 2006), p.635 – where he notes: ‘However, there is no generally 
established theory of intelligence and hence no given theoretical framework for the analysis of 
intelligence liaison.’ 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 4: Enhancing Interoperability 
IV : 139 
Chapter 4 
Enhancing Interoperability: 
Structural UK~US intelligence liaison  
in the early 21st Century 
 
 
‘We are now in the midst of a… revolution [in information technology and connectivity] in 
military communications. Proprietary solutions, where each nation develops its own radios 
and waveforms at the cost of wider interoperability, are becoming a thing of the past. Instead 
we are seeing international standardisation… and interoperability emerge as the 
watchwords.’ 
- Bruno Rambaud, Senior Vice-President and Managing Director of Thales.1 
 
 
[1.0]: Introduction 
 
‘American help is vital,’ The Economist succinctly noted in an article on UK 
intelligence during March 2005.2 This chapter expands on the introductory passage 
provided in Chapter 1 [10.0] by further exploring UK-US intelligence liaison in the 
early twenty-first century. Notably this chapter examines the extent to which 
interoperability is enhanced and underpinned by structural factors. Accordingly, we 
need to analyse: (i) who is involved in UK-US intelligence liaison – for example, 
which agencies and which roles; (ii) what type of liaison takes place; (iii) when does 
it take place; (iv) where that liaison is ‘located’; as well as (v) how it is conducted. 
This chapter, together with this study as a whole, also seeks to contribute towards 
comprehensively addressing the observation of Dan Plesch that ‘despite efforts the 
[UK-US intelligence] relationship has not yet received the attention it deserves in 
Britain.’3 Whether the nature of UK-US intelligence liaison is structurally ‘ever closer’ 
in the early twenty-first century is then evaluated towards the end of this chapter. 
 
A plethora of conduits exist. When disaggregated, structurally UK-US intelligence 
liaison consists of a matrix or a series of different simple to complex linkages. These 
are found in each of the specific areas liaised over - such as HUMINT, SIGINT, and 
so forth.4 These are relatively self-contained channels, although they are interrelated 
and naturally there is sometimes overlap. In terms of UK-US relations, over time 
each of these links, together with their multiple ties within them, varies to different 
degrees of ‘specialness’.  
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Distinct trends emerge. The greatest UK-US intelligence interactions (in terms 
of their freedom and extent) occur in the overt intelligence realm, through outreach 
activities. While, in the covert intelligence realm - roughly descending from the 
broadest (‘need to share/pool’) to narrowest (‘need to know’) domains of 
exchange/sharing/access - the interactions concern: open source intelligence 
(OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), military intelligence (MILINT or MI) - 
including measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) and imagery 
intelligence (IMINT), etc. - and finally human intelligence (HUMINT). Extending 
beyond merely these expanding, and often increasingly technically automated, 
channels, are more collaborative interactions. These are structurally orientated around 
exponentially proliferating specific tasks/cases that have an increasingly central 
intelligence component, such as in the domains of law enforcement and military 
operations. Moreover, in parallel there exist interactions involving all-source and 
intelligence assessment/analysis material, which includes a degree of input from all 
the above ‘INTs’.  
Variously over time, each of these links and their associated ties also contribute 
towards collectively helping to sustain the overall UK-US intelligence relationship. 
For example, from the UK side, this is mainly on qualitative (quality of intelligence 
exchanged), rather than so much on quantitative (volume of intelligence exchanged), 
bases. Again, for the UK at least, maintaining a close UK-US intelligence relationship 
has moved beyond being merely a central component of overall UK foreign policy 
towards being more of a condition of ‘an ingrained habit.’5 Providing some insights 
into international intelligence liaison generally, and more specifically UK-US 
intelligence interactions focussed on counter-terrorism, the UK Intelligence and 
Security Committee (ISC) Renditions report clearly highlighted how necessary the US 
help was to the UK:   
 
We have been told by all three Agency Heads that their intelligence-sharing 
relationships with foreign liaison services are vital to counter the threat 
from international terrorism. The U.S. link is the most important, not least 
because of the resources the U.S. agencies command. The Chief of SIS [Sir 
John Scarlett] told the Committee: 
 
The global resources of CIA, FBI and NSA [National Security 
Agency] are vast… The UK Agencies’ long-developed relationships 
with U.S. intelligence agencies give them vital access to U.S. 
intelligence and resources. It is neither practical, desirable, nor is it in 
the national interest, for UK Agencies to carry out [counter-
terrorism] work independently of the U.S. effort. 
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The Director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) 
[Sir David Pepper] reiterated the value of the relationship to the UK, saying 
“Overall the benefit to the UK from this arrangement is enormous”, and the 
Director General of the Security Service [Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller 
(in post until her retirement in April 2007)] said “It is unimaginable that we 
could [cease sharing intelligence with the U.S.] because of the degree of importance 
of SIGINT and HUMINT and the intelligence they give us”. 
 
The Director General of the Security Service made a further important 
point about the UK/U.S. relationship – that the two countries are 
inextricably linked: “As [the summer 2006 UK/U.S. airliner plot] showed, their 
security is absolutely bound up with ours.”6 
 
Similarities emerge as important facilitators. As former UK intelligence practitioner 
Michael Herman notes, the most ‘effective contact is specialist-to-specialist; like talks 
with like.’7 However, this is more easily stated than mapped. To provide at least an 
initial insight, each of these expanding clusters of specialist/expert intelligence ties 
will now be briefly explored in succession. Starting with SIGINT liaison, this chapter 
will then go on to examine: HUMINT liaison, MILINT or MI, MASINT and IMINT 
liaison, OSINT liaison, UK-US law enforcement intelligence liaison, and UK-US 
intelligence assessment/analysis and ‘shared/common perceptions’ liaison. Some 
further insights into how UK-US and international (or foreign) intelligence liaison is 
managed and co-ordinated are also presented. 
 
 
[2.0]: UK-US signals intelligence (SIGINT) liaison 
 
Some of the closest ties are over SIGINT. In the realm of covert intelligence, this 
forms the ‘core’ of the UK-US intelligence relationship8 – or, at the least, in the 
contemporary era of exponentially burgeoning OSINT (see below [5.0]), SIGINT 
liaison continues to form one of the relationship’s major supporting pillars. It is 
because of the nature of this dimension that BBC journalist Mark Urban somewhat 
controversially claims that: ‘More than anything else, British intelligence is a system 
for repackaging information gathered by the USA.’9 There is the constant exchange 
of vast quantities of data between the substantially integrated UK Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and its US counterpart, the National 
Security Agency (NSA). According to The Guardian newspaper’s security affairs 
correspondent, Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘GCHQ… has a symbiotic relationship with 
its American big brother…’ He continued, while quantitatively at least ‘the 
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Americans give more than Britain gives in return… an internal GCHQ staff manual 
[dated 1994] notes that the [UK] agency’s contribution to the relationship must be “of 
sufficient scale and of the right kind to make a continuation of the Sigint… alliance 
worthwhile to our partners.”’10 Elaborating further, the GCHQ staff manual noted 
that: ‘This may entail on occasion the applying of UK resources to the meeting of US 
requirements.’11  
Intricately networked computer set-ups facilitate the UK-US intelligence 
interactions in the SIGINT domain. These include the UKUSA ECHELON system, 
described by one of its foremost analysts, US national security scholar Jeffrey 
Richelson, as: ‘a computer-based tasking and exchange system… that allows the 
various [UKUSA] parties to request, via keywords, data collected by the other’s 
collection assets and to have it transmitted to the requesting party.’12 Around 2000, 
during the debates surrounding the prominent European Parliamentary inquiry into 
ECHELON, several claims regarding the capabilities of the system were arguably 
exaggerated.13 The intelligence ‘failures’ surrounding 9/11 demonstrated vividly that 
the system was not as ‘all-powerful’ as some had claimed. Constant rapid 
technological developments writ large have also served to keep the UK and US 
intelligence agencies smartly on their toes in this domain of operation. This is so that 
they do not fall behind the curve of general trends.14  
Undoubtedly, a high volume of data is gathered and processed in the SIGINT 
domain. Much of this is undertaken as part of the bilateral UK-US sharing 
arrangements, also involving the ‘exclusive’ multilateral UKUSA arrangement. Tasks 
include monitoring e-mails, faxes, mobile (cell) and fixed-line telephone calls and 
electronic (and financial/bank) transactions.15 Moreover, the volume of data 
processed, with arguably some greater finite targeting over time, has increased 
exponentially in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ context.16 Indeed, the volume of data 
processed in the UK-US intelligence relationship is so vast, that there is considerable 
engagement with the real issue of ‘information overload’. This requires the 
application of ever-more sophisticated data filtering software, which is generally 
orientated around the flagging up of particular targeted keywords of interest. In 
2000, Professor Harold Shukman posed an ongoing concern vis-à-vis this domain of 
operation. This took the form of the reasonable question: ‘Are the intelligence 
services faced by the paradox that too much data can mean too little 
understanding?’17 Inevitably, various time lags are involved due to the processing 
(including translation) of the vast quantities of data gathered. 
A significant amount of UK-US liaison is witnessed in this domain. Due to 
the substantial integration of NSA and GCHQ, there is routine ‘physical’ liaison to 
varying degrees on more of a regularised everyday basis. This is facilitated through a 
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sizeable exchange of staff both at headquarters level (Fort Meade and Cheltenham), 
and with the running of joint UK and US staffed monitoring sites located in different 
parts of the world.18 The liaison simultaneously occurs ‘virtually’ through the 
constantly networked and highly integrated computer systems and platforms, 
allowing access to the (substantially) pooled SIGINT. 
Close liaison between GCHQ and the US National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO) is also apparent. This involves interactions over US ‘spy’ satellite output, 
where intelligence ‘product’ comes from an elaborately networked satellite system 
offering global coverage.19 It is a set-up in which the UK is a part investor. Rather 
than (explicitly) developing the UK’s own expensive series of satellites for espionage, 
surveillance and monitoring purposes - and after the UK’s own short-lived pursuit of 
the ‘ZIRCON’ satellite project in the 1980s20 - today the UK contributes a sizeable 
sum of money towards the US ‘spy’ satellite system. This is in order to acquire (at 
least a degree of) privileged access to the valuable data produced.21  
By 2006, further technological advances in the satellite sector had emerged. 
Some ramifications of these developments for the UK-US intelligence liaison 
relationship could be readily anticipated. Reportedly in 2006, according to defence 
analyst Bruce Sweetman, again ‘[t]he idea of a UK-operated space constellation is 
being taken seriously within the UK MoD…’ He continued, ‘Strategically, one goal of 
a UK space programme would be to give the MoD and intelligence community more 
to offer its US allies, in exchange for continued or improved access to US satellite 
data.’22 Furthermore, the Eros satellites ‘contain no critical US technology [(such as 
the US DoD-developed global positioning system [GPS])]… [meaning] that the US 
government exercises no “shutter control” over the system.’23 Wing Commander 
Mark Presley, the director of space strategy at the UK’s air staff, remarked: ‘The UK 
is a leader in small space technology, and that provides an opportunity for 
indigenous capability and influence with our allies.’24 In short, through pursuit of 
such a strategy, greater bargaining and leverage potential in this area of UK-US 
relations could be better facilitated.  
Added to these developments, March 2007 saw the launch of the upgraded 
UK ‘Skynet’ 5A satellite. Reportedly, its tasks include delivering ‘secure, high-
bandwidth communications for UK and allied forces.’25 As Sweetman noted:  
 
The practice is to offload mundane [data] traffic on to commercial satellites 
and then to use a complementary, secure proprietary system for the traffic 
that has to be protected… Take for example the capability of unmanned air 
vehicles [UAVs]. These generate a lot of imagery and that has to be passed 
over a secure communications link. Modern warfare involves passing 
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around a lot of data [including processes such as transferring SIGINT], and 
that puts a premium on satellite capacity.26 
 
Once gathered and processed, dissemination of SIGINT ‘product’ is 
undertaken. The SIGINT ‘take’ tends to be more pooled between the UK and US. 
Also it tends to be widely shared with varying degrees of ‘exclusive’ multilateral 
distribution, on a ‘need-to-share/pool’ basis, for example with the other UKUSA 
partners. The ‘need-to-share/pool’ mentality is codified and sanctioned by exclusive 
agreements, such as those composing the overall UKUSA agreements and their 
associated ‘memoranda of understanding’ (MoU), between the parties involved.27 
 
 
[3.0]: UK-US human intelligence (HUMINT) liaison 
 
Exchange in the domain of HUMINT is different. In contrast to SIGINT, HUMINT 
tends to be shared on much more of a strict ‘need-to-know’ basis. This type of 
sharing is more narrow and direct. It is usually confined to being bilateral and to just 
involving a carefully managed limited range of particular individuals within the 
partaking intelligence services. Reflecting this trend, in the UK-US intelligence 
relationship, the ties on the HUMINT front are mainly between the UK Secret 
Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6) and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
Although, the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and its Defense HUMINT 
Service (DHS)/Defense HUMINT Management Office (DHMO) - created in 2005 - is 
also sometimes involved.28 Showing the value of the UK to the US in the realm of 
HUMINT, former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and 
Production, Mark Lowenthal, has noted that: ‘British HUMINT does not completely 
overlap that of the United States, with Britain having some advantages in 
Commonwealth countries.’29 
 
Demonstrably, the HUMINT ties tend to operate restrictedly. This is in terms of the 
volume and what precise intelligence is exchanged, as well as these interactions 
operating on more of a selective case-by-case basis than the SIGINT ties. Done for the 
ubiquitous so-called ‘security reasons’, these controls are intended for addressing 
counter-intelligence anxieties and maintaining at least a form of intelligence control 
and protectionism.30 Indeed, these forms of control, and the associated ‘sanitisation’ 
of intelligence, are at their most apparent during two occasions: (i) declassification; 
and (ii) when in operation vis-à-vis the interactions within forums where the broader 
forms of intelligence liaison is undertaken. Notably, this is vividly seen in the ‘less-
exclusive’ multilateral intelligence sharing arrangements (for instance, when 
compared with the UKUSA arrangement), such as at the North Atlantic Treaty 
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Organisation (NATO), especially as expansion is undergone.31 As US defence expert 
Derek S. Reveron has observed: 
 
Multilateral relationships through organizations like NATO provide a 
greater audience for intelligence, but may create counterintelligence 
concerns greater than the value of the intelligence they produce … when 
expanding beyond traditional allies, a variety of practical and 
counterintelligence concerns arise.32  
 
HUMINT sources and their provenance are especially sensitive. They thus continue 
to be closely (and at times jealously) guarded by national intelligence agencies.33 As 
UK journalist Stephen Fidler has observed, ‘The sharing of humint between the US 
and UK is more selective than the sharing of sigint…’, and demonstrating the 
importance and high sensitivity accorded to HUMINT intensive operations, 
‘Whitehall officials say that intelligence gathered by MI6, obtained they say at great 
risk to those involved, was critical in bringing an end to Libya’s non-conventional 
weapons programmes.’34 This practice of closely guarding HUMINT is even largely 
maintained in an era of increasingly ‘globalised’ intelligence.35 It simultaneously 
demonstrates that observed phenomena, such as the ‘globalisation of intelligence’, 
are not entirely unfettered processes in all domains of intelligence activity. Again, 
their overall haphazard nature is emphasised. 
 
 
[4.0]: UK-US military intelligence liaison (including MASINT & IMINT) 
 
MILINT/MI offers another extensive mode of liaison. This is not least as military 
doctrinal concepts, such as Intelligence, Surveillance, [Target Acquisition] and 
Reconnaissance (ISTAR/ISR), together with their facilitators, perform an 
increasingly central role in real-time on the battlefield (or in the ‘battle-space’).36 
However, in this domain, interoperability obstacles can emerge more starkly, and 
can have more of an impact. This is due to the nature of the tools closely involved, 
and the (often high) tempo at which operations in this domain are conducted. The 
UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
liaise mainly over military intelligence (MILINT or MI), measurement and signature 
intelligence (MASINT), as well as imagery intelligence (IMINT).37 The UK DIS also 
liaises with other US intelligence agencies, such as the CIA, over geographic and 
thematic/functional issues, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and 
proliferation. The UK Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (JARIC), also 
known as the National Imagery Exploitation Centre, handles UK IMINT, GEOINT 
and MASINT.38 Their main point of interface is the US National Geospatial-
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Intelligence Agency (NGA), which manages US IMINT/GEOINT (including high-
resolution radar-imagery), acquired from sources such as its satellites.39  
Some US IMINT is also acquired out-in-the-field. This is obtained by the UK 
from the US, reportedly due to ‘an agreement with the US Air Force (USAF) to gain 
access to imagery from the service’s RQ/MQ-1 Predators in Iraq and Afghanistan.’ 
Some valuable SIGINT, particularly of the ‘short-range’ variety (see below), is 
simultaneously obtained through the use of these platforms and their ability to fly 
over battle spaces. However, this operational sharing is not always smooth, with it 
being reported in 2006 that ‘British Army officers in Afghanistan are … frustrated 
that they are not getting the level of support required to cope with the current 
upsurge of Taliban activity and have asked for dedicated UK UAV [(unmanned 
aerial vehicle)] support.’40 These concerns were particularly troubling for the UK 
military before the delivery of the UK’s own new UAV models (Watch-Keeper 450 
and Reaper [a Predator B purchased from the US] with a strike-capable platform) 
later in 2007.41 These new arrivals could now - at long last by October 2007 - operate 
in terrain as diverse as Afghanistan, as well as bring with them the added value of 
being able to function independently without the UK having to (overly) rely upon 
the capabilities of the US. Summarising the other element of persisting UK 
dependency on the US in the IMINT domain, Lowenthal observed in 2006 that: 
‘Britain’s independent imagery intelligence (IMINT) capability is restricted to 
airborne platforms, but it receives satellite imagery from the United States.’42 
Sharing over MASINT is similarly witnessed. MASINT is particularly key in 
assisting UK-US intelligence WMD and non-proliferation detection and verification 
enterprises. MASINT provides essential data on chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear and (high-yield) explosive (CBRNE) components and their associated 
programmes. Gathered via a range of sensors located across the world, including 
seismometers, the MASINT is exchanged between the UK and US’s WMD specialists 
to aid their individual and joint analysis and assessment efforts.43 Other selected 
partners beyond, such as other UKUSA members - notably Canada and Australia - 
are also frequently included within this sharing.44  
 Further liaison takes place in the military context. In the armed services 
(army, air force and navy), UK-US intelligence liaison takes place primarily within 
G2 and J2 departments at headquarters.45 Activities include joint military planning 
and operations - involving operations intelligence (OPINT) and, in its handling, 
operations security (OPSEC) - and occur between ‘conventional’ forces as well as the 
Special Operations Forces (SOF). Indeed, the close contact maintained between the 
UK and US Special Forces (SF) dates from their joint operations undertaken during 
the Second World War. For instance, alongside joint SF training activities and 
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operations, over time the UK SAS has retained at least two operators who liaise with 
US Delta Force at Fort Bragg in North Carolina.46 
The UK-US military intelligence liaison is witnessed both at joint respective 
home-based headquarters and within their commands out in-the-field/on-the-
ground. This includes within Joint Task Forces (JTF) and Joint Special Operations 
Task Forces (JSOTF) - for example, as witnessed during the 2001 Afghanistan and 
2003 Iraq wars. During OPERATION ‘ENDURING FREEDOM’ in Afghanistan, UK 
and US military chiefs and planners worked together at US Central Command 
(CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida. Meanwhile, at the UK Permanent Joint 
Headquarters (PJHQ) at Northwood, UK staff worked with their US counterparts.47 
The US Military European Command (EUCOM) Joint Analysis Center (JAC) based at 
RAF Molesworth, the US Visiting Forces base in Cambridgeshire, UK, also features 
as a location where UK-US military intelligence liaison takes place.48 Generally, a 
sizeable number of UK and US military personnel are routinely exchanged between 
the two countries and their respective armed forces at all levels.49 Indeed, as a UK 
Defence White Paper in 2003 noted: 
 
Where the UK chooses to be engaged, we will wish to be able to influence 
political and military decision-making throughout the crisis, including 
during the post-conflict period. The significant military contribution the 
UK is able to make to such operations means that we secure an effective 
place in the political and military decision-making processes. To exploit 
this effectively, our Armed Forces will need to be interoperable with U.S. 
command and control structures, match the U.S. operational tempo and 
provide those capabilities that deliver the greatest impact when operating 
alongside the U.S.50 
 
Military and defence attachés simultaneously figure.51 These personnel, based in the 
UK embassy in Washington and the US embassy in London, both conduct liaison on 
military and defence matters. Their role includes handling military/operations-
relevant ELINT/SIGINT, such as the ‘short-range’ varieties (from military-tactical 
communications, including radios) found in battle spaces.52 Moreover, again 
highlighting the importance of the defence attaché’s intelligence role, in the US, 
responsibility for managing that post is assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA).53 
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[5.0]: UK-US open source intelligence (OSINT) liaison 
 
UK-US OSINT liaison similarly performs a vital role. Indeed, this is one that is 
growing exponentially. The vast majority of UK-US intelligence information comes 
from open source intelligence (OSINT). In the realm of UK-US OSINT handling, 
historically there is a long-term and close partnership between the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Monitoring and the US (CIA) Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS) – the latter replaced by the DNI Open Source Center 
(OSC) in November 2005.54 Recognising this relationship’s importance, not least to 
sustaining the overall UK-US partnership, BBC Monitoring, an arm of the BBC 
World Service, is also partly funded by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO).55 Today, operating alongside private sector media output monitoring 
companies, 24-hours-a-day and 7-days-a-week, together these services monitor and 
translate a high volume of foreign media and newswire/news agency output. The 
resulting product is arranged ‘geographically’ and ‘thematically’, and is produced 
for a large range of both public and private sector clients, from intelligence agencies 
to think-tanks.56 The UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) officially judge 
the exchange of OSINT between the UK and the US via these services as valuable.57  
Indeed, the overall OSINT collaboration extends further. In terms of OSINT 
international partnerships, core international partnerships include between the Open 
Source Branch (OSB) of the Office of National Assessments in Australia, the UK’s 
BBC Monitoring (including input from the UK Intelligence Community Open Source 
Joint Working Group), and the US Open Source Center (OSC). More widely, there 
are OSINT international partnerships within the framework of the ‘International 
Open Source Working Group’ (IOSWG), which consists of the USA, Germany, 
Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Austria, Sweden, 
Israel, Australia, Norway, France and Belgium. All share OSINT via the Internet 
portal of ‘opensource.gov’, managed by the US intelligence community.58 Again, 
within this domain of collaboration, ‘best practices’ and ‘standards’ are shared across 
the globe amongst these partners.59 The domain of OSINT is where the ‘globalisation 
of intelligence’ extends to its furthest in the world of covert intelligence. 
 In parallel in the overt intelligence realm is some considerable outreach. This 
occurs between various configurations of UK and US groups. Reflecting the presence 
of entities such as transnational knowledge and policy networks, it takes place 
around tables in the UK, US and abroad in other countries, involving varying key 
societal stakeholders (including practitioners, former-practitioners, academics, 
private sector, non-profit sector operators and other non-governmental groups).60 
The outreach mainly involves interactions over information. For instance, concerning 
open source (OS) material and research-originating material, or ‘RESINT’, which in 
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turn essentially consists of connected OS material, offering effective contextualisation 
potential. If properly and fully utilised through effective exploitation, the product 
gathered in this domain of activity can offer both high volume and high impact 
assistance to overall intelligence efforts. Here, anyone is included who can 
potentially contribute usefully to overall intelligence efforts in some manner.61 
 
 
[6.0]: UK-US law enforcement intelligence liaison  
 
UK-US intelligence liaison extends beyond merely the conduits already examined. A 
more recent addition in terms of participating agencies is the UK’s Serious Organised 
Crime Agency (SOCA).62 SOCA was formally launched in April 2006, after shadow 
operating during 2005, and has been dubbed by the media as the ‘British FBI’. 
Typically, this comparison is not entirely accurate.63 Although, both the FBI and US 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) can be seen as models for SOCA, and 
certain areas of responsibility do overlap, providing useful points of contact for 
liaison purposes. An amalgamation of the UK National Crime Squad, the National 
Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and Customs and Home Office Immigration 
Service investigators, the intention is for SOCA to facilitate information sharing on 
organised crime and related issues, as well as to allow for the more effective 
targeting of resources to those ends.64 SOCA also now conveniently provides one UK 
agency with which various US agencies can liaise. Bureaux under the control of the 
US Department of Justice (DoJ), including the US Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) - liaise with SOCA on drug (narcotics) investigations - while the FBI liaises on 
issues such as money laundering and other financial crime related matters. Bureaux 
under the US DHS liaise with SOCA on immigration and customs issues.65 Joint UK-
US conferences are held,66 while liaison also takes place with and via SOCA’s ‘large 
network of overseas officers.’ Again for ‘security reasons’, more details concerning 
SOCA officers’ exact postings are not provided.67  
More focussed law enforcement intelligence liaison also exists. For example, 
this concerns particular ‘functional’ issues such as specific legal cases and 
investigations. This occurs between the FBI - usually conducted by its overseas-based 
US embassies’ legal attachés (‘legats’) - the US State Department’s ‘regional security 
officers’,68 and SOCA, the UK Police ‘Special Branch’ (SO12) and the Anti-Terrorism 
branch (SO13) – in 2006 both amalgamated into Counter-Terrorism Command 
(SO15)69 - and between conventional UK and US Police forces.70 
Similarly, UK and US Customs closely co-operate. In December 2002, the UK 
joined the US Container Security Initiative (CSI), by signing a ‘Declaration of 
Principles’.71 This co-operation was later further enhanced by US Customs personnel 
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coming to work at major container ports in the UK alongside their UK counterparts 
in a specific intelligence-sharing role.72 
Moreover, a form of UK-US liaison occurs concerning the issue of 
accountability. For instance, there is some evidence of communication, including 
bilateral visits overseas and multilateral conferences, between the UK and US (and 
other countries’) intelligence oversight committees.73 This type of liaison, albeit 
taking place more regularly, is similar to the liaison witnessed between the UK 
Butler Committee conducting the Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction 
and the US Robb-Silberman Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction.74 While not strictly ‘pure’ UK-US 
intelligence liaison per se, this mode of liaison does, however, sit on the fringes of, 
and involves, both the UK and US intelligence communities - albeit if perhaps more 
indirectly and peripherally. Thus it demonstrably has some relevance to be at least 
referenced.  
Together with these more direct UK-US ties, other transatlantic and 
plurilateral (European/EU/Council of Europe-US) interactions occur. These take 
place in parallel in the domain of intelligence and security co-operation, and concern 
issues such as the exchange of airline passenger data.75 
 
 
[7.0]: UK-US intelligence assessment/analysis and all-source liaison 
 
‘Pure’ UK-US intelligence liaison has other dimensions. As well as ‘raw’ intelligence 
product liaison over each of the ‘INTs’, there is UK-US liaison over ‘finished’ or 
‘processed’ intelligence - namely analysis output in the form of 
assessments/estimates. This occurs not only between experts and specialists at 
regular cross-national and cross-agency meetings, but also between ‘higher-ranking’ 
intelligence assessment ‘committees’, and within terrorist threat assessment/analysis 
centres, such as the UK Joint Terrorism Assessment/Analysis Centre (JTAC).76 
Significantly, in the UK, the US is sometimes involved in the drafting of the final 
analyses produced.77 The exchange of this type of ‘finished’ intelligence reports, 
judgements, and frequently ‘all-source’ material, helps to facilitate the development 
of shared UK-US perceptions on intelligence issues. In the UK Cabinet Office, there is 
a UK/US Joint Contact Group (JCG) on Homeland Security, established in 2003 and 
originally (before the role underwent all of its subsequent changes78) chaired by the 
Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator.79 Meanwhile, in the UK Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC), liaison officers from the UKUSA partner countries (including CIA 
personnel) sometimes attend meetings.80 The JIC also has an ‘assessment staff’, 
which, according to the UK Government’s National Intelligence Machinery brochure,  
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like the three agencies and the DIS… maintains its own contacts with 
analogous overseas intelligence organisations. Such liaison arrangements 
allow access to information and analysis, which might otherwise not be 
available. In the case of countries with which the UK has military alliances 
or faces a common threat, information is shared so that decisions can be 
taken on the basis of a common perception…81  
 
This example additionally serves to highlight a case of where having an alliance 
facilitates the sharing of intelligence. Although, of course if the shared/common 
perceptions are taken too far, as cautioned throughout this study, detrimental 
episodes of intelligence liaison ‘blowback’, for example in the form of ‘groupthink’, 
can occur. This is particularly the case when intelligence liaison ironically over-
extends. In such circumstances, liaison undermines its positive attributes.82 
 
 
[8.0]: Mapping further UK-US intelligence flows and challenges 
 
Transatlantically, liaison is rarely conducted with solely one agency. Alongside the 
SIS, the UK domestic Security Service (MI5) also liaises with the CIA, as well as with 
the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the US Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).83 Indeed, especially post-9/11, this is one of the areas where the 
greatest increase in intelligence/information sharing has occurred: namely 
concerning the exchange of domestic-focussed intelligence and information, rather 
than merely just foreign/international-focussed intelligence and information.84 
Some CIA liaison activities can be readily mapped. CIA staff on-the-ground 
or out in-the-field abroad are usually based in the US embassies’ CIA ‘Stations’ 
belonging to the ‘Directorate of Operations’ (DO) (called the ‘National Clandestine 
Service’ [NCS] since October 2005). Alongside specific US intelligence liaison officers 
(ILOs) posted in that host country, other CIA staff conduct liaison with parties in the 
host country.85 Together with this liaison is that conducted between specialist ‘liaison 
officers’ from the service being liaised with (‘liaison service’) who are usually posted 
in their own intelligence services’ ‘station’ (or equivalent) in their country’s 
Washington embassy. Less frequently, ‘summit liaison’ is undertaken. This occurs 
with CIA staff, sometimes including senior personnel, at specific conferences and 
meetings with their counterparts in the liaison service at various locations, such as 
abroad or at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia. In the case of the UK, such a 
meeting is usually held annually.86 
Some SIS liaison interactions can similarly be mapped. In SIS, liaison again 
takes place between UK intelligence liaison officers (ILOs) based in the host country 
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and various relevant parties in the host country. It also occurs between members of 
UK intelligence staff, including those at the most senior levels, at summits and 
meetings. A well-known example is catalogued in the ISC Annual Report 2001-02 
when ‘the day after the attacks [of 11 September 2001] the Director of GCHQ, Chief 
of the SIS and the Deputy Director General of the Security Service were in the USA, 
to co-ordinate the intelligence picture with their US counterparts.’87 
 Further UK-US intelligence and law enforcement liaison takes place less 
directly, such as at The Hague, between EUROPOL (the European police service) and 
the US Secret Service. This type of liaison was facilitated, for instance, with the 
‘formal creation of a Secret Service liaison position at EUROPOL’ in 2005.88 
 Moving more into operational UK-US and multilateral international 
intelligence liaison territory, other liaison ‘locations’ or nexuses come to the fore. 
Most notably, the top-secret centre in Paris, codenamed ‘Alliance Base’, can be 
highlighted. After 9/11, some of the counter-terrorism efforts directed 
internationally involved input from the interactions undertaken in this significant 
venue. Reportedly,  
 
Funded largely by the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center, Alliance Base 
analyzes the transnational movement of terrorist suspects and develops 
operations to catch or spy on them… The base is unique in the world 
because it is multinational and actually plans operations instead of sharing 
information among countries… It has case officers from Britain, France, 
Germany, Canada, Australia and the United States.89  
 
The importance of the Joint Analysis Center (JAC) venue (see above [4.0]) can 
simultaneously be further highlighted. Since from around 2006, it can be formally 
connected to contributing towards helping bolster NATO intelligence 
arrangements.90 
 Yet, despite the presence of the extensive range of various structural 
facilitators, the liaison undertaken within them is not always entirely 
straightforward. At least on formal bases, many liaison challenges continue to be 
confronted. Most obviously, structural obstacles to liaison are encountered, and more 
or less persist. As US defence expert Reveron notes, ‘…the sheer number of 
organizations in the U.S. intelligence community [17 agencies including the Office of 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)91 (see also [11.0] below)] presents a major 
challenge for internationalizing the community…’92 Alongside, are worries about 
‘technology gaps’ between international partners impacting operationally (see below 
[10.0]), as well as concerns about UK (and European) and US practice and legal 
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differences influencing operations and the directions and extents to which they can 
be pursued.93 In their Renditions report, the ISC observed: 
 
The UK/U.S. relationship has a long history based upon shared goals, 
common values and complementary intelligence capabilities. This is not to 
say that the UK and U.S. Governments necessarily see eye to eye on all 
subjects – there are certain areas of foreign policy and strategy where the 
two countries have quite different approaches. There are also certain 
aspects that complicate the relationship between the respective intelligence 
and security agencies – for example, the possibility that UK assistance to a 
U.S. operation might result in a trial leading to capital punishment.  
 
Demonstrating some of the UK-US operational constraints, the report later 
continued, ‘Where credible assurances cannot be obtained, the Chief of SIS [Sir John 
Scarlett] explained “… then we cannot provide the information. Therefore you have the 
dilemma [of perhaps not being able to prevent attacks] that flows from that.”’94 
However, here, arguably the more culturally imbued dimensions of liaison 
can offer (at least some) assistance. Informal liaison also occurs. Beside the more 
‘formal’ conferences and official venue interactions, some more 
personal/friendship-aided UK-US intelligence liaison takes place in more informal 
settings. This includes face-to-face contact through social-linked ‘café’, ‘sofa’ and 
‘cocktail party’ interactions - for example, at diplomatic functions and parties, in 
hotel lobbies, and so forth. Again, this mode of liaison is hard to quantify (indeed, it 
is the most challenging to quantify), including in terms of its qualitative range and 
scope – namely what it can achieve. For instance, it is persistently unclear to what 
extent informal liaison operates outside of, and beyond, the more formal liaison 
constraints and considerations. Hence, it remains subject to being highly open to 
differing interpretations. Going unrecorded, and taking place in real-time, not 
(always) unintentionally, these interactions are the most difficult to capture and 
preserve. This is as well as them being challenging to portray faithfully and to 
analyse and assess in sufficient detail in contemporary and historical accounts, such 
as this study.95 However, the US phrase ‘friends and allies’ appropriately resonates 
here, to a degree encapsulating these different dimensions in broad terms.96 
 
 
[9.0]: Management of UK-US and international intelligence liaison 
 
Managing liaison is useful. Indeed, today, at all levels of interaction, further efforts 
need to continue to be devoted towards implementing this task. Inside the CIA - 
traditionally at least - the ‘Office of Collection Strategies and Analysis (CSAA)’, 
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under the ‘Directorate of Intelligence’ (DI), manages international intelligence liaison 
while ‘…develop[ing] policies on foreign intelligence-sharing activities.’97  
In SIS, the responsibility for liaison ultimately rests with ‘the Chief’ (‘C’). The 
UK JIC, for example when ‘tasking’ SIS, supplies additional guidance.98 Intelligence 
liaison takes place in multiple locations throughout the whole organisation of SIS. It 
concerns both ‘geographical’ (‘regional’) and ‘functional’ (‘thematic’) desks, and it is 
associated with both the ‘Requirements Department’ and the ‘Operations 
Department’. More recently, ‘the most significant reform [of SIS since the Butler 
Inquiry Report into WMD intelligence in July 2004] is the creation of a head of 
requirements post… [‘a senior “quality control officer”… who will be known as 
“R”… for reporting officer… responsible for reviewing secret information…’99] The 
new interface function will include liaison relationships with foreign services and 
other exchange partners…’100 The greater and pressing micro-management of these 
intelligence liaison relationships can also be anticipated. This is alongside a greater 
challenging of the intelligence received - adopting ‘A + B Team’ and ‘Red Teaming’ 
tactics – as part of the enhanced ‘professionalisation’ of intelligence, particularly in 
the wake of the high profile UK and US intelligence inquiries.101 
Some broader co-ordination of international intelligence liaison would be 
helpful. Concerning the management of the intelligence liaison relationships, as US 
intelligence scholar Jennifer Sims has emphasised, ‘policy oversight of liaison has, 
until 2005, largely been the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence 
(DCI).’ She continued, raising some contemporary concerns: ‘In the transition to the 
new structure, in which a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) now heads the 
Intelligence Community, responsibility for oversight of liaison requires urgent 
clarification.’102  
 
In 2004, in theory at least, attempts in the US at asserting some greater clarity 
concerning the management of liaison were tried. This came as responsibility for 
overseeing foreign liaison was added to the long-list remit of the newly created post 
of DNI.103 However, Sims is right to be concerned. These qualitative movements 
emerged just as liaison is quantitatively increasing exponentially in the early twenty-
first century. Worryingly, when compared with previous configurations, today there 
is arguably the overall effect of the greater ‘dilution’ of liaison’s ‘management’ 
(control and oversight) in the US. This paucity extends further than witnessed before; 
when those responsibilities were instead included as part of the DCI’s less wide-
ranging remit. US intelligence scholar Stan Taylor flags up some further concerns, 
particularly where he notes:  
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…The DNI was supposed to be given the necessary personnel and budget 
authority to enforce greater cooperation. While cooperation is greater in 
some areas of the IC than it was earlier, the failure to include many of the 
Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence operations under the authority 
of the new DNI is widely seen as a weakness of the 2004 reorganization. … 
The intelligence activities of the DoD have grown dramatically since 2001, 
most recently by its placement of Military Liaison Elements (a euphemism 
for military special forces teams) in more than a dozen embassies around 
the world.104  
 
Interestingly, by 2007, such concerns were being officially rebuffed. The claim 
surfaced from the ODNI that the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
of 2004 
 
… did more than create the Office of the Director of National Intelligence - 
it charged the Office with significantly reforming and strengthening 
America’s Intelligence Community. Under the leadership of Director John 
D. Negroponte, the ODNI has revitalized, reformed, and led the 
Community to better protect our nation … [including the creation of] the 
Foreign Relations Coordinating Committee to synchronize Intelligence 
Community foreign outreach efforts and maximize opportunities for the U.S. to 
achieve intelligence goals and national policy objectives. For example, a new 
intelligence relationship was expeditiously established with a country and 
an existing relationship with another country is being enhanced as a 
Community effort instead of the traditional “stove-piped” approach to partner 
relationships…105  
 
Were foreign liaison relationships now becoming less compartmentalised, at least 
within the US intelligence community? It appears so, at least on paper and in some 
areas. But, typically this was only to a degree. Yet, again demonstrating that in the 
US the management of foreign liaison relationships is not solely confined to the DNI 
level or to happening just within the CIA, or even solely within the other civilian US 
intelligence agencies, the US defence intelligence agencies also have ‘foreign 
disclosure offices’ to help manage their foreign intelligence liaison relationships.106 
While challenging to quantify precisely, a degree of poorly centralised and 
inadequately comprehensive co-ordination of international intelligence liaison 
therefore continues in the large US intelligence community. Here, somewhat of a 
conundrum emerges: to what extent should international intelligence liaison 
relationships be subject to centralised high/macro level co-ordination, control and 
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management? Indeed, evident in both the US, and arguably to a slightly lesser 
degree, the UK - due to the element of enhanced input coming from the JIC (see 
above) - the co-ordination of international intelligence liaison relations instead 
essentially exists in a more devolved manner. Responsibility for the management of 
those relationships remains largely within the major channels outlined throughout 
this chapter. The important role technology collectively plays in these will now be 
explored. 
 
 
[10.0]: Structural UK-US intelligence liaison and technology 
 
Generally in the intelligence world, great emphasis is put on technology. Rightly 
technology is accorded an important status. This is not least as it underpins activities 
in a multiple number of ways on a daily basis, as well as delivering the bulk of 
intelligence gathered.107 However, again like any tool, technology alone is not 
infallible nor enough.108 At times, in some circumstances, the emphasis on technology 
and what it can deliver can be exaggerated and too glossy. Also there exist several 
concerns that (at least sometimes) this scenario, and techniques – such as data mining 
and terrorist profiling - can be at the expense of other dimensions, such as HUMINT 
efforts. Simultaneously, there is anxiety that these ‘tools’ can transgress on other 
important considerations, notably civil liberties and privacy.109 Worries also prevail 
about ‘technology-gaps’ between partners hampering co-operation and 
interoperability - for example, in coalition and alliance contexts. This includes core 
allies, such as the UK and US110 – although considerable lengths are gone to in order 
to try and effectively address these types of concerns (of which the US is acutely 
aware), for instance through trying to encourage arrangements such as ‘backwards 
interoperability’ (whereby old and new systems can still work together).111 Constant 
modernisation programmes vis-à-vis SIGINT are similarly witnessed.112 
There are a plethora of ‘systems’ and ‘architectures’ involved. These 
structurally help to facilitate internal (both in the UK and the US) and external UK-
US intelligence liaison.113 These vary in terms of their overall effectiveness, at times 
also being plagued with expensive development problems.114 Alongside varyingly 
shared hardware (computer platforms), there is varyingly shared software 
(databases and other programmes).115 Sometimes, the development of hardware and 
software is done ‘in-house’ (privately) by specially recruited specialist programmers; 
at other times, it is obtainable from commercial sources - such as Microsoft™ - in 
either an exclusively developed or in a more publicly available (off-the-shelf) form.116 
At the various different points of contact, there are many databases, so-called ‘watch 
lists’117 – itemising ‘persons of concern/interest’ – and computer programmes 
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involved, enabling instantaneous cross-linking and referencing.118 They can also be 
web-based, harnessing the power of the Internet.119 Collectively and individually, 
these are intimate components to operational C4I (Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Intelligence/Information) concerns. The tasks the 
technology focusses on include the sharing of intelligence, forensics, protection of 
borders, surveillance operations, processing biometrics and identification (DNA, 
fingerprints, etc.), processing visa and passport controls, the pooling of research and 
training, preventing and countering cyber and electronic attack.120 Carefully selected 
product for dissemination across the Atlantic from each party’s own exclusive 
databases, such as the UK’s SCOPE (currently under continued development), can 
also be shared/made available for access.121 
As witnessed in relation to other ‘facilitators’ in intelligence liaison 
interactions, familiar trends emerge. The structural information 
computer/communications technology (ICT)/COMSEC components, systems and 
architectures are shared to varying degrees, ranging from bilateral to exclusive 
multilateral. One of the most notable ‘systems’ is the UKUSA ECHELON system 
(discussed above [2.0]). The UK and Australia were also eventually allowed at least 
some ‘special’ access to the US Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) - 
viewed as the foremost computer network for accessing and communicating US 
classified/secret material. This came once the intelligence-sharing hampering 
‘NOFORN’ (No foreigner/US eyes only) restriction was removed exclusively for the 
UK and Australia after US President Bush signed a directive in July 2004, following 
pleas from UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Australian Prime Minister John 
Howard.122 This access appears to have been authorised due to pressing operational 
demands, and the need to conduct more closely co-ordinated and well-informed 
joint operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.123 Granting of this access to 
SIPRNet again demonstrated the UK and Australian privileged intelligence status 
with the US.124 But, obtaining these ‘permissions’ was by no means an all-smooth or 
easy process at the lower daily work levels of activity - even once the US Presidential 
directive had been signed at the high level.125 Some scepticism also remains 
concerning the exact nature of the access in terms of its extent and scope. 
Operationally, some of these frustrations persist, albeit in slightly recalibrated 
forms.126 For instance, most troublingly, UK-originating content put onto the US 
SIPRNet platform cannot be shared back to the UK unless it has been explicitly 
sanitised/cleared for release to the UK.127 However, in general terms, overall this 
development (access to SIPRNet content) can be seen as more positive than negative 
- as reflecting ‘work-in-progress’ evolution - with there undoubtedly being sufficient 
scope for it to be extended further into the future through some re-adjustment. 
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Other information/intelligence sharing and exchange set-ups are being 
developed in parallel. These become of increasing importance as various multilateral 
coalitions are formed to deal with the globalised security problems of the early 
twenty-first century. A more widely available system for assisting 
information/intelligence exchange between countries is the US Combined Enterprise 
Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS). Reveron notes that: ‘The 
system not only enables the United States to collaborate with its partners, but also 
allows the partners to collaborate with one another.’128 Again, this system and 
similar, associated spin-offs are very much works-in-progress, being constantly 
updated and upgraded, evolving over time in a manner reactive to requirements.129 
Recent multi-national military operations, such as ‘IRAQI FREEDOM’ in Iraq and 
‘ENDURING FREEDOM’ in Afghanistan, have provided several lessons, while 
highlighting the flaws that need to be addressed in the various systems.130 In her 
assessment, a Royal Air Force Squadron Leader highlighted some of the information-
sharing flaws and frustrations experienced during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. She 
also demonstrated how operationally these sorts of obstacles were largely mitigated:  
 
… CIS [Coalition Information Sharing] systems were also a problem, with 
the US operating on their infinitely superior SIPRNET system, which was 
not releasable to UK eyes without US supervision, while the UK operated 
its myriad CIS systems, and had access to CENTRIX; a US CIS system, with 
AUS/UK access, onto which AUS/UK releasable SIPRNET information 
could be transferred. However, the process was “mandraulic” rather than 
automatic, requiring our US counterparts to find the time (in a high tempo 
operational environment) to decide on and implement the transfer of 
information. Again, [emphasising the importance of the presence of a more 
personal/friendship-aided and direct variant of liaison] these challenges 
tended to be overcome through face-to-face dialogue and the development 
of good working relationships, although not without costs to efficiency.131  
 
Some lessons were learnt. By mid-2006, reportedly Coalition Information Sharing 
(CIS) ‘architecture’ was being assessed by US Central Command (CENTCOM) as a 
possible, and arguably more simplified and streamlined, ‘alternative’ to CENTRIXS. 
According to CENTCOM’s Chief for Data Systems, Lieutenant Colonel Alan 
Claypool, the CIS architecture ‘could also provide technologies for migration to the 
US Multinational Information Sharing (MNIS) and Global Information Grid (GIG) 
programmes…’132 Such developments suggest that some further advances in 
attempting to facilitate bilateral to multilateral international intelligence liaison 
through technological means are currently underway. These developments are also 
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likely to continue on similar trajectories into the foreseeable future.133 Yet, despite 
these observed developments, questions still linger surrounding exactly how far the 
interoperability qualitatively and quantitatively extends. Notably, to what extents 
will the US’ allies genuinely be able to keep up with future developments, 
particularly when those developments are present in their most formal and indirect 
variants? It can also be anticipated that some ‘technology gaps’ will remain in this 
domain, albeit if in slightly reconfigured varying forms. 
 
 
[11.0]: Conclusions: Structurally ‘ever closer’? 
 
Significant changes have emerged. As the former Director General of MI5 (1992-96), 
Dame Stella Rimington, observed in 2001: ‘Secret services are not usually associated 
with cooperation and sharing. It sounds like a contradiction. But in a world where 
the threats get more sophisticated and more global, the intelligence task gets more 
difficult, and cooperation between intelligence allies is vital and grows ever closer.’134 
On balance, UK-US interoperability has been enhanced. In the early twenty-first 
century, at least broadly, UK-US intelligence liaison appears to be structurally ‘ever 
closer’. This is at least largely physically, if not so much spiritually/culturally. While 
many of the ties and infrastructures in the various domains of intelligence liaison – 
notably SIGINT, HUMINT, and so forth – already existed prior to the 9/11 attacks, 
many of these were considerably reinforced, consolidated and expanded 
(recalibrated) in the wake of the attacks. The extent of the effectiveness of these 
structures to facilitate UK-US intelligence liaison was also considerably tested over 
time on intensive and high-tempo joint UK-US conventional military and Special 
Operations Forces’ tasks and operations, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Several lessons have been propagated. 
Developments can be readily charted. The trend towards increasing 
structural expansion was in line with the gradual continuing expansion and 
evolution towards greater transatlantic co-operation witnessed in the UK-US 
intelligence, law enforcement and military sectors over time. These developments 
occurred particularly markedly during the post-Cold War years. This was as 
globalisation (writ large) generally gathered pace, and as previous intelligence liaison 
hampering Cold War considerations – such as the high risk of penetration by a high-
grade intelligence agency belonging to the main threat faced135 – ebbed somewhat, 
due to sub- and non-state actors instead increasingly taking centre stage. The 
quantity of intelligence exchanged across the Atlantic, already on an increasing 
trajectory, simultaneously grew more significantly as post-9/11 and subsequent joint 
UK-US intelligence investigations and operations rapidly proliferated. This trend in 
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turn correlated with an expansion in the range of ‘functional’ security, law 
enforcement and intelligence issues liaised over by the UK and the US; together with 
those issues uncomfortably acquiring a higher public profile, as well as assuming 
greater mainstream political importance, in both Washington and London. This was 
not least through the application of a ‘new prism’ through which international 
security affairs were viewed (see Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [2.6], below).136 
 Agency reorganisations in both the UK and US contributed. The creation of 
the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from 2002 and the UK SOCA from 
2004 officially helped to provide several further UK and US security and law 
enforcement conglomerates. These both consisted of amalgamations of previously 
more scattered agencies. Arguably, they then helped facilitate the development of 
clearer UK-US liaison ‘connection points’ concerning particular intelligence and law 
enforcement issues. Thus they contributed towards paving the way for helping 
enable further consolidated UK and US intelligence and information sharing 
activities.  
Nevertheless, such moves are not entirely beneficial. One of the claimed 
significant downsides is that as the UK-US intelligence services have increasingly 
moved ‘ever closer’ to one another over time, the ability in either the UK or the US to 
call their activities effectively, democratically and publicly to account, has 
commensurately haemorrhaged.137 At least for ‘outsiders’, it is increasingly difficult 
to unpack ‘individual’ UK and US intelligence agency activities from those jointly 
taken in concert with their major and primary partner.138 This disaggregation is 
especially hard to ascertain once intelligence product has been subject to 
‘sanitisation’ processes purposely intended to protect sources and methods. As the 
former UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook noted in his testimony to the UK 
Parliament Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (FAC) in June 2003: ‘…it is often 
difficult when you look at intelligence assessments to spot which raw data was 
originally gathered by the United Kingdom and which was originally gathered by 
the United States.’139 
However, all has not become entirely ‘homogenised’. Together with the trends 
representative of convergence, some broader UK and US intelligence community 
differences persist. Most obviously, the scale/size factor can be highlighted. The US 
intelligence community is considerably larger than the UK intelligence community. 
For instance, the US intelligence community consists of 17 agencies (and of 
approximately 100,000 employees140) to the UK intelligence community’s three 
agencies and the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) (collectively some 13,400 
employees141). The US intelligence community also enjoys access to significantly 
more resources. For example, while in the UK, according to the IISS: ‘the annual 
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allocation rose from £1.31bn [$2.57bn] in 2004 to £1.48bn [$2.90bn] in 2006’;142 in the 
US – although the precise total figure was at least supposed to remain classified – it 
‘slipped out’ that the annual US intelligence budget (around the end of 2005) was 
$44bn (£22.45bn).143 Given the dynamic nature of the contemporary threats 
confronted, both of these budgets will have risen further since those dates. Indeed, 
somewhat to the chagrin of the ODNI, the official US intelligence budget was 
declassified in October 2007. According to Walter Pincus of The Washington Post, it 
was now said to stand at:  
 
$43.5 billion budget total for national intelligence programs… When the 
cost of intelligence by the military services is added, aggregate U.S. 
intelligence spending for fiscal 2007 exceeded $50 billion, according to 
administration and congressional sources, who spoke on the condition of 
anonymity because the total remains classified.144 
 
Even with ‘like talking to like’, connecting on such bases is increasingly challenging 
for the UK to effect when there are a multitude of differing, yet relevant, US 
intelligence players to consider. Structural changes, on either side, similarly 
contribute to the challenges encountered, and which have to be navigated, by 
intelligence practitioners. More significantly, added to this, during the early years of 
the twenty-first century, the intelligence ‘centre of gravity’ in the US has undergone a 
shift. It has moved more to the Pentagon and the other military agencies, away from 
the CIA and the other civilian intelligence agencies.145 Such internal US adjustments 
have reverberations affecting the UK’s own intelligence community – not least how it 
interacts with its US counterpart, both transatlantically and elsewhere across the 
world.146 Here, further UK-US differences, including over adhering to different laws 
and practices - such as rendition and ‘intensive interrogation’ techniques - similarly 
figure.  
 Ultimately, the structural framework constructed for facilitating UK-US 
intelligence liaison, both formal and informal, emerges as being key. As is revealed 
in the two case studies contained in the next chapter, Chapter 5, once the various 
structures were in place to facilitate close UK-US intelligence liaison, over time these 
formed the main ‘channels’ along which increasing volumes of UK-US intelligence 
could flow. Continuing into the future, these formed the conduits through which the 
assets of UK and US intelligence co-operation could be communicated. As already 
seen, they also formed the structures through which tensions that simultaneously 
arose could be contained and mitigated.  
 
• • • 
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Massive Clearinghouse’, The Washington Post (25 March 2007). 
118 See, for example, O. Bowcott, ‘Biometrics – great hope for world security or triumph for Big 
Brother? British police ready to link up to databases of US intelligence’, The Guardian (18 June 2004). 
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144 W. Pincus, ‘Intelligence Budget Disclosure Is Hailed’, The Washington Post (31 October 2007); see 
also S. Aftergood, ‘DoD Regulation on Formulating the Intelligence Budget’, FAS Secrecy News, 
2007, 111 (07 November 2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘The U.S. intelligence budget is 
comprised of two spending “aggregations”: the National Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military 
Intelligence Program (MIP) … The NIP budget, which totaled $43.5 billion in 2007 according to last 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 4: Enhancing Interoperability 
IV : 181 
                                                                                                                                      
week’s official disclosure, funds intelligence to support national policy makers.  The MIP budget, 
which probably amounts to at least another $10 billion, supports the Secretary of Defense, the military 
services, and military commanders in the field. In practice, the distinction between the NIP and the 
MIP is not crystal clear, and several large “national” intelligence agencies -- including NSA, DIA, 
NGA, NRO -- also receive funding through the MIP.’ 
145 See, for example, E. Lichtblau and M. Mazzetti, ‘Military Is Expanding Its U.S. Intelligence Role’, 
The New York Times (14 January 2007) and K. DeYoung, ‘Officials: Pentagon Probed Finances: 
Citizens’ Records Culled in Expanded Intelligence Efforts’, The Washington Post (14 January 2007); 
‘US military’s use of domestic intelligence’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest (16 February 2007); see also 
M. Mazzetti, ‘Pentagon Is Expected to Close Intelligence Unit’, The New York Times (02 April 2008). 
146 The recent growth of UK military intelligence can be cited – from a non-attributable source [c-38]. 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 5: The Case Studies 
V : 182 
Chapter 5: The Case Studies 
Evaluating UK~US intelligence liaison in the 
early 21st Century:  
The ‘operationalisation’ of understandings 
 
 
Introduction: 
Strategic & operational dissonances & harmonies 
 
This chapter presents the two case studies. These contextualise and evaluate episodes 
of UK-US intelligence liaison: firstly, against terrorism; and secondly, against 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation. These case studies also 
empirically underpin the efforts at theorising intelligence liaison undertaken 
throughout this study. The case studies have been adopted for pragmatic reasons. 
Both quantitatively and qualitatively, they represent the key issue areas that the UK 
and US intelligence communities have constantly liaised over from 2000 to 2005, and 
beyond. These issues have been liaised over particularly intensively since after the 
9/11 attacks on the US and during the so-called ‘War on Terror’/‘Long War’. The 
two case studies are closely interrelated, for instance where terrorism and WMD 
concerns overlap, as well as being intensive and critical in their scope. 
 
Especially since 9/11, the quest for enhanced security has been dominant. This has 
been sought by both the UK - and particularly markedly – the US in their foreign 
policies. A discernable shift has resulted. Rather than as previously that quest trying 
to be realised merely on defensive grounds, it has tried to be realised more 
instantaneously on offensive-defensive grounds. The military has simultaneously 
become the primary agency in contemporary international affairs in order to deliver 
that enhanced security.  
The examples selected for examination in Case Study 1 appropriately 
catalogue the central trend of the shift against terrorism. In summary, this can be 
characterised as moving from being: (i) more of a ‘containment’ approach – that is: 
reactive, overall broader and ‘softer’, promoting an ‘anti-terrorism paradigm’; to 
being (ii) more of a ‘rollback’ approach – that places more of an emphasis on 
overarching ‘harder’, proactive, preventative and pre-emptive qualities, propagating 
a ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’. Rather than counter-terrorism tactics forming merely 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 5: The Case Studies 
V : 183 
one part (tool or pillar) of the overall anti-terrorism approach, this dimension is 
instead enhanced. Meanwhile, the other anti-terrorism strategy tactics have 
simultaneously become more subsumed or overlooked during the strategising of 
counter-terrorism. 
Similar trends can be readily discerned in the proliferation domain. The 
example of supposed Iraqi WMD, selected for exploration in Case Study 2, effectively 
illustrates the shift from: (i) more of a ‘containment’ stance – promoting a wider 
overall ‘softer’ ‘non-proliferation paradigm’; to (ii) more of a ‘rollback’ stance – 
propagating an overall narrower and ‘harder’ preventative and pre-emptive 
‘counter-proliferation paradigm’. Again, in the broader non-proliferation approach, 
counter-proliferation tactics only form one aspect or pillar in its toolset. However, 
during the years 2000-05, and especially post-9/11, the implementation of this last 
pillar has been particularly enhanced. Alongside the ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’, a 
‘counter-proliferation paradigm’ has therefore been increasingly implemented by the 
US, and, by close association, the UK. This shift can also be characterised as the 
strategising of counter-proliferation, rather than it remaining as merely a tactic. Also 
this shift effectively represents the tipping point between mainly applying the 
‘intelligence methodology’ or the ‘security/law enforcement methodology’ during 
the pursuit of operations. Again, in this shift, the UK has not gone quite as far or as 
fast as the US. Naturally, some UK and US strategic and operational dissonances, 
and equally harmonies, flow from these sorts of considerations. These shall now be 
explored in greater depth within the following case studies. 
    
 
• • • 
 
 
 
 
(Over the page – [Plates 1-8]: Presented below are 16 photographs of key participants in 
UK-US relations, many of whom feature in the following case studies.) 
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Chapter 5: Case Study 1 
Enhancing efforts against terrorism: 
Implementing the ‘counter~terrorism paradigm’ 
 
 ‘I cannot remember any incident in my work where we were hesitant to share anything… It’s 
a bit of a special case with the Brits.’  
- Admiral James M. Loy, Deputy Secretary of the US DHS (2003-05).1 
 
 
[1.0]: Prologue  
 
The years 2000 to the end of 2005 were punctuated by a series of major jihadist-inspired 
terrorist attacks that signalled further developments in the continuing rapid evolution of 
terrorism.2 On 11 September 2001, international terrorism vividly struck the American 
homeland. The attacks were ‘spectaculars’ and seized the attention of the world, galvanising 
the international engagement and the Bush administration’s fight against terrorism.3 
Virtually simultaneously, four US domestic flights were hijacked. Two aeroplanes crashed 
into the two World Trade Center towers, which both shortly later collapsed, killing c.2,500 
people. The third aeroplane crashed into the Pentagon. The fourth aeroplane, said to be en 
route to the White House or Camp David, crashed in a field in Pennsylvania.4 266 crew and 
passengers were killed on the planes.5 The following year, on 12 October 2002, two bomb 
explosions tore through busy nightclubs in the Kuta district of Bali. According to the final 
death toll, 202 people died as a result of the attacks, including 26 Britons.6 The following 
month, on 28 November 2002, in Kenya, two missiles were fired at a civilian Israeli aeroplane 
just after take-off from Mombasa airport, but missed. Minutes afterwards, there was a suicide 
bomb attack on the Israeli-owned ‘Paradise Hotel’, at least 11 people were killed.7 The year 
2003 saw attacks in Saudi Arabia, Casablanca (44 killed) and on UK interests in Istanbul 
(killing more than 30 people, including the UK Consul-General).8 On 11 March 2004, 10 
bombs exploded on four packed Madrid commuter trains in three stations during the morning 
‘rush-hour’. 191 people were killed in the attacks.9 In 2005, on the morning of 7 July, almost 
simultaneously, three bombs exploded on the London Underground (the ‘Tube’). A fourth 
bomb exploded almost an hour later on a bus. Four suicide bombers carried out the bombings; 
52 other people died with over 700 injured.10 Significantly, these attacks represented the first 
time suicide attacks had been carried out in Europe. On 21 July, four more bombings were 
attempted on three London Underground trains and a bus. The devices failed to detonate.11  
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These episodes catalogue but a few of the terrorist attacks that took place. The 
attacks also formed the most pressing issues that governments and their publics alike 
were trying to comprehend, and then address, in the nascent twenty-first century. 
Indeed, the ‘new’ terrorism - hailed at least in conceptual terms throughout the 1990s 
- now appeared to be beginning to be directly experienced. ‘Where and what next?’ 
were questions that figured prominently. ‘Fire-fighting’ and other emergency first-
response activities (more akin to crisis management, rather than mere risk 
management12) were fast becoming the dominant mode of operating, with the desire 
for effective preventative pre-emption in the name of ‘public safety’ firmly on the 
ascendancy in Washington and London. Time for reflection by intelligence and 
security services was increasingly eclipsed. This was apparent as their predominant 
task became one of successfully getting ‘ahead of’, rather than remaining ‘behind’, 
the prevailing ‘curve’ of events. 
 
 
[2.0]: Introduction 
 
This case study evaluates UK-US intelligence liaison focussed on the key issue area 
of counter-terrorism (CT) from 2000 to 2005. A high volume of intelligence on CT 
issues is shared between the UK and US. Despite having slightly differing strategic 
cultures and CT approaches and emphases, there is sufficient common ground for 
considerable UK-US agreement on CT. The UK and US, therefore, co-operate closely 
on the issue of CT.13 This is perhaps in part epitomised by the existence of the 
‘UK/US Joint Contact Group (JCG) on Homeland Security’, established in June 2003 
by an agreement between the then UK Home Secretary David Blunkett and the then 
US Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge.14 Furthermore, both the UK and the 
US political and intelligence communities are agreed on the essential need for 
effective, but not unbounded, international co-operation to help deal with the 
threat.15 This is an agreement that helps to pave the way for particularly close 
bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison.  
In their detail, the different UK-US CT styles can at times diverge. This can 
engender some tensions of fluctuating degrees of intensity over time during UK-US 
intelligence liaison.16 However, these tensions ultimately appear not to thwart overall 
joint UK-US CT efforts, and in broad terms there is substantial overlap in the UK and 
US approaches on which common, though not always smooth, movements focussed 
on CT can be made. The greatest UK-US CT collaboration is witnessed when 
catalysed by specific terrorist attacks, such as 11 September 2001 (9/11) in the US and 
7 July 2005 (7/7) in the UK.  
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Bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison on CT is generally healthy. In terms of the 
schools relating to the nature of overall Anglo-American relations, from 2000 into 
2006 ‘functionalism’ and ‘evangelicalism’ were the dominant drivers. Any hints of 
‘terminalism’ were considerably less, being tied to particular episodes of specific 
disconnect, and were subject to being swiftly suppressed through their ready 
navigation. Overall, on pragmatic, functional bases, ultimately too much was at stake 
for both the UK and US to let those ‘narrower’ considerations counter-productively 
obstruct in wider terms. 
 
Multilateral UK-US intelligence liaison on the issue of CT is no less important. 
Indeed, here, CT is the lead issue in these types of interactions. While ‘less-exclusive’ 
than the multilateral liaison that takes place within the UKUSA SIGINT 
arrangement, this works on the basis of international intelligence liaison with other 
countries, as well as within international organisations and arrangements, including 
the United Nations (UN),17 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO),18 the 
G8,19 and with the European Union (EU).20 As the UK Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) remarked in their Renditions report:  
 
The importance of international cooperation between intelligence and 
security services was emphasised after 9/11 by UN Security Council 
Resolution 1373, which called on all States to work ever closer in the fight 
to combat terrorism. In particular, it called for States to “find ways of 
intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information, 
especially regarding actions or movements of terrorist persons or 
networks” and to cooperate more generally to “prevent and suppress 
terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts”.21 
 
Indeed, the UK and the US were key driving partners behind getting UNSCR 1373, 
as well as its substance, quickly onto the table and unanimously adopted on 28 
September 2001.22 As part of the measures introduced, the Counter-Terrorism 
Committee was established at the UN to effectively oversee the subsequent 
implementation of the requirements as stipulated by UNSCR 1373, including the 
enhanced internationalisation of intelligence co-operation.23 Other interesting 
movements were also lent some further impetus by the adoption of UNSCR 1373. 
These involved assisting developing countries in building up their counter-terrorism 
capabilities.24 
 However, despite these more multilateral movements, some familiar 
parameters remain distinct. Accordingly, to maintain at least some intelligence 
protectionism, and to best prevent intelligence compromise in the face of security 
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and counter-intelligence anxieties,25 the multilateral intelligence liaison necessarily 
continues to work on more of a restricted ‘need to know’ basis. This is rather than on 
the greater ‘need to share/pool’ basis of more exclusive bilateral UK-US intelligence 
liaison. Smaller quantities of increasingly ‘diluted’ or ‘sanitised’ intelligence are 
exchanged, with interactions featuring more in the form of information sharing.26  
Some analytical distinctions are helpful. This is especially when evaluating 
multilateral intelligence liaison in these ‘less-exclusive’ forums, and indeed when 
evaluating intelligence liaison generally. These distinctions include: (i) differences 
between ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’; (ii) the type(s) of intelligence involved – 
SIGINT, MASINT, OSINT, etc.; (iii) the different forms intelligence can take – is it 
‘raw’ or ‘finished/processed’ intelligence, ‘single-source’ or ‘all-source’, analysis 
(what is it?) or assessment (UK)/estimate (US) (what does it mean?) product?; (iv) 
purpose: what is it needed for - ‘strategy/policy’ and/or ‘tactical/operational’ 
purposes, thereby is it operationally-viable/actionable/serious intelligence, or is it 
more ‘sanitised’ intelligence, in order to better protect sources and methods, for 
strategic/decision-making purposes?; (v) how is the intelligence 
access/sharing/exchange occurring – is it ad hoc (conducted on a ‘need to know’ 
basis) or more regularised and/or institutionalised (conducted on a ‘need to 
share/pool’ basis), formal or informal?; and (vi) when is the intelligence 
access/sharing/exchange taking place – for instance, is it a priori (before events, in an 
attempt to pre-empt/prevent them) or post facto (in the context of post-event 
investigations); and (vii) where is the intelligence access/sharing/exchange taking 
place – for example, is it in an organisation at headquarters level, more out-in-the-
field in ‘operational commands’ or in ‘Sensitive Compartmentalised Information 
Facilities’ (SCIFs), if such distinctions exist (for example, in the NATO context)?27 
Specific details concerning the particular intelligence liaison under-scrutiny acquire 
enhanced importance. 
 
The general impetus for international co-operation on CT is high. It also continues to 
grow. Not least, international co-operation is a useful means of intelligence 
gathering.28 Throughout the 1990s, the jihadist-inspired terrorist threat to the US and 
to the ‘international community’ as a whole had been becoming increasingly 
apparent, lethal and with more of a global reach as time progressed.29 This was seen 
notably, for example, in 1993 with the World Trade Center (WTC) underground car 
park bombing in New York and the shooting of two CIA employees outside CIA 
headquarters in Langley, and later in 1998 with the almost simultaneous US embassy 
bombings in Kenya, where 224 people were killed.30 Subsequently, there were 
substantial and increasing calls for greater international co-operation on terrorism as 
the new millennium approached. Cosmetically at least, this was seen on 18 October 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 5: Case Study 1 
V(i) : 188 
1999 when UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1269 was passed: 
‘unequivocally condemning all acts, methods and practices of terrorism and calling 
on states to strengthen international cooperation in fighting terrorism and bringing 
terrorists to justice.’31 Overall, later reflecting back, Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, 
the Director General of MI5 (2002-07), in the words of the ISC, ‘described the UK’s 
work on [international co-operation on terrorism] in the post-11 September 
environment as a continuum with expansion, rather than a kick-start…’32 The findings 
of this case study support that observation. The terrorist attacks meanwhile served as 
catalysts on the expansion or at least drove forward its underlying impetus. 
 
Throughout, this case study draws on a number of prominent themes. Adopting a 
largely thematic-chronological hybrid approach, this case study evaluates in depth 
UK-US intelligence liaison on CT from 2000 to the end of 2005. With main focus on 
the domain where the most interactions take place, the key theme explored is bilateral 
UK-US intelligence liaison. This is evaluated, first, more generally, and then focussed 
on a series of more specific issues. References out to multilateral intelligence liaison 
arrangements, with which the UK and US are closely associated, simultaneously 
figure. A useful place to begin, however, is with some of the differences concerning 
how the UK and US approach the tackling of terrorism. 
 
 
[3.0]: Differentiated UK and US approaches to countering terrorism 
 
‘Frustrating terrorism’ both vis-à-vis and versus ‘defeating terrorism’ captures the 
core differences present in the respective UK and US approaches to addressing 
terrorism. This is together with characterising the sources of their synergies and 
tensions. The overall CT approaches of both the UK and the US consist of two key 
pillars. These are conceptualised here as: (i) ‘law enforcement’, where broader anti-
terrorism tactics are reflected in the overall strategy adopted (reflective of the ‘anti-
terrorism paradigm’); and (ii) ‘militarised’, where narrower counter-terrorism tactics 
predominate in the overarching strategy pursued (reflective of the ‘counter-terrorism 
paradigm’). Within each of the UK and US approaches, elements of both the 
intelligence (‘wait and watch’) and military (‘see and strike’) methodologies are 
reflected. A complex co-existence duality is present at their core. For instance, the 
investigation element reflects the intelligence-style of using surveillance tactics, 
while the actual act of the application of the law (enforcing/implementing the law) 
reflects more a military-style of tactics, which involves the breaking up and 
disrupting of criminal activities. Here, the tensions between ‘pure’ intelligence and 
security activities (and equally their differences) similarly become distinct. 
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There are fundamental tensions between the two pillars. These tensions not 
least involve timescales. This is especially apparent at the ‘operational’ level, 
concerning at what point in time should intelligence operations be stopped and the 
law enforced - typically through the interdicting of suspects? Naturally, on which 
pillar the most emphasis is put determines the core balance and overarching nature 
of the CT approach and strategy implemented. Overall, UK and US security 
strategies have slightly different configurations. In its law enforcement dominated 
(and more subset militarised) approach to CT, the UK appears to put greater 
emphasis on the intelligence methodology. Instead, the US, in its militarised 
dominated (and more subset law enforcement) approach to CT, appears to put 
greater emphasis on the military methodology.33 This contributes to a differing 
balance to varying degrees in the nature of their respective overall CT approaches. In 
part, due to their respective experiences, the UK views terrorism more as a tactic and 
the US views terrorism more as a strategy.34  
In summary, as Lutz and Lutz note when drawing distinctions: ‘Terrorism 
can be viewed as a problem to be resolved by military means (war on terrorism) 
[more the US approach], by normal police techniques (terrorism as crime), or as a 
medical problem with underlying causes and symptoms (terrorism as disease)…’35, 
the last two of which are more characteristic of the UK approach. At times these 
differentiated CT approaches can converge and complement in a synergistic manner 
(by figuring in their vis-à-vis mode).  
However, at other junctures, they can diverge and clash, even compete (by 
instead featuring in their versus mode). This generates tensions of varying degrees of 
intensity in relations. Again, while overall the UK has tended to stress the frustrating 
of terrorism, the US has tended to instead emphasise the defeating of terrorism. For 
many in Europe, over time the phrase ‘War on Terror’ has considerably rankled. 
Both domestically and internationally, the UK traditionally responds to terrorism 
and insurgencies as an ‘emergency’, rather than a ‘war’.36 These considerations, 
involving more than mere semantics, naturally have some implications for how UK 
and US intelligence and security confront the issue of terrorism. Again, a range of 
strategic and operational dissonances and, equally, harmonies between the UK and 
US can flow from such distinctions. 
 
 
[4.0]: Bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison on counter-terrorism 
 
In 2000, close bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison on the issue of CT was not new. As 
the so-called ‘new’ terrorism developed, the intelligence co-operation on CT had 
evolved in-step.37 Terrorism ‘is a common problem so intelligence is shared…’, 
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candidly remarked a Whitehall official in November 2002.38 The UK Government 
echoed this sentiment in its response to the 2007 ISC Renditions report: ‘… Many of 
the terrorist threats to the UK have international connections which can only be dealt 
with effectively in cooperation with the intelligence and security agencies of other 
States.’39 As the US Joint Inquiry examining the attacks of 9/11 observed in December 
2002, prior to the attacks: ‘The [US] intelligence community depended heavily on 
foreign intelligence and law enforcement services for the collection of 
counterterrorism intelligence and the conduct of other counterterrorism activities.’40 
This was especially due to the persisting perennial weaknesses of US intelligence 
concerning HUMINT (see below [4.1.i]). 
Indeed, terrorism has been a long-term driver for spurring close intelligence 
liaison.41 For this reason, close US intelligence liaison with countries such as the UK 
was necessary. Although, overall, the Joint Inquiry went on to judge that: ‘The results 
were mixed in terms of productive intelligence, reflecting vast differences in the 
ability and willingness of the various foreign services to target the Bin Ladin and al-
Qa’ida network…’42 The UK, however, was a leading partner with the US on CT. In 
2006, the ISC noted that: ‘intelligence on Islamic terrorist networks… has been a JIC 
Priority Band 1 [high priority] requirement for many years, well before the attacks in 
the US on 11 September 2001.’43 Over time, overseas liaison continued to be of 
importance to the UK.44 Yet, in 2000, the volume of intelligence exchanged was 
quantitatively less than would be seen later. This was due to the then prevailing 
circumstances. 
 
Before the 9/11 attacks, different main UK and US CT priorities were evident.45 This 
trend of each being mainly preoccupied with their own, at times disparate, highest 
priority terrorist targets naturally resulted in there being less CT intelligence 
collaboration. Greater CT collaboration and harmonisation of approaches were seen 
once the UK and US highest priority CT targets had significantly converged after the 
9/11 attacks on the US. This trend was cemented after several new joint 
investigations had been launched. Subsequent attacks, such as the 7/7 London 
bombings, had a similar ‘multiplier effect’ on UK-US CT interactions, assisting in 
their focussing. 
The structures to facilitate UK-US intelligence liaison already existed prior to 
9/11. The framework and channels facilitating the exchange of information, and 
close UK-US intelligence liaison, were already functioning.46 The UK-US interactions 
were taking place along the lines as outlined in Chapter 4, above. After the 9/11 
attacks, the volume and frequency of intelligence flow through these began to 
increase substantially. Further channels were also opened up to cope with the 
enhanced supply and demand. This happened especially as CT targets converged 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 5: Case Study 1 
V(i) : 191 
and as the numbers of specific cases opened for joint investigation proliferated 
exponentially.47 
There was increased UK-US convergence at all levels. On 9/11, UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair unhesitatingly declared the UK’s solidarity with the US: ‘We … 
in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of 
tragedy and we like them will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.’48 
Some of the ‘evangelicalism’ present in UK-US relations was revealed. Between the 
UK and US intelligence agencies, George Tenet, head of the CIA, called Sir Richard 
Dearlove, Chief of SIS (MI6), ‘to tell him what we were hearing and what we knew’. 
Especially as events were rapidly unfolding in real-time on 9/11, there were 
concerns regarding what Tenet later described as ‘a commercial passenger jet on its 
way to Great Britain [which] was emitting all kinds of squawks, with its transponder 
going off and on…’49 On 12 September, as a physical realisation of the UK and US 
intelligence services standing ‘shoulder to shoulder’, the Director of GCHQ (Sir 
Francis Richards), the Chief of SIS (Dearlove) and the Deputy Director-General of the 
Security Service (MI5) (then Manningham-Buller) flew to the US for urgent 
discussions with their US counterparts.50 As Tenet later recalled: ‘I still don’t know 
how they got flight clearance into the country, but they came on a private plane, just 
for the night, to express their condolences and to be with us. We had dinner that 
night at Langley, an affirmation of the special relationship between our two nations 
and as touching an event as I experienced during my seven years as [US Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI)].’51  
Later, the contemporary centrality of liaison was further demonstrated. 
Indeed, in relation to international intelligence liaison generally, in the Government 
Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Annual Report 2001–2002, the UK 
Government noted that:  
 
The ISC supports the collaborative work of the Agencies with their partners 
abroad, and wants to see this vigorously pursued in the future. Even before 
9/11, there were well-established and effective links, both bilateral and 
multilateral, between the Agencies and a wide range of international 
partners, on counter-terrorist and other investigations and operations. The 
Government shares the ISC objective of making such liaison relationships 
even more close and effective.52 
 
UK and US CT targets increasingly converged. Previously already at the top 
of the agendas of GCHQ and MI6, and gradually making its way up the other UK 
intelligence agendas, international, al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden and jihadist-related 
terrorism now forcefully dominated all of the UK and US intelligence agencies’ 
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increasingly harmonised agendas.53 As the leading priority, this variety of terrorism 
was going to get sustained attention, as well as the allocation of substantial 
intelligence and security community resources directed towards its tackling. As one 
analyst commented, noting the UK’s value as an educative CT intelligence partner to 
the US, the UK is ‘America’s premier ally, and the potential number two target for 
Al-Qaeda… But with more than 30 years’ experience of dealing with IRA activity, the 
UK is ahead of the US in many areas, including intelligence…’54 Although, while 
there was British willingness to impart this experience and the lessons learnt to their 
US counterparts, these lessons were not always universally welcomed.55 
CT investigations were rejuvenated. After the 9/11 attacks, the US and UK 
intelligence agencies in their investigations now could cast at a minimum a slightly 
better targeted - yet in practice still wide - net for leads.56 Enhanced international 
intelligence liaison on CT efforts was of central importance. Response to this impetus 
was soon forthcoming, albeit more gradually over time on the multilateral bases.57 
The departing Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton 
unambiguously declared: ‘Intelligence will be key. There is no question about it.’58 
Joint UK-US interests were also more pronounced. The importance of 
maintaining close UK-US intelligence relations on CT issues, and UK-US relations 
more widely, was stressed pragmatically in 2005 by Ed Owen, a former special 
adviser to the UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw: ‘The bottom line… is that “the US 
has the diplomatic and military strength to make things happen. They are the 
dominant power and in so many areas there’s nothing that can be done without their 
support… What’s the alternative?”’59 The belief that UK and US interests are close 
was frequently stated. In November 2002, during the NATO Prague Summit, UK 
Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon emphasised the extent to which the UK and US came 
together on issues such as CT: ‘I do not see a divergence between the basis of UK and 
US security interests… Our security interests coincide or are very similar, whether as 
part of our close bilateral relationship or within wider defence alliances such as 
Nato.’60 This suggested some continuing UK-US convergence particularly detectable 
at the macro ideological/theoretical level of relations. 
By the end of 2005, the scope of UK CT investigations was continuing to 
expand. The investigations were edging slightly closer towards the large-scale nature 
of US CT efforts. This was during attempts by UK intelligence to strike better 
intelligence and security reach balances within its own terror enquiries, as well as to 
become more effectively ‘catch-all/most’ in a broadening of its risk management 
approach.61 In the UK, the devotion of further resources was later seen as being 
helpful in addressing any perceived intelligence and surveillance under-reach.62  
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The bilateral intelligence liaison between the UK and US on CT from 2000 to the end 
of 2005 took two major closely related forms. Firstly, there was general intelligence 
liaison; secondly, there was more focussed intelligence liaison concerning specific 
issues, such as on: (i) whether to publicise intelligence or not, (ii) ‘persons of interest’, 
(iii) counter-cyber-terrorism, and (iv) ‘asset freezing’ and financial CT efforts. Each of 
these will now be explored in turn. 
 
[4.1]: General intelligence liaison: 
General intelligence liaison formed the bulk of UK-US interactions on CT. This 
tended to be less specifically focussed, and was more concerned with broader issues 
figuring at the macro/higher ‘ideological/theoretical’ and ‘strategy/policy’ levels. 
More peripheral concerns and topics for UK-US intelligence liaison were also 
covered here. Several generic issues emerged over time during the bilateral UK-US 
intelligence liaison on CT from 2000 to the end of 2005. Those that appear to 
particularly standout in the historical record will now be explored. This is together 
with efforts towards their appropriate contextualisation. 
 
[4.1.i]: Before 9/11 – Different highest priority targets: 
At the beginning of 2000, international and jihadist al-Qaeda-related terrorism was 
the main CT focus of the US.63 This was due to the increasing series of attacks against 
US interests from this source throughout the 1990s. From 1998 and after the US 
embassy bombings in Africa, the US intelligence and law enforcement agencies had 
already declared ‘war’ on the jihadist-inspired al-Qaeda terrorism;64 although, the 
‘war’ was not as all encompassing and overt, as that which would be seen after the 
9/11 attacks. Moreover, at this juncture, the main US emphasis was still focussed on 
anti-terrorism, before a fuller implementation of what can be termed the wider and 
deeper reaching ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’.  
The spectre of terrorism overshadowed the new millennium celebrations. On 
the US CT front, during December 1999 there was the arrest in the US of Ahmed 
Ressam along with the recovery of explosives.65 There was also the pressing need to 
disrupt the associated so-called ‘Millennium Threat’ in the US and Jordan. US CT 
efforts included thwarting the plot to bomb Los Angeles Airport (LAX) on New 
Year’s Eve 1999, alongside responding to intelligence warnings of possible terrorist 
attacks during the Seattle, Washington and New York celebrations.66 
By contrast, the main UK CT focus in 2000 was instead fixed elsewhere. In its 
anti-terrorism approach, the UK was more focussed on domestic terrorism, and the 
more immediate UK national security threat posed by the dissident ‘Real IRA’.67 The 
Real IRA was refusing to participate in the 1998 Northern Ireland Good Friday 
Agreement peace process. It launched a bombing campaign involving carrying out a 
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series of attacks, such as the 1998 Omagh bombing, and several bombings around 
London, including mortars being fired onto the SIS (MI6) Vauxhall Cross 
headquarters on 20 September 2000, and the explosion of a car bomb outside the BBC 
Television Centre on 5 March 2001.68  
However, UK-US CT interests were increasingly converging. Gradually each 
of the other’s main CT targets made it higher up their own respective agendas. This 
trend occurred as the range and extent of terrorist attacks against both individual 
and shared UK and US interests continued to mount. The attacks were now well-
surpassing the ‘inconvenience’ of other terrorist attacks in the past. This was by 
being more frequent, as well as more absorbing of attention and resources. 
Simultaneously, the international co-operation heralded earlier still was seen as 
being a helpful solution. Moreover, over time it was continuously developing and 
evolving. For example, the UK was aided by the US no longer being so ambivalent 
towards the activities of the IRA,69 with Washington placing the Real IRA on its 
terrorist organisations list.70 This was a decision reportedly based on the sharing of a 
sizeable dossier including UK and Irish intelligence. The FBI was also tasked with 
the monitoring of Irish-Americans allegedly continuing to help fund the Real IRA.71 
In return, the UK was willing to pass on some of the CT lessons it had learnt during 
its dealings with the IRA and Northern Ireland, while al-Qaeda and the jihadist 
terrorism was placed at the top of the agendas of both MI6 and GCHQ.72 This 
contrasted somewhat with the other European countries (except perhaps more 
indirectly France, and its focus on Algerian-associated terrorism). In his evidence, 
former US National Security Adviser Sandy Berger later ‘told the Joint Inquiry that 
European governments (except Britain) did not share the US assessment of the al-
Qa’ida threat…’73 As Tyler Drumheller, division chief for the CIA Directorate of 
Operations (DO) in Europe until he retired in 2005, later reflected:  
 
My part … was to try and go to our European allies. One of Tenet’s real 
goals was to break down the barriers between the services, because you 
have very long-standing rules of engagement between foreign intelligence 
services. You work together, but you don’t really trust each other. It’s an 
interesting sort of dance in that every service wants to protect its sources, 
obviously, and information. We had been looking for ways to engage on 
this [the terrorist threat]; they, [the] Europeans, were looking for ways to 
engage on it. But even among themselves, they had a hard time doing that. 
Then after 9/11, there was increased interest in it obviously, and I think we 
actually had some success…74 
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Over time, the main US CT focus continued to remain on international 
terrorist attacks. These were occurring on US interests largely in the Middle East and 
those geographically away from the West.75 The major international terrorist attack 
on US interests of 2000 came on 12 October when a small boat was brought alongside 
the US Navy’s destroyer the USS Cole, docked in the port of Aden. A bomb was 
detonated blowing a hole in the hull of the USS Cole, killing 17 US sailors and 
injuring 39.76 During the 1990s and beyond, as a whole CT had been gradually 
steadily increasing its way up the US intelligence agencies’ agendas, becoming 
focussed more specifically on bin Laden and al-Qaeda.77 However, it took the deeply 
shocking terrorist attacks of 9/11 on the US homeland to push CT efforts to the 
absolute top of the Bush administration’s political agenda, and for more of a national 
US CT strategy to be better developed. CT would now get the necessary and 
sustained highest-level attention that some well-placed US CT experts, such as 
Richard A. Clarke, the chief counter-terrorism adviser on the US National Security 
Council (NSC), believed (and had argued) it deserved and should have received 
prior to the 9/11 attacks.78  
Liaison generally flourished after the Cold War. In the wake of post-Cold 
War ‘peace dividend’ cuts, part of the CIA’s strategy had been to place ‘great 
emphasis on close relations with foreign liaison services, whose help was needed to 
gain information that the United States itself did not have the capacity to collect.’79 
The close intelligence liaison relationship with the UK fitted neatly into that strategy 
of drawing heavily on liaison partners. The US Joint Inquiry noted:  
 
The [US] Intelligence Community recognized early on that an effective US 
response to al-Qa’ida must be global and that foreign intelligence and 
security services (“liaison services”) would be important allies in fighting 
terrorism. Improving ties to liaison services became increasingly important 
for the CIA, FBI, NSA, and other agencies, and their efforts helped make 
foreign countries more effective partners and more willing to assist US 
counterterrorism efforts…80 
 
However, overall this strategy was judged later to have been too limited. Some US 
weaknesses on CT matters were highlighted with acknowledgement by the 9/11 
Commission Report that: ‘Serving officers… were suited for traditional agent 
recruitment or for exploiting liaison relationships with foreign services but were not 
equipped to seek or use assets inside the terrorist network.’81 Accordingly, the US 
had crucially needed some more unilateral intelligence gathering to complement the 
liaison input. Essentially US infiltration of terrorist cells had apparently been 
forfeited at the expense of over-reliance on foreign liaison services.82 Indeed, at this 
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time, arguably under-reach and non-/under-optimised outreach balances were also 
present within these sorts of interactions across the US intelligence community. This 
was not least in a context where there was the beginning of a transition from 
predominantly international competition - including the enduring residues of its 
legacy during that transitional period – to principally international co-operation in 
transformed intelligence activities during the 1990s.83 Reportedly, before the 9/11 
attacks at least 19 ‘explicit warnings’ had been received by US intelligence from 
various foreign sources, including the UK on at least a couple of occasions.84  
US intelligence was otherwise emasculated. More generally prior to 9/11, the 
quantity of CT intelligence – for instance, too much SIGINT and lesser HUMINT - 
had on the whole usurped the quality of intelligence available and analysed. There 
had been both systemic and systematic breakdown involving all levels of the 
intelligence cycle. Compounding issues were notably: (i) the type and quality of 
intelligence available; (ii) the technological obstacles (such as information overload 
and targeting issues); and (iii) management factors, in both the intelligence world 
and at the macro/higher political/national security leadership levels. Collectively, 
these had contributed towards not helping intelligence analysis, information sharing, 
and warning efforts before 9/11.85 As former Assistant Director of Central 
Intelligence for Analysis and Production, Mark Lowenthal, has observed about 
intelligence: ‘[It] … serves and is subservient to policy and … it works best – 
analytically and operationally – when tied to clearly understood policy goals.’86 
Within US intelligence, overall an unhealthy outreach balance had been present. 
Including within the ‘producer-consumer’ relationship, under-optimised and non-
optimised conditions were reflected. Counter-productively, reach deficits and 
excesses had tended to dominate. Ultimately, too much overreach and under-reach 
had featured too widely.87 
 
[4.1.ii]: After 9/11 - a ‘wake-up call’? Implementing the counter-terrorism paradigm: 
In the wake of 9/11, the UK also came more under the spotlight. In the plethora of 
widely cast investigations that were quickly launched, some ‘terrorist’ connections to 
the UK were beginning to emerge.88 To some critics, the UK first had to ‘get its own 
house in order’. Throughout the 1990s and into the early years of the new 
millennium, both foreign (such as French) and the UK law enforcement, intelligence 
and security authorities were increasingly aware of the presence in the UK of some 
Islamic ‘extremists’ harbouring anti-US sentiments and with (at least alleged) links to 
international terrorism. Former CIA operative Bob Baer’s account is especially vivid: 
‘It didn’t take a sophisticated intelligence organization to figure out that Europe, our 
traditional ally in the war against the bad guys, had become a hot-house of Islamic 
fundamentalism… [and, exposing the formal limits and conditions of UK-US 
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intelligence liaison as explicitly specified by treaty, as well as an area of real persona 
non grata transgression,] the CIA was prohibited by British authorities from 
recruiting sources, even Islamic fundamentalists, in their country…’89 But how 
exactly and to what extent intelligence services should react to the presence of such 
individuals and groups was a different matter than simply detecting their presence. 
Moreover, in what circumstances should pro-active preventative and pre-emptive 
actions be taken against them? Recognising that they had to tread carefully with the 
finite resources at their disposal, the British were especially keen that any perceived 
‘disproportionality’ did not emerge in a potentially provocative and then counter-
productive manner. 
These were the types of considerations that generated much intra-liaison 
debate. Indeed in the UK, these extremists and controversial groups – such as ‘the 
Islamic Jihad’, ‘Gamaa Islamiyya’ (the ‘Islamic Group’), the ‘Armed Islamic Group 
(Groupe Islamique Armé [GIA])’,90 and ‘Al-Muhajiroun’ – had already been 
significant contributory factors towards the introduction and passing of the UK 
Terrorism Act of 2000.91 However, on the whole, the extremists - in a considerable 
minority in relation to the wider moderate Muslim population in the UK - were 
essentially treated pragmatically. The UK intelligence and security authorities 
continued to adopt a ‘watchful tolerance’92 or ‘hands-off’ approach, as was especially 
witnessed (and had seemed proven to be a satisfactorily viable approach forward to 
adopt) throughout the 1990s. This approach dovetailed into the general UK CT 
containment and ‘wait and watch’-dominated strategy.  
A small proportion of key priority individuals were kept under some 
surveillance. This approach was due to the UK authorities only having limited 
resources and staff to hand. Additionally, it could be argued that at the time the 
extremists appeared to be more incoherently noisy than spreading cohesive, 
potentially effective and popular, national - extending to global - security 
undermining jihadist messages and ideologies. Therefore, compounded with the 
absence of an attack from this source on UK soil and against UK interests, they could 
be evaluated at this time as not posing the most pressing threat to the UK’s own 
national security - unlike the then more immediate UK CT priority, the Real IRA, 
who at the time were actually conducting an active bombing campaign. As a logical 
extension of this evaluation, neither were the extremists in the UK deemed a 
sufficient national security threat to close UK allies, such as the US.93 This was 
especially before the full nature of the terrorist threat had been increasingly clarified. 
After the attacks of 9/11, broadly this softer type of approach was still felt to 
be defensible. Appropriate proportionality was still trying to be maintained in CT 
activities by the UK authorities. In the UK context, a sufficiently provocative ‘tipping 
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point’ with the jihadist vein of terrorist had still not yet been reached. Although, 
arguably time was quickly running out for the authorities as some post-9/11 changes 
were increasingly ushered in, such as the issue of extremists operating in the UK 
beginning to be more significantly addressed. This was alongside the rapid 
increasing of UK police and intelligence CT resources and staffs. An interviewee 
identified only as a ‘Whitehall official’ was keen to stress early on during the post-
9/11 investigations that: ‘Both the FBI and British security officials do not at this 
stage believe the UK end of the investigation is too significant.’94 However, this did 
not prevent tensions from surfacing. The UK came under some public US criticism 
for essentially being too lax towards the extremists prior to 9/11.95 The UK Cabinet 
Office Intelligence and Security Coordinator, Sir David Omand, also later admitted 
in 2004 that: ‘…my own hunch is that round about 1999-2000 we probably under-
estimated the extent to which there were radicalised individuals here in the UK.’96  
To what extent hindsight was aiding this reflecting back is more debatable. 
Nevertheless, the 9/11 attacks provided a newfound lens and some greater focus. At 
least for a time, this helped to ‘clarify’ the scale and source of the ‘new’ highest 
priority terrorist threat. The ISC concluded later in its Annual Report 2001-2002, that: 
‘… with hindsight… the scale of the threat and vulnerability of Western states to 
terrorists with this degree of sophistication and a total disregard for their own lives 
[such as using suicide bombing tactics] was not understood.’97 
UK-US intelligence liaison was further galvanised after the attacks. Rather 
than being solely mainly reactive after an event, pro-activity increased. This shifted 
to varying degrees the balance found in the CT stance of all parties. Psychologically, 
the attacks of 9/11 on the US homeland, relayed essentially live and repetitively by 
the global mass media, had been so spectacularly shocking and on such a virtually 
simultaneous grand scale that they well-surpassed the earlier arguably more 
‘nuisance’ level of previous terrorist atrocities.98 Furthermore, in the words of some 
US commentators, the 9/11 attacks on the American homeland represented ‘a 
quantum leap in the deadliness and audacity of terror… [revealing] a vulnerability 
that many in the United States had never before appreciated.’99 
The new investigative lens helped. There was now a prism provided through 
which to jointly view and evaluate security issues. Post-9/11, information passed 
from the FBI was quickly followed up by UK authorities. These moves were also 
pursuant with already existing UK-US agreements, for example the UK-US Mutual 
Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) of 1994 – essentially a ‘mutual assistance agreement 
on criminal and counter-terrorism with UK law enforcement and intelligence 
organisations.’100 Several raids and arrests in London and elsewhere in the UK, such 
as the detention of one man in Birmingham, resulted.101 At times perhaps these leads 
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were too swiftly and keenly followed up given the number of those arrested later 
being released without charge. Moreover, as a US Congressional Research Service 
Report observed: ‘As of January 2004… only six of the 544 people arrested under UK 
anti-terrorist legislation since September 11 [2001] had been convicted…’102 But, as 
the UK Government defensively noted vis-à-vis the US renditions policy and UK-US 
intelligence interactions: ‘It is important to remember the context… events were 
moving quickly, the settled direction of the U.S. Government’s response to the 9/11 
attacks was not clear, and the priority for the UK and U.S. intelligence agencies was 
to identify and seek to prevent further attacks.’103 Arguably, the full implications of 
the legislation introduced earlier in 1989, 1994 and 2001, to which the intelligence 
agencies legally had to adhere in the UK (see Chapter 1 [4.0], above), had not yet been 
appreciated (see also below [4.1.iv/4.2.ii]). This was together with there being 
operational difficulties in reconciling the stipulations of the various pieces of 
legislation with the episodes being actually experienced, as well as there being 
further complications posed by considerations such as how those episodes should be 
best handled subsequently. 
In the joint UK-US CT efforts, the continuing importance of FBI legal attachés 
was repeatedly emphasised. Foreign intelligence liaison underway in the law 
enforcement sector was seen as central.104 Alongside the presence of liaison between 
UK authorities and the FBI legal attachés in London, there was evidence of liaison 
between UK counterparts and FBI agents on the issue of CT at FBI Headquarters in 
Washington.105 
Some changes were becoming increasingly apparent, however. In September 
2002, the US explicitly outlined its national strategy. With pre-emptive action an 
important cornerstone of the document, it carefully stressed inclusiveness with ‘this 
path is not America’s alone. It is open to all.’106 The security issue of WMD featured 
heavily alongside terrorism. This was because the two issues were substantially 
integrated, instead of being more disaggregated.107 London also followed this route. 
On 24 September 2002, the UK Government released a dossier titled Iraq’s Weapons of 
Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government. On 7 October, US President 
Bush gave a televised address outlining the case against Saddam Hussein and Iraq’s 
(supposed) WMD. In the risk management argument being promoted politically, 
possibilities were being articulated over probabilities. Already, at this early stage in 
the run up to the 2003 Iraq war, pursuit of this line of activity was being criticised by 
some members of the US intelligence community.108 Concern was continuing to 
mount that the political momentum snowballing on the issue of supposed Iraqi 
WMD was counter-productively sidetracking the UK-US intelligence focus. The 
worry was that the intelligence tasking had undergone a shift, together with 
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resources and staff allocations. Instead, now they would be focussed more on the 
alleged threat posed by supposed Iraqi WMD and Saddam Hussein himself, as well 
as his fancied links with al-Qaeda (see Case Study 2, below).109 Another major 
international terrorist attack was to bring exactly these concerns firmly to the 
forefront of peoples’ minds. 
On 12 October 2002, Bali was attacked. The Bali attacks did nothing to 
assuage the prevailing worries. Indeed, some critics felt that, distracted by focussing 
on supposed Iraqi WMD, the UK-US intelligence agencies and governments had 
misguidedly failed to remain sufficiently focussed on terrorism. This shortcoming 
was believed to extend further, with the UK remaining insufficiently focussed on 
other potentially problematic parts of the world beyond merely Iraq. Later in 
December 2002, the special ISC report examining the intelligence circumstances 
surrounding the Bali attacks concluded significantly that given the prevailing 
circumstances ‘…the threat assessments to general British interests [in Indonesia] 
ought to have been raised to HIGH…’ The report continued: ‘However… on the 
available intelligence… we do not believe that the attack could have been 
prevented.’110 At the time of the Bali attacks, the context again had failed to be 
appreciated to its fullest extent. This was a factor that some informing hindsight 
could illuminate, suggesting that some greater foresight, as well as there being 
enhanced efforts towards its engendering and subsequent development, could be of 
real added value to the intelligence efforts of the UK. Bali clearly did not represent 
an intelligence failure. However, it did represent more of a knowledge failure, where 
inadequate and insufficient contextualisation had prevailed, once again to all too 
unfortunate extents.  
In the meantime, the general wider political concerns were firmly dismissed 
by No. 10 Downing Street: ‘What Bali shows is that if you don’t deal with problems, 
they will come back and hit you. The same applies to Iraq. It’s not either or, it’s 
both.’111 Later in March 2004, continuing to highlight the UK’s enhanced – yet still 
developing – approach to the perceived risks, the Cabinet Office Security and 
Intelligence coordinator, Sir David Omand, publicly warned of the connection 
between terrorists and WMD.112 The 9/11 attacks with terrorists creatively using 
conventional aircraft as weapons had caused terrible enough atrocities, ran the 
argument, what if WMD had been used as well or instead? The possibility of such a 
scenario could easily be contemplated, even if the probability of such an eventuality 
was considerably harder to quantify. As risk analyst Jens O. Zinn has observed:  
 
Risk perception research shows that the perceived seriousness of risks 
(expected number of fatalities) and the catastrophic potential influence the 
acceptance of a risk even when its probability of occurrence is very low. 
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Risks with a low probability but high consequences are perceived as more 
threatening than more probable risks with low or medium consequences. 
Additionally, having personal control over a risk or familiarity with a risk 
decreases the perceived risk…113  
 
Evidence gathered by Special Forces ‘in-the-field’ in Afghanistan in November 2001 - 
along with memories of the 1995 Sarin nerve agent attacks in Japan - had certainly 
not helped to alleviate the very real fears of terrorists potentially using WMD or a 
‘dirty bomb’.114 The considerable extent of UK-US convergence at the high levels was 
again suggested.  
Operationally, the Bali bombings prompted further UK-US liaison. Another 
major international terrorist attack had taken place involving both British and US 
citizens, over which the UK and US intelligence agencies would liaise. A team of UK 
SO13 (Police anti-terrorism Special Branch) officers was sent to Bali to assist in the 
post-attacks investigation alongside their US and Australian counterparts. At the 
political leader level, UK PM Blair had discussions with US President George W. 
Bush and the Australian PM John Howard – the leaders of some of the other UKUSA 
intelligence community countries. In his subsequent statement to the House of 
Commons, Blair noted that: ‘We had no specific intelligence relating to the attack in 
Bali…’115 Had the political considerations concerning Iraq trumped other security 
interests? Blair finished his statement by continuing to scotch claims of political 
distraction. He declared: ‘Some say that we should fight terrorism alone; and that 
issues to do with WMD are a distraction. I reject that entirely. Both, though different 
in means, are the same in nature…’116 Whatever is accepted, undeniably by October 
2002 the highest priority tasks allocated to the UK-US intelligence agencies were 
increasing exponentially, as was the tempo at which these issues needed processing. 
With the significantly increased UK-US intelligence efforts focussed on supposed 
Iraqi WMD (see Case Study 2), as well as having to remain focussed on CT, UK-US 
intelligence resources and staffs were being increasingly stretched. 
There were plenty of topics for consideration. In early November 2002, 
another series of high-level meetings were held in London between US and UK 
intelligence counterparts. The Director of US Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, met 
with both the Director-General of the British Security Service (MI5) and the Chief of 
SIS. A wide range of issues was discussed during the talks, demonstrating the 
multiplicity of tasks with which they jointly had to grapple. These issues notably 
included the UK’s extensive long-term counter-terrorism experience with the IRA, 
with the articulation of intelligence lessons learnt, and – perhaps more significantly, 
given the extent to which this issue was to absorb high-level US attention in 
Washington during the years 2002 to 2004 – there was the consideration of whether 
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MI5 would be a good model for the US to draw upon for reforms to the FBI.117 
Reportedly, ‘…behind the scenes there has been growing intelligence co-operation 
and a recognition within Washington that Britain and Israel are world leaders in this 
field.’118 Eventually, however, the US decided not use the MI5 model for reforms to 
the FBI – in part demonstrating the continued US discomfort with, and lack of 
consensus regarding, the issue of domestic intelligence and its management.119 The 
sentiments of those opposed to such a move were clearly apparent. These were 
evident in testimony given to Congress in 2003 by former US Attorney General 
(1991-1993) William P. Barr, where he argued:  
 
I would like to focus my remarks on the idea advanced in some quarters of 
severing “domestic intelligence” from the FBI and creating a new domestic 
spy agency akin to Britain's MI-5. I think this is preposterous and goes in 
exactly the wrong direction. Artificial stove-piping hurts our counter-
terrorism efforts. What we need to do now is meld intelligence and law 
enforcement more closely together, not tear them apart. We already have 
too many agencies and creating still another simply adds more 
bureaucracy, spawns intractable and debilitating turf wars, and creates 
further barriers to the kind of seamless integration that is needed in this 
area.120  
 
UK-US intelligence liaison also had other business. Reflecting its multi-
levelled character, the liaison was not confined to just taking place at the highest 
echelons in Washington and London. There was simultaneously close UK-US 
intelligence liaison discernable ‘on-the-ground’ and ‘out-in-the-field’ in numerous 
other countries scattered across the world. A few days after the November 2002 
Kenya attacks, following receipt of a ‘specific threat’, the UK closed its High 
Commission in Kenya. The US also closed its diplomatic offices in Nairobi, with an 
American diplomat acknowledging that: ‘The British have shared intelligence with 
us which we consider extremely disturbing.’121 Memories of the US embassy 
bombings in Kenya, just four years earlier in 1998, still resonated strongly. Similar 
UK and US embassy closures were again undertaken in Kenya following a 
subsequent ‘security scare’ around May/June 2003.122 In harmony with UNSCR 1373, 
there was also evidence of joint UK-US counter-terrorism capability and capacity 
building assistance to Kenya.123 Later, in the Middle East, the UK and US embassies 
in Yemen exchanged intelligence concerning threats to Western interests.124 The 
overall picture, however, appeared to be becoming increasingly complicated. 
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[4.1.iii]: The terrorist threat morphs as ideas increasingly take centre stage: 
By early 2003, the changing nature of the terrorist threat was evident. Structural 
changes had been wrought. The individual (as professional)/personal and 
operational/tactical levels of the terrorists were being increasingly disrupted. This 
was mainly thanks to actions such as the destruction of al-Qaeda bases in 
Afghanistan and the systematic ‘dismantling’ of extremist networks in Europe.125 
Notably, as the physical terrorist infrastructures were on the whole successfully 
broken up by the CT efforts, the macro/higher levels were instead gaining in 
significance. This included what was occurring at the ideological/theoretical and 
strategy/policy levels. The ideas war or engagement was becoming increasingly 
important (and has continued to do so to date) as the other lower/micro levels of 
operation were stripped away, and as al-Qaeda as an ‘organisation’ was successfully 
being increasingly fractured through its disruption.126 As The Observer journalist 
Jason Burke reported: ‘What [now] worries intelligence chiefs is that bin Laden’s 
close associates, with their experience, [and ideologies] will link up homegrown 
groups comprising individuals with no known links to terrorism and thus unknown 
to police. “That’s the nightmare scenario,” said one senior police source.’127 
Unfortunately, that ‘nightmare’ was soon to emerge. 
Al-Qaeda had changed. The al-Qaeda entity of 2003 appeared no longer to be 
the al-Qaeda entity of 2001. Rather than being so much (i) a hierarchical organisation 
per se, with a discernable ‘command and control’ set-up headed by bin Laden 
himself, and (ii) possessing detectable individuals and cells with discernable and 
breakable connections, such as being ‘foreign fighters’ and possessing shared 
Afghanistan training camp histories/experiences, al-Qaeda now appeared to be 
different. Instead, it seemed to be more of a virtual entity that was providing 
international ideological inspiration. Worse, those it was providing ideological 
inspiration to appeared to be more dispersed and consist of more devolved - and 
consequently harder to detect - groups and individuals scattered in several countries 
across the world. They were also increasingly members of ‘home’ (domestic) 
populations, on the whole possessing local rather than remote (or foreign) 
nationality status. The task at hand now for intelligence and security services was 
increasingly more akin to searching for ‘a needle in a haystack’.128  
The fact that this scenario had now emerged needed to be quickly recognised. 
Effective re-tooling was involved in response. This figured in the form of intelligence 
and security agencies themselves quickly evolving in order to most successfully deal 
with this even ‘newer’ terrorist threat which continued to rapidly morph in real-time. 
The important development of national threat assessment/analysis centres, such as 
the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) in the UK, can be cited here as part of this 
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general trend.129 Spearheaded by the UK and US, these centres were established from 
early 2003 firstly in the UKUSA countries (see below [4.2.i]), with similar concepts 
also later being adopted by other countries beyond, such as Denmark and 
Germany.130 The centres then became increasingly interconnected internationally, 
extending their activities beyond merely their domestic spheres. Moreover, 
significantly in terms of its form, the intelligence product shared within and between 
these centres represents more of a mid-way fusion between actionable 
operational/tactical intelligence, as well as more strategic-leaning intelligence (as 
characterised above [2.0]), extending its utility to the various partners. Also at this 
time, the learning curves encountered by the intelligence and security services were 
clearly continuing to be increasingly steep, as well as needing to be swiftly refined 
while on the move in the high-tempo operating environments. This was so that the 
authorities could try to keep at least one step ahead of their adversaries. 
In these murkier circumstances, the popularity of intelligence liaison was 
further enhanced. Unlike during the Cold War, the issue of penetration of a liaison 
partner’s intelligence and security service by the primary enemy (namely in the form 
of a high-grade intelligence service of a rival state) was felt to be no longer quite so 
acute.131 This was due to the different nature and source of the primary post-Cold 
War threat (now coming from non- and/or sub-state actors). Some of the inherent 
risks of intelligence liaison appeared to be more neutralised, making liaison more of 
an attractive option to pursue further.132 9/11, together with trends linked to 
globalisation writ large, further spurred on this thinking, with reports noting: ‘The 
ease with which people can now move across borders has involved a radical 
rethinking in intelligence sharing.’133 
In early 2003, bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison was extended. UK-US 
intelligence liaison developments appeared to be re-energised. On 1 April, it was 
announced that a UK-US agreement concerning intelligence liaison had been made 
in Washington between the US Director of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, and UK 
Home Secretary David Blunkett. The agreement was described as being focussed ‘on 
unprecedented co-operation and sharing of intelligence between the two countries.’ 
As part of the agreement, it would be subject to ‘internal’ monitoring processes - also 
through the mechanism of intelligence liaison – whereby: ‘A new group of senior 
officials will meet regularly to make sure their joint programme is on track.’ The 
agreement reportedly involved ‘closer working’ on a large range of issues, including 
biometrics and the development of scenarios.134 As Blunkett revealed, the concept of 
‘best practice’ was central:  
 
We are announcing today that we will establish a joint working group, a 
contact group, [the UK/US Joint Contact Group (JCG) on Homeland 
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Security] which will involve officials from the Homeland Security 
Department and … [the Home Office] in developing the work 
collaboratively, so that instead of just sharing best practice, they’re actually 
working on that best practice, learning from each other and being able to 
develop the very similar approaches which are necessary to protect our 
population.135  
 
Blunkett later argued: ‘If we accept that we are now interrelated with one another, 
whether we like it or not, we will understand why the UK and the US stand shoulder 
to shoulder.’136 
It was not all unsupported rhetoric. As a way of translating the words of the 
UK-US agreement of April 2003 into practical action, it was later reported that a joint 
UK-US CT exercise would be launched. Ongoing ‘unpublicised “table-top” planning 
exercises to test national resilience against terrorist attack’ were taking place in both 
the UK and US. Meanwhile, continuing explorations to improve UK-US intelligence 
sharing were underway as part of discussions between Omand, other UK officials 
and the US officials based in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).137 
This was not the only enhanced UK-US liaison. Evidence simultaneously 
abounded of some newer and expanded UK-US intelligence liaison at other levels of 
authority. Notably there were joint UK-US Customs and Excise operations shortly 
after the UK had joined the US Container Security Initiative (CSI).138 These included 
forward US border controls in the UK, so ‘Fortress America’ would not become 
penetrated. US and UK Customs counterparts worked alongside one another in the 
UK’s large container ports in order to stop anything terrorist-related, such as a ‘dirty 
bomb’, from being sent across the Atlantic into the US.139 
The international terrorist threat continued to provide impetus. During May 
2003, intelligence warnings and actual terrorist bombings persisted. There were 
attacks in the Saudi Arabian capital, Riyadh, and the Casablanca attacks on 17 May 
2003 (44 killed).140 A plethora of deteriorating security situations, demonstrated that 
internationally there were still plenty of counter-terrorism issues with which the UK 
and US intelligence services could jointly grapple. There were the Istanbul attacks on 
20 November 2003 on UK interests - HSBC bank offices and the UK consulate141 - 
alongside the continuing deteriorating security situation in Iraq. More ominously, 
the increasing involvement of foreign fighters and foreign sponsorship was apparent 
in Iraq.142  
National publics were increasingly dismayed with developments. The UK, in 
particular, was experiencing difficulties on the domestic ideological front.143 Public 
concerns about being over-spied upon emerged prominently. Some of the fears of 
intelligence and security overreach were not helped by the burgeoning climate of 
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mistrust in politicians and their - seemingly colluding - intelligence services. UK and 
US intelligence was looking - and indeed arguably was even made to look - 
particularly discredited after the headline-dominating failure in the wake of the 2003 
Iraq war to locate supposed Iraqi WMD, the claimed casus belli.144 As 2004 
progressed, widely held discussions also turned to whether proportionality had been 
lost.145 Concerns were also present regarding whether the terror ‘myth’ had been 
overly exaggerated and misevaluated by governments, particularly the US and 
UK.146 
Ideas were now undeniably performing a more central and coherent role. 
Gradually, the ideological dimension was increasingly recognised as being of 
growing importance internationally, as well as domestically. The issue of 
‘radicalisation’ was beginning to figure more prominently. Several experts believed 
that ideas should receive considerably more attention and be systematically 
addressed in both the individual and joint UK-US counter-terrorism efforts. The 
former Chair of the UK JIC, Dame Pauline Neville-Jones, succinctly captured the 
contemporary lack of clarity concerning the US-led so-called ‘War on Terror’ by 
noting: ‘Uncertain objectives are hampering success on the propaganda front…’147 
Other authors with ‘insider’ and intelligence expertise, such as Mike Scheuer, the 
former head of the CIA’s bin Laden Unit, further criticised the general direction of 
the so-called ‘War on Terror’.148 
By mid-2004, the terrorist threat confronted on 9/11 had changed. 
Governments now felt that they were less ‘behind the curve’ and instead were more 
ahead of terrorist events and developments.149 Reports observed that: ‘The better 
preparedness of businesses, improved protection for national infrastructure and the 
success in preventing attacks … have combined to create an increased sense of 
confidence that counter-terrorism is no longer trying to catch up…’150 For the US, 
continuing to maintain its forward borders and ‘Fortress America’ approach, the 
highest priority CT problem remained essentially international terrorism. Or, at the 
least, the terrorist threat was originating and operating elsewhere - most notably 
amongst the burgeoning insurgency in Iraq.151 While by contrast for European 
countries - such as witnessed with the Madrid (11 March 2004) and the later London 
bombings (7 July 2005) - technically domestic terrorism, ‘homeland’ originating, 
stemming from radicalised ‘indigenous Muslim communities’, was being 
increasingly confronted. It was ‘homegrown’ in nature, but internationally 
inspired.152 More worrying, for some US intelligence and security experts, as well as 
their partners beyond, was the extent to which the jihadist terrorism threat was now 
increasingly (and more clearly) being confronted both from and within Europe (see 
below [4.1.iv]).153 
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These trends helped to continue to complicate joint CT efforts. Indeed, one of 
the traditional categorising (and hence management) distinctions of terrorism was 
further eroding. On one hand due to its domestic origin, states wanted to deal with 
the terrorism in their own way as domestic terrorism, without ‘interference’ from an 
external state, such as the US, ‘transgressing’ their sovereignty. However, this results 
in a tension with the fact that the terrorism is internationally inspired and so fits into 
the wider US-led global CT efforts and its so-called ‘War on Terror’.154 In these 
circumstances, international intelligence liaison being conducted by domestic-
focussed security and intelligence services, such as MI5, was on an upward 
trajectory. 
Conceptually, analysts tried to capture the terrorist inspiration. Observer 
journalist Jason Burke characterised it as ‘al-Qaeda-ism’.155 ‘Al-Qaeda-ism’ and 
international jihadism as ideologies and ideological inspiration made the CT efforts 
more challenging. Targeting concerns again took centre stage. It was harder for 
intelligence and security agencies to deal with the threat through their traditional 
toolset of targeting methods, as well as their traditional division of responsibility and 
labour. Ideas can readily be concealed inside individuals’ heads, without presenting 
external and visual signs that can easily and ‘objectively’ be detected, and then 
agreed upon, by intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The threat is more 
elusive, and it is difficult to try and pin down ‘gaseous’ ideas and the 
radicals/extremists who expound them. Confronted with these types of challenges, 
conventionally relied upon tools, such as terrorist profiling, struggle to function as 
they are originally intended, and their meaning is increasingly questioned.156 In these 
circumstances, agreement between intelligence partners is naturally harder to reach. 
More room is provided for interpretations to differ on increasingly ‘subjective’ and 
slippery concepts. The US CT intelligence expert, Paul R. Pillar, cautioned that: 
‘Foreign cooperation will become more problematic as the issue moves beyond Al 
Qaeda.’157 Methods borrowed from military-associated ‘war-gaming’ - such as the 
use of joint ‘table-top’ and ‘Red Teaming’ exercises, as well as enacting actual 
physical training scenarios - were of increasing value in terms of their 
instructiveness. This was apparent through their enhanced adoption by the UK and 
US intelligence and security communities during 2003.158 
Would shared UK-US perceptions on CT now increasingly breakdown? On 
the approach to the first anniversary of 9/11 in September 2002, reportedly ‘both the 
US and UK security establishments [had taken] seriously broad warnings of attack…’ 
on the basis of shared perceptions.159 By logical extension, as the terrorist threat gets 
less clear, the loosening and unravelling of tight co-operation is suggested, raising 
questions, such as: will some increased divergence in CT priorities be witnessed 
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again? And: has the CT strategy of breaking-up terrorist cells, rather than watching 
them, been counter-productive over a longer-term time span? At least partially, the 
threat had become more devolved and dissipated. As the US Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Diplomatic Security, Joe Morton, acknowledged in a speech which 
summarised counter-terrorism ‘successes’, by 2005 there was still much to be 
accomplished: ‘…even as we have achieved such tremendous success in breaking up 
al-Qaida as a centralized organization, the threat of international terrorism 
continues… al-Qaida has energized a movement greater than itself…160  
Anxieties continued to persist. In early 2005 and within its own CT strategy 
(‘CONTEST’) document, the UK Government summed up the current broad 
situation in a similar manner to the US. At the macro level, broad agreement could 
be sufficiently maintained between the partners. Persisting common UK-US CT 
evaluations and shared perceptions again were illustrated: ‘Although Al Qaeda has 
been damaged as an organisation since 9/11 – losing key leaders, its base in 
Afghanistan and, with it, its infrastructure of training camps and laboratories – its 
ideology has inspired other networks of terrorists across the world, some exploiting 
local grievances.’161 Accordingly, the current terrorist threat was far from 
‘defeated’.162 Its ‘frustration’ was also continuing to be broadly elusive. Indeed, it was 
becoming increasingly complex. Moreover, keeping ‘ahead of the curve’ was not 
being accomplished as far, or as steadily, as was desirable. Prior to the Pakistan 
connections acquiring some clarified potency later in 2005, enhanced uncertainties 
had returned by 2004, and continued into mid-2005. Their nature was similar to 
those that had existed pre-9/11, before a lens was provided by the attacks. 
Partly in response to this burgeoning complexity, yet further intelligence 
liaison was fuelled. As CT investigations became increasingly fragmented, the pieces 
of the proverbial ‘jigsaw puzzle’ were becoming smaller and thus harder to gather 
and fit together. Arguably this necessitated even further enhanced communication 
between intelligence liaison partners. Some increased differences could also be 
perceived as being not entirely negative. Indeed, frequently those differences 
arguably acted as a valuable asset. They helped contribute towards preventing 
overreach in interactions and hence intelligence liaison ‘blowback’, notably in the 
form of ‘groupthink’.163 
 
[4.1.iv]: Tense moments and intense UK-US counter-terrorism debates:  
Continuing to maintain heightened vigilance was advisable. On 7 July 2005, London 
itself experienced a jihadist-inspired terrorist attack. Close bilateral UK-US 
intelligence liaison again demonstrated its fullest value in the post-attack 
investigations.164 As Manningham-Buller acknowledged, the London attacks when 
they came ‘were a shock’, but not altogether a ‘surprise’ to the UK intelligence 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 5: Case Study 1 
V(i) : 209 
services.165 Some form of attack had been anticipated at some point. Accordingly, 
there had been some preparation in the form of training during a joint UK-US (and 
Canadian) anti-terror drill - ‘Exercise Atlantic Blue’ - carried out shortly before in 
April 2005. The questions remained when and how the actual attacks would occur, 
rather than if.166 
Links to the perpetrators were immediately sought. As the investigations into 
the bombings got underway, claims of responsibility were posted on supposedly al-
Qaeda-related websites citing the UK’s involvement in the US-led 2003 War in Iraq 
as a cause.167 On the BBC Newsnight television programme, an ‘Islamic extremist’, 
Abu Uzair, claimed that British ‘Muslims had previously accepted a “covenant of 
security” which meant they should not resort to violence in the UK because they 
were not under threat there. “We don’t live in peace with you any more, which 
means the covenant of security no longer exists”.’168 The so-called ‘covenant of 
security’ - whether a construct in reality, or else merely more an unofficial truce in 
the form of an unspoken threshold never really explicitly agreed - had been 
considerably undermined by the high-profile UK participation in the US-led war in 
Iraq in March 2003. This participation, and the ‘unquestioning’ manner in which it 
had been presented publicly, had unfortunately propelled the UK to the forefront of 
jihadist ire that had previously been more concentrated solely on the US. Other 
European countries that had explicitly participated in the Iraq invasion, such as 
Denmark and Spain, were not spared similar vitriol. Worse, the extent of the 
vulnerability of the UK was starkly exposed to enemies and allies alike. This 
vulnerability, together with the extent of UK ‘permissiveness’ – in order to try and 
maintain at least an element of adequate proportionality in its overall CT activities - 
sought to be effectively exploited by adversaries into the future. 
During the investigations, tension-generating differences in UK and US CT 
methods were exposed.169 MI5’s general tactics of keeping people under surveillance 
(‘wait and watch’), rather than adopting more of the US style of taking earlier 
disruptive action (‘see and strike’) were reiterated. According to a US diplomat with 
CT experience, ‘Britain’s small size and island geography make it easier for the 
security services to track and gather intelligence on local extremists, a luxury he 
contends that the US does not have. “You can get lost in the US a lot easier… Letting 
people wander around and watching them presents more of a dilemma.”’170 The 
multi-layered nature of the UK-US intelligence liaison relationship was again 
highlighted. One official reportedly rated the broad UK-US intelligence liaison 
relationship as ‘excellent’. Meanwhile, the more specific UK-US intelligence 
relationship focussed on CT was judged to be ‘more fraught.’171 Different UK-US 
human rights concerns and justice system requirements were repeatedly stressed - 
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for example, UK intelligence legally having to adhere to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) in its operations (see below [4.2.ii]). UK law enforcement 
officials also noted that an ‘offence of acts preparatory to terrorism’ was required to 
address what their US counterparts saw as ‘loopholes’ in the UK legal system, which 
would then allow for more terrorism-related prosecutions.172 One unnamed former 
senior US intelligence official claimed: ‘(The problem) we have had with the British is 
the failure to see that the existing laws and protections, privacy etc, aren’t getting the 
job done in terms of protecting their own society… The place was being used as a 
recruitment centre and also a place from which people were being dispatched out for 
training to other places.’173 
Indeed, UK-US legal tensions and differences cut across all levels of activity. 
At the operational level, these formed some further obstacles that had to be 
successfully navigated in UK-US intelligence relations. This was especially so that 
UK intelligence officers, in particular, would not become incriminated, which 
presented them with several dilemmas when interacting closely with their US 
counterparts. Unlike their US counterparts - who were more protected by their 
methods being underwritten (albeit arguably somewhat dubiously) by the Bush 
administration’s series of controversial Department of Justice (DoJ) legal memos - as 
already seen, UK intelligence officers were instead considerably more vulnerable to 
being prosecuted for breaching the ECHR, and other related human rights 
covenants, during the conduct of their joint operations.174 It is quite remarkable that 
we have not seen, either in the UK or in the US, considerably more legal action being 
taken against individual intelligence officers and agencies (or their contractors) for 
some of the actions they have (allegedly) undertaken. This is especially as liberal 
democracies, most notably and disappointingly the US, to varying degrees have 
increasingly adopted some of the distinctly unseemly methods of the very 
adversaries they are trying to confront, in order to successfully combat them.175 
Nevertheless, significantly, intelligence in the US has not been completely 
immune to some legal probes. These have been conducted along similar lines to 
those in the UK (see below [4.2.ii]), and have similarly concerned the conduct of 
intelligence vis-à-vis issues such as the treatment of detainees and intensive 
interrogation techniques.176 In February 2005, according to reports based on 
information from US intelligence officials, the CIA’s own Inspector General, John L. 
Helgerson, was ‘conducting several reviews of the agency’s detention and 
interrogation practices in Iraq and Afghanistan, including several episodes in which 
prisoners have been injured or killed in C.I.A. custody…’, and reportedly there was 
already ‘one C.I.A. contract employee, David Passaro, [who had] been charged with 
a crime in connection with allegations of abuse of Al Qaeda prisoners.’177 These CIA 
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Inspector General probes, including into the wiping of CIA detainee interrogation 
videotapes, themselves were later subject to review, as they were deemed by some 
officials to be overly rigorous.178 By February 2008, the CIA Inspector General was 
said to have ‘agreed to tighter controls over [his] investigative procedures… in what 
appeared to be an attempt to soften resentments among agency officials over the 
watchdog’s aggressive probes into the legality and effectiveness of the CIA’s 
counterterrorism efforts and detention programs.’179  
Tension-generating differences emerged. The presence of transatlantic and 
epistemic legal communities pitted against similarly clustered transatlantic 
intelligence, law enforcement, and political communities, became apparent. Better 
interdisciplinary working agreements had to be sought. For instance, this was most 
evident during the occasions that significantly involved the presence of the 
overriding goal of public safety in governing calculations.180  
Post-9/11, the goal of public safety had continued firmly on its ascendancy. 
This was as a strong political impetus and intelligence and security operational 
driver in both the UK and US. Indeed, its general pursuit was especially energised 
after the 9/11 attacks, together with enhanced attempts towards its better realisation 
and maintenance into the future. This resulted in it being sought more widely, and 
its implementation being attempted in more of a timely manner on improved a priori 
bases.181 Sometimes, this enactment could even be versus the law. These were actions 
deemed essentially legitimised (at least to some participants and observers) 
according to the (believed exonerating) ‘crisis’ circumstances in which the 
overarching goal of public safety was trying to be successfully fulfilled. Particularly 
as witnessed in and by the UK, largely proportionality considerations were 
simultaneously attempting to be appropriately maintained in the situations judged 
to be requiring a crisis management approach.182 These were the situations believed to 
necessitate approaches beyond merely risk management - for instance, in the UK 
requiring the ‘activation’ of the Cabinet Office Briefing Room A (COBRA) 
mechanism with its various Bronze, Silver and/or Gold Commands, such as used on 
7/7, and in the US, the use of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA).183 But, difficult trade-offs were involved on individual bases, especially in 
terms of individual human rights versus the wider goal of public safety.184 This was 
apparent when the more collective leaning utilitarianism-influenced ‘greatest 
good/happiness for the greatest number’ in the domain of human security, was one 
of the prominent prevailing underlying philosophies emergent in the overall mix of 
expressed governing ideas (see below).  
Legal tensions encountered both between and within the UK and US continued 
to increase over the years from 2002, becoming increasingly paramount. By 2004, and 
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indeed continuing to date, the law itself was now having to considerably, and 
rapidly, catch-up. This was most pressing with regard to the enhanced public safety-
led political and operational requirements that had been adopted strongly on either 
side of the Atlantic, as well as more broadly globally when intelligence and security 
(including military) operations were conducted abroad. For the law, this involved 
some of its own essential adjustments, again undertaken in both the UK and US, in 
order to try and better accommodate, as well as appropriately control, the latest 
developments which were rapidly unfolding in their multitude in high-tempo real-
time environments.185 
Meanwhile, some of the UK-US differences extended further. US frustration 
was voiced, particularly highlighting UK-US differences over terrorism. The UK 
often drew on their lessons learnt in Northern Ireland and from their experience 
with dealing with the IRA. The UK also tried to pass on this knowledge and 
expertise to their US partners. However, there were views that the jihadist terrorism 
being faced was different, conceptualised as so-called ‘new’ terrorism. This 
therefore called into question the exact value of the UK’s Northern Ireland 
experience and lessons. Reportedly, UK officials were ‘… said to be frustrated at US 
reluctance to learn from Britain’s experience in fighting terrorism in Northern 
Ireland…’186 Meanwhile, a US official lamented: ‘“[The British] have a really hard 
time understanding that people like Masri187 and Abu Qatada188 are real goddamn 
problems. It took a long, long time before they began taking those threats 
seriously…”’189 Indeed, some prominent security commentators in the US and 
beyond were sharply critical of the British approach. These were sentiments that 
other commentators quickly picked up on in their own opining, such as Daniel 
Pipes:  
 
Thanks to the war in Iraq, much of the world sees the British government 
as resolute and tough and the French one as appeasing and weak. But in 
another war, the one against terrorism and radical Islam, the reverse is true: 
France is the most stalwart nation in the West, even more so than America, 
while Britain is the most hapless… In frustration, Egypt’s president, Hosni 
Mubarak, publicly denounced Britain for “protecting killers.” One 
American security group has called for Britain to be listed as a terrorism-
sponsoring state. Counterterrorism specialists disdain the British. Roger 
Cressey calls London “easily the most important jihadist hub in Western 
Europe.” Steven Simon dismisses the British capital as “the Star Wars bar 
scene” of Islamic radicals. 190  
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Such evaluations did not stop there, however. Continuing to illustrate the depth of 
some frank US concerns that the UK’s CT approach was not being sufficiently 
ruthless: ‘More brutally, [a US] intelligence official said of last week’s [7/7 London] 
attacks: “The terrorists have come home. It is payback time for … an irresponsible 
policy.”’ The criticism was sustained. The contention that the French were ‘better’ 
than the British at countering terrorism (at least the jihadist variant), and were more 
skilled with dealing with the associated issue of radicalisation, was then pursued 
further, as Pipes continued: 
 
While London hosts terrorists, Paris hosts a top-secret counterterrorism 
center, code-named Alliance Base… As the British ban fox hunting, the 
French ban hijabs. The former embrace multiculturalism, the latter retain a 
pride in their historic culture. This contrast in matters of identity makes 
Britain the Western country most vulnerable to the ravages of radical Islam 
whereas France, for all its political failings, has held onto a sense of self that 
may yet see it through.191 
 
Simultaneously, some of the more critically inclined US intelligence experts 
speculated that their ‘Fortress America’ would be penetrated via the UK. They were 
reportedly concerned that the ‘Visa Waiver Program could allow British terrorists to 
enter the US with insufficient security screening…’192 Albeit frequently somewhat 
exaggerated, and figuring as ‘worse-case scenarios’, these US arguments had some 
resonances in the UK.193 
The UK did undergo a shift. Over time, the UK moved somewhat closer to the 
US position.194 This was perceptible especially after the 7/7 London bombings, with 
the UK Government adopting a harder line towards extremists and radicals, and 
threatening to deport allegedly jihad-encouraging so-called ‘preachers of hate’.195 
Additionally in the DG of MI5’s speech of 1 September 2005, the UK Government’s 
post-7/7 toughening stance was articulated. Manningham-Buller warned:  
 
We also value civil liberties and wish to do nothing to damage these hard 
fought rights. But the world has changed and there needs to be a debate on 
whether some erosion of what we all value may be necessary to improve 
the chances of our citizens not being blown apart as they go about their 
daily lives.196  
 
However, the UK shift was only partial. An intensification of effort, along broadly 
similar lines as witnessed earlier, emerged as the dominant theme. Typically, rather 
than more dramatic reform, some incremental intelligence change was introduced. 
At all costs, in a well-balanced manner, a form of appropriate proportionality strived 
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be maintained by the UK, while simultaneously still successfully pursuing the 
overarching honourable goal of ‘public safety’. A slight re-framing of the nature of 
the problem confronted was enacted. This was not least with the greater focus on 
‘radicalisation’, in intelligence and security efforts to try and improve their targeting.  
By the end of 2005, UK CT efforts had increased even further than witnessed 
previously. The boundaries of investigations appeared to have been pushed to 
greater extents. The UK continued to try to better address its overall balance in terms 
of intelligence and law enforcement reach. This was attempted by trying to move 
away from marginal under-reach to more of an ideal optimised reach balance, with 
the investigations edging slightly closer towards the larger-scale and enhanced risk 
averse nature of US CT efforts.197 Yet, reflective of only the marginal shift, the ‘wait 
and watch’ approach of the UK was the dimension that was most expanded. Shortly 
after the 7/7 London bombings, media reports flagged up that while  
 
… co-operation between US and UK intelligence officials over the London 
bombings had been “superb”… the UK had a different view of the war on 
terrorism than the US. “One of the distinguishing characteristics of (the US) 
is that they think they are at war, and we don’t. It is very difficult to 
persuade people in London, even after the bombings that there’s a war on. 
This is a big psychological difference.”198  
 
Ultimately, however, these wider differences were not allowed to obstruct the 
more narrowly focussed CT interactions. The UK-US CT divergences were broadly 
contained. Functional and regular ‘business as usual’ activities continued, 
particularly at the daily operational/tactical level of relations. On 20 July, a series of 
high-level UK-US government and intelligence service meetings (arranged before the 
bombings) were held in London. Senior attendees included the new US Director of 
National Intelligence, John Negroponte, with the UK Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, 
the new Chief of SIS (MI6), Sir John Scarlett, and the DG of MI5, Dame Eliza 
Manningham-Buller. Officials felt that the London attacks had given the meeting 
greater focus.199 A terrorist strike had again provided something specifically tangible 
to lend further impetus to UK-US intelligence liaison on CT. This was despite some 
prevailing differences. 
 
[4.2]: Specific intelligence liaison: 
Specific issues similarly underpinned close bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison. 
Together with the general bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison and the generic UK-US 
CT concerns and differences, there was some more focussed UK-US intelligence 
liaison on CT. This especially dealt with ‘specifics’, often linked to particular 
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investigations. Here, more of the core fundamental issues were addressed. Also here 
the micro/lower operational/tactical and individual (as professional)/personal 
levels gained greater significance. The first of these more specific issues concerned 
the publicising of intelligence. 
 
[4.2.i]: Publicise intelligence or not? 
The publicising of intelligence product frequently causes quandaries. Most 
obviously, ‘sensitive’ sources and methods could be exposed and compromised.200 
The extent to which intelligence should be shared is a topic of considerable debate. 
This concerns whether it is between intelligence agency departments internally, with 
other government agencies, with another liaison service, more widely with the 
public, or multilaterally rather than just bilaterally. The matter under consideration 
often results in a series of finely balanced trade-offs. Ideally this is so that the 
excesses and deficits of outreach, respectively overreach and under-reach, can be 
managed as far as possible.  
After the Bali attacks in 2002, some shortcomings in the handling of CT 
intelligence were exposed.201 The UK CT threat assessment system was judged to be 
flawed following an inquiry by the ISC (see above [4.1.ii]). To improve both the 
national and international co-ordination of CT intelligence, a Joint Terrorism 
Analysis (or Assessment) Centre (JTAC) was established in Thames House (MI5 
headquarters) in June 2003.202 The intention was essentially to facilitate the 
communication of CT intelligence cross-agency, as well as the better integration of 
government agencies specifically focussed on the CT task. To achieve this, JTAC 
included members from UK intelligence agencies, such as MI5, MI6 and GCHQ, as 
well as drawing members from the other UK Government departments, such as 
Transport (TRANSEC). By 2004, it was noted by the ISC that: ‘…because [JTAC] 
allows all counter-terrorism intelligence to be processed centrally, [it] has 
significantly improved the UK intelligence community’s ability to warn of terrorist 
attacks, and this concept is now being copied by several countries…’203 The US had 
invested in a similar model with the setting up of its multi-agency Terrorist Threat 
Integration Center (TTIC) in May 2003. Later, by December 2004, this became re-
branded the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).204 The US had been studying 
and had learnt some useful lessons from the then proposed UK JTAC model when 
thinking about setting up its own TTIC.205 Moreover, from the end of 2005, greater 
‘integration’ and ‘standardisation’ on the domestic front for the US intelligence 
community was the strategy being generally promoted.206 
Prior to JTAC being in operation, the UK’s threat assessment process 
remained firmly under the spotlight in 2002. This was as further terrorist attacks 
were emerging. In the wake of the Kenya attacks of 28 November 2002, an increasing 
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political dispute arose in the UK surrounding the type of warning issued to UK 
nationals abroad concerning Mombasa and terrorism. The UK Foreign Secretary Jack 
Straw was prompted to declare that ‘no information was available to the UK, US or 
Australia which could have prevented the attacks which took place…’207 This was a 
cast of countries that again hinted at the important role played by the UKUSA 
SIGINT arrangement in CT intelligence gathering and pooling.208 Moreover, the 
security/sharing dilemma was continuing to be intensively debated, together with 
how best to achieve an optimum balance.209 
UK intelligence remained reluctant about releasing intelligence. Overall, MI5 
and MI6 continued their traditional wariness about frequently issuing generic 
intelligence warnings in the public realm. These were felt to be too vague and 
general to be of much tangible utility. The UK CT strategy (‘CONTEST’) document of 
2005 carefully spelt out the UK’s position on the publicising of intelligence: ‘Our 
citizens can be confident that we shall warn if a specific threat emerges … But we do 
not intend to provide a running commentary on our assessment of the threat. That 
would help terrorists without helping the public…’210 In the absence of specific 
intelligence, the UK intelligence community was determined not to acquire a 
counterproductive ‘crying wolf’ reputation amongst the public.211 This also offers an 
explanation for why more tangible information, such as the approximate numbers of 
suspects being kept under surveillance – in the UK, about 2,000 as at mid-2007 – has 
been released over time by MI5; a move in order to effectively demonstrate that the 
UK Government is not exaggerating the terrorist threat, and that the threat is 
genuinely substantial, rather than the Government conspiratorially engaging in more 
sinister public scaremongering activities for the purposes of greater draconian 
political and population control.212 
Especially prevalent during the years 2002 to 2004, some sharp differences 
emerged between the UK and US on the issue of threat warnings. Alluding to the at 
times tension-generating modus operandi differences in the UK-US intelligence 
relationship, it was observed that Whitehall had at times criticised their US 
counterparts for issuing warnings too frequently.213 Echoing these earlier debates and 
differences, the threats concerning British Airways (BA) flight 223 (London to 
Washington route) around December 2003, together with the UK and US responses, 
continued to generate some debate. This was apparent between UK and US 
intelligence officials when they were deciding on how best to handle their joint 
warnings and the issues. Apparently, amongst UK officials concerns existed that: 
‘“There is a feeling that the intelligence which is being put out has not been through 
all the filters it should go through”…’ This contributed towards the alleged ‘“frank 
exchanges of views” between London and Washington…’214  
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Over time, such differences re-emerged. Despite general instances of 
increasingly close UK-US co-operation, some publicly aired UK-US tensions within 
the intelligence liaison relationship were evident in parallel during the summer of 
2004. During September 2004, as Sir David Omand attended meetings in 
Washington, it was noted that UK officials were critical of the US (and Pakistan) for 
revealing to the global media sensitive details closely relating to one of their ongoing 
investigations. This concerned material found on a detainee’s computer that had 
been seized following a recent raid in Gujarat by Pakistani authorities in July 2004.215 
A UK official stated: ‘I think the consternation expressed by some British officials 
was warranted… When information is divulged, it does complicate your law 
enforcement.’216  
Subsequently, the media picked up some of the details. This episode also threw 
into sharp relief in the public domain the differences between the UK’s greater ‘wait 
and watch’-dominated CT strategy vis-à-vis the US’ greater ‘see and strike’-
dominated CT strategy. The US dimension of this terrorist plot initially dated from 
2000 - before being resurrected again after the 9/11 attacks, and being planned as 
recently as up to February 2004 - and again the connection between terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was highlighted. Significantly, this plot 
involved a British-born Muslim convert, together with the assistance of two other 
Britons, targeting - reportedly including with a WMD (in the form of a ‘dirty bomb’) 
- prominent global financial institutions in the US. For example, among those listed 
was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) headquarters in Washington, DC and 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Causing consternation, according to the 
interrogations of a key al-Qaeda figure held by the US, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, 
the plotters were operating on behalf of al-Qaeda, tasked by bin Laden himself. A 
plot in the UK was also being planned. Various targets around London, particularly 
major railway stations, such as Paddington, Waterloo and King’s Cross, were 
suggested. Most developed was the idea to blow up three limousines loaded with 
explosives and gas cylinders next to prominent UK buildings.217 
US authorities quickly went public with the plot in July 2004. Potential target 
institutions, in the buildings focussed on, were also briefed on the threat. This tactic 
and the use of sensitive intelligence in the public realm, arguably even as a form of a 
political public relations (PR) exercise in the run-up to the US Presidential Election of 
2004, was very much to the dismay of the UK authorities. They, in the form of MI5, 
were meanwhile using surveillance to monitor the British national, Abu Musa al-
Hindi (one of the many aliases for ‘Dhiren Barot’), who the US officials requested be 
arrested. The UK acquiesced. Al-Hindi/Barot’s subsequent detention and that of 
around 13 others in August 2004 curtailed the UK intelligence gathering activities. 
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The UK authorities were thus prevented from determining whether any others were 
potentially involved, and from acquiring further investigative leads. Using the media 
to express thinly veiled irritation with the tactics adopted by the US in this case, the 
Home Secretary David Blunkett commented soon after Ridge’s announcement: 
‘There are very good reasons why we shouldn’t reveal certain information to the 
public… We do not want to undermine in any way our sources of information, or 
share information which could place investigations in jeopardy.’218  
Later in March 2008, after some successful prosecutions had eventually been 
accomplished during November 2006, US Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey 
offered the following appraisal of the case:  
 
In counter-terrorism, one important case run jointly by the United States 
and the United Kingdom was known by the codename Operation Rhyme. 
In that case, Dhiren Barot, a British national with links to Al Qaeda, and 
seven co-conspirators were convicted of plotting: to detonate car bombs 
and a dirty bomb; engage in other attacks on civilians in the United 
Kingdom; and detonate bombs at financial centers in the United States, 
including the New York Stock Exchange and the World Bank.219 
 
He continued, highlighting a source where US visa concerns (see above [4.1.iv]) once 
more originated vis-à-vis a UK citizen: 
 
Barot traveled freely between our two countries [the UK and US] and 
enrolled in a university in the United States under a student visa. He 
exploited the convenience of our open borders and our friendly relations in 
order to try to kill American and British civilians alike. We were able to 
thwart his plans only through the close cooperation of our law enforcement 
agencies.220  
 
Ultimately, the ‘knocks’ to UK-US intelligence and law enforcement relations 
stemming from the public revelations had been kept in perspective and were 
contained. Overall, the tensions were not so severe as to frustrate overarching 
‘functional’ and ‘evangelical’ relations. Too much was at stake for the disputes to 
have an interrupting effect on the whole of UK-US intelligence liaison on CT. 
However, similar further disagreements soon emerged. These came in the 
wake of the 7/7 London bombings as the investigations progressed during July 2005. 
On this occasion, they were over the handling of bomb scene evidence in the UK-US 
police and law enforcement sector. Sir Ian Blair, the London Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner, publicly expressed his ‘concern’ at the US television broadcast of 
sensitive crime-scene photographs, which had been ‘supplied in confidence to some 
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of our colleague agencies.’221 Later, further UK-US differences concerning intelligence 
liaison at the UK-US police and law enforcement level surfaced. This was after the 
New York Police Department apologised to London as confidential details 
concerning the 7/7 bombers again emerged in the US media.222 However, the fact of 
both the UK and US sharing the sensitive investigation-related material once more 
highlighted the extent to which the UK and US worked closely at this operational 
level. Relations were not overly interrupted by these episodes. From the frank 
expression of UK dismay at the above revelations, some useful lessons were 
propagated. These could be applied in the management of UK-US relations into the 
future. 
Keeping intelligence operations secret was not always intended. Intelligence 
agencies also at times felt obligated to participate in overt politics and in their own 
PR (public relations) activities.223 In a manner non-compromising to intelligence 
gathering efforts once the joint investigations had ended, sometimes the authorities 
welcomed the ‘oxygen of publicity’ and sanctioned the release of further details 
concerning a case. This was done for several reasons. For instance, in order to help 
try and make or bolster a particular case, and to try to prove to public opinion that 
the terrorist threats were not being exaggerated. These officially 
controlled/determined exposés revealed some cases where international intelligence 
co-operation had been regarded as ‘successful’.224 
More remarkably, sanitised UK JIC intelligence assessments were released. 
Setting another precedent after 9/11, some of the intelligence collected and evaluated 
was shared widely with the public during the autumn of 2001. This was done to help 
foster UK domestic and international public opinion in the burgeoning so-called 
‘War on Terror’. The UK Government released a dossier drawing on sanitised 
intelligence. It aimed to prove bin Laden and al-Qaeda’s culpability for the 9/11 
attacks. It bluntly stated: ‘Although US targets are al-Qaida’s priority, it also 
explicitly threatens the United States’ allies, which unquestionably include the 
United Kingdom.’225 That threat also came from certain individuals. 
 
 
[4.2.ii]: ‘Persons of interest’: 
Particular individuals formed another specific issue of liaison interest. Again 
frequently during these interactions, the importance of the micro individual (as 
professional)/personal level in intelligence liaison was suggested. On this issue, the 
UK and US could be useful to one another. The extent of US dependence on and the 
enduring importance to the US of the UK intelligence liaison relationship on a CT 
task was outlined in depth in the 9/11 Commission Report. The value of FBI legal 
attachés for conducting such liaison on criminal matters was again highlighted. 
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Shortly before 9/11, the FBI launched an investigation into Zacarias Moussaoui, who 
was arrested on 16 August 2001 and was supposed to have been the twentieth 
hijacker on 9/11.226 During the course of this investigation, the FBI became aware 
that Moussaoui had lived in London. Through their legal attaché based in London, 
the FBI liaised with their ‘counterparts in the British government, hand-delivering 
the request [for assistance regarding information about Moussaoui] on August 21.  
 
On August 24, the CIA also sent a cable to London and Paris regarding 
“subjects involved in suspicious 747 flight training” that described 
Moussaoui as a possible “suicide hijacker.” On August 28, the CIA sent a 
request for information to a different service of the British government 
[given the content of the communication, presumably the Security Service 
(MI5)]; this communication warned that Moussaoui might be expelled to 
Britain by the end of August. The FBI office in London raised the matter 
with British officials as an aside, after a meeting about a more urgent 
matter on September 3, and sent the British service a written update on 
September 5. The case was not handled by the British as a priority amid a 
large number of other terrorist-related inquiries…  
On September 11, after the attacks, the FBI office in London 
renewed their appeal for information about Moussaoui. In response to the 
US requests, the British government supplied some basic biographical 
information about Moussaoui. The British government informed us that it 
also immediately tasked intelligence collection facilities for information 
about Moussaoui. On September 13, the British government received new, 
sensitive intelligence that Moussaoui had attended an al Qaeda training 
camp in Afghanistan. It passed this intelligence to the United States on the 
same day. Had this information been available in late August 2001, the 
Moussaoui case would almost certainly have received intense, high-level 
attention… Either the British information or the Ressam identification 
would have broken the logjam.227 
 
Other ‘persons of interest’ were soon flagged by intelligence and security services 
during the continued further development of potential investigative leads. After the 
9/11 attacks, in the UK intelligence agencies, outstanding US requests, such as that 
concerning Moussaoui (above), were urgently re-prioritised, tasked and followed up. 
UK-US liaison continued concerning specific people, such as the London-based 
Saudi ‘dissident’ Khalid al-Fawwaz, who were alleged to have links to terrorism. 
Over time, ‘individuals of concern’, such as Moussaoui and UK citizen Richard Reid 
- the failed ‘shoe bomber’ of December 2001 - remained the subject of specific UK-US 
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intelligence and law enforcement liaison as their cases continued.228 In the wake of 
the Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004 and during their subsequent investigations, 
UK authorities probed the UK connections to the bombings. A connection was 
reportedly made between the terrorists who perpetrated the Madrid attacks and the 
already detained terror suspect, Moussaoui.229 Shortly before the November 2004 US 
Presidential election, UK-US intelligence liaison at the operational/tactical level was 
continuing unabated. This was apparent with UK and US law enforcement and 
intelligence personnel jointly analysing the latest videotape supposedly from bin 
Laden.230  
Particular individuals continued to provoke concern. By the spring of 2005, 
the FBI and UK anti-terrorism Special Branch (SO13) were liaising closely over 
another specific ‘person of interest’. US authorities’ suspicions were raised by 
Zayead Christopher Hajaig, a British citizen, who had escaped back to the UK after 
taking flying lessons at the same flight school where two 9/11 hijackers had 
trained.231 After the 7/7 London attacks, close UK-US intelligence liaison was again 
undertaken specifically concerning the suicide bombers who had perpetrated the 
attacks. These interactions took place against the backdrop of the ongoing wider 
post-attack investigations.232 
Allegedly, this type of UK-US intelligence liaison was not always effective. 
According to disclosures made in 2006 in The One Percent Doctrine, by US journalist 
and author Ron Suskind, the believed ‘leader’ of the 7/7 London suicide bombings, 
Mohammed Sidique Khan, had previously been flagged up in 2003. Contradicting 
evidence given by MI5 to the ISC and based on what ‘a senior British security source’ 
dismissed as ‘“untrue and one of the myths that have grown up around Khan”’, 
Suskind claimed:  
 
British intelligence was certainly told about Khan [by the US] in March and 
April 2003. This was a significant set of contacts that Khan had, and ones of 
much less importance were exchanged on a daily basis between the CIA 
and MI5. British authorities were sent a very detailed file. This 
demonstrates a catastrophic breakdown in communication across the 
Atlantic.233  
 
However, from the debates surrounding the UK and US official rebuttals made 
directly in relation to Suskind’s claims regarding Khan, it appears most likely that 
the ‘wrong’ Khan may have been flagged-up (at least on occasions) in his claims. 
This was attributed to there being ‘confusion’ on the behalf of Suskind’s original 
source.234 From other well-placed sources, it does appear most likely that there was a 
mix-up regarding the particular Khan identified in the claims.235 Investigating 
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different individuals with the same name is a challenging issue encountered on a 
day-to-day basis for intelligence officers. This is aside from also being similarly 
challenging for those journalists and researchers following intelligence activities. The 
name ‘Khan’ surfaces many times in relation to several different individuals, as seen 
throughout this study, for instance. Although, it is worth highlighting that several 
unanswered questions still surround precisely how much MI5 exactly knew about 
the perpetrators of the 7/7 London bombings, including Mohammed Sidique Khan. 
Reportedly, some of the information is legally blocked from being disseminated to 
the public by the media, arguably possibly to avoid prejudicing a trial that was later 
being held in April 2008, and also suggesting perhaps a ‘[Defence Advisory] DA-
Notice’ being in force.236 
Whatever can be agreed concerning this particularly controversial case, due to 
limited resources at their disposal, intelligence agencies continued to maintain 
specific targeting on their perceived highest priorities. Those who were not included 
on those lists were essentially allotted a lower priority status and hence appeared to 
more slip under the radar.237 After the 7/7 London bombings, there was the 
allocation of further resources, especially for surveillance purposes.238 This emerged 
as a useful way of helping to contribute towards further mitigating the shortfalls and 
related shortcomings, as well as better addressing the associated (and unavoidable) 
risks, of the approach that had been adopted by the UK authorities. As BBC security 
correspondent Gordon Corera has highlighted: ‘Since January of 2006, [MI5’s] 
casework on counter-terrorism has increased by 80%.’239 Simultaneously 
demonstrating the extent of MI5’s contemporary overstretch, as Corera has argued, 
to a degree these types of pressing management considerations persist:  
 
The scale of activity leads to hard choices. Every week, in co-ordination 
with the police, MI5 has to decide which of its many investigations it will 
prioritise and, every day, it has to make further decisions on how to apply 
its resources - whose phones to tap, who to follow. It takes many officers to 
conduct 24-hours-a-day, seven-days-a-week surveillance so putting 
resources in one area involves diverting them from other investigations.240 
 
Dealing with ‘persons of interest’ abroad was another task involving liaison. 
Over time, the joint UK-US interrogation of about nine UK prisoners (at least by the 
years 2003 to 2004)241 continued at the US Guantánamo Bay prison (‘Camp X-Ray’) in 
Cuba.242 Indeed, US ‘War on Terror’ detainees and the issue of associated abuse 
figured prominently.243 As 2003 progressed, UK-US intelligence relations persisted 
amid the public controversy.244 Domestically in the UK, there were concerns about 
the general treatment of detainees and, more specifically, the detention of UK 
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citizens at that location, including the recently developed ‘Camp Delta’. At least 
early on, in July 2003, Downing Street readily justified the risks of the UK’s 
association, claiming that there was some intelligence value to be reaped: ‘…the 
information flowing from those at Guantanamo Bay is important in terms of the war 
against terrorism and we can’t overlook that.’245  
However, as time progressed, this issue itself could not be ignored. Not least, 
some domestic and international legal obligations made increasing inroads. The 
generally prevailing concerns surrounding the treatment of detainees eventually 
made it into the ISC ‘accountability’ system.246 On 9 March 2004, showing the high 
degree of trust established with the UK through agreements on sensitive intelligence 
and security matters, the US announced that it was transferring five British 
Guantanamo detainees to the UK. Granting another insight into interactions at the 
operational/tactical level, the criteria for permitting this move were declared to be as 
follows:  
 
The decision to transfer or release a detainee is based on many factors, 
including whether the detainee is of further intelligence value to the United 
States or its allies. The decision to transfer these detainees was made after 
extensive discussions between our two governments. The British 
government has agreed to accept the transfer of these detainees and to take 
responsibility to ensure that the detainees do not pose a security threat to 
the United States or our allies.247  
 
Although, again showing that these sorts of interactions are not unconstrained, the 
remaining detainees held at Guantanamo Bay had to wait until sufficient UK security 
measures were in place. This was to be to the mutual satisfaction of both the UK and 
US authorities, before the detainees could be handed over safely. Moving forward on 
this issue dragged. As Blair remarked in his testimony to the UK House of Commons 
Parliamentary Liaison Committee in July 2004:  
 
[H]e hoped the issue would be resolved “reasonably soon… I do not think 
the US is being unreasonable in saying we need to make sure there is 
security in place for these people… There is an issue about these particular 
people in respect of the United States that is not just about their status as 
detainees and we need to be very clear … that we are not putting anyone at 
risk… I am not yet satisfied that we have the necessary [security] 
machinery in place but we are working on that… We all know that we are 
faced with a significant terrorism threat. These people were picked up in 
circumstances where we believe at the very least there are issues that need 
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to be resolved … in respect of those individuals… Certainly from what I 
have seen about those individual cases I would need to be very, very clear 
that there was in place in this country a sufficient infrastructure and 
machinery to be able to protect our own security.”248  
 
Some of the acute moral/ethical dilemmas that UK and US intelligence were 
confronting were highlighted.249 UK and US intelligence were striking some 
increasingly complex balances in their international intelligence liaison. These 
difficult and morally-explosive trade-offs were exposed particularly starkly during 
the controversy in May 2005 over the use of Uzbekistani intelligence. The former UK 
ambassador to Uzbekistan, Craig Murray, revealed that Uzbekistani intelligence 
(allegedly) obtained through dubious methods, such as torture, was then being 
intimately shared between the UK and US as part of the close bilateral UK-US 
intelligence liaison arrangements. Together with some civil liberties, some human 
rights principles would have to be set aside.250 This was as part of the controversial 
trade-off when dealing with unsavoury intelligence partners with distinctly doubtful 
human rights records. These ‘dangerous liaisons’ were courted when the UK and US 
intelligence agencies also wanted access to the potentially valuable intelligence 
product that could be supplied.251 Indeed, on occasions in the past, interrogation 
under duress reportedly had yielded some useful intelligence and investigative leads. 
This was highlighted especially where Alasdair Palmer noted in December 2002:  
 
Most of us are so appalled by the whole idea of torture that we are inclined 
to claim that it does not work. Unfortunately it does - at least sometimes. In 
1995 al-Qaeda planned to hijack 11 airliners flying out of the Philippines, 
with a total of 4,000 people aboard, and to crash them into the Pacific. The 
Philippine intelligence agencies, suspecting a plot, arrested and tortured a 
man they thought was one of the terrorists. They broke most of his ribs, 
burned his genitals with cigarettes and poured water into his mouth until 
he couldn’t breathe. After 67 days, he came up with the information which 
enabled the Filipinos, together with the Americans - who were provided 
with the fruits of the interrogation - to frustrate the plot.252 
 
Risk management considerations while conducting liaison in such contexts, and 
when involving torture-originating intelligence product, again figured prominently 
in this domain of activity. This was not least as other potentially extreme and 
politically-acute situations had to be carefully navigated in parallel by intelligence 
and security personnel in their day-to-day work. These considerations were captured 
by a referential eye to the ‘ticking bomb’ scenario, together with the presence of a 
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vigorous ‘not on our watch’ mentality, as the overarching goal of public safety 
continued to predominate.253 
By November 2005, UK-US intelligence relations were evidently taking place 
amid the public controversy regarding the US’s own CIA ‘extraordinary renditions’ 
and associated use of ‘intensive interrogation’ techniques, such as ‘waterboarding’.254 
Many people both inside and outside of the intelligence world found these methods 
exceedingly repugnant morally. Inevitably, even in private, UK-US intelligence 
liaison relations were not isolated from stressful knock-on ramifications and 
implications concerning the widespread US use of these controversial methods, as 
explicitly endorsed by the Bush administration.255 As the UK ISC later observed 
solemnly in June 2007, when it reported on the renditions issue:  
 
The rendition programme has revealed aspects of the usually close 
UK/U.S. relationship that are surprising and concerning. It has highlighted 
that the UK and U.S. work under very different legal guidelines and ethical 
approaches. The Director General of the Security Service said that the 
Americans are aware of the concerns of the UK Agencies in relation to 
rendition and detainee treatment…256  
 
Indeed, as the ISC soberly continued:  
 
The U.S. rendition programme has required that the Security Service and 
SIS modify their relationship with their American counterparts to ensure 
that, in sharing intelligence, the differing legal frameworks of both 
countries are honoured. … Although the U.S. may take note of UK protests 
and concerns, this does not appear materially to affect its strategy on 
rendition.257  
 
Some of the reconfigurations that had to be undertaken within UK-US intelligence 
liaison relations were emphasised. These were principally implemented as a 
consequence of the presence - and indeed enhanced use (or ‘normalisation’) in the 
‘War on Terror’ context - of the US ‘extraordinary renditions’ programme and use of 
‘intensive interrogation’ methods. Distinct defining operational parameters for UK-
US intelligence liaison relations were again clearly demonstrated. From an 
international intelligence liaison risk management perspective, the UK-US 
intelligence liaison was disappointingly becoming somewhat increasingly 
dangerous. With the enhanced attention focussed on legal liabilities, as well as their 
associated greater enforcement through being better adhered to in operations, in 
some circumstances, actionable operational/tactical intelligence (as defined above 
[2.0]) now could not be so directly or explicitly, or indeed legally permissibly, shared 
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by the UK (or other European countries) with the US.258 Intelligence interactions 
involving intensive interrogation techniques and renditions, quickly acquired similar 
‘blocks’ on the scope of their operation as those interactions involved in 
investigations that might ultimately lead to the US legal sentence of capital 
punishment being enacted (see below).259 
Significantly, this political controversy was not confined to impacting solely 
on direct UK-US intelligence liaison relations. By late 2005 and into early 2006, it also 
figured at the plurilateral level between the US and the EU, with the European 
Parliament inquiry, and the Council of Europe (CoE) inquiry. CoE Secretary General 
Terry Davis, who presented the Council’s report, importantly claimed ‘safeguards 
were needed to stop abuse… a number of countries had systems for overseeing their 
own national security services - such as the UK. But “hardly any country in Europe 
has any legal provisions to ensure an effective oversight over the activities of foreign 
agencies on their territory.”…’260  
The CoE’s advisory body on constitutional affairs, the ‘Venice Commission’ 
(The European Commission for Democracy through Law) also probed the issue.261 
Notably, in March 2006, the Venice Commission report quickly unveiled the further 
obstacles and operational parameters that would need to be navigated in UK-US 
intelligence interactions. Together with making many valid points, the most 
awkward implications for UK-US intelligence liaison relations flowed from the 
Venice Commission observing within its conclusions that: 
 
Council of Europe member States are under an international legal 
obligation to secure that everyone within their jurisdiction … enjoy 
internationally agreed fundamental rights, including and notably that they 
are not unlawfully deprived of their personal freedom and are not 
subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment, including in 
breach of the prohibition to extradite or deport where there exists a risk of 
torture or ill-treatment. This obligation may also be violated by acquiescence or 
connivance in the conduct of foreign agents. There exists in particular a positive 
duty to investigate into substantiated claims of breaches of fundamental rights by 
foreign agents, particularly in case of allegations of torture or unacknowledged 
detention.262 
 
In the overall mix of controversy - which persisted into 2008 with revelations 
of detainees allegedly being held on some 17 US ‘prison ships’ - parliamentary 
inquiries in other European countries, such as Germany and Italy, were also closely 
involved.263 In the throes of the wake of the Arar case and its subsequent 
commission, Canada, too, was not exempt from these types of probes.264 The disputes 
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concerned particularly those renditions to countries where interrogation (allegedly) 
takes place with torture.265 Together with the UK, the other European countries and 
their interactions with the US on this issue were subject to close scrutiny. This was 
not least due to several prevailing concerns surrounding the violating of their 
domestic and international legal obligations. As already witnessed, these 
requirements were largely incurred as a consequence of being signatories to the 
ECHR, as well as due to the presence of other prevailing human rights legislation, 
such as for the UK, its Human Rights Act of 1998, as well as having to adhere to the 
obligations as laid down by the various UN agreements on human rights, such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.266  
With these in mind, from September 2005, the media probed the UK’s alleged 
involvement in the US process.267 Although later in December 2005, this was officially 
rebutted by the UK Government with explicit assurances claiming ‘no record’ of any 
involvement.268 However, some MPs were not convinced by those assurances, and 
still wanted to question UK intelligence and security service officers concerning the 
renditions. In these circumstances, the ISC decided to investigate the process.269 
Later, in early 2008, an examination of US records demonstrated that two CIA 
renditions flights had in fact landed on British territory in 2002. This was at the base 
on Diego Garcia. Chastened, the UK Government apologised.270 More 
characteristically, an official UK Government response to the (alleged) role 
performed by UK Special Forces in the US-led renditions process has remained 
conspicuously absent.271 This was not least concerning the claims of Ben Griffin, 
reportedly ‘a former SAS soldier who quit the Army in protest at the “illegal” tactics 
and policies of coalition forces, [who] said the [UK] Government knew what was 
happening… [He] said the SAS was part of a joint US/UK unit which captured 
suspected terrorist[s] who were then spirited away for interrogation.’272 
The fallout spread further. By October 2005, worries were already prevalent 
that wider ‘counterterrorism co-operation is endangered by US renditions.’273 
Simultaneously, in December 2005, the UK Law Lords raised the ‘burden of proof’ 
required for terrorism cases. They declared that evidence against terror suspects 
obtained by torture was inadmissible in the UK courts. Again, the high legal 
threshold set by UK courts, and which had caused some earlier US chagrin (see 
above [4.1.iv]), was demonstrated.274 The controversy also had some impact 
politically on the US, with a ‘torture ban law’ being introduced.275 But in the US this 
quickly became overshadowed later in December 2005, by the US ‘spying on its own 
citizens’ domestic controversy. The persistently disliked whiff of Americans spying 
on Americans lingered, extending into 2006.276 Behind-the-scenes, away from public 
scrutiny, UK-US intelligence liaison on CT continued. However, as a consequence of 
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the impact of the above controversial methods and practices pursued by the US, it 
was plainly subject to some recalibration.277 
 
[4.2.iii]: Counter-cyber-terrorism: 
The Internet similarly figured in specific bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison.278 At the 
dawn of the new millennium, cyber-terrorism concerns were prevalent. ‘Info-war’ 
was emerging as a new paradigm.279 In both the US and UK there were worries that 
‘cyber-terrorists’ would exploit any ‘millennium bug’ or ‘Year 2000’ (Y2K) issues and 
launch attacks on major computer systems.280 This was something that the 
intelligence agencies on both sides of the Atlantic were keen to watch and prevent. 
The Chairman of the US National Commission on Terrorism, Paul Bremer, later in 
June 2000 revealed the importance of intelligence liaison, remarking that: ‘It turned 
out that there really were plans for some major attacks during the Millennium, and 
thanks to some excellent liaison work… we were able to avoid them.’281  
Persisting joint UK-US concerns maintained the momentum. These 
surrounded wider ‘cyber-crime’, and at times again especially focussed on specific 
cases and individuals, ensuring that over time there was continuing close UK-US 
intelligence liaison on the issue.282 Additionally, suggesting close ties with the wider 
exclusive multilateral UKUSA SIGINT arrangement, it was revealed that:  
 
Within [the US National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC), FBI], the 
NIPC has full-time representatives… [including those] from three foreign 
partners: the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia. The NIPC has 
established information sharing connectivity with a number of foreign 
cyber watch centers, including in the UK…  
 
The continued important role of FBI legal attachés on this issue was asserted with: 
‘And, we continue to take advantage of the FBI’s global presence through its Legal 
Attaché offices in 44 nations…’283 The ‘legats’ were also useful for aiding with UK-
US intelligence liaison on the financial front of counter-terrorism efforts.284 
 
[4.2.iv]: ‘Asset freezing’ and financial counter-terrorism: 
Following money trails emerged significantly. After the 9/11 attacks, bilateral UK-
US intelligence liaison concerning financial counter-terrorism efforts was enhanced. 
Involving financial ‘asset freezing’, these formed the first strikes the UK-US 
intelligence services could jointly take the lead in mobilising, in the ensuing so-called 
‘War on Terror’. These began with the bank details of suspect ‘charities’ beginning to 
be probed.285 As more multilateral moves slowly began to burgeon, the UK-US-led 
freezing of ‘terrorist’ assets continued over time with the circulation of lists drawn 
up as ‘a result of intelligence sharing and co-ordination between the UK and US. We 
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will continue to work with our allies, and take a leading role internationally to cut off 
the ready supply of finance which is the lifeblood of modern terrorism…’, declared 
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown.286 He later offered the US Treasury 
Secretary, Paul O’Neill, the services of the UK’s National Criminal Intelligence 
Service (NCIS) as a ‘force multiplier’287, in order to ‘co-ordinate intelligence’ relating 
to terrorist finances.288  
How successful these ‘asset freezing’ efforts were remains questionable. At 
least in the short-term, it appears that they were not outstanding, having only a 
limited impact. For example, ‘conventional’ Western banking tools and controls were 
variously undermined by the presence of popular alternative, more ‘informal’, 
banking methods/systems - especially used in the Middle East - known as hawala.289 
By April 2002, according to The Financial Times, the UK and US ‘admitted they had 
tracked down only a fraction of funds used to finance alleged terrorists.’290 Later, by 
2004, a British Bankers’ Association conference was reportedly informed that 
although ‘the number of terrorist-related suspicious bank transaction reports in the 
UK has fallen since 2001 … the overall number of suspicious reports is rising…’291 
Some diversification in the methods of terrorist financing was suggested. This was 
along with a greater appreciation that vast sums of money were not necessarily 
essential when executing jihadist terrorist attacks - as the 7/7 London bombings had 
demonstrated.292 
Yet, overall, the tool of financial ‘asset freezing’ was still useful. As part of the 
UK counter-terrorism response to the Bali bombings, and in the wake of similar US 
moves, the Chancellor ordered the freezing of assets associated with Jemaah 
Islamiyah, the radical Islamic group believed to be responsible for the bombings.293 As 
the group’s al-Qaeda connections tried to be ascertained, the announcement came 
that more terrorist groups were being banned under the UK Terrorism Act of 2000.294  
Finance intelligence underwent substantial evolution between 2003 and 2005. 
Given the multiple difficulties encountered, intelligence and security authorities 
gradually adopted some more sophisticated strategies and tactics. Watching rather 
than snatching tactics again took the lead. Instead of instantly freezing the assets, it 
was reported that,  
 
Special Branch, regional police forces and the intelligence agencies have 
learnt over the past 16 months that terrorist money, once identified, is often 
better put under surveillance than seized. “Watching those funds come and 
go has been a revelation and far more useful in developing new leads than 
just steaming in with confiscations and arrests”, [said] a Home Office 
source … “Better for us to know what terrorists are doing than vice 
versa...” 
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The ‘asset freezing’ tactics adopted after 9/11 were recognised to be somewhat 
ineffective. The Home Office source continued: ‘I think everyone now concedes that 
was a bit of a knee-jerk reaction… We were all flailing about to reassure the public 
that we were on top of things, but freezing money didn’t always get us very far.’295 
Steep learning curves for the authorities again had to be mastered. 
By mid-2005, the US officially evaluated that there had been some partial 
success: ‘The US government has made significant progress in bolstering the political 
will and ability of governments in the Middle East and South Asia to combat 
terrorism and the financing of terrorists, but more needs to be done…’ Although, 
‘…burden sharing with our key coalition partners is an emerging success story.’296 
Further actions against terrorist financing were demanded after the July London 
bombings.297 These movements would build on the secret programmes that had 
already been underway for some time since the 9/11 attacks, including the 
monitoring of international bank and money transactions.298 By early 2006, these 
efforts, including those against hawala, were judged to be ‘very successful’.299 
However, into 2007, some associated shortcomings remained.300 Overall, results 
continued to be mixed in terms of their effectiveness.301 
Over time, some broader UK and US attempts to tackle terrorist funds were 
witnessed. These concerned wider multilateral efforts, including the setting up of a 
G7 anti-money laundering task force in October-November 2001.302 This specific 
multilateral effort co-existed as part of several other general multilateral CT 
initiatives. Similarly to UK-US intelligence liaison on CT elsewhere, trends here were 
also on a ‘continuum with expansion’.303 
 
 
[5.0]: Overall conclusions - Evaluating UK-US intelligence liaison on CT 
 
Terrorism featured prominently in the early years of the twenty-first century. At the 
end of 2005, the results of the US-led so-called ‘War on Terror’ were mixed. As it 
morphed into the ‘Long War’304 during early 2006, at best there could be deduced 
some partial counter-terrorism (CT) success.305 Arguably this success was 
particularly seen in the disruption wrought at the lower and narrower 
operational/tactical and individual/personal levels of terrorism. Terrorist ‘al-Qaeda’ 
bases in Afghanistan had been destroyed and numerous ‘persons of interest’ had 
either been killed or detained across the world.306 Yet, by 2007, and continuing into 
2008, how long-lasting, and indeed sustained, this ‘success’ would be, appeared to be 
considerably more debatable.307 
 At worst, the counter-terrorism strategies were not being sufficiently 
effective.308 Their long-term sustainability, both in terms of their modi operandi 
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deployed and the resulting modus vivendi, was at best questionable. This was 
because, in implementing the ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’, narrower counter-
terrorism activities, rather than wider anti-terrorism efforts, were being promoted. 
The considerations concerning how, rather than why, there was terrorism were being 
better addressed.309 According to the annual US State Department Patterns of Global 
Terrorism report, an increase in terrorism was recorded during 2005.310 Al-Qaeda as a 
command-and-control organisation had received a battering, but not a killer blow.311  
 By 2006, the security situation in Afghanistan was still volatile. There were 
continued Taliban uprisings and there was the further expanded presence of the 
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).312 Moreover, vis-à-vis the 
macro/higher, broader ideological/theoretical and strategy/policy levels – arguably 
increasingly the most important levels in the jihadist terrorism being faced by the end 
of 2005 - success was lacking. Indeed, at this juncture a convincing case could be 
made that on the ‘ideas front’ aspects of the counter-terrorism strategies – that is, 
crudely the winning of ‘hearts and minds’ – the approaches currently being adopted 
were even being counter-productive.313  
 Essentially, not enough ‘counter-jihadism’ was taking place.314 The associated 
circumventing of international law, and the undermining of the moral high ground 
with highly visible so-called ‘War on Terror’ symbols, notably Guantánamo Bay, 
highlighted the full shortcomings.315 These could be, and were, effectively exploited 
by opponents, further fuelling widespread vitriol against the West and its allies.316 
Equally, UK and US intelligence and security operations at home and abroad were 
hampered by such moves. In 2003, the US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
had declared: ‘We will win the war of ideas.’317 However, by 2006 this was not being 
achieved as effectively as it potentially could be. ‘Soft’ power was still not being 
sufficiently projected.318 Indeed, through being overly ‘kinetic’319 in its efforts, the US 
was even being counter-productive. Strains were also caused with close allies on this 
plane of activity: 
 
As Sir Richard Dearlove [former ‘Chief’ of the UK SIS/MI6]… put it, by the 
end of the Cold War there was no doubt about which side stood on the 
moral high ground. “Potential recruits would come to us because they 
believed in the cause,” he said. “This made our work much easier.” 
Dearlove and countless others argued that the United States had gravely 
weakened its position by seeming to ignore its long-standing constitutional 
principles, in internal checks-and-balances and in its practices around the 
world. “America's cause is doomed unless it regains the moral high 
ground,” Dearlove said.320 
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Therefore, implementing the ‘counter-terrorism paradigm’ has had chequered 
results. This raises some interesting conclusions. Especially for the US, rather than 
counter-terrorism (‘rollback’) featuring as a strategy, this dimension should be 
somewhat more scaled back and feature more as tactics. In turn, this dimension 
should then be subsumed within, and as part of, a broader anti-terrorism strategy, 
which involves more ‘containment’. Within its overall anti-terrorism strategy, the 
UK, meanwhile, arguably needs to marginally extend its counter-terrorism 
dimension.321 
 
Prioritisation problems can be highlighted. While funding and resources for 
intelligence, law enforcement and security services in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ 
context undoubtedly have substantially increased, as US intelligence scholar Stan 
Taylor has observed, ‘an increasing percentage of intelligence spending is being 
targeted against terrorism.’ This is fuelling concern that ‘it is leaving other traditional 
intelligence targets (non-proliferation, transnational drugs and crime, and even 
WMD, for example [including counter-intelligence (CI) efforts]) under-funded and 
ripe for surprise.’322 Open sources (in the form of OSINT) needed to be further 
exploited, including through the greater ‘globalisation of intelligence’. This is 
alongside realising the fuller potential of an all-source intelligence approach.323 A 
case for a coherent and comprehensive UK national security strategy was also 
beginning to be put forward.324 Critically, these types of efforts continue to need to be 
extended further. 
 By 2006, there was still much to do.325 In January 2006, Henry A. Crumpton, US 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, summarised the currently perceived situation in 
the following way: 
 
Non-state actors like Al Qaeda have … developed asymmetric approaches 
that allow them to side-step conventional military power. They embrace 
terror as a tactic, but on such a level as to provide them strategic impact. 
Toward that end, they seek to acquire capabilities that can pose 
catastrophic threats, such as WMD, disruptive technologies, or a 
combination of these measures… we will increasingly face enemy forces in 
small teams or even individuals … these are “micro-targets with macro-
impact” operating in the global exchange of people, data, and ideas … all 
evolve at the pace of globalization itself. We are facing the future of war 
today. The ongoing debate, sometimes disagreement, among allies reflects 
this new reality…326  
 
Offering some further detail of the US perspective, he continued:  
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We see the enemy as a “threat complex” comprising three elements: 
leaders, safe havens and underlying conditions… We seek to act globally, 
over an extended time-frame, to isolate the threat, defeat the isolated threat, 
and prevent its re-emergence… The first implication [for the future] is the 
need for us to build trusted networks of allies and partners - state, non-
state, and multilateral - who support the rule of law and oppose the use of 
terrorism to resolve grievances.327  
 
To progress the ‘Long War’ counter-terrorism efforts further and to realise greater 
success in the future, the psychological, ideological/theoretical and strategy/policy 
levels, on many different planes of activity, needed to be more comprehensively and 
carefully addressed.328 This also needed to be done in a sustained – and, into the 
future, sustainable – manner, fully sensitive to and more closely connected to all the 
highly complex details encountered. Such an approach particularly includes better 
observing those aspects experienced and encountered at the micro/lower 
operational/tactical and individual (as professional)/personal levels, again in many 
different domains of activity. Enhanced contextualisation efforts, both in terms of 
their comprehensiveness and coherence, are increasingly required. This is together 
with the increased uptake of their results, especially by policy/decision-makers, 
politicians and their publics alike, in an educative manner that ideally produces 
‘intelligent customers’. Also emphasising the importance of the contextualisation 
task, Crumpton maintained: 
 
…operations … need to be partner-led wherever possible - initiatives need 
to be developed in close conjunction with local partners, to meet their 
needs and address the real conditions on the ground, rather than address 
conditions only as they are perceived to be in Washington, London, or 
Paris… A final implication is the need for inter-agency operations… 
[which] goes way beyond mere coordination or cooperation. It demands 
that we plan, conduct and structure operations - from the very outset - as 
part of an intimately connected whole-of-government approach.329  
 
 In terms of intelligence and security outreach, some under-reach was evident. 
The beginnings of some more effective official recognition of this need to step-up and 
engage more productively in the so-called ‘ideas war’, as part of the wider CT efforts, 
were being witnessed. For example, at least in the military realm, the US Pentagon 
doctrine document, ‘Information Operations,’ Joint Publication 3-13 of 13 February 
2006 examined the issue.330 Meanwhile, in the UK, slightly later in March 2007, the 
establishment of the so-called ‘Research, Information and Communications Unit’ 
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(RICU), was announced, as part of wider Home Office changes to attempt to deal 
better with the tackling of terrorism.331 RICU is supposedly intended to handle the 
tasks required in the realm of ideas.332 As Home Secretary Jacqui Smith revealed in a 
House of Commons debate in early July 2007, outlining RICU’s purpose: ‘We will 
push forward on the need to counter the destructive ideology…’333 However, how 
largely it figures as part of the UK’s overall strategy is rather more of a moot point. 
Not least, these concerns emerge when we are aware of the reportedly small size of 
the unit, consisting of around just 30 people.334 A comprehensive humanistic Western 
values system, based on liberal-democratic values, now required promoting. This 
was as well as consistent adherence to those values by the UK, the US, and their 
other allies, in a non-hypocritical manner. This would be in order to potentially 
counter the jihadist values more effectively, and intended to fill any ideological 
vacuums before these became further hijacked by the alternative jihadist values. 
 
[5.1]: Delivering tangible results through UK-US intelligence collaboration? 
Frequently with the highly secret intelligence liaison phenomenon, ‘… we cannot 
know what invisible successes have been achieved…’335 Equally, we cannot discern 
what shortcomings have emerged.336 However, as is demonstrated throughout this 
case study, a few specific publicised episodes can be confidently explored and 
evaluated, yielding some interesting conclusions.  
 
[5.1.i]: The dynamics of UK-US counter-terrorism relationships:  
The UK-US intelligence liaison on CT is dynamic. It is multilayered and multifaceted, 
consisting not of one relationship, but many overlapping ones. As frequently 
witnessed over time in UK-US relations generally, the ends are broadly agreed upon; 
although the means and respective UK-US approaches or styles of reaching those 
ends can diverge, at times considerably, generating some tensions. These tensions, 
however, even when intense, tend to be kept contained in perspective and to be 
localised to their sector/level. Thus they do not disrupt more widely.337 As Stevenson 
argues: ‘Transatlantic strategic policy differences and a few episodes of counter-
terrorism dyspepsia belie overall day-to-day operational harmony, for which there 
are strong incentives…’338 The importance of the micro/low levels in the intelligence 
world is suggested, where personal relationships, routine (including daily work 
patterns and practices) and specifics feature significantly.  
Further trends are apparent. The UK-US divergences that do emerge over 
time repeatedly appear to tend to revolve around the same or similar contentious 
issues. These are often also dealt with, including being minimised, in a 
corresponding manner to the previous episodes. Frequently this is done on the basis 
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of lessons learnt from that previous experience. Here, having a long-term history of 
operating together can have particular ‘added value’. At other times, the different 
UK-US approaches to CT can equally complement (in their vis-à-vis mode) alongside 
those that compete or clash (in their versus mode). 
Overall, ‘functionalism’ and ‘evangelicalism’ are predominant. They appear 
to trump ‘terminalism’ in each of the eight levels of UK-US intelligence liaison on CT. 
The detectable fleeting instances of ‘terminalism’ were confined to particular 
episodes or issue areas - such as the UK sentiments concerning the counter-
productive ceding of the moral high ground by the US, and the US worries that the 
UK was failing to clamp down adequately on their domestic terrorists. Again, these 
issues have tended to be focussed on specifics, allowing at least some scope for them 
to be negotiated in a problem-solving manner. They do not appear to have persisted 
long enough, and/or to sufficiently deep or wide extents, across enough of the levels, 
without some form of recalibration being effected. 
‘Functionalism’ appears to be the dominant position. This perhaps comes as 
an unsurprising conclusion, as UK-US intelligence liaison on CT is focussed precisely 
on the ‘functional’ CT issue. Ultimately, the end stakes for both parties are too high 
to be forfeited to any detrimentally counter-productive instances of overall 
‘terminalism’ linked to particular events or episodes. Furthermore, any 
‘evangelicalism’ articulated arguably tends to become somewhat more muted at the 
juncture of production. This is when agreements actually have to be put into 
practice, and promises have to be delivered. Issues concerning practicalities, such as 
the control of intelligence, then have a greater impact. 
Together, these observed trends help to account for why UK-US intelligence 
relations have endured as effectively as they have done for over 60 years. Overall, 
the ‘functional issues’ have essentially provided something tangible around which 
the UK and US can collectively orbit. 
 
[5.1.ii]: Presenting a generic overview:  
Some general trends can be depicted. Usually, the greatest and most easily 
negotiated CT agreement between the UK and the US is at the broadest and 
highest/macro level. This concerns the ends - for example, terrorism and political 
violence being unacceptable actions requiring pre-emption and prevention, in order 
to best fulfil the goal of ‘public safety’. Greater UK-US counter-terrorism differences 
tend to emerge at the increasingly micro/narrower, yet closely interlinked, levels of 
analysis. Cascades of complexities increasingly enter as these depths are reached. 
Again, it is here that the specifics and intangibles matter more in the UK-US 
interactions, particularly when concerning the means and styles of achieving the 
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desired ends. The endurance of continuing routine interactions also should not be 
undervalued or overlooked. Neither should the possibility for more informal and 
individual processes - such as (albeit frequently unrecorded) face-to-face interactions 
– namely those beyond and outside of mere formal constraints, be discounted. Here, 
the cultural dimension of relations can perform an important role. 
 
[5.1.iii]: Developments before and after 9/11: 
Some themes have endured. Developments before and after 9/11 do appear to have 
been on a ‘continuum with expansion’, also including ‘muddling through’ 
characteristics.339 Before 9/11, some initiatives were evidently already in place and 
evolving, such as the UK-US MLAT of 1994.340 These developments were extended 
and given greater impetus by the 9/11 attacks, the 7/7 bombings and other 
subsequent attacks. Collectively, the attacks acted as catalysts, generating some 
overall exponential growth in international intelligence liaison. The growth was most 
remarkable at the bilateral level, with some increases also taking place at the 
multilateral level - albeit more tentatively and gradually. This was noticeable with 
some intelligence sharing and co-operation limitations/obstacles remaining in place, 
as was particularly evident during the most sensitive investigations - for example, 
involving HUMINT - and especially acutely so concerning the interactions at the 
less-exclusive multilateral level. 
SIGINT liaison also featured centrally. During the whole period 2000 to the 
end of 2005, the UKUSA SIGINT arrangement evidently continued to remain 
important to UK-US intelligence liaison on CT and law enforcement issues.341 
However, it was most effective when not too widely targeted in an unfocussed 
manner. This better enabled the more proportionate applying of the ‘rapier’ rather 
than the ‘bludgeon’.342 
 
[5.1.iv]: Are moves being made towards the greater ‘globalisation’ of intelligence?  
Yes. Despite the presence of some rhetoric concerning the greater international 
sharing of CT intelligence in international affairs post-9/11, it is not all over-hyped. 
Some actual and greater ‘globalisation’ of CT intelligence is perceptible. Notably this 
is most acutely seen through developments including the increasingly integrated, 
both nationally and internationally, terrorism threat assessment/analysis centres.343  
Also, there is considerable evidence of Western, UK-US-led, top-down, and 
long-term ‘international standardisation’ and ‘homogenisation’ moves being 
undertaken, particularly focussed on the issue of CT. This seems to be being done 
through the mechanism of the close UK-US intelligence liaison relationship, as well 
as through international intelligence liaison with other countries - for example, 
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Indonesia - in both the law enforcement and intelligence agencies’ sectors, through 
the processes of intelligence and security sector reform (SSR).344 In these newer, over-
lapping and more ‘globalised’ intelligence arrangements, episodes of counter-
productive ‘groupthink’, and other intelligence reach excesses and deficits, will have 
to be carefully avoided. Some ‘shared perceptions’ are healthy and acceptable; over-
shared, unchallenged perceptions, forfeiting considerably divergent micro/lower 
level differences, are not.345 This is another fine balance, especially in terms of 
outreach, which has to be struck. Moreover, all the different trade-offs involved need 
to be carefully and judiciously weighed. 
 
[5.1.v]: The results are fluid: 
Some uncertainties remain. The overall outcomes and effects of UK-US intelligence 
liaison on CT can be regarded as having a complex and mixed record. The wider 
ambiguous characteristic of international intelligence liaison is discernable. In part, 
the UK-US intelligence liaison is delivering tangible results (effects and outcomes) 
through successful collaboration. By the end of 2005, it appears that there were some 
successes and some shortcomings. Where to place the weight of the overall balance is 
more of a moot point. It will continue to be considerably debated. This is not least 
because of the presence of the intangibles, and due to the fact that the multiple CT 
efforts are constantly ongoing in a dynamic manner.  
Some progress has been made. As a result of joint UK-US CT efforts, together 
with those of other countries, the formal and physical terrorist infrastructures have 
been substantially shattered. Although to what extent they remain intact in more of a 
devolved and dispersed form, or only fractured in the short - rather than long and 
enduring – term, is more questionable. This is especially as by 2007-08 they appeared 
to be re-emerging, such as being located near the Afghan border in Pakistan. 
However, the nature of the terrorist threat as it was confronted during September 
2001 has indeed changed. This is in part thanks to those earlier CT efforts – as 
appears to be particularly the case in relation to the micro/low levels of the jihadist 
terrorism confronted.  
Yet, several persisting intangibles and shortcomings do standout. It is 
arguably at the macro/higher levels of ‘al-Qaeda-ism’ and global jihadism that the 
counter-terrorism results are less tangible; and, so far, there seems to have been 
considerably less success. The increasingly amorphous, extremist/radical 
promulgated and propagated, jihadist terrorism-inspiring ideologies (‘al-Qaeda-ism’) 
and other informal aspects - for example, as effectively delivered socially over the 
Internet - still remain to be adequately addressed in a defusing and non-
counterproductive manner. This is despite more recent governmental initiatives such 
as RICU. As Rumsfeld himself remarked on 27 March 2006:  
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If I were rating, I would say we probably deserve a D or a D+ as a country 
as how well we’re doing in the battle of ideas that’s taking place… I’m not 
going to suggest that it’s easy, but we have not found the formula as a 
country.346  
 
It is challenging to determine whether the re-branding of the so-called ‘War on 
Terror’ as laid out in the February 2006 US Quadrennial Review strategy – now termed 
the ‘Long War’ - and the more recent National Strategy of the United States (of March 
2006) - reaffirming pre-emptive action advocated in the earlier 2002 US National 
Strategy document and applied in relation to Iraq in 2003 - will be effective in this 
area.347 Early impressions into 2008 are perhaps not the most inspiring. This is as the 
UK and US in particular remain engaged by various intractable insurgencies in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. 
 
[5.1.vi]: The CT future is uncertain, but bleak if adjustments are not implemented:  
Into the future, considerably more positive moves can be implemented. Deducible is 
that co-operation on CT intelligence is likely to be at least as equally dynamic as 
already observed. This is the case as complications proliferate exponentially - for 
example, with ‘subjective’ interpretations rather than more ‘objective’ determinants 
increasingly featuring; and as the arguably ‘post-modern’348 breaking-down of 
traditional categories used to distinguish and evaluate types of terrorism – for 
example, ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ - continue apace in the era of globalisation 
writ large being experienced in international affairs.349  
Undoubtedly, the moral high ground needs to be better upheld. Whatever 
results over the long term, continuing poor adherence to human rights and civil 
liberties, disregard for international laws and the Geneva Conventions, sidelining 
international institutions (such as the UN and NATO), the use of the CIA secret 
prisons and the ‘extraordinary renditions’ process outside of international law,350 and 
related movements, and what have become essentially so-called ‘War on Terror’ 
‘symbols’ - such as the phrase ‘War on Terror’ itself and the existence of Guantánamo 
Bay - as seen especially in the US counter-terrorism approach, are far from helpful.351 
The ‘fallout’ from the Iraq war has also undeniably contributed to complicating the 
issue of global CT efforts.352 As some more cracks are appearing in the international 
consensus in early 2008, Afghanistan itself, too, continues to be far from being 
beneficially ‘solved’ in any sustainable security manner.353 
Ultimately, ‘finding and killing’ terrorists was not enough.354 To use an 
analogy, just amputating was not curing or preventing the disease. Taken together, 
the observed shortcomings in UK and US CT efforts serve only to alienate people 
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further. This includes estranging those critically needed supporters out in 
communities, located both at home and more widely within other countries’ 
populations across the world. As the UK Government itself has noted: ‘The 
Government’s strategy for countering terrorism depends upon everyone making a 
contribution to its success.’355 ‘Hearts and minds’ are not being sufficiently engaged. 
Crucially, these very people need to be better engaged in order to assist the law 
enforcement and intelligence and security agencies’ local, extending through to 
global, CT operations.356 Greater (wider and deeper) stakeholder ‘ownership’ needs 
to be engendered. 
Forfeiting of the ‘moral high ground’ is counter-productive. The achieving of 
the longer-term ‘end’ objectives is detrimentally undermined. This is both in terms of 
‘soft’ and ‘hard’ power and security, and whether those end objectives are deemed 
‘realistic’ or ‘idealistic’. In the shorter-term, operations are simultaneously not helped 
by such actions, not least where wider engagement is critically needed by, and 
indeed even beyond, intelligence and security agencies. Much required tolerance is 
also stifled. By mid-2006, the US appeared to be officially at least beginning to 
recognise some of these shortcomings.357 The passage of further time is now required 
to see whether new measures subsequently introduced will be effective overall. That 
time is also needed to discover whether they will actually contribute in a productive 
manner towards wider CT, and related counter-insurgency (COIN), efforts into the 
future.  
Finally, as the new Director of Chatham House observed in early 2007: 
‘Cooperation between our intelligence services and our surveillance agencies is as 
valuable as ever today, at a time when international terrorists are targeting both UK 
and US citizens on a persistent basis.’358 But, as Charles Secrett, Director of Friends of 
the Earth, has rightly stressed, that vital co-operation should not be in isolation. Nor 
should it be confined to solely the intelligence and security sector, again without 
some wider public (or stakeholder) engagement. As Secrett astutely observed in a 
UK Cabinet Office briefing in late 2001:  
 
… engagement in Anglo-Saxon culture (political and social) like Britain’s is 
too often of the oppositional kind … and … eventually synthesis emerges. 
We rely a great deal on the analysis of experts, and a top-down approach to 
make up our public minds: it is much more a command-and-control 
political model than in other cultures. It is very different, for example, from 
a Scandic or Dutch approach, where parties from government, the private 
sector and societal groups engage around full discussions and 
consideration of alternatives in the round, and almost as equals in terms of 
input.359  
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Where does this leave us? In an era where much of the desired command-and-
control appears to be lacking, greater engagement on these latter more consensual 
bases now needs to be better facilitated. This is in both individual and joint UK and 
US intelligence and security counter-terrorism enterprises. In a transformative 
manner, this is in order to realise longer-term enduring intelligence and security 
sustainability, through some better burden sharing, emancipation, and to best 
maximise these types of arrangements’ potential for success into the future.360 
Simultaneously, in CT risk management efforts, by adopting such an approach, the 
UK and US can move more away from their current condition of deploying costly 
‘fire-fighting’ tactics, to increasingly one of effective ‘risk pre-emption’. Informative 
lessons stemming from the experiences of other close CT partners, such as Canada, 
should also be carefully heeded.361 Otherwise, the commonly shared wider driving 
goal of ‘public safety’ will remain increasingly elusive for us all. 
 
• • • 
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to the Challenge (London: Routledge, 2007). 
108 J. Borger, ‘White House “exaggerating Iraqi threat”’, The Guardian (09 October 2002). 
109 See, for example, P. Wintour, ‘Bali bombing: Blair denies that Iraq focus is misguided: Britain No 
10 says no contradiction between combating Saddam and al-Qaida’, The Guardian (15 October 2002). 
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344 For some further detail on these developments, see, for instance, Svendsen, ‘The globalization of 
intelligence since 9/11: frameworks and operational parameters’, pp.129-144. These trends are also 
occurring within other international security relationships on other issue areas, such as in the domain of 
security sector reform (SSR) - see, for example, A. Webb-Vidal, ‘Colombian police to train Afghans in 
counter-narcotics’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 October 2006); ‘Kurdish soldiers trained by 
Israelis’, BBC Newsnight Online (20 September 2006); see also HM Government, Countering 
International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy (July 2006), p.22 - especially where it notes:  
Both intelligence gathering and action to disrupt and apprehend terrorists are often carried out in 
co-operation with our international partners. To facilitate this, the UK provides training and 
other assistance to certain foreign governments, in order to help them build up their ability to 
counter terrorism. 
 
Assisting other countries: 
• In FY05/06, the UK spent over £7.3M helping other nations to build their counter-terrorist 
capabilities. 
• Over the past year the Ministry of Defence has assisted with counter-terrorist training in more 
than a dozen countries. 
• Other agencies, such as the Police, have provided counter-terrorism training assistance to 
officials from other nations, both in the UK and by deploying trainers overseas. 
• The police Counter-Terrorism & Extremism Liaison Officer (CTELO) Scheme has also been 
expanded. In addition to close co-operation with our partners in the European Union, CTELOs 
are now being posted to Pakistan, Malaysia, and North Africa. 
 
Working with and through international institutions: 
• A new EU Counter-terrorism Strategy was endorsed by the European Council in December 
2005 during the UK’s Presidency. 
• The swift extradition from Italy to the United Kingdom of a suspect in the attempted bombings 
on 21 July demonstrated the effectiveness of the new European Arrest Warrant. 
• In the United Nations we are working to ensure the implementation of Security Council 
Resolution 1373 which creates legal obligations on all states to crack down on terrorists, their 
supporters and their sources of finance, as part of an effective UN global counter-terrorism 
strategy. 
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345 See, for example, the definition of ‘liaison’ cited in Chapter 1 of this study and as agreed by the US 
Department of Defense and NATO: ‘That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements 
of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action.’ - Quoted in NATO 
Standardisation Agency (NSA), NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French) (AAP-
6[2006]), p.2-L-3. (Emphasis added); also cited in US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms’, Joint Publication 1-02 ([12 April 2001] updated 17 
September 2006), p.312. 
346 US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Aftergood, ‘DoD issues new doctrine on 
information operations’. 
347 For more on the changing nature of the US-led ‘war on terror’ to the ‘Long War’ see the 2006 US 
Quadrennial Defense Review - via URL: <http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr/> (accessed: 20/02/2006); 
see also The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (March 2006); S. Tisdall et al, 
‘Special Report: America’s Long War’, The Guardian (15 February 2006); S. Tisdall and E. 
MacAskill, ‘America’s Long War’, The Guardian (15 February 2006); J. Westhead, ‘Planning the US 
“Long War” on terror’, BBC News Online (10 April 2006); P. Baker, ‘Bush to restate terror strategy: 
2002 doctrine of preemptive war to be reaffirmed’, The Washington Post (16 March 2006); ‘US backs 
first-strike attack plan’, BBC News Online (16 March 2006). 
348 See A. Rathmell, ‘Towards Post-modern Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 17, 3 
(Autumn, 2002). 
349 There is also an associated breaking-down of traditional police and army roles, see, for example, 
‘Truncheons and tommy guns’, Jane’s Foreign Report (06 February 2003); see also references to the 
‘hybridisation’ aspect of globalisation in J.A. Scholte, Globalization: A critical introduction (London: 
Palgrave, 2005 [2ed – revised & updated]), pp.252-254; see also ‘Globalization and (In)Security’, 
chapter 9 in ibid., pp.279-315.  
350 That is: the shipping of suspects to countries where they will be interrogated under the duress of 
torture, rather than being taken into custody and being put on trial in the US or UK, for instance. 
351 There is arguably at least some official US recognition of this counter-productivity, for example, the 
closing of Abu Ghraib and the re-branding of the so-called ‘War on Terror’ to the ‘Long War’. More 
complete recognition would come with the US dropping of the term ‘war’ altogether. A phrase such as 
the ‘Long Engagement’ would arguably be more appropriate, particularly in the domain of ideas. Such 
a phrase also suggests greater inclusiveness, rather than setting up dangerous ‘us and them’ 
juxtapositions. For some of these concerns, see, for example, P. Sands, Lawless World: The whistle-
blowing account of how Bush and Blair are taking the law into their own hands (London: Penguin, 
2006 [Updated ed.]); H. Kennedy, Just Law: The Changing Face of Justice – and Why It Matters to Us 
All - Equality, Fairness, Respect, Dignity, Civil Liberties (London: Vintage, 2004); S.V. Scott, 
International Law in World Politics: An Introduction (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004); for 
background on law and international relations, see J. Morris, ‘Law, Politics, and the Use of Force’, 
chapter 5 in Baylis, et al (eds), Strategy in the Contemporary World, pp.101-121; A. Roberts, 
‘Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War’, Survival, 44, 1 (Spring 2002), pp.7-32; see 
also Reveron, ‘Old Allies, New Friends’, p.462 – where he notes that: ‘The ongoing investigation of 
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[the] alleged secret CIA interrogation sites and continued association with foreign intelligence services 
that have poor human-rights records challenges U.S. strategic communications [i.e. information 
operations], which is attempting to reduce the anti-Americanism in the world.’; see also IISS Strategic 
Survey 2006, p.51 – ‘Flaws in US counter-terrorism strategy mean that dangerous strategic incoherence 
afflicts counter-terrorism overall.’ For more on the US and the Geneva Conventions, see L. Beehner, 
‘Backgrounder: The United States and the Geneva Conventions’, Council on Foreign Relations (20 
September 2006) – via URL: <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11485/> (accessed: 20/09/2006); S.R. 
Ratner, ‘Why the Old Rules of War Are Still the Best Rules: The Geneva Conventions help protect 
civilians and soldiers from the atrocities of war. But these hard-won rules of battle are falling by the 
wayside: Terrorists ignore them, and governments increasingly find them quaint and outdated. With 
every violation, war only gets deadlier for everyone’, Foreign Policy (March 2008); see also M.R. 
Gordon, ‘U.S. Command Shortens Life of “Long War” as a Reference’, The New York Times (24 April 
2007), for later developments with the phrase; see for a ‘training manual’, L.R. Blank and G.P. Noone, 
Law of War Training: Resources for Military and Civilian Leaders (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace, March 2008) - via URL: 
<http://www.usip.org/ruleoflaw/pubs/law_of_war_training.pdf> (accessed: 03/04/2008). 
352 See, for example, M. Mazzetti, ‘Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terrorism Threat’, The New 
York Times (24 September 2006); K. DeYoung, ‘Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Hurting U.S. Terror 
Fight’, The Washington Post (24 September 2006); D. Glaister, ‘Campaign in Iraq has increased 
terrorism threat, says American intelligence report: Views of 16 government agencies pooled; Study 
contradicting Bush was not made public’, The Guardian (25 September 2006); M. Mazzetti, ‘Backing 
Policy, President Issues Terror Estimate’, The New York Times (27 September 2006); K. DeYoung and 
W. Pincus, ‘Sobering Conclusions On Why Jihad Has Spread’, The Washington Post (27 September 
2006); see also A. Ward and J. Hackett (eds), ‘Transnational terrorism after the Iraq war: Net effect’, 
IISS Strategic Comments, 9, 4 (June 2003); see also ‘International Terrorism’ in ‘International 
Terrorism Part III’ in IISS The Military Balance, 104, 1 (January 2004), pp.378-385 - particularly 
where it notes: ‘Overall, risks of terrorism to Westerners and Western assets in Arab countries 
appeared to increase after the Iraq war began in March 2003…’; M. Moss and S. Mekhennet, ‘Militants 
Widen Reach as Terror Seeps Out of Iraq’, The New York Times (28 May 2007). 
353 See, for instance, ‘UK-US call for Afghan war support’, BBC News Online (06 February 2008); see 
also C. Wyatt and R. Watson, ‘Nato at pains to dismiss Afghan tensions’, BBC News Online (07 
February 2008). 
354 See ‘Global War on Terror’ subheading in N. Brown et al, ‘2005 Annual Defence Report: Major 
Events and Future Trends – New Resolutions’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (21 December 2005). 
355 HM Government, Countering International Terrorism, p.33. 
356 See, for example, A. Rathmell, ‘Building Counterterrorism Strategies and Institutions: The Iraqi 
Experience’, chapter 9 in D. Aaron (ed.), Three Years After: Next Steps in the War on Terror (RAND, 
2005), p.47; see also, ‘“Help Muslims report terror” call: A top Muslim police officer has urged forces 
to use “third-party reporting” to get terror information from Muslims’, BBC News Online (28 January 
2007); see also N. Suleaman, ‘Police chief calls on communities: The police are considering proposals 
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to share intelligence and information with Muslims before launching anti-terror operations. The plans, 
announced by the Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair, are part of a wider vision to engage 
more with British Muslims whose support police need in fighting terrorism’, BBC News Online (24 
January 2007); ‘Police rethink on stop and search: Police are reviewing stop and search policies amid 
fears they are damaging community relations, a senior officer has confirmed’, BBC News Online (24 
January 2007); see also I. Van der Kloet, ‘Building Trust in the Mission Area: a Weapon Against 
Terrorism?’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 17, 4 (December 2006), pp.421-436. By way of an example 
of this type of engagement beneficially in action: in early June 2006, Canada’s domestic CT approach 
was demonstrably sufficiently well-tuned, allowing for the successful thwarting of the Toronto Cell. 
This was achieved through the use of an informant, a Muslim Canadian citizen willing to engage, 
reportedly voluntarily, with the Canadian authorities - see J. Bennion, ‘The Radical Informant’, PBS 
Frontline/World website (30 January 2007), via URL: 
<http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/canada602/shaikh.html> (accessed: 22/02/2007). 
357 By mid-2006, the US, at least minimally, appears to be beginning to address the counterproductive 
wider counter-terrorism shortcomings. For example, the US also wants to close Guantánamo Bay – see, 
for example, ‘The US “wants to end Guantanamo”’, BBC News Online (21 June 2006); see also 
‘Editorial: Closing Guantanamo: It's inevitable; better that Mr. Bush do it, while fixing the flawed legal 
system behind it’, The Washington Post (27 June 2007). In addition, on 29 June 2006, the US Supreme 
Court ruled that the Geneva Conventions did in fact apply to US detainees – see C. Lane, ‘High Court 
rejects detainee tribunals: 5 to 3 ruling curbs President’s claim of wartime power’, The Washington 
Post (30 June 2006). Following the ruling, the White House shifted its policy and announced that ‘All 
US military detainees, including those at Guantánamo Bay, are to be treated in line with the minimum 
standards of the Geneva Conventions’ – see, for example, ‘US detainees to get Geneva rights’, BBC 
News Online (11 July 2006); see also M.D. Davis, ‘OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR: The Guantánamo I 
Know’, The New York Times (26 June 2007) - particularly where he notes: ‘LINDSEY GRAHAM, a 
Republican senator from South Carolina, is right: “The image of Guantánamo Bay and the reality of 
Guantánamo Bay are completely different.” It is disappointing that so many embrace a contrived 
image…’ On the ‘image’ issue, see, for example, K. DeYoung, ‘The Pentagon Gets a Lesson From 
Madison Avenue: U.S. Needs to Devise a Different “Brand” to Win Over the Iraqi People, Study 
Advises’, The Washington Post (21 July 2007). The Pentagon then issued instructions to its personnel – 
see US Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, ‘Application of Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions to the Treatment of Detainees in the Department of Defense’, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense Memorandum (07 July 2006) – via URL: 
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dod/geneva070606.pdf> (accessed: 11/07/2006); T.E. Ricks, ‘U.S. 
troops will benefit from clarity, experts say’, The Washington Post (12 July 2006); see also Roberts, 
‘Review Essay: Torture and Incompetence in the “War on Terror”’, pp.199-212 – especially where he 
notes: ‘The US change of policy following this decision in 2006 is significant but still incomplete.’ 
(p.199). Other shortcomings also appear to be beginning to be addressed - see, for example, G. Witte, 
‘Army to end expansive, exclusive Halliburton deal: Logistics contract to be open for bidding’, The 
Washington Post (12 July 2006); see also J. Glanz, ‘U.S. Agency Finds New Waste and Fraud in Iraqi 
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Rebuilding Projects’, The New York Times (01 February 2007); D. Hedgpeth, ‘Audit of KBR Iraq 
Contract Faults Records For Fuel, Food: U.S. Says It Will Increase Monitoring in Baghdad’, The 
Washington Post (25 June 2007); J.K. Elsea and N.M. Serafino, ‘Private Security Contractors in Iraq: 
Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues’, CRS Report for Congress (21 June 2007); N. Hodge, 
‘Private security firms weigh impact of US law change’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (31 January 2007); N. 
Fiorenza, ‘EU calls for private security regulation policy’, Jane’s Defence Weekly (20 December 
2006); see also references to private security companies (PSCs) and private military companies 
(PMCs) in Case Study 2, below. However, several significant obstacles remain - see, for example, S. 
Goldenberg, ‘US confirms existence of secret prison network’, The Guardian (07 September 2006), 
particularly where she notes: ‘The announcement that the 14 prisoners would be moved from CIA 
[secret] prisons to Guantánamo frustrates hopes that the detention camp there would be shut down… 
[Bush] also signalled that the White House would continue to press Congress for a version of the 
military tribunals struck down by the supreme court last June [2006].’; J. White, ‘Guantanamo 
Detainees Lose Appeal: Habeas Corpus Case May Go to High Court’, The Washington Post (21 
February 2007); see also J.K. Elsea and K.R. Thomas, ‘Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus 
Challenges in Federal Court’, CRS Report for Congress (26 June 2007); for follow-up, see L. 
Greenhouse, ‘Supreme Court Denies Guantánamo Appeal’, The New York Times (03 April 2007); see 
also A. Goldstein, ‘Justices Won't Hear Detainee Rights Cases -- for Now’, The Washington Post (03 
April 2007); see also on this issue J. Lelyveld, ‘Feature: No Exit’, The New York Review of Books, 54, 
2 (15 February 2007); see also ‘The Language and Law of War: Distinguishing terrorists from 
combatants’, IISS Strategic Comments, 7, 8 (October 2001); Golden, ‘For Guantánamo Review Boards, 
Limits Abound’; J.K. Elsea and K.R. Thomas, ‘Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus 
Challenges in Federal Court’, CRS Report for Congress (Updated 06 April 2007); C.D. Leonnig, ‘U.S. 
Wants to Limit Guantanamo Detainees' Access to Lawyers’, The Washington Post (27 April 2007); W. 
Glaberson, ‘Court Asked to Limit Lawyers at Guantánamo’, The New York Times (26 April 2007); 
‘EDITORIAL: After the Lawyers’, The New York Times (27 April 2007); ‘Editorial: Ban All the 
Lawyers: Prisoners at Guantanamo don't really need them, or so says the Justice Department’, The 
Washington Post (29 April 2007); A. Goldstein, ‘Justices Again Refuse Guantanamo Bay Cases’, The 
Washington Post (01 May 2007); see also, for associated problems, C. Whitlock, ‘82 Inmates Cleared 
but Still Held at Guantanamo: U.S. Cites Difficulty Deporting Detainees’, The Washington Post (29 
April 2007); for further related problems, see W. Glaberson, ‘Many Detainees at Guantánamo Rebuff 
Lawyers’, The New York Times (05 May 2007); ‘Guantanamo pair's charges dropped: A US military 
judge has thrown out charges against two Guantanamo Bay detainees, casting fresh doubt on efforts to 
try foreign terror suspects’, BBC News Online (05 June 2007); J. White, ‘Charges Against Guantanamo 
Detainee Set for Trial Dropped Over Limit in Law’, The Washington Post (05 June 2007); W. 
Glaberson, ‘Military Judges Dismiss Charges for 2 Detainees’, The New York Times (05 June 2007); J. 
White and S. Murray, ‘Guantanamo Ruling Renews The Debate Over Detainees: Bush Policy Faces 
New Hill Challenge’, The Washington Post (06 June 2007); ‘EDITORIAL: Gitmo: A National 
Disgrace’, The New York Times (06 June 2007); ‘Stuck in Guantanamo: President Bush tried to create a 
new legal system for terrorism suspects. He created a quagmire instead.’, The Washington Post (07 
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June 2007); see also J. White, ‘Pentagon Says Terror Suspect Has Been Moved to Guantanamo: 
Groups to Sue, Alleging Disappearance of Dozens Held by U.S.’, The Washington Post (07 June 
2007); S. Shane, ‘Rights Groups Call for End to Secret Detentions’, The New York Times (07 June 
2007); R. Barnes, ‘Justices to Weigh Detainee Rights: In Reversal, Court Agrees to Hear Case’, The 
Washington Post (30 June 2007); W. Glaberson, ‘In Shift, Justices Agree to Review Detainees’ Case’, 
The New York Times (30 June 2007); see also J.K. Elsea, ‘Treatment of “Battlefield Detainees” in the 
War on Terrorism’, CRS Report for Congress (Updated: 23 January 2007); J. White and R. Wright, 
‘Guantanamo Splits Administration: Arguments Center on How to Handle Remaining Detainees’, The 
Washington Post (22 June 2007); J. Johnson, ‘Vigil Raises “Voices Against Terror”’, The Washington 
Post (24 June 2007); K. DeYoung, ‘Administration Struggles With Interrogation Specifics’, The 
Washington Post (19 June 2007); ‘Editorial: Justice at Guantanamo: Congress has another chance to 
repair the rules for handling detainees in the war on terrorism’, The Washington Post (18 July 2007); 
W. Glaberson, ‘Court Tells U.S. to Reveal Data on Detainees at Guantánamo’, The New York Times 
(21 July 2007); J. White, ‘Government Must Share All Evidence On Detainees’, The Washington Post 
(21 July 2007); see also for repercussions for some of the people conducting the interrogations, L. 
Blumenfeld, ‘The Tortured Lives of Interrogators: Veterans of Iraq, N. Ireland and Mideast Share Stark 
Memories’, The Washington Post (04 June 2007). To an extent America was in a ‘state of denial’, at 
least publicly - see, for example, J. Webb, ‘Bush “concealing Iraq violence”’, BBC News Online (29 
September 2006) and the claims made by veteran Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward. See also 
B. Woodward, ‘Secret Reports Dispute White House Optimism’, The Washington Post (01 October 
2006); B. Woodward, State of Denial: Bush At War, Part III (London: Simon & Schuster, 2006); 
‘EDITORIAL: The Iraq War Debate: The Great Denier’, The New York Times (21 July 2007); S, 
Vedantam, ‘Bush: Naturally, Never Wrong’, The Washington Post (09 July 2007); ‘EDITORIAL: The 
Iraq War Debate: A Reality Check on Military Spending’, The New York Times (21 July 2007). 
However, the US elsewhere officially and publicly appears to have had somewhat more of a ‘reality-
check’ - see, for example, P. Reynolds, ‘Search for least-worst option in Iraq’, BBC News Online (19 
October 2006) and S. Goldenburg, ‘We’ve lost the battle for Baghdad, US admits: President concedes 
war may be at a turning point; Mounting death toll brings comparison with Vietnam’, The Guardian 
(20 October 2006); see also D.E. Sanger and D.S. Cloud, ‘News Analysis: Bush Faces a Battery of 
Ugly Choices on War’, The New York Times (20 October 2006); M. Abramowitz and T.E. Ricks, 
‘Major Change Expected In Strategy for Iraq War’, The Washington Post (20 October 2006). The poor 
post-war security situation in Iraq is no longer so deniable – see, for example, J. Alic, ‘Iraq: From bad 
to worse to impossible: Bush admits Iraq is becoming another Vietnam, and for most observers, the US 
is out of options for exiting the quagmire’, ISN Security Watch (20 October 2006). Although, this new 
realisation appeared not to extend too far as Bush opted to instead consider new tactics, not changing 
his policy/strategy in Iraq – see, for example, ‘Bush to consider new Iraq tactics’, BBC News Online 
(20 October 2006); A. Scott Tyson and M.A. Fletcher, ‘Bush, Rumsfeld Defend Strategy: They Say 
Surge In Violence Won’t Change Iraq Goals’, The Washington Post (21 October 2006). Although some 
cold feet at the top appeared to be having an impact at least in private - see, for example, ‘Rumsfeld 
urged Iraq tactics shift’, BBC News Online (03 December 2006); M.R. Gordon and D.S. Cloud, 
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‘Rumsfeld Memo on Iraq Proposed “Major” Change: Two days before he resigned as defense 
secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld submitted a classified memo to the White House that acknowledged 
that the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq was not working and called for a major course 
correction...’, The New York Times (03 December 2006); P. Harris, ‘Rumsfeld: US failing in Iraq: A 
leaked memo shows that the former Defence Secretary thinks a major change in strategy is needed, 
focusing on a staged pull-out of troops’, The Observer (03 December 2006). However, changes in US 
domestic politics in early November 2006, whereby the Democrats seized a majority and control of 
Congress from the Republicans in the US mid-term elections, and with the subsequent resignation of 
Donald Rumsfeld as US Defense Secretary, suggested that some further changes will be afoot in the 
future, including in relation to Iraq - see, for example, T.E. Ricks and M. Abramowitz, ‘A Meek 
Departure From the War Cabinet: Rumsfeld Ends His Stormy Tenure at Defense Dept.’, The 
Washington Post (09 November 2006); D. Balz, ‘For Bush’s New Direction, Cooperation Is The 
Challenge’, The Washington Post (09 November 2006); S.G. Stolberg and J. Rutenberg, ‘Rumsfeld 
Resigns; Bush Vows to “Find Common Ground”; Focus Is on Virginia’, The New York Times (09 
November 2006); J. Alic, ‘“Stuff happens,” Mr Rumsfeld’, ISN Security Watch (09 November 2006); 
see also ‘Top of the Agenda: Rumsfeld Out; Gates In’, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Daily 
Brief (09 November 2006) – via URL: 
<http://www.cfr.org/about/what_we_do/editorial_detail.html?id=246> (accessed: 09/11/2006); D.E. 
Sanger, ‘After Rumsfeld: Bid to Reshape the Brain Trust’, The New York Times (10 November 2006). 
The ushering in of a more consensual, intelligence-led, rather than military-led, era in US foreign, 
defence and security policies, as well as counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies, may be 
heralded with former CIA Director Robert Gates (1991-92) being nominated as the new US Defense 
Secretary – see, for example, ‘Rumsfeld replaced after poll loss’, BBC News Online (08 November 
2006). There also appears to be the beginning of more policy/strategy level engagement and re-
connection with the lower operational/tactical level - see, for example, ‘US army “to suggest Iraq 
changes”: US military leaders are preparing to recommend changes in strategy on Iraq, America's top 
military officer says’, BBC News Online (11 November 2006); E.A. Cohen, ‘Plan B’, The Wall Street 
Journal (20 October 2006); D.E. Sanger, et al, ‘Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in ’06, Bush Team Says’, The 
New York Times (02 January 2007). The passage of more time now is required to see how future 
developments evolve. What is clearer, however, is the increasing domestic US frustration with the 
Bush administration’s approach to Iraq, as articulated in the US media – see, for instance, 
‘EDITORIAL: Past Time to Get Real on Iraq’, The New York Times (09 January 2007). However, the 
back-to-front US strategy in Iraq appears likely to continue, as again there is reportedly some political 
and military disconnect present – see, for example, M. Abramowitz, R. Wright and T.E. Ricks, ‘With 
Iraq Speech, Bush to Pull Away From His Generals’, The Washington Post (10 January 2007), 
particularly where they note: ‘When President Bush goes before the American people tonight to outline 
his new strategy for Iraq, he will be doing something he has avoided since the invasion of Iraq in 
March 2003: ordering his top military brass to take action they initially resisted and advised against…’ 
Related to this overall issue of disconnect between ‘idealism’ and ‘reality’ in relation to Iraq, see also 
M. Danner, ‘Iraq: The War of the Imagination’, The New York Review of Books, 53, 20 (21 December 
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2006); for the related UK dimension, see C. Spencer, ‘Talk Long, Reflect Little: The conflicts and 
crises of the Middle East are now inter-linked, but not in the ways currently set out in the official 
British approach. Behind the scenes and in regional diplomatic postings, the complexities are doubtless 
well-documented and commented on. As a result, a swift return to a strategy based on realistic 
assessments and achievable outcomes is not inconceivable for Prime Minister Tony Blair’s successor, 
even if the damage to British influence in the region may take time to overcome. Equally, a new 
government needs to give much closer consideration to the link between the presence of its troops on 
foreign soil, where they might be seen as occupiers, and acts of terror at home.’, The World Today, 62, 
12 (December 2006), pp.4-6. For more on the ‘new’ US strategy in Iraq, see, for example, ‘Bush 
revamps US military in Iraq’, BBC News Online (05 January 2007); M. Abramowitz, R. Wright and A. 
Scott Tyson, ‘Critics Say “Surge” Is More of The Same: Past Troop Buildups Have Not Quelled Iraq’, 
The Washington Post (07 January 2007); ‘EDITORIAL: Past Time to Get Real on Iraq’, The New York 
Times (09 January 2007); Abramowitz, et al, ‘With Iraq Speech, Bush to Pull Away From His 
Generals’; T.E. Ricks and A. Scott Tyson, ‘Intensified Combat on Streets Likely’, The Washington 
Post (11 January 2007); M.R. Gordon, ‘MILITARY ANALYSIS: Bid to Secure Baghdad Relies on 
Troops and Iraqi Leaders’, The New York Times (11 January 2007); S. Gay Stolberg, ‘NEWS 
ANALYSIS: Bush’s Strategy for Iraq Risks Confrontations’, The New York Times (11 January 2007); 
A. Brookes, ‘Can Bush’s new way forward work?’, BBC News Online (11 January 2007); S. Tavernise 
and J.F. Burns, ‘Promising Troops Where They Aren’t Really Wanted’, The New York Times (11 
January 2007); D. Moran, ‘Bush chooses confrontation: US President George W Bush’s announcement 
last night that he would increase troop presence in Iraq reveals that he is out of fresh ideas for quelling 
the quagmire’, ISN Security Watch (11 January 2007); ‘Bush steps up battle for Baghdad: US President 
George Bush is to send thousands more troops to Iraq to help secure Baghdad’s streets as part of a new 
strategy to tackle the conflict’, BBC News Online (11 January 2007); D.E. Sanger, ‘Bush Adds Troops 
in Bid to Secure Iraq’, The New York Times (11 January 2007); M. Abramowitz and R. Wright, ‘Bush 
to Add 20,000 Troops In an Effort to Stabilize Iraq’, The Washington Post (11 January 2007); ‘CFR 
Scholars Respond to Bush’s New Iraq Strategy’, US Council on Foreign Relations (10 January 2007) - 
via e-mail; T. Shanker and D.S. Cloud, ‘Bush’s Plan for Iraq Runs Into Opposition in Congress’, The 
New York Times (12 January 2007); M. Abramowitz and J. Weisman, ‘Bush’s Iraq Plan Meets 
Skepticism On Capitol Hill: Opposition to Troop Increase Is Bipartisan’, The Washington Post (12 
January 2007); T. Shanker, ‘New Strategy Vindicates Ex-Army Chief Shinseki’, The New York Times 
(12 January 2007); D. Stoker, ‘Insurgencies Rarely Win – And Iraq Won’t Be Any Different (Maybe): 
Vietnam taught many Americans the wrong lesson: that determined guerrilla fighters are invincible. 
But history shows that insurgents rarely win, and Iraq should be no different. Now that it finally has a 
winning strategy, the Bush administration is in a race against time to beat the insurgency before the 
public’s patience finally wears out’, Foreign Policy (January 2007) - via URL: 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/> (accessed: 29/01/2007); P.W. Galbraith, ‘Feature: The Surge’, The 
New York Review of Books, 54, 4 (15 March 2007). Whatever the strategy implemented in Iraq, the 
outlook is not rosy – see, for example, K. DeYoung and W. Pincus, ‘Iraq at Risk of Further Strife, 
Intelligence Report Warns’, The Washington Post (02 February 2007); M. Mazzetti, ‘Analysis Is Bleak 
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on Iraq’s Future’, The New York Times (03 February 2007); K. DeYoung and W. Pincus, ‘Bleak Iraq 
Report Is Sent to Congress: Threats to Government Are Detailed’, The Washington Post (03 February 
2007); K. DeYoung, ‘Doubts Run Deep on Reforms Crucial to Bush's Iraq Strategy: Even Plan's 
Authors Say Political, Economic Changes May Fail’, The Washington Post (04 February 2007); S. 
Raghavan, ‘In Shift, U.S., Iran Meet On Iraq: Diplomats Air Grievances at Regional Summit’, The 
Washington Post (11 March 2007). By early 2007, with continuing difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
Bush committed further US troops – see, for example, P. Baker, ‘Additional Troop Increase Approved: 
President Agrees To Send 8,200 More To Iraq, Afghanistan’, The Washington Post (11 March 2007). 
‘Plan B’s were also beginning to be considered more seriously, see, for example, M. Abramowitz, 
‘Second Life for Study Group: Iraq Woes Lead To a Reappraisal’, The Washington Post (21 May 
2007); A.S. Tyson, ‘New Strategy for War Stresses Iraqi Politics: U.S. Aims to Oust Sectarians From 
Key Roles’, The Washington Post (23 May 2007); D.E. Sanger and D.S. Cloud, ‘White House Is Said 
to Debate ’08 Cut in Iraq Troops by 50%’, The New York Times (26 May 2007). Shortly into the new 
US Iraq strategy, several shortcomings persisted and political fallout continued in Washington – see, 
for example, J. O'Brien, ‘Doubt cast on US Iraq 'surge' strategy: May has been one of the deadliest 
months on record in Iraq - 10 American soldiers were killed on Memorial Day alone bringing US 
deaths to a total of 120, the highest since November 2004’, BBC News Online (30 May 2007); A.S. 
Tyson and J.W. Anderson, ‘Attacks on U.S. Troops in Iraq Grow in Lethality, Complexity: Bigger 
Bombs a Key Cause of May's High Death Toll’, The Washington Post (03 June 2007); T. Shanker, 
‘Iraqi Bombers Thwart Efforts to Shield G.I.’s’, The New York Times (02 June 2007); J.W. Anderson, 
‘Baghdad's Green Zone Is a Haven Under Siege’, The Washington Post (07 June 2007); J. Partlow, 
‘For U.S. Unit in Baghdad, An Alliance of Last Resort’, The Washington Post (09 June 2007); D.S. 
Cloud and D. Cave, ‘Commanders Say Push in Baghdad Is Short of Goal’, The New York Times (04 
June 2007); D.E. Sanger, ‘News Analysis: With Korea as Model, Bush Team Ponders Long Support 
Role in Iraq’, The New York Times (03 June 2007); ‘Editorial: After the Surge: It's time for the 
president and Congress to begin talking about a smaller, more sustainable mission in Iraq’, The 
Washington Post (03 June 2007); T.E. Ricks, ‘Military Envisions Longer Stay in Iraq: Officers 
Anticipate Small “'Post-Occupation” Force’, The Washington Post (10 June 2007); P. Baker and K. 
DeYoung, ‘Nominee to Coordinate War Offers Grim Forecast on Iraq: General's Appraisal Echoes 
Secret Intelligence Findings’, The Washington Post (08 June 2007); A. Flaherty, AP, ‘War Adviser 
Skeptical of Iraq Troop Plan’, The Guardian (06 June 2007); T. Shanker, ‘Chairman of Joint Chiefs 
Will Not Be Reappointed’, The New York Times (09 June 2007); ‘Head of US military “forced out”: 
The US military's outgoing top commander, Gen Peter Pace, says he opposed the decision to replace 
him at the end of his first term’, BBC News Online (15 June 2007); J. Campbell, M. O’Hanlon and 
Amy Unikewicz, ‘OP-ED CONTRIBUTORS: The State of Iraq: An Update’, The New York Times (10 
June 2007); for the importance of the US ‘winning’ (or at least being seen to ‘win’) in Iraq, see P.W. 
Rodman and W. Shawcross, ‘OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR: Defeat’s Killing Fields’, The New York Times 
(07 June 2007); see also C.S. Gray, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture’, 
Comparative Strategy, 26, 1, (January 2007), pp.1-20; for further signs of patience running out in the 
US regarding Iraq operations, see, for example, O. West and B. West, ‘The Laptop Is Mightier Than 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 5: Case Study 1 
V(i) : 302 
                                                                                                                                      
the Sword’, The New York Times (15 June 2007); ‘EDITORIAL: A Failure to Protect Our Troops’, The 
New York Times (14 June 2007); see also A.S. Tyson, ‘No Drop in Iraq Violence Seen Since Troop 
Buildup’, The Washington Post (14 June 2007); D. Cave, ‘Iraqis Are Failing to Meet U.S. 
Benchmarks’, The New York Times (13 June 2007); M.R. Gordon, ‘U.S. Warns Iraq That Progress Is 
Needed Soon’, The New York Times (12 June 2007); W. Pincus and A.S. Tyson, ‘Big Boost In Iraqi 
Forces Is Urged: A Top General Sees Years Before U.S. Ends Security Role’, The Washington Post 
(13 June 2007). See also L. Beehner, ‘Daily Analysis: Sorting Fact from Violence in Iraq’, Council on 
Foreign Relations (14 June 2007); J.W. Anderson, ‘Sunni Shrine Leveled In Apparent Reprisal: Attack 
Spurs Basra Curfew; U.S. Troop Buildup Completed’, The Washington Post (16 June 2007); T. 
Shanker, ‘In Iraq, Gates Says Progress Toward Peace Is Lagging’, The New York Times (16 June 
2007); P. Wood, ‘The uniformed kidnappers of Baghdad: The search is continuing for a British 
computer expert and his four bodyguards who were seized last month from a building belonging to the 
Iraqi finance ministry by men in police uniform’, ‘From Our Own Correspondent’, BBC Radio 4/BBC 
News Online (16 June 2007); T. Shanker and M.R. Gordon, ‘G.I.’s in Iraq Open Big Offensive Against 
Al Qaeda’, The New York Times (17 June 2007); see also R. Wright, ‘News Analysis: For U.S. and 
Key Allies in Region, Mideast Morass Just Gets Deeper’, The Washington Post (17 June 2007); L. 
Wiley, Jr., ‘FRONTLINE – Endgame…’, PBS FRONTLINE Bulletin (17 June 2007) - see particularly 
where he notes: ‘In “Endgame” … Michael Kirk examines how strategy in Iraq evolved from getting 
out quickly, to letting Iraqi forces do the job, to now, reinvigorating the American role in the war. … In 
thinking about the title … it strikes me that we might have put a question mark after “endgame.” 
Experts in our program say that we are nowhere near the endgame, and if there is no significant 
improvement by the fall, then the president’s decision to send more troops and extend tours of duty of 
those already there may be judged too little, too late…’; J.W. Anderson, ‘Ten U.S. Deaths in Iraq Bring 
June Toll to 80’, The Washington Post (24 June 2007); M.R. Gordon and D. Cave, ‘Assault Pressed on 
Insurgents Near Baghdad’, The New York Times (19 June 2007); ‘US launches major Iraq offensive: 
The US military has said 10,000 US and Iraqi troops are taking part in a major operation against 
militants linked to al-Qaeda north of the capital, Baghdad’, BBC News Online (19 June 2007); M.R. 
Gordon, ‘MILITARY ANALYSIS: U.S. Seeks to Block Exits for Iraq Insurgents’, The New York 
Times (20 June 2007); J.W. Anderson and S. Dehima, ‘Offensive Targets Al-Qaeda In Iraq: Blast Near 
Mosque Kills 60 in Baghdad’, The Washington Post (20 June 2007); J.F. Burns, ‘Militants Said to Flee 
Before U.S. Offensive’, The New York Times (23 June 2007); J. Partlow and J.W. Anderson, ‘Troops 
Pushing South Through Insurgent Area: Searches, Airstrikes in Iraq Attempt to Isolate Fighters’, The 
Washington Post (22 June 2007); D.E. Sanger and T. Shanker, ‘General’s Iraq Progress Report Has 
Competition’, The New York Times (24 June 2007). Meanwhile, for more on local proxy schemes and 
partnerships in Iraq, see E. MacAskill, ‘US arms Sunni dissidents in risky bid to contain al-Qaida 
fighters in Iraq: Guns and equipment already handed over; Insurgents promise not to attack 
Americans’, The Guardian (12 June 2007); J.F. Burns and A.J. Rubin, ‘U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to 
Battle Old Qaeda Allies’, The New York Times (11 June 2007); see also J. Partlow and J.W. Anderson, 
‘Tribal Coalition in Anbar Said to Be Crumbling: U.S.-Backed Group Has Fought Al-Qaeda in Iraq’, 
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The Washington Post (11 June 2007). More widely in the Middle East, reports suggested ‘CENTCOM 
to improve Mideast Partnership’, Middle East Newsline (11 June 2007). 
358 R. Niblett, ‘The UK and the US in a Changed Transatlantic Relationship’, Chatham House 
Transcript (15 February 2007), Inaugural lecture of Director, Chatham House. 
359 C. Secrett, ‘What Steps should Governments be taking in Communicating with and Engaging the 
Public More Effectively on the range of Complex Risks that we all face?’, PIU Presentation (14 
December 2001) - via URL: 
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Chapter 5: Case Study 2 
Enhancing efforts against proliferation: 
Implementing the ‘counter~proliferation paradigm’ 
 
 
‘Good intelligence and the rough-and-tumble of the open political process do not always 
mix… To be agile and well-informed, policy needs disinterested intelligence. To be relevant, 
intelligence efforts must address policy concerns.’ 
- Finding from the US Congressional ‘Commission to Assess the Organization of 
the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction’ (1999)1 
 
 
[1.0]: Introduction 
 
This case study evaluates UK-US intelligence liaison on Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) non- and counter-proliferation (N/CP) efforts. It also seeks to 
assess whether together UK and US intelligence have delivered effective results. 
WMD and their N/CP efforts have had prominent coverage in recent years.2 This 
key issue area also features largely in UK-US intelligence liaison, alongside and - 
especially after 9/11 - intimately tied to counter-terrorism (CT) efforts. However, 
rarely probed are questions concerning: how effective is the UK-US intelligence 
liaison concerning WMD N/CP; and how effectively is that liaison contributing 
towards the tackling of the proliferation challenges currently being confronted?  
 
From 2000 to the end of 2005, several UK and US WMD N/CP efforts can be 
highlighted. Indeed, these types of interactions are routine, frequently occurring on a 
daily basis. The most high profile example on which there has been considerable UK-
US intelligence liaison, and which especially stands out in the early twenty-first 
century, is the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD and related programmes. Adopting a 
broadly chronological-thematic hybrid approach, this example is now evaluated.  
This episode has been selected for examination for several reasons. It was 
explored by the official WMD inquiries in both the UK and US, held in the wake of 
the 2003 war in Iraq. In the UK, the Butler Committee Review of Intelligence on 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘Butler Report’) was published on 14 July 2004; while in 
the US, the Robb-Silberman Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United 
States regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction was published on 31 March 2005. Both of 
these reports, therefore, offer some valuable official UK and US insights. As well as 
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figuring prominently in public, this example also effectively demonstrates the 
implementation of the ‘counter-proliferation paradigm’ in action. 
Significantly, the Butler Report carefully avoided probing in depth the specific 
issue of UK-US intelligence liaison. The authors remarked that:  
 
[w]e have focused on the intelligence available to the British Government 
and the use made of it by our Government. Although that inevitably has 
led us to areas of UK/US co-operation, we have deliberately not 
commented in this Report on the actions of the US intelligence agencies, 
ground that is being covered by the Presidential Commission.3  
 
Detailing intelligence co-operation with allies was essentially outside of the UK 
Committee’s remit. It was intended to look solely at the UK use of the intelligence. 
Acting like exemplary professional allies at the inquiry level, as well as elsewhere, 
the UK inquiry did not want to publicly probe, pre-empt or discuss critically any US 
findings on US intelligence on WMD. Otherwise, they could have potentially 
jeopardised generic UK-US relations and, more specifically, the UK-US intelligence 
relationship. Notably, for similar reasons, in the final US Robb-Silberman 
Commission Report, their references to British Intelligence did not go beyond the 
findings of those already presented in the Butler Report. 
Some commentators saw this omission as the crucial ‘missing link’. Dan 
Plesch argued that: ‘The missing third dimension concerns the relationship of the 
British with their American counterparts… In general terms, the government is 
proud of the special intelligence relationship, and we are told that British ministers 
spoke to their American counterparts almost daily during the run-up to [the 2003 
Iraq] war. But Butler and his colleagues produced a report with just eight references 
to the United States, and several of these are to US publications…’4 US intelligence 
historian, Thomas Powers, argued that: ‘… the close cooperation between American 
and British intelligence services… helped President Bush and Prime Minister Tony 
Blair make their case for war while protecting them from awkward questions…’5 
Publicly available evaluations of UK-US intelligence liaison by each inquiry are 
significantly absent, leaving a gap in the contemporary historical record. This case 
study aims to address that gap. 
 
UK-US intelligence liaison on the N/CP of WMD is widespread. Importantly, UK-US 
intelligence liaison on this issue involves the participation of multiple intelligence 
agencies. This is apparent on both sides, as well as beyond when involving more 
multilateral input than solely bilateral intelligence liaison interactions. Multiple 
agency participation is especially evident with regard to the vaster, and more 
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competitive than co-operative, US intelligence community. As is revealed 
throughout this case study, at times, this factor can contribute to some significant 
disconnects and mis-flows of information. This is particularly the scenario that 
appears either in the absence of effective overall intelligence co-ordination and 
associated orchestrations (for instance, as was witnessed in the US [2.6/2.7]); or 
during its co-option for contributing towards the building of specific political cases, 
which can then be easily marketed and sold to the public (for example, as observed 
in the UK - see below [2.3/2.7]).  
Indeed, examples of these types of disconnect, as well as their associated mis-
flows of information, were witnessed frequently during the run up to the Iraq war. 
This was particularly concerning the source appropriately codenamed 
‘CURVEBALL’, and the handling (or rather mis-management) of his product. 
Forthcoming from German Intelligence, the BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst), his 
product - rather than the actual source himself in person (for standard, perhaps in 
this case overly rigorous, HUMINT source ‘protection’ purposes by the BND) - was 
handled/accessed by the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); while 
simultaneously the CIA was kept more out of the loop – even ignored/bypassed (see 
below [2.4]) - concerning this source. This was not least after CURVEBALL had been 
dismissed as a ‘fabricator’ by the CIA, as well as by their direct counterparts in 
British Intelligence (SIS/MI6).6 For instance, as reported in Der Speigel: 
 
… The [German] secret service [the BND] now points to a Washington 
meeting in the autumn of 2002 … whereby the then-BND agent in 
Washington met with Tyler Drumheller, CIA operations leader for Europe, 
for a lunch meeting … Drumheller recalls that the BND agent warned that 
“Curveball” was psychologically unstable and likely a fraud. … The British 
secret service had expressed its doubts openly as early as 2001, after an 
expert from MI6 used a pretext to arrange a meeting with “Curveball.” He 
came to the conclusion that elements of “Curveball’s” behavior “strike us 
as typical of fabricators.”…7 
 
The interactions concerning CURVEBALL also nicely expose some of the dynamics 
that can be encountered when engaging in wider international intelligence liaison 
exchanges. This is together with revealing episodes when different international 
intelligence liaison arrangements significantly overlap, both jointly and individually, 
in London and/or Washington. To this end, the episodes concerning CURVEBALL 
are referred to throughout this case study for its illustrative value. These interactions 
(as well as those closely associated) can then go in either a positive or negative 
direction depending on the other surrounding circumstances involved. This includes 
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the political climate and its forcefulness, in terms of influence, within which these 
interactions are being played out. Evidently, in such contexts, higher-level 
intelligence management and co-ordination considerations also have an important 
role to perform. This is especially in helping to shape the final effects and outcomes 
that eventually emerge from the liaison interactions undertaken. 
Generally, UK and US strategies regarding N/CP efforts are manifold and 
complex.8 A significant part of the UK and US N/CP strategies involve signing up to 
several, sometimes overlapping, multilateral arrangements and non-proliferation 
‘regimes’.9 A complex series of intelligence liaison arrangements then take place in 
the background behind them. Amongst many tasks, these activities help to verify 
that the agreements are being upheld. Due to all the risks inherent in intelligence 
liaison, unsurprisingly the intelligence liaison and associated interactions on 
proliferation issues often operate in a similar manner as witnessed over other issues, 
such as counter-terrorism (CT) intelligence sharing. As Ellis and Kiefer observe:  
 
… intelligence sharing is a potentially risky, if sometimes necessary, 
enterprise. When undertaken, intelligence-sharing or data exchanges must 
be conducted with a full appreciation of the potential risks involved. Yet 
despite the obvious downside potential, intelligence sharing need not be 
dismissed as a pointless exercise or one that is so fraught with danger that 
it should never be attempted. As in other policy areas, decisionmakers will 
be required to prioritize objectives and resources, making difficult trade-
offs when necessary.10  
 
Again, on this issue, the closest and highest volume of intelligence liaison is 
witnessed bilaterally between the UK and the US, with the exclusive multilateral 
UKUSA SIGINT arrangement performing a demonstrably important role. There is 
also some intelligence liaison, frequently involving more information sharing, 
bilaterally and multilaterally, with other countries and international organisations - 
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and NATO.11  
 
 
[2.0]: The issue of supposed Iraqi WMD & related programmes 
 
UK-US intelligence liaison was generally close on this issue. Moreover, it formed the 
core intelligence liaison relationship around which other international intelligence 
liaison relationships with other countries - such as Germany (as already seen), 
France, Israel, and Italy (see below [2.6/2.8]) - bilaterally and multilaterally clustered 
in their both joint and individual overlap with the UK and/or US. As CIA Director 
George Tenet demanded: ‘How come all the good reporting I get is from SIS?’12 In 
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fact, UK-US liaison was judged to be so close that sometimes it was perhaps 
ironically too ‘successful’. Vis-à-vis intelligence liaison generally, as the Robb-
Silberman Commission later warned in 2005: 
  
A cautionary note: the increased sharing of intelligence reporting among 
liaison services — without sharing the sourcing details or identity of the 
source — may lead to unwitting circular reporting. When several services 
unknowingly rely on the same sources and then share the intelligence 
production from those sources, the result can be false corroboration of the 
reporting. In fact, one reason for the apparent unanimity among Western 
intelligence services that Iraq posed a more serious WMD threat than 
proved to be the case was the extensive sharing of intelligence information, 
and even analysis, among liaison services. Such sharing of information, 
without sharing of source information, can result in “groupthink” on an 
international scale.13  
 
The perceived ‘groupthink’ or ‘a bureaucratic consensus’14 appears to have 
been most acute in the critical domain of the ‘producer-consumer/customer’ 
relationship. This was between senior intelligence staff and the politicians in both the 
UK and US. The alleged global/international ‘groupthink’ also has been attributed to 
what one commentator has characterised critically as ‘…an ingrained “inferiority 
complex” with regard to the capabilities of American intelligence…’ amongst the 
major intelligence agencies around the world that liaise with the US. This was 
attributed to being due to them ‘lack[ing] the capability to collect the information on 
which to base independent judgments.’ Furthermore, he asserted that these 
intelligence agencies’ ‘leaders generally fear to take positions at variance with 
American intelligence conclusions because the political leaders of their countries 
tend to judge their performance by the criterion of their agreement with American 
Intelligence.’ Significantly, the British were judged as being ‘no exception to this 
rule…’15 Although, as is demonstrated throughout this case study, that judgement 
arguably extended too far. 
A degree of ‘overreach’ did figure in the overall mix. More detrimentally, 
here, and certainly amid the highest intelligence and political echelons between, as 
well as within, the UK and US, an optimised intelligence outreach balance was 
absent.  
 
[2.1]: Twentieth Century Prelude: 
Iraq and its supposed WMD had plagued UK and US intelligence for sometime. 
During the 1990s, Iraq, together with its disarmament verification process, evidently 
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absorbed substantial UK-US intelligence resources. For instance, inside the UK 
intelligence community, a special Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) led group (cell) 
focussed on Iraq - part of ‘Operation Rockingham’ - had existed from 1991. Its role 
over time was to provide intelligence support, as well as chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapon expertise, to both the UN weapons 
inspectors and to a range of UK customers.16  
In 1991, after the ‘Gulf War’ (1990-91) following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 
UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 was passed. This established the 
United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament (UNSCOM). UNSCOM was 
intended to verify the Iraqi disarmament of WMD. However, as the 1990s 
progressed, the eventual findings of UNSCOM were essentially dismissed by the UK 
and the US. This was not least with the findings coming soon after the disquieting 
revelations regarding the exposure of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme in the 
wake of the Gulf War. Increasing speculation about what else was being missed by 
the UNSCOM and the IAEA now had to be surmounted (see below).  
Although UNSCOM had destroyed several Iraqi WMD, the Iraqis had also 
ensured that the besieged UN weapons inspectors had been effectively excluded 
from inspecting so-called ‘presidential sites’. This suggested that the UNSCOM 
findings of 1997, that Iraqi WMD had essentially been destroyed, were not absolute 
enough. Indeed, they were incomplete in the eyes of the US and UK, to the extent of 
being substantially discredited.17 This was despite other countries, such as Russia 
and France, being more accepting of those findings. UK-US trust in the UNSCOM 
verification regime was lacking, and over time continued to haemorrhage.18 Plagued 
with such problems on all sides, and having also been accused of being a thinly 
veiled Israeli spying mechanism by the hostile Iraqis - who continued to obstruct the 
inspectors, thus over time preventing the inspectors from working as freely as they 
would have desired - UNSCOM eventually withdrew from Iraq in early December 
1998.  
A few days afterwards, on 16 December 1998, the controversial US-UK 
OPERATION ‘DESERT FOX’ was launched. A more proactive ‘containment’ 
approach through the bombing of suspected Iraqi WMD sites was attempted. 
However, the operation was ultimately judged to be ‘highly ineffective’.19 Drift on 
the issue then ensued as other pressing political considerations, such as Kosovo, 
increasingly took centre stage. Uncertainty regarding the exact status of Iraqi WMD 
continued over into the new millennium. By 2000, UN-sponsored weapons 
inspectors carrying out even disputed verification activities were also now currently 
lacking. This contributed further towards the general prevailing uncertainty 
concerning the exact status of supposed Iraqi WMD. Moreover, according to the 
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BBC, in January 2000, ‘Iraq … said that it has already destroyed all its weapons of 
mass destruction and it will not accept a new arms control body.’20 Stalemate had 
been reached. 
By 2002, the potential strengths UK-US intelligence liaison could bring on the 
issue of supposed Iraqi WMD appear to have been even further reduced. Indeed, they 
were shown to be considerably undermined in the process of having (and following) 
a set political agenda. Thereby the crucially required flexibility and open-
mindedness needed in approach when dealing with the generally non-static WMD 
N/CP issue, was absent.21 Rather than a greyer response regarding the supposed 
Iraqi WMD, political masters in the UK and US sought to extract a ‘black-or-white’ 
answer from their intelligence agencies.22 In the absence of that type of artificial 
answer being provided, due to the nature of the problem being probed (that amply 
reflected the qualities of dynamism, ambiguity and high complexity), the decision-
makers instead sought to create it through a policy of ‘regime change’ in Iraq. A 
stronger counter-proliferation paradigm was advocated. This chosen course of action 
was virtually regardless of the on-the-ground considerations. A dangerous path was 
being forged into the future. This came as the importance of contextualisation, as 
well as allowing intelligence to fulfil its proper and most useful informing role, 
became increasingly overlooked and dismissed politically.23 
 
[2.2]: The road to war in Iraq: much ado about nothing? 
In 2000, US and UK interest in Iraq and its supposed WMD clearly was not new.24 
However, it was not until the Bush administration took office in January 2001 that 
the political ‘obsession’ with Iraq was clearly apparent.25 This political ‘obsession’ 
also fitted with the widespread prevailing, and increasing, beliefs that the Iraq 
‘containment policy’ of the previous Clinton administrations during the 1990s had 
not worked.26 This was albeit that – arguably - there were not any sufficiently 
compelling ways, or mechanisms in place, for telling convincingly whether 
containment had, or equally had not, adequately worked.27 The re-invigorated 
political focus on Iraq of early 2001 also fitted in sufficiently with similarly long 
standing US, UK, and indeed other countries’, desires to see Saddam Hussein at least 
disarmed of WMD, if not removed from power altogether. Again, these sentiments 
dated most strongly from the end of the ‘Gulf War’ in 1991.28  
From February 2001, the new Bush administration, with the UK, increased 
the pressure on Iraq through further bombing raids.29 UK Prime Minister Tony Blair 
pledged to use ‘whatever means are necessary’30 to contain Saddam Hussein, and to 
stop the supposed Iraqi WMD development. As veteran Washington Post journalist, 
Bob Woodward observed during a Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) interview in 
September 2004: ‘…on Aug. 1, [2001], after a series of meetings among the National 
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Security Council [NSC] principals, they presented a document … called “A 
Liberation Strategy” for Iraq, attempting to ratchet up the pressure in terms of covert 
action, economic sanctions -- not a military invasion, however. It was only after 9/11 
that the president took [US Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld aside and said, 
“Let’s start looking at Iraq seriously.”’31 Indeed, after the 9/11 attacks, there is 
considerable evidence that several ‘hawkish’, ‘neo-conservative’, members of the 
Bush administration believed that there should now be the long hankered after 
action against Iraq.32 Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, in 
particular, thought that 9/11 provided the opportunity.  
However, others in the Bush administration were opposed. This was at least 
at this early stage in the burgeoning so-called ‘War on Terror’. Notably Vice-
President Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of 
State Colin Powell, and ultimately President Bush himself, decided to focus first on 
al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and international terrorism, and deal most immediately with 
Afghanistan. They would then return to the issue of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, and his 
alleged terrorism links and supposed WMD later. As Woodward again observed: 
‘All of the discussion of Iraq, it’s there, it’s serious, but the president and Cheney 
reject it and adopt very clearly an “Afghanistan first” policy. But it’s background 
music.’33 After, at least initial, ‘success’ in the operations undertaken in Afghanistan, 
and in the wake of the toppling of the Taliban regime, by around the end of 
November to early December 2001, Bush et al were again much more attentive to the 
issues of WMD and Iraq. The issue began to feature more prominently.34  
This prioritisation was especially highlighted by the US ‘State of the Union’ 
address of January 2002. The ‘axis of evil’, including Iraq, figured significantly. 
Indeed, US President Bush declared: ‘Iraq continues to flaunt its hostility toward 
America and to support terror. The Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax, and 
nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for over a decade. This is a regime that has already 
used poison gas to murder thousands of its own citizens… This is a regime that 
agreed to international inspections, then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime 
that has something to hide from the civilised world.’ He continued: ‘States like these, 
and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the 
world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and 
growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means 
to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United 
States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.’35 The 
Bush administration’s line of argument and course of action was becoming 
established publicly. 
Iraq was now again firmly at the top of the agendas of the UK and US 
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intelligence agencies. It also featured more in the media. Washington and London 
started to channel more energy and intelligence staff and resources into continuing 
to build their case against Saddam Hussein.36 Moreover, reportedly according to the 
BBC, ‘The day after the [‘axis of evil’] State of the Union message, members of the 
leading Iraqi opposition group, the Iraqi National Congress [(INC)], suddenly found 
doors were opening for them in Washington. Frozen funding was resumed.’37  
The essential prevailing political reasoning was one of inevitability. It was 
argued that Iraq and the decisive tackling of its supposed WMD issue, more or less 
whatever the intelligence picture of the precise nature of the threat confronted, 
would have to be undertaken sooner or later.38 What would need to be done in the 
future might as well be done now ran the prevailing reasoning. Constellations of 
location, space and time considerations emerged. Executing the desired policy 
against Iraq, not least following soon in the wake of the recent ‘defeat’ of the Taliban 
in nearby Afghanistan, and while substantial US military forces and matériel were 
already deployed geographically close to Iraq in the South Asia/Middle East Gulf 
region, resonated. This was not least in pragmatic managerial and organisational 
terms. 
However, the UK case for tackling Iraq was presently undeveloped. It was 
not ready at this early stage in the run-up to war. Nor was it yet sufficiently ready for 
a future risk to be conflated with a threat that was supposed to present an immediate 
danger/crisis, in terms of the underlying conceptualisation driving the ‘responsive’ 
pre-emptive policy trying to be pushed politically.39 In April 2002, a UK Government 
decision to publish evidence against Iraq was delayed. This was due to the body of 
evidence, based on sanitised intelligence sources and UK Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) intelligence assessments, arguably not yet being compelling enough, 
either quantitatively and/or qualitatively. Already existing intelligence, available 
from older and better-developed/vetted sources, appears not to have provided the 
case wanting to be established with enough political weight and urgency (see below 
[2.6]). Further tasking got underway as more, new, and indeed hopefully publicly 
persuasive, intelligence had to be gathered. This extended to it even having to be 
more actively hunted by UK intelligence agencies. Significantly, some of the 
intelligence secrecy and control restrictions were commensurably eroded. 
Instructively, in its report of September 2003, the UK Intelligence and Security 
Committee (ISC) later claimed the reason for not publishing a dossier in March 2002 
was ‘because the time was not right to produce either a document on the WMD 
capabilities of four countries including Iraq or on the Iraqi capability alone. The 24 
September [2002] dossier was a new piece of work, produced by the JIC Chairman, 
based on earlier material and new intelligence.’40 This observation simultaneously 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Chapter 5: Case Study 2 
V(ii) : 313 
provides an interesting insight into the JIC ‘process’ at the time. As a former 
Secretary to the JIC, Michael Herman, had catalogued in 2001 concerning how the 
JIC operated:  
 
It is misleading to see JIC assessment as just the work of a committee, or a 
principal committee sitting over its subsidiary London committees, the 
Current Intelligence Groups (CIG). It has always been serviced by a central 
staff who do the important drafting and effectively lead the system, 
sometimes short-circuiting committee procedures and producing items 
direct for senior readers.41  
 
Prolonging the electronics metaphor, did any ‘short-circuiting’ during the run-up to 
the war in Iraq cause the ‘fuses’ in the JIC system to become essentially blown – 
namely in the form of people (agents) bypassing formal mechanisms and machinery 
(structures) in high tempo and condensed space operating environments? The 
methods employed by some of the people acting within and in close proximity to the 
JIC could point to at least some of the less desirable outcomes observed later in terms 
of the handling and presentation of intelligence on supposed Iraqi WMD at the 
important producer-consumer nexus. This also concerned the handling of the badly 
laundered information that was eventually disseminated to the public through the 
notorious British dossiers. Intelligence sanitisation processes, together with 
validation processes, were badly skewed. In one instance of direct producer-
customer interaction, for example, the Butler Report provided some enlightening 
insights:  
 
… As it happened, the Chief of SIS had a meeting with the Prime Minister 
on 12 September [2002] to brief him on SIS operations in respect of Iraq. At 
this meeting, he briefed the Prime Minister on each of SIS’s main sources 
including the new source on trial. He told us that he had underlined to the 
Prime Minister the potential importance of the new source and what SIS 
understood his access to be; but also said that the case was developmental 
and that the source remained unproven. Nevertheless, it may be that, in the 
context of the intense interest at that moment in the status of Iraq’s 
prohibited weapons programmes, and in particular continuing work on the 
dossier, this concurrence of events caused more weight to be given to this 
unvalidated new source than would normally have been the case.42 
 
Arguably, the JIC itself was by now increasingly reflecting an antiquated structure 
akin to a relic dating from a different era, the Cold War. Worse, in the contemporary 
increasingly globalised early 21st century circumstances in which it was now being 
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forced to operate, it was being substantially stretched. While it had to consider a 
wider range and volume of sharply contrasting intelligence material of varying 
quality, which also had to meet political – rather than deliberative - requirements, its 
processes simultaneously had to be accelerated.  
Eventually, the JIC essentially became overextended. It was operating well 
beyond its conventional capabilities and its proper, as well as traditionally intended, 
functioning. There were also some prevailing worries about the extent of foreign 
liaison partner participation in the JIC (see Chapter 4 [7.0], above). These concerns 
were raised in 2005 by the commentator Dan Plesch, who claimed that: ‘Some former 
JIC staff and chairs have told me that they consider that it has become more and 
more difficult for the UK to think independently and to reject United States-sourced 
intelligence for fear of offending the Americans…’ However, he continued: ‘Others 
… say that since JIC meetings have two parts – one open to foreigners and another … 
closed, there is no cause for concern.’43 Although, the precise role of the JIC, in the 
overall decision- and policy-making processes in the UK during the run up to the 
war in Iraq, continued to be a focus of interest (see below [2.3]).44 
 
[2.3]: They who seek… find? 
Overall, it was readily apparent that some UK-US agreement did exist regarding the 
intelligence assessments on Iraq. For instance, as the later Robb-Silberman 
Commission report remarked: ‘For its part, the British Joint Intelligence Committee 
assessed, as did the [US National Intelligence Estimates] NIE, that the aluminum 
tubes, with some modifications, would be suitable for use in a centrifuge, but noted 
that there was no definitive intelligence that the tubes were destined for the nuclear 
program.’45 However, the UK-US agreement was not complete. Differences were 
most sharply delineated when it came to the specifics encountered at (and within) 
the micro/narrower levels of analysis into which intelligence liaison relations can be 
disaggregated.46 Moreover, differences became more apparent when intelligence was 
analysed (i) beyond the competencies (especially technical) and (ii) beyond the 
primary business (or ‘INT’) focus of the intelligence agency involved in conducting 
the analysis. As former Australian intelligence officer Andrew Wilkie noted: ‘Even in 
Australia the trust usually placed in the CIA was abandoned when it came to the 
aluminum tubes story.’47  
UK-US intelligence differences emerged early on. Some of these persisted over 
time, although they were increasingly subject to being ‘tidied’ into the background at 
the macro/higher levels. Convergence was the dominant theme. This was intended 
to help reach more UK-US agreement at the ideological/theoretical and 
strategy/policy levels. Indeed, at these latter levels, both within each of the UK and 
US, as well as between them, intelligence and security reach excesses and deficits 
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increasingly featured in the overall reach balances being struck. In March 2002, CIA 
Director George Tenet reportedly claimed US intelligence had detected ‘contacts and 
linkages’ between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein.48 This was something US 
politicians, such as US Vice-President Dick Cheney, seized upon. According to 
Woodward, ‘Former [US] president Gerald R. Ford said in an embargoed interview 
in July 2004 that… he agreed with former secretary of state Colin L. Powell’s 
assertion that Cheney developed a “fever” about the threat of terrorism and Iraq. “I 
think that’s probably true.”’49 As Paul Pillar, the former US National Intelligence 
Council (NIC) official responsible for the Middle East region, later observed: 
 
The issue of possible ties between Saddam and al Qaeda was especially 
prone to the selective use of raw intelligence to make a public case for war. 
In the shadowy world of international terrorism, almost anyone can be 
“linked” to almost anyone else if enough effort is made to find evidence of 
casual contacts, the mentioning of names in the same breath, or indications 
of common travels or experiences. Even the most minimal and 
circumstantial data can be adduced as evidence of a “relationship”, 
ignoring the important question of whether a given regime actually 
supports a given terrorist group and the fact that relationships can be 
competitive or distrustful rather than cooperative.50 
 
On both sides of the Atlantic, much scepticism remained concerning these 
claims in the intelligence communities. According to a US official in early February 
2003, ‘…drawing such a conclusion [official Iraq-al-Qaeda links] from Mr al-
Zarkawi’s presence in Baghdad was “an inferential leap”.’51 UK intelligence as a 
whole was especially critical of such links, and instead decided to focus their efforts 
on Iraqi WMD. Early on, at least, it appeared that a far more compelling case - in the 
style of a lawyer seeking argument/case-shoring evidence, rather than as an 
intelligence officer searching for any further potential investigative leads - could be 
made on the issue.52  
Over time, UK intelligence continued to remain sceptical of the weak alleged 
links between al-Qaeda and Iraq. As the Butler Report later observed: ‘LINKS 
BETWEEN AL QAIDA AND THE IRAQI REGIME: 42. The JIC made it clear that the 
Al Qaida-linked facilities in the Kurdish Ansar al Islam area [of northern Iraq] were 
involved in the production of chemical and biological agents, but that they were 
beyond the control of the Iraqi regime. (Paragraph 479); 43. The JIC made clear that, 
although there were contacts between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaida, there was no 
evidence of co-operation. (Paragraph 484).’53 The WMD disarmament argument 
appeared to have more mileage. Unfortunately, the Iraq-WMD-linked route was 
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subsequently proved to be just as bankrupt as the Iraq and al-Qaeda/terrorism-
linked route.54  
 
By early 2002, the UK was keen to know more. Current high-level US thinking on 
Iraq was sought. In these early stages of the eventual run-up to war, UK and US 
political and intelligence co-ordination and liaison on the issue of Iraq was arguably 
lacking. Prior to 9/11, SIS and CIA annually held a summit meeting at various 
locations. In early 2001, it was held in Bermuda. After 9/11 and during early 2002, 
however, Tenet was reportedly ‘too busy’ to have another such conference with UK 
intelligence. Tenet’s reluctance was suggestive that liaison with UK intelligence at 
this time was arguably not the priority, or indeed so important, or useful, in terms of 
the sources and other intelligence which could be exchanged. The UK-US 
intelligence interactions could be left to those that were routine at the more 
regularised, micro/lower levels of operation. By early July 2002, the UK reportedly 
urgently requested a meeting with the CIA. This suggested UK hunger for more 
intelligence input on a range of issues, including US intentions and the latest 
intelligence the US had on Iraq. After the apparent ‘insistence’ of SIS, eventually a 
summit meeting was held with the CIA at their headquarters in Langley. Blair 
appears to have tasked Sir Richard Dearlove (‘C’), the Chief of SIS, with finding out 
the Bush administration’s current position on the issue of Iraq.55  
Intelligence from that SIS-CIA meeting was soon forthcoming. On 23 July 
2002, Downing Street foreign policy aide, Matthew Rycroft, sent to David Manning, 
Blair’s chief foreign policy adviser - and to other select UK officials on a restricted list 
- the so-called ‘secret Downing Street memo’. On intelligence it stated that:  
 
C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift 
in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to 
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of 
terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around 
the policy. The NSC [US National Security Council] had no patience with 
the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi 
regime’s record…56 
 
The future did not augur well. By late 2002, it was clear that intelligence was 
increasingly irrelevant. Such a scenario was also suggestive of the legitimate basis for 
conducting intelligence activities becoming increasingly perverted, and intelligence 
was instead emerging as an entity that could be ‘picked and mixed’ to fit the 
prevailing political desires. This was apparent after reportedly ‘the CIA … made a 
major intelligence breakthrough on Iraq’s nuclear program [when] Naji Sabri, Iraq’s 
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foreign minister… made a deal to reveal Iraq’s military secrets to the CIA.’ Tyler 
Drumheller, Europe division chief for the CIA Directorate of Operations (DO), until 
his retirement in 2005, headed up the operation: ‘“This was a very high inner circle of 
Saddam Hussein. Someone who would know what he was talking about … He told 
us that they had no active weapons of mass destruction program…”’ Drumheller 
continued: ‘“The policy was set… The war in Iraq was coming. And they [the 
policymakers] were looking for intelligence to fit into the policy, to justify the 
policy.” … Once they learned what it was the source had to say — that Saddam 
Hussein did not have the capability to wage nuclear war or have an active WMD 
program, Drumheller says, “They stopped being interested in the intelligence.”’57 
Later, he remarked: ‘Eventually I had to accept that nothing we said or did was 
going to change the administration’s collective mind.’58 
A worrying paradox was emerging. Indeed, this scenario also made it all the 
more ironic that the case for war would try to be built on intelligence ‘evidence’. At 
least intelligence would give the war a veneer of respectability and seeming 
legitimacy publicly – or so it was hoped. Publics, through the conduit of the 
generally passive and uninformed mainstream media, are arguably somewhat 
readily seduced by the presentation of ‘secret’ intelligence, which can only be taken 
at face-value.59 Its full veracity can rarely be challenged by those ‘not in the know’ 
and excluded from the ‘inner ring(s) of secrecy’. Strategic differences were also a 
factor. The Downing Street memo clearly expressed London’s concern that ‘… on the 
political strategy, there could be US/UK differences…’60 Another marketing strategy, 
or at least some capitulation, would have to be devised to prevent this state of affairs 
from occurring.  
WMD featured prominently in the US National Strategy of September 2002.61 
Globalised security issues were becoming increasingly integrated (or conflated).62 
The early uncertainty surrounding the exact status of supposed Iraqi WMD was not 
missed, however, with reporters noting in September 2002 that: ‘Tony Blair… has 
until now insisted that the UK and US do not know the state of Iraq’s weapons 
capability because United Nations inspectors have not been allowed into the country 
for the past four years…’63 Moreover, towards the end of December 2002, there were 
still some concerns emanating from the UK intelligence community that the US 
intelligence community was perhaps not sharing to the fullest extent. According to 
an unnamed senior British official: ‘We know [of] material which is unaccounted 
for… But we have not got a definite site, a grid reference, where we can say Saddam 
is hiding it…’ Reflecting some of the continuing wider uncertainties, as well as some 
of the ambiguity discernable within UK-US intelligence liaison relations as they were 
being conducted in real-time situations, the official maintained: ‘If the US 
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administration does indeed have that kind of specifics, it has not been passed on to 
us. The main problem is known to us all. After all, it was Paul Wolfowitz … who 
said, “Iraq isn’t a country where we’ve had human intelligence for years”.’64 
The UK and US intelligence agencies now, at least in theory, had to establish 
more clearly the status of supposed Iraqi WMD and related programmes. This had to 
be accomplished without (at this stage) what is believed to have been essentially one 
of their previously most useful and reliable sources of information (despite the 
earlier political dismissals), namely the UN weapons inspectors.65 When UN 
weapons inspectors were later re-introduced into Iraq in November 2002, under the 
authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, arguably they were then 
essentially not helped by the US and the UK, frustrating them from performing to 
their fullest potential (see below [2.4/2.6]).66  
In political terms, the selection of Dr Hans Blix to head up the renewed 
weapons inspections was particularly unfortunate. In the eyes of some critical 
decision-makers, especially in the US, Blix had already failed to impress vis-à-vis the 
issue of Iraq and its arms inspections. This had occurred when he had previously 
held the post of head of the IAEA from 1981-1997, during the period when Iraq’s 
clandestine extended nuclear programme had subsequently been exposed after the 
first Gulf War in 1991.67 As Drumheller noted: ‘This general view developed that the 
inspectors were a bunch of clowns, which wasn’t true. The inspectors are very 
serious guys, and they actually did an effective job -- not perfect, but they were 
pretty effective. But the intelligence that was coming in was saying that there aren’t 
any weapons, the actual hard intelligence.’68 Politically, however, these findings were 
discounted. 
Ultimately, UK and US intelligence were under pressure. They felt somewhat 
obligated to provide (or in ‘Whitehall/mandarin-speak’, deliver) evidence to meet, 
and indeed surpass, the ‘burden of proof’ for justifying the war. This was done in 
order to help bolster the grand aims of the hard ‘shock and awe rollback’ political 
regime change case (pervaded by a counter-proliferation paradigm), originating in 
particularly strong terms from Washington. This was rather than focussing to a 
greater extent on a softer ‘containment and then gradual rollback’ disarmament case 
(influenced by a greater and wider encompassing non-proliferation paradigm), 
which was more favoured in other countries’ capitals. The counter-proliferation 
paradigm was in the ascendancy.  
In fact, perhaps more debatable is whether a ‘burden of proof’ really was 
actually needed. This was given that military action was essentially looking, and 
arguably was becoming, increasingly ‘inevitable’ as time leading up to the launch of 
the war (in the narrow window available) rapidly progressed. Indeed, on a perceived 
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stagnant issue, where stalemate had prevailed for some time, any form of kinetic was 
demanded. This course of action was essentially followed whatever the precise 
circumstances.69 Intelligence resources in both the UK and US were becoming too 
overburdened in an unhelpful and overly narrow direction. 
 
In the end, adopting this approach, and trying to fulfil all these requirements at once, 
proved to be far too ambitious. Disconnects in several areas in both the UK and US, 
as well as between them, emerged compellingly. The burden of responsibility being 
placed upon individual UK and US intelligence, as well as on more joint UK-US 
shared intelligence, was too great. Later, in January 2004 in a spirited defence of UK 
intelligence, Sir Rodric Braithwaite, former Chairman of the Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) and foreign policy adviser to UK PM John Major, tried to 
contextualise the dilemmas UK intelligence had encountered. He rallied against 
‘unreasonable expectations’, declaring that ‘Intelligence agencies are no more 
immune to error than other human organisations.’ Drawing a valid contrast between 
the UK and US, he continued by noting that: ‘The Americans believe that truth 
emerges from a dialectical clash of opinions… The British, on the other hand, try to 
reach a consensus among interested parties. Their instrument is the Joint Intelligence 
Committee [JIC]…’ Indeed, as Braithwaite also remarked, providing some further 
insights into the JIC process and how it operates: ‘The result is often a bland lowest 
common denominator, which does not make exciting reading. One minister 
remarked that he found JIC assessments “very boring”. And a colleague said they 
were “very unhelpful” on the subject. I took it all as a compliment. The alternative is 
worse: the risk identified by [former Chairman of JIC, Sir Percy] Cradock [is] that 
“the analysts become courtiers, whereas their proper function is to report their 
findings, almost always unpalatable, without fear or favour.”’ In Braithwaite’s view, 
and equally supported by the findings of this case study,  
 
…the JIC’s real failure seems to have been that it fell straight into Cradock’s 
trap. It stepped outside its traditional role. It entered the prime minister’s 
magic circle. It was engulfed in the atmosphere of excitement which 
surrounds all decision-making in a crisis. It went beyond assessment to 
become part of the process of making, advocating and implementing 
policy. That was bound to undermine the objectivity which is the main 
justification for its existence.70  
 
Both UK and US intelligence capabilities and capacities, together with the sources 
they were each variously and overly relying upon, were being stretched too far. 
In private, this intelligence overstretch was something that was dawning on US 
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Secretary of State Colin Powell. This was especially as he later tried to put together 
his 5 February 2003 presentation for the UN Security Council (see below [2.4]). In the 
days before that presentation, rather than the verification of the intelligence being the 
dominant mode, rejection was instead. As he and his secret review team checked and 
decided which supporting intelligence to include and remove from the draft 
presentation to the UNSC, Powell at one stage reportedly got so exasperated that he 
declared: ‘I’m not reading this. This is bullshit.’71 His case appeared to be (and was) 
being built on increasingly shaky ground.  
Worse was to come. At the launch of the UK dossier of 24 September 2002, 
critically Blair did not articulate any ambiguity in the case. As former Australian 
intelligence analyst Wilkie argued, again demonstrating the extent of allied Western 
intelligence convergence, as well as the commensurate haemorrhaging of adequate 
intelligence tradecraft and management techniques: ‘Most often the deceit lay in the 
way Washington, London and Canberra deliberately skewed the truth by taking the 
ambiguity out of the issue… On balance the strong, unambiguous language 
contained in the case for war seemed more the work of salespeople than professional 
intelligence officers.’72 In Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the 
British Government, essential caveats appeared to be suppressed. Indeed, as part of 
the UK’s striving to make a compelling, not only a convincing, disarmament case, 
Blair announced that Saddam Hussein’s ‘WMD program is active, detailed and 
growing. The policy of containment is not working…’73 However, it was Blair’s 
forceful ‘Foreword’ to the dossier – including passages such as: ‘…Saddam Hussein 
is continuing to develop WMD, and with them the ability to inflict real damage upon 
the region, and the stability of the world…’74 - which was particularly problematic 
for the case Blair et al were trying to make.  
The dossier featured centrally. Notably, it was judged by Wilkie as a ‘key 
building block for the case, not least because of its timing and scope.’75 This was 
unfortunate, and would continue to bedevil Blair et al into the future. Not least, this 
came as making a credible disarmament case continued to collapse under the weight 
of (or in danger of being hoist by) its own petard-like claims. As the Butler Report 
later revealed, there was evidence of UK-US liaison as the dossier was compiled: ‘In 
preparing the dossier, the UK consulted the US.’ To help their premier ally, based on 
sanitised information acquired during a unilateral ‘fact-finding’ mission they had 
recently undertaken (see below [2.6]): ‘The CIA advised caution about any 
suggestion that Iraq had succeeded in acquiring uranium from Africa, but agreed 
that there was evidence that it had been sought.’76 
Senior Iraqi officials publicly dismissed the September dossier. Blair’s launch 
announcement was also termed by Lt. Gen. Amir Sadi, an adviser to Saddam 
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Hussein, as ‘a hodgepodge of half-truths, lies and naïve allegations.’77 But was this 
Iraqi rejection a ‘double-cross’? During October 2002, the CIA released a National 
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) document, also including references to Iraq and uranium 
from Niger.78 However, some persisting CIA uncertainty was suggested with the 
qualification in the NIE that the CIA ‘cannot confirm whether Iraq succeeded in 
acquiring uranium ore and/or yellowcake from these sources.’79 The shadows of 
something rather more sinister within international intelligence liaison relationships, 
as well as the extent and consequences of their important overlap, was suggested. 
This was together with the (rarely flawless) collaborative impact these activities can 
stimulate. Overall, the Australian WMD inquiry later was critical of the UK and US 
dossiers, noting that:  
 
Both the US and UK documents, as published in September/October 2002, 
presented an unequivocal and uncontested view of Iraq’s possession of 
WMD and its willingness to use them. This view did not recognise the gaps 
in the intelligence, the problematic nature of much of the new intelligence 
or the uncertainties and disputes within the agencies about what the 
intelligence meant. Taken together, the omissions and changes constituted 
an exaggeration of the available intelligence, since established as an 
exaggeration of the facts.80 
  
Again, the ‘irrelevance’ of intelligence was highlighted. This was most apparent 
when that intelligence was trying to be evaluated in the face of a ‘fixed’ policy. 
Intelligence that did not shore up the argument being advanced by the Bush 
administration, such as those sources that claimed there were not any Iraqi WMD, 
was discarded.81 Or perhaps, alternatively - or even in addition - the latter type of 
intelligence was in fact very relevant. Was it seized upon to fulfil the ‘private’ 
judgement by Dick Cheney, for example, that Iraq was ‘doable’?82 As Drumheller 
later observed, ‘[the] idea that we could overwhelm [the Iraqis and Iraq] with our 
technology really caught on.’83 Unfortunately, matériel - such as satellites, ‘smart 
bombs’, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) - can only go so far before their 
discernable limits are reached. Arguably the ‘human dimension’ was overly 
discounted, together with other cultural factors. Acontextualisation and streaks of 
arrogance also prevailed. Both of the above scenarios resonate, however, offering an 
effective reflection of the reality.84 
Considerable uncertainty remained. Looking increasingly prescient from the 
later vantage point of 2008, towards the end of February 2003 a news report claimed 
that: ‘…Experts can spin out countless … scary scenarios [concerning Iraq]. Kurdish 
parties could be tempted to push for independence. The country could split between 
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Shiite and Sunni Muslims. Or neighbor Iran could meddle. “On some days, I get up 
thinking this will be relatively quick and we will be left with a pretty good situation 
afterwards,” says one U.S. official involved in the planning. “On other days, I wake 
up and think, ‘Holy sh - -.’”’85 Several analysts and experts in the UK and US 
intelligence communities could not agree amongst themselves, especially when 
delving more widely and deeply. This was of little value to the politicians on either 
side of the Atlantic, especially regarding the case they were trying to build and 
present to the public. Indeed, it was unhelpful and frustrating.86 Discernibly, a 
sizeable quantity of scepticism, ambiguity and a lack of clarity persisted amongst 
serving and former intelligence officials and more technically inclined WMD experts. 
This was particularly evident when President Bush’s televised address to the US 
nation on 7 October 2002 was criticised. Meanwhile, it appeared according to reports, 
and supported by the findings of the later Australian Parliamentary inquiry 
concerning supposed Iraqi WMD, that ‘officials in the CIA, FBI and energy 
department are being put under intense pressure to produce reports which back the 
administration’s line…’87 However, the persisting US and UK intelligence differences 
over the Iraq and uranium claim during 2002 and later beyond (see below [2.6]) 
contributed towards, at least on this earlier occasion, the CIA successfully requesting 
that such references were removed from Bush’s address before it was delivered.88 
However, the luxury of time for observing such nuanced intelligence considerations 
was not to last for long. 
 
[2.4]: Trying the United Nations route: 
On 8 November 2002, the UN Security Council (UNSC) unanimously passed UNSCR 
1441.89 The extent of sufficiently existing international consensus amongst the 
members in the UNSC on the issue of ‘containing’ and disarming Iraq of WMD was 
demonstrated. Later, however, both the UK and US failed to capitalise upon this 
earlier ‘success’ at the UN in order to secure a second unifying UNSCR. A second 
‘insurance policy’ UNSCR could have more explicitly sanctioned WMD 
disarmament and more firmly legitimised military intervention in Iraq, rather than 
more controversially relying just on UNSCR 1441. In its text, UNSCR 1441 recalled 
‘repeated warning of “Serious Consequences” for continued violations… Holding 
Iraq in “material breach” of its obligations under previous resolutions, the Security 
Council … decided to afford it a “final opportunity to comply” with its disarmament 
obligations [within 45 days], while setting up an enhanced inspection regime for full 
and verified completion of the disarmament process established by [UNSC] 
resolution 687 (1991)…’90 Blix, as chief UN weapons inspector, took charge of the 
new round of UN investigations (UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection 
Commission - UNMOVIC).91 UK and US intelligence supplied some information to 
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‘assist’ with the UN inspections. This was forthcoming as the inspectors returned to 
Iraq as stipulated by UNSCR 1441.92  
Enhanced information gathering was wanted. Perhaps showing US 
intelligence ‘desperation’ at this time for further intelligence, it was observed that: 
‘The United States has signalled that it will reward any Iraqi scientists coming 
forward with information about Saddam Hussein’s clandestine weapons 
programmes with sanctuary… “The key to the next few months is getting a couple of 
good defectors,” [noted] one [US] official.’93 These reports also suggested the 
arguably potentially ‘dangerous’ lengths, extending to overreach, intelligence would 
need to go to in order to successfully deliver to its tasked requirements. For example, 
hinted was the extent of arguably relying too heavily on potentially untrustworthy 
defector and dissident sources, such as was eventually witnessed most notably with 
regard to ‘CURVEBALL’.94 However, such a situation was eventually discounted by 
the Butler Report, at least with regard to the performance of UK intelligence: ‘We do 
not believe that over-reliance on dissident and émigré sources was a major cause of 
subsequent weaknesses in the human intelligence relied on by the UK.’ 95 Ultimately, 
did the presence of potentially untrustworthy sources in this context of an agenda set 
on regime change really matter? As already witnessed (see above [2.3]), not really.  
More concerningly for intelligence agencies, however, was the enhanced 
plausibility of the argument that they were increasingly losing control of their 
product. This included its associated handling, both vis-à-vis and by their customers. 
These concerns emerged especially as the product was being inputted on industrial 
scales into vast intelligence databases, such as the US Secret Internet Protocol Router 
Network (see Chapter 4 [10.0]), to which policy/decision-makers had their own 
secure access. This type of facilitator, enabling intelligence pooling, allowed 
consumers to conduct their own analysis and synthesise their own assessments. 
These activities extended beyond those conducted merely by the agencies and their 
traditionally skilled analysts, who, by contrast, were more inclined to exhibit 
tradecraft standards and qualities, as well as recognise their significance.96 
In December 2002, UK and US intelligence came under some early criticism. 
While still facing some Iraqi intransigence, simultaneously the UK-US intelligence 
sharing with Blix was not as extensive as he would have liked. Further tensions were 
generated. The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) also later found 
that ‘The rationale used by the Central Intelligence Agency for deciding what 
information to share with the United Nations was inherently subjective, 
inconsistently applied, and not well-documented…’97 The UK offered to give UN 
weapons inspectors Iraqi telephone conversations that had been intercepted at 
GCHQ, and hinted that the quantity of intelligence shared would increase. Arguably, 
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in harmony with their tasked agenda, this supply of information was provided in 
order to help bolster the overarching case–building attempts. However, doubts still 
remained concerning the supposed Iraqi WMD and related programmes ‘evidence’. 
Those doubts also persisted, not least amongst the weapons inspectors themselves, 
concerning the quantity and quality of the intelligence held by both the UK and the 
US.98 Meanwhile, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw pointed to the UK essentially 
embracing ‘America’s “axis of evil” philosophy’. This development came when the 
UK appeared to move closer - at least politically - towards the US position on the 
issue of WMD at the macro/broad levels of their interactions.99 The counter-
proliferation paradigm continued to burgeon. 
The descent towards war was gaining momentum. Early in January 2003, 
ahead of his final deadline of 27 January, Blix gave an interim status report to the 
UNSC. He observed that no Iraqi WMD or ‘smoking guns’ had been found. 
Remarkably (or perhaps not given the eventual outcome), this was despite all of the 
UK and US intelligence efforts to try and provide those ‘smoking guns’ - conducted 
by variously assisting Blix through providing, if not UK-US intelligence in its purist 
and most actionable form, at least information, regarding sites where those weapons 
should be discovered. Nevertheless, several questions remained unanswered and it 
was felt that the Iraqis needed to be more co-operative.100 The UN weapons 
inspectors’ ambiguity concerning Iraqi WMD persisted over time. The US was not 
convinced by the UN/IAEA weapons inspections results.101 However, in the 
intelligence world, as former US intelligence officer Frederick Harrison, writing later 
in the Defense Intelligence Journal, has observed: ‘Sometimes, truth is discovered not 
by connecting dots, but by determining that there are none.’102 Rightly, the UN 
weapons inspectors were trying to be more discursive on the issue. They were acting 
more as a source of information and were trying to just present the facts so the facts 
could ‘speak for themselves’. This was rather than the weapons inspectors intending 
to make or support a specific case one way or the other regarding the issue of 
supposed Iraqi WMD. Ambiguity overall persisted. 
UK and US intelligence efforts continued in the background. Both jointly and 
individually, the UK and US case building occurred in parallel to the UN weapons 
inspectors’ efforts. On 14 January 2003, the UK Government released another (the 
second) dossier. Blair again unambiguously claimed Saddam Hussein’s WMD 
programme was ‘active, detailed and growing…’ The conclusions of uncertainty so 
far reached by Blix et al, who were actually on the ground in Iraq - including visiting 
the suspected sites that were pointed to by the UK and US through the data they 
supplied (see above) - were thus contradicted. Blair meanwhile reiterated, with 
doubts suppressed: ‘The policy of containment is not working. The WMD 
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programme is not shut down. It is up and running.’ The available intelligence 
appeared to be (and was) being stretched. Similarly to the first dossier, the new 
dossier again sensationally claimed that Iraq could deploy WMD in 45-minutes, Iraq 
had sought uranium from Africa, and that mobile biological weapon laboratories 
had been developed.103 Much to the CIA’s regret, and despite their prevailing doubts 
and best (albeit typically haphazard) efforts, the extent of inadequately controlled 
UK-US intelligence pooling on this issue was soon apparent. This was with the 
reference to the Niger yellowcake, and the British links to the claim, figuring in 
Bush’s January 2003 State of the Union address (see below [2.6]). 
Washington was similarly sceptical concerning the UN inspections. 
Reportedly, by 31 January, behind-the-scenes Bush saw war as ‘inevitable’. This was 
according to a ‘confidential memo’ by David Manning, Blair’s head foreign policy 
adviser, recording a Blair-Bush Oval Office meeting.104 Blair said he would ‘solidly’ 
back the US, while the second UN resolution would serve as an ‘insurance policy’.105 
Back in the public domain, in a push for that second UNSC resolution, on 5 February 
2003 US Secretary of State Colin Powell made his presentation to the UNSC. The 
presentation pulled together the mélange of UK and US ‘intelligence’ and ‘evidence’. 
This was intended to try and convince the UNSC members and international public 
opinion that the Iraqis were still not complying with UNSCR 1441. According to the 
case made, the Iraq WMD still existed along with related programmes.106 The source 
‘CURVEBALL’ was again pivotal. This was particularly where Powell declared: 
‘…One of the most worrisome things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we 
have on Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities 
used to make biological agents… The source was an eyewitness, an Iraqi chemical 
engineer who supervised one of these facilities… This defector is currently hiding in 
another country [Germany] with the certain knowledge that Saddam Hussein will 
kill him if he finds him…’107 As Drumheller later revealled in an interview with Der 
Speigel in early January 2007, CURVEBALL’s central role was particularly 
unfortunate for - at the least - German-US intelligence liaison relations. It is not too 
much of a stretch to observe that some British Intelligence operatives, given their 
professional views concerning CURVEBALL that have already been expressed, 
similarly would not have been impressed by this turn of events:  
 
Drumheller: I had assured my German friends that [CURVEBALL] 
wouldn’t be in the speech. I really thought that I had put it to bed. I had 
warned the CIA deputy John McLaughlin that this case could be fabricated. 
The night before the speech, then CIA director George Tenet called me at 
home. I said: “Hey Boss, be careful with that German report. It’s supposed 
to be taken out. There are a lot of problems with that.” He said: “Yeah, 
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yeah. Right. Don’t worry about that.” 
 
SPIEGEL: But it turned out to be the centerpiece in Powell’s presentation -- 
and nobody had told him about the doubts. 
 
Drumheller: I turned on the TV in my office, and there it was. So the first 
thing I thought, having worked in the government all my life, was that we 
probably gave Powell the wrong speech. We checked our files and found 
out that they had just ignored it. 
 
SPIEGEL: So the White House just ignored the fact that the whole story 
might have been untrue? 
 
Drumheller: The policy was set…108 
 
At the UN, the US, and closely in train, the UK, tried to push their case for pre-
emptive action against Iraq on the basis of the ‘evidence’ presented. Although many 
key UNSC members, such as France (headed by the former French-Algerian war 
veteran President Chirac), remained firmly unpersuaded.109 Significantly, this was 
despite having access to most of the same or similar intelligence, as well as to the 
sources shared in Powell’s recent presentation. Germany (at least publicly, and 
beyond the more cloistered intelligence world110) and Russia (headed by the former 
KGB intelligence officer, President Putin) were also opposed, wanting more time for, 
and as repeatedly requested by, the UN weapons inspectors.111 High-level political 
relations with the US in particular, and by close association, with the UK, cooled 
considerably.112 
In February 2003, Katharine Gun, a translator working at GCHQ, leaked a 
memo. Detailed insights into UK and US intelligence interactions were soon 
forthcoming. By 2 March, the memo appeared in The Observer newspaper. As a 
consequence of the leaking activity, an insight was granted into the extent and nature 
of UK-US intelligence liaison then taking place in the SIGINT UKUSA arrangement. 
The leak again demonstrated the lengths – extending to the allegedly illegal, at least 
in terms of international law - that both the UK and US intelligence communities 
were going to in order to deliver their tasked outcomes. Collective UK-US 
intelligence ‘desperation’ for any leads and useful intelligence was again suggested. 
The document leaked appears to have been an ‘informal’ approach, in the form of an 
e-mail/memo from Frank Koza, Defense Chief of Staff (Regional Targets) at the US 
NSA.113 (The judgement that this was an ‘informal’ communication stems from the 
passage in the text, ‘… I suspect that you’ll be hearing more along these lines in 
formal channels…’114) Dated 31 January 2003, the communication was forwarded 
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around GCHQ essentially requesting UK assistance in monitoring six members of 
the UN Security Council. These parties’ votes would be crucial in order to support 
the second resolution sanctioning military intervention in Iraq. The telephones of 
officials from Angola, Cameroon, Chile, Bulgaria, Guinea and Pakistan were 
monitored in an intelligence ‘surge’ seemingly violating diplomatic protocols, such 
as the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This enabled the UK and US to 
determine those countries’ voting intentions and positions, thus aiding the UK and 
US in advance of subsequent UNSC resolution negotiations.115 The Iraq war 
‘insurance policy’ was proving increasingly elusive. 
Revelations continued. During February 2004, the UK Government decided 
not to prosecute Gun under the Official Secrets Act. Officials decided to let the issue 
quietly fade away into the background, especially as the precise ‘legality’ of the Iraq 
War would be increasingly (and uncomfortably) opened up for examination in court. 
The former Cabinet minister and International Development Secretary Clare Short 
somewhat, albeit temporarily, thwarted that strategy. She also made some further 
(but vaguer) allegations concerning the alleged UK and, at least by implication, US 
bugging of the office of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in New York. She claimed 
to have read transcripts of his telephone conversations.116 The origins and methods of 
intelligence and intelligence-gathering were once again exposed publicly in a manner 
that both the UK and US Governments were keen to quickly tidy away. The UK 
Government was determined not to allow the revelations of one intelligence 
employee and her conscience, and one former Cabinet minister - whom Blair 
denounced as ‘deeply irresponsible’117 - jeopardise overall UK-US intelligence liaison 
relations.  
The US and GCHQ were concerned by the Gun leak. However, the 
subsequent investigation and the speed at which the source of the leak was located 
and dealt with was helpful vis-à-vis the management of relations.118 The overall 
damage to UK-US intelligence relations from these episodes was not severe, and they 
did not impact overwhelmingly on the outcomes and effects of the liaison. Episodes, 
such as these, of occasional compromise on each side, are anticipated as part of the 
trade-offs of such a close intelligence relationship. GCHQ in turn, for example, is 
reportedly concerned about the rapid turnover of NSA staff.119 As a result, there is 
the contingency of effective mechanisms in place to assist with a quick and thorough 
post-‘incident’ investigation existing on both sides.120 Additionally in the Gun case, 
the ‘leak’ investigation was considerably aided by the integrity of the ‘source’ 
quickly identifying herself to the relevant authorities, and by the fact that her actions 
were ascribable to those of genuine conscience rather than political maliciousness. 
Significantly, the ‘leak’ ultimately did not detrimentally affect UK or US national 
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security, or the politicians.  
Chiming with the findings of the subsequent inquiries, revelations about the 
intelligence agencies were politically helpful to government. By letting the public 
and media dwell over time more on issues pertaining to (at least alleged) 
‘intelligence failure’, was arguably preferred. This was determined by the tightly 
drawn remits for the inquiries, such as that conducted specifically into the death of 
Dr David Kelly (see below [2.6]). Moreover, this approach was adopted because 
encouraging concentration on alleged ‘intelligence failure’ was an effective way of 
diverting (through distraction tactics) unwanted attention away from the 
politicians/policy-makers and their conduct. This was as well as diverting ‘heat’ 
away from other politically-charged issues, such as the ‘legality’ of the war. As 
Wilkie cogently argued, challenging the hegemony of ‘intelligence failure’ claims: ‘I 
emphasise that the [intelligence] agencies were producing measured assessments 
and that all it took to distort their work decisively was for politicians and their 
advisers to omit a few words like “uncorroborated evidence suggests” and insert a 
word or two like “massive”… In essence, the politicians turned uncertainty into 
certainty. Bush, Blair and [Australian Prime Minister John] Howard also chose to use 
the truth selectively, for example by regularly playing up the risk of WMD terrorism 
but neglecting to point out that the likelihood of such an attack is low.’121 As UK 
academic Mark Phythian also acknowledged in his later analysis of these events: 
‘…as with earlier investigations into intelligence failure on both sides of the Atlantic 
… the possibility of policy-maker failure representing a contributory factor was left 
unexplored.’122 US non-proliferation expert, Joseph Cirincione, was similarly critical 
of the inquiries and their findings: ‘First, by limiting the scope of their investigations 
to the narrow issues of intelligence policy and procedures, the commission and the 
committee fail to examine the larger policy failure. It was failure at the strategic level, 
not the operational or tactical, that caused US officials to underestimate the terrorist 
threat in the first instance, and then target the wrong country for attack in the second 
instance.’ He continued: ‘Second, in the name of political unity, they both stop short 
of the logical completion of their investigations: they pull their punches, and find no 
one is to blame. Or rather, they blame everyone, and thus no one… The result is … 
long on organisational diagrams and short on accountability.’123 US political scientist, 
Ian Shapiro meanwhile observed that: ‘The intelligence “failure” over WMD masked 
larger institutional and political failures on Capitol Hill. In view of what we have 
since learned of dissenting views within the intelligence community, and field 
reports that were at variance with the administration’s public claims about the threat 
Iraq actually posed, the questions have to be put: Where were the checks and 
balances? Where was the loyal opposition? In the absence of a vigorous opposition it 
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is easy for governments to get people to support war…’124 In his assessment, former 
US intelligence practitioner Drumheller pithily observed, ‘... the White House 
deliberately tried to draw a cloak over its own misjudgments by shining a light on 
ours.’125 
The spotlight was additionally diverted from scrutinizing the vitally 
important producer-consumer relationship. More muted departures in protest due to 
the dubious legality of the war, notably that of Elizabeth Wilmshurst from her post 
as Deputy Legal Adviser at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in March 
2003, were arguably potentially more damaging to the UK Government. This 
increased the pressure exerted on the politicians and focussed the spotlight in a more 
concentrated manner on their flimsy disarmament case for war, which was more 
rooted in perceived Iraqi intent in the long-term rather than its actual immediate 
capabilities.126 Still enduring into 2007, palpable dissatisfaction concerning these 
issues remained apparent in the UK.127 
The Iraq-terrorism link continued to be probed in the immediate pre-war 
phase. In February 2003, the UK and US intelligence agencies were still struggling to 
establish links between al-Qaeda and Iraq. While it was an integral part of their 
multiple-branched investigations, UK and US intelligence ‘closure’ on this issue 
remained elusive. Reportedly, they remained ‘unconvinced by the allegations made 
by senior US politicians’, such as Cheney.128 Reports that Jordanian Abu Musaab al-
Zarkawi ‘known to have worked on al-Qaeda’s [WMD] programme in Afghanistan’ 
had visited Baghdad for ‘medical treatment’ around May 2002,129 were arguably too 
circumstantial and lacking in substance to draw direct links to Saddam Hussein. This 
was at least the case for (the majority of) intelligence practitioners. US politicians, 
however, were seemingly more convinced by such links.130 Crucially, more short-
term revelations (or intelligence ‘blips’), needed to be put into better overall and 
longer-term perspective - especially given that Iraq had been a long-term target of 
UK-US intelligence interest. It, therefore, hardly formed a ‘new’ issue; nor was it a 
subject void of plenty of essential contextualisation opportunities. However, none of 
these were properly or meaningfully seized. Events then rapidly overtook the UK 
and US intelligence agencies and diplomats.131 After the persisting failure to secure a 
second UNSC resolution, by 20 March 2003 the overt dimension of the US-UK-led 
war on Iraq – OPERATION ‘IRAQI FREEDOM’ - was underway.132  
 
[2.5]: It’s war! 
In the wake of Rumsfeld’s kinetic ‘shock and awe’, the invasion of Iraq progressed 
quickly.133 But where were the Iraqi WMD? Despite some Iraqi surrenders, by 17 
April 2003, it was observed that ‘no firm evidence of weapons production has 
emerged… “Our experience to date is that the [Iraqi] people we have… are sticking 
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to the party line, that there have been no [WMD] programmes since 1991”’, remarked 
an unspecified official.134 The 1990s Iraq ‘containment policy’, on the whole, had 
appeared to work after all. Towards the end of May 2003, one of the leading 
proponents for war, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, conceded that Iraqi 
WMD might have already been destroyed prior to the war.135 This was a line of 
argument that former chief UN weapons inspector and US Marine Scott Ritter had 
been trying to put across forcefully prior to the war:136 ‘President Bush is force-
feeding Americans “a whole bunch of oversimplified horse manure,” [Scott Ritter] 
told them boldly. “None of what you are being told remotely resembles the truth. 
Facts do matter, and it is time that you, the American people, start demanding the 
facts.”…’137 Postwar he could feel somewhat vindicated. Indeed, he later even 
dubbed this episode as ‘an intelligence success and [a] policy failure’. He explained 
his premise: ‘The job given to the CIA, and the job assumed by MI6, was that of 
regime change. In April 2003 they succeeded. The regime of Saddam Hussein was 
eliminated…’138  
Drumheller also challenged the intelligence ‘failure’ allegations. He later 
observed that: ‘“It just sticks in my craw every time I hear them say it’s an 
intelligence failure. … This was a policy failure”…’ Overall, as already argued, it was 
partially an intelligence failure - spearheaded by the US and in close train the UK, 
both jointly and individually. However, clearly the presence of the policy failure 
dimension undoubtedly helped to have knock-on ramifications onto the intelligence 
world and the nature of its interactions. Thereby, the policy failure also contributed 
substantially to the subsequent intelligence failure encountered, and therefore could 
quite legitimately take the lead in being the most flawed dimension.139 Continuing, 
Drumheller reportedly said that he did not ‘think it mattered very much to the 
administration what the intelligence community had to say. “I think it mattered it if 
verified. This basic belief that had taken hold in the U.S. government that now is the 
time, we had the means, all we needed was the will”…’140 
 
UK and US intelligence held their breath. Over time, the UK and US Governments 
faced growing disquiet over the rationale for the Iraq war. This was especially 
marked in light of the supposed Iraqi WMD not having been located.141 By 17 April 
2003, Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, a US military spokesman, tried to 
contextualise: ‘…the hunt for evidence of WMD is “very much putting together 
pieces of a puzzle, one piece at a time, and when you see the shape of the one piece, 
you see how it may relate to the other pieces that are out there.”’142 Adopting this 
contextualisation approach was now – finally - deemed to be of value, as it suitably 
met the political requirements. However, such arguments did not convince.  
Blame games started.143 Within the US intelligence community, the 
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CIA/Pentagon intelligence rivalries were emphasised, with each accusing the other 
of intelligence shortcomings and inaccuracies.144 The complicated and hostile politics 
amongst US intelligence bodies, including intense competition or ‘turf battles’ 
between the so-called ‘Cabal’ group of advisers and analysts based in the Pentagon’s 
Office of Special Plans (OSP) - headed by Doug Feith145 - the Defense Intelligence 
Agency (DIA), and the CIA, continued unabated in the context of Iraqi WMD 
intelligence fallout.146  
Indeed, there are several examples of ‘turf battles’ that have erupted over 
time within the US intelligence community. These also tie-in closely with the long-
term enduring CIA/Pentagon intelligence ‘rivalries’, and each trying to attain some 
sort of intelligence ascendancy over one another - in, for instance, the specific area of 
HUMINT collection and processing. By 2006, the Pentagon did seem to have 
triumphed over a weakened CIA, damaged in the wake of the Iraq war intelligence 
‘fallout’. The US intelligence ‘centre of gravity’ has therefore shifted away from the 
civilian intelligence agencies more to the military intelligence agencies.147 As US 
intelligence insider Mark Lowenthal has observed, highlighting how the US 
intelligence community operates: ‘The secretary of defense continues to control much 
more of the intelligence community on a day-by-day basis than does DNI [Director 
of National Intelligence]… At the same time, the secretary of defense is unlikely to 
have the same level of interest in intelligence as the DNI does. In fact, much of the 
responsibility for intelligence within DOD is delegated to the under-secretary of 
defense for intelligence (USDI), a relatively new office that was created in 2002.’148 By 
February 2007, following the published findings of a Pentagon Inspector General 
investigation, reportedly ‘Senate Democrats and Republicans disagreed … over the 
meaning and importance of … [the] conclusion that a Pentagon policy office 
produced and gave senior policymakers “alternative intelligence assessments on Iraq 
and Al Qaida relations” that were “inconsistent” with the intelligence community’s 
consensus view in the lead-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq…’149 
Amid the fallout, UK-US strains were similarly apparent. In terms of UK-US 
relations and their interactions over Iraq, together with the Blair-claimed equal 
partnership, according to Jonathan Steele, The Guardian newspaper’s roving foreign 
affairs correspondent and columnist:  
 
British officials were under no such illusions. “We weren’t plugged into the 
state department’s detailed planning exercise. We tried but couldn’t get 
into it. It was the first warning sign that we weren’t part of it,” one senior 
diplomat told me. In the words of another: “The UK supplied 10% of the 
invasion force. We provided 10% of the staff of the Coalition Provisional 
Authority. We had 10% of input into policy.” In the final weeks before the 
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invasion, the Pentagon wrested control of postwar planning away from the 
state department, leaving British ministers even more in the dark…150 
 
As Professor of War Studies at King’s College, London, Sir Lawrence Freedman had 
presciently observed in 1998, with an eye on Britain and revolution in military affairs 
(RMA) developments: ‘We can assume that [in the future] British foreign policy will 
still be tied to the United States and, like the Americans, will follow a line of limited 
liability but without lapsing into isolationism.’151 He continued: ‘If the Americans 
intervene in a particular conflict, it will be difficult for Britain to remain a spectator 
(although it may still opt for minimal participation)… As in the past, Britain’s force 
structure will be designed to find the minimum level sufficient to ensure access to 
high-level American decisionmaking…’152 Highlighting the most plausible form that 
the UK contribution/participation would take, which was exactly witnessed in 
relation to Iraq five years later in 2003, he maintained: ‘Immediate operational 
requirements will keep [Britain] focused on the infantry and Special Forces as well as 
seeing through established [defence and military] programs…’153 
 As vocal criticism concerning Iraq gathered momentum, UK-US intelligence 
interactions were increasingly brought into focus. More worryingly for UK-US 
intelligence relations, as the UK liaised with varying effect with all of the different 
sparring US intelligence agencies, were the claims presented in media reports that 
‘unreliable information had been passed to London as part of intelligence-sharing by 
American officials who had interviewed a defector recruited by the INC.’ However, 
some UK intelligence officers forcefully dismissed this claim considering it ‘to be 
unreliable and uncorroborated.’154 Another ‘season of inquiries’, similar to that 
witnessed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the US, was soon to be in the offing in 
both the UK and the US. 
 
[2.6]: The aftermath - inquiries begin into what went wrong: 
In June 2003, the US Congress decided to open an inquiry. The intelligence 
concerning supposed Iraqi WMD would be probed.155 Holes in the UK-US case for 
war continued to be exposed – not least the extent of alleged exaggeration by 
politicians. The embarrassing UK January 2003 ‘dodgy’ dossier, exposed as hastily 
and poorly compiled, was particularly criticised for using plagiarised content 
reportedly from a 12 year old PhD thesis,156 authored by an unaccredited ‘US-based 
expert on the Iraqi security services… and [it] contained elementary cut-and-paste 
errors.’157 Moreover, as University of Cambridge academic Glen Rangwala had 
quickly discovered soon after the dossier’s original publication, out of a total of 19 
pages, pages 6 to 16 were ‘directly copied’, inclusive of the original grammatical 
errors.158 As evidence of supposed Iraqi WMD continued to elude discovery, 
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intelligence officers and agencies on both sides of the Atlantic went on the defensive. 
Damage limitation exercises were attempted.159 Intelligence had counter-
productively been laundered in the public domain without necessary qualifiers and 
caveats included, and without the fuller complexities being sufficiently revealed or 
acknowledged. UK and US intelligence were dismayed. 
The security situation in Iraq continued to deteriorate. During June 2003, UN 
inspectors examined the looting of sensitive facilities, such as laboratories, in Iraq.160 
A leaked Pentagon Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report, dating from 
September 2002, reportedly noted that there was ‘no absolute proof that Iraq had 
WMD’, adding fuel to the speculation and controversy over supposed Iraqi WMD.161 
The so-called ‘45-minute claim’ was also increasingly discredited. The claim about 
Iraqi WMD being able to be deployed in 45 minutes was shown to be detrimentally 
over-simplified. The UK Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee (FAC) 
decided to launch an inquiry into especially that claim.162 In July 2003, Blix also 
raised concerns about the ’45-minute claim’.163 By July 2004, the Butler Report soberly 
concluded that: ‘The JIC should not have included the “45 minute” report in its 
assessment and in the Government’s [September 2002] dossier without stating what 
it was believed to refer to [that is, short-distance, battlefield weapons, rather than 
long range missiles]. The fact that the reference in the classified assessment was 
repeated in the dossier later led to suspicions that it had been included because of its 
eye-catching character.’164 Again, alluded to were the ‘mystique’ qualities attributed 
to intelligence, which could be conveniently relied upon for political purposes in 
tricky and complicated circumstances.  
The FAC final report was more muted from an intelligence perspective. 
Concerning UK-US intelligence, the FAC report provided little enlightenment. The 
findings of the report suffered from the FAC not having access to classified 
intelligence material, and from the FAC lacking the ability to draw on and question 
senior UK intelligence personnel. The ISC did have that ability, but in its later 
investigation into intelligence concerning Iraq’s WMD, the issue of UK-US 
intelligence and their liaison barely featured.165 As foreign agents, US intelligence 
personnel were of course well beyond the scope of both these inquiries’ jurisdiction, 
and hence could not be summoned to contribute their potentially enlightening 
insights. 
UN weapon inspector findings were similarly critical. In Blix’s final report 
presented to the UNSC he declared an ‘open verdict’ on supposed Iraqi WMD.166 
This was another disarmament/non-proliferation case where ambiguity had 
trumped certainty. The quality of intelligence supplied by the US and UK to Blix was 
also criticised by him, noting that on the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD there 
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remained ‘many unanswered questions’.167 Later Blix argued that he had 
encountered some unhelpful opposition from the Pentagon in Washington.168 
The UK political controversy concerning alleged political ‘editing’ or ‘sexing 
up’ of intelligence then broke into public view. No. 10 Downing Street denied 
pressure had been exerted on intelligence.169 Although they admitted that certain 
revisions had been needed in the drafting process of the September 2002 dossier.170 
UK Minister of Defence Geoff Hoon later remarked to the UK ISC that at the time, 
after seeing a draft of the dossier, he felt that ‘his “reaction in a political sense was 
that I was concerned that this was insufficiently dramatic to make our case as 
strongly as I would have liked it to be made.”’171 The role of the UK PM’s press chief, 
Alistair Campbell, in that process continued to be probed.172 Allegations made in a 
BBC report by BBC Defence correspondent Andrew Gilligan on the Today Radio 4 
programme, about which the BBC refused to apologise to the UK Government, as 
well as (perhaps more provocatively) an article written by Gilligan that was 
published shortly afterwards in the Mail On Sunday newspaper, did not help. These 
allegations concerned the UK September 2002 dossier essentially being ‘sexed up’ by 
Campbell in particular, which brought the BBC into conflict with the UK 
Government.173 In his approximate allegations, Gilligan got close to the roots of what 
had gone ‘wrong’, and where, in the overall government machinery. However, his 
chosen focus and approach of more singling out and emphasising Campbell’s role 
was less beneficial - not least in his accusations being too over-simplified. This was 
especially apparent with critical dimensions such as the JIC’s role in the overall 
dossier drafting process, under the chairmanship of Sir John Scarlett, being more 
overlooked. 
During early July 2003 the dispute escalated. Eventually the scientist Dr 
David Kelly - a former UN weapons inspector and important UK/global WMD 
expert – was identified as the BBC’s source, and not just confined to being solely the 
journalist Gilligan’s source. This sequence of events contributed to Kelly’s 
subsequent suicide on 18 July.174 His suicide compelled the UK Government to 
establish the Hutton Inquiry to investigate his death. Indeed, together with the 
FAC’s inquiry and the later ISC inquiry in September 2003, this inquiry was to form 
the second of four high profile official inquiries in the UK and US being conducted 
during 2003, probing the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD and associated matters.175  
Over the next series of weeks, several government ministers, civil servants 
and, perhaps more remarkably, intelligence officials, were called to give evidence at 
the Hutton Inquiry.176 Meanwhile, at least confined solely to the intelligence world at 
this early stage, there was already the postwar ‘withdrawal’ of some of the prewar 
intelligence by SIS due to its unreliability. However, Dearlove (‘C’) or Scarlett 
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(Chairman of the JIC) did not mention this development in their evidence to the 
Hutton Inquiry. Also suggesting the intelligence services’ withholding of some 
information from the intelligence producer-consumer/user relationship at this time - 
perhaps demonstrating somewhat of a breakdown of trust within the producer-
consumer relationship in the UK - Blair also appeared to be unaware of such 
intelligence developments by not having been briefed by C on the issue. Instead Blair 
apparently – and arguably politically conveniently, some might claim - found out 
later in 2004 from the Butler Report that the intelligence had been withdrawn. 
According to a later anodyne comment by Blair’s official spokesman, the ‘security 
services … felt that this development was “too sensitive” to be made public.’177 
Despite the release of several government documents and e-mails during the course 
of the Hutton inquiry, the final Hutton report, however, was widely perceived as a 
‘white-wash’.178 To much disappointment, it was felt that Hutton had perhaps been 
too harsh on the BBC, while keeping too narrowly to his remit (solely investigating 
the death of Dr Kelly). This was rather than roaming wider and including 
investigating the intelligence and political compiling of the case for war in the run-
up to the Iraq invasion, and thus castigating the politicians further. Campbell also 
was exonerated of Gilligan’s earlier ‘sexing up’ allegations. Indeed, according to 
Campbell’s own diary entry of 7 July 2003 (released by Lord Hutton during the 
course of his inquiry), Campbell observed from a conversation that he had just held 
with the Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) of the MoD, Sir Kevin Tebbit, that: ‘Kevin 
said the guy [Dr David Kelly] claimed he never mentioned me… Felt that maybe 
Gilligan just lied about the stuff about me … Again we should be saying the source 
was misrepresented by [Gilligan]…’179 Although formally exonerated, Campbell’s 
role as ‘communicator-in-chief’ in charge of ‘presentation’ in the dossier process 
nevertheless still continued to provoke several unanswered questions. 
Unsurprisingly, the US intelligence dimension also was absent. 
Storm clouds continued to gather. Throughout the summer of 2003, several 
questions remained concerning the supposed Iraqi WMD. The integrity of UK and 
US intelligence agencies, their analysis and assessment systems and the quality of 
their product, as well as (perhaps more concerningly) their respective relationships 
with foreign liaison services and the politicians (their customers/users), were all 
widely called into question. Together with the uncomfortable highlighting of these 
shortcomings publicly, many other questions, concerning the case for the war, were 
left completely unanswered or at most unsatisfactorily answered.180 Again the extent 
of uncertainty in UK and US intelligence circles concerning Iraqi WMD, and whether 
they would be deployed against coalition troops when attacking Iraq, was reportedly 
suggested in a UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) report entitled: Operations in Iraq 2003: 
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First Reflections.181 For battlespace ‘health and safety’ considerations, troops were 
issued with gas masks during the invasion of Iraq. On one plane of analysis, 
therefore, an argument could be made that, in the context of this perceived 
uncertainty, the invasion of Iraq was actually instead a potentially high-risk UK-US 
gamble. Although, the ambiguity - resulting from the absence of firmer evidence of 
actual Iraqi WMD, and indeed added to the reporting (both from intelligence and 
media sources) stating otherwise, and arguably more reliably countering the 
prevailing general flow of UK-US claims - could suggest that in the event the risks 
from supposed Iraqi WMD would actually be much lower. This last point accounts, 
at least in part, for the different Canadian response to the issue – notably its 
subsequent absence from the US ‘coalition of the willing’ that invaded Iraq in March 
2003.182 
The politicians’ credibility was similarly under challenge. Blair went on the 
defensive. As the UK Parliament Commons Liaison Committee questioned him on 
the issue in July 2003, he dismissed doubts concerning supposed Iraqi WMD 
claiming: ‘For me, the jury is not out at all.’183 Across the Atlantic, in his justification, 
Rumsfeld, in front of the US Senate Armed Service Committee, claimed: ‘The 
coalition did not act in Iraq because we had discovered dramatic evidence of Iraq’s 
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. We acted because we saw the evidence in a 
dramatic new light – through the prism of our experience on 9/11.’184 It was time to 
wake-up and pursue the perceived real and projected US national security threats 
more vigorously, including through the application of a forward strategy of pre-
emption.185 The counter-proliferation paradigm would now get fuller expression. 
UK-US intelligence divergences again featured. This was with the UK-US 
differences over intelligence concerning African uranium or Niger ‘yellowcake’ 
surfacing publicly to a fuller extent. By now, it was evident that the CIA had 
essentially disavowed the intelligence on the issue in 2002-03, after the CIA’s fact-
finding mission by former US Ambassador Joseph Wilson during early 2002. In a 
memo to the National Security Council (NSC), showing the lack of co-ordination of 
information flows in the US, a senior CIA official remarked: ‘We told Congress that 
the Brits have exaggerated this issue…’186 The US Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence (SSCI) inquiry also drew attention to an episode during September 2002 
where a CIA analyst in conversation with a NSC staff member apparently ‘suggested 
that the reference to Iraqi attempts to acquire uranium from Africa be removed. The 
CIA analyst said the NSC staff member said that would leave the British “flapping in 
the wind.”…’ The NSC staff member, in a later communication with the inquiry,  
 
said he had no recollection of telling a CIA analyst that the replacing the 
uranium reference would leave the British “flapping in the wind” and said 
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such a statement would have been illogical since the President never 
presented in any one speech every detail of intelligence gathered on Iraq 
either by the U.S. or the U.K.187  
 
With hindsight, the CIA had other regrets. It bemoaned the fact that the 16 word 
sentence, ‘The British Government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought 
significant quantities of uranium from Africa…’, had featured in Bush’s 28 January 
2003 State of the Union address. An apologetic statement was issued.188 As US 
investigative journalist Ron Suskind noted, and as seen earlier: ‘On that last score, 
CIA had … alerted the British – in mid-September [2002] – that MI6’s similar claims 
about the yellowcake had been investigated by U.S. intelligence and shown to be 
suspect.’189 The UK Government, however, continued to defend the African uranium 
intelligence. It claimed that not all the intelligence on the issue was shared with the 
US. Reportedly, that ‘UK-EYES ONLY’ intelligence ‘had come from a foreign 
[liaison] service [(believed to be the French190)] and [therefore] could not be 
disclosed.’191  
Despite their perceived cliquéness, UK and US intelligence were clearly not 
interacting alone. Several other states’ intelligence agencies were intimately involved 
in the thirsty UK and US intelligence-gathering processes in the run-up to war in 
Iraq. Much international intelligence liaison with both the UK and the US, jointly and 
individually, over the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD was going on behind the scenes. 
While inevitably many of the originating points of the intelligence involved are 
difficult to trace and unpack, it appears that the international intelligence liaison 
included (at the least) the Italian, French and German intelligence agencies. This was 
even though at the macro/higher political levels, France and Germany did not 
support the ‘means’ - notably the latest US-proposed course of action, war in Iraq 
(see above [2.4]). They had, however, remained consistently supportive of the ‘ends’, 
namely the disarmament of Iraqi WMD.192  
The existence of this extensive international intelligence liaison, with all of its 
‘double-edged sword’ characteristics, was most starkly witnessed during disputes 
over sources. This included over such dubious sources as ‘CURVEBALL’, and during 
the fallout surrounding the Niger uranium ‘yellowcake’ controversy. This last issue 
was one over which there was distinctly some significant Italian Intelligence (Italian 
Intelligence and Military Security Service, Servizio per le Informazioni e la Sicurezza 
Militare – SISMI) participation.193  
The SISMI involvement was very interesting. However, former Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) defense intelligence officer for the Middle East, South Asia 
and terrorism, Colonel W. Patrick Lang, was under no illusions why SISMI might be 
interested in contributing to overall efforts: ‘… SISMI would also have wanted to 
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ingratiate itself with the incoming administration. “These foreign intelligence 
agencies are so dependent on us [the US] that the urge to acquire I.O.U.’s is a 
powerful incentive by itself…”’194 As reported in 2005 by Laura Rozen, a Prospect 
senior correspondent and a national security correspondent for The Washington 
Monthly:  
 
… Nicolo Pollari, chief of … Sismi, brought the Niger yellowcake story 
directly to the White House [reportedly via a secret meeting held with 
Deputy National Security Adviser (NSA) Stephen Hadley on 9 September 
2002] after [Pollari’s] insistent overtures had been rejected by the Central 
Intelligence Agency in 2001 and 2002… the Italians sent the bogus 
intelligence about Niger and Iraq not only through traditional allied 
channels such as the CIA [and including copies sent to British and French 
Intelligence], but seemingly directly into the White House… [a] channel 
[that] amplifies questions about a now-infamous 16-word reference to the 
Niger uranium in President Bush's 2003 State of the Union address -- which 
remained in the speech despite warnings from the CIA and the State 
Department that the allegation was not substantiated.195 
 
For the sake of continuing and maintaining their overarching valuable intelligence 
liaison relationships with UK and US intelligence, intelligence co-operation was 
forthcoming from these quarters at the routine micro/lower levels. Maintaining close 
interactions with UK and US intelligence at these levels ultimately were overall more 
valuable than particular differences at the macro/higher levels could, and indeed 
perhaps more arguably should, be allowed to interrupt. Allegedly, for its different 
overarching stance concerning Iraq, Canada had arguably experienced a degree of 
intelligence ‘punishment’ at the hands of the US: ‘Aspects of the intelligence pipeline, 
which we’ve taken for granted, are shutting down. We’ve been told essentially by 
Pentagon officials that some of our senior officials need not call because they’re not 
going to get calls returned,’ claimed chair of the Canadian Parliamentary Defence 
Committee, David Pratt. However, Canadian Solicitor General Wayne Easter directly 
contradicted this claim (probably with more of a referential eye focussed on the CIA-
Canadian Security Intelligence Service [CSIS] ties than the defence/military 
intelligence links): ‘Our Canadian security intelligence agency is certainly working 
very closely with the Americans and with others around the world, as well…’196 
Through this enhanced international intelligence liaison, potentially useful 
sources could be passed on. Unfortunately, equally, as already seen, so could tainted 
sources, as well as incompletely/inadequately referenced ones, which – even worse – 
are then more easily susceptible to becoming artificially corroborated through other 
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liaison channels. The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) inquiry later 
concluded that:  
 
Because the United States lacked an official presence inside Iraq [for instance, 
due to not having human agents recruited within Saddam Hussein’s inner-
circle197], the Intelligence Community depended too heavily on defectors [a 
reference to sources, such as ‘CURVEBALL’] and foreign government services 
[for example, Germany, Italy, and the UK’s (SIS/MI6’s) own increasingly 
discredited and subsequently withdrawn sources (see above)] to obtain 
HUMINT information on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction activities. 
[Again, the familiar perennial US intelligence HUMINT weaknesses were 
clearly highlighted.] While these sources had the potential to provide some 
valuable information, they had a limited ability to provide the kind of detailed 
intelligence about current Iraqi weapons of mass destruction efforts sought by 
U.S. policymakers. Moreover, because the Intelligence Community did not 
have direct access to many of these sources, their credibility was difficult to 
assess and was often left to the foreign government services to judge [such as 
again as witnessed in relation to ‘CURVEBALL’ tightly-controlled by the 
German BND]…198 
 
Indeed, regarding this last issue, Dr David Kay, the former head of the Iraq Survey 
Group (see below [2.7]), was sharply critical. This international intelligence liaison 
had not been as successful as might have been hoped from the outset. Nor were 
intelligence liaison dividends reaped. More condemningly, albeit in an educative 
manner, it had exposed real weaknesses in tradecraft on all sides to each of the 
participants involved in the interactions, as well as – perhaps even more worryingly - 
to their other foreign liaison partners beyond. In a 2008 interview with Der Spiegel 
newspaper, Kay remarked: 
 
I stand by my criticism of the BND to this day: To not have checked up on 
the exile Iraqis in Germany who knew [‘CURVEBALL’], not to have made 
all the appropriate efforts to validate the source, is a level of irresponsibility 
that is awfully hard to imagine in a service like the BND. And then, the fact 
that they failed to provide direct access to him remains one of the most 
striking things. It was a blockade that made it impossible for any other 
service to validate his information. The German service did not live up to 
their responsibilities or to the level of integrity you would expect from such 
a service… I feel disillusioned. I think that ‘Curveball’ was the biggest and 
most consequential intelligence fiasco of my lifetime. It shows how 
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important effective civilian control of the intelligence services is, because 
non-transparency is extraordinarily dangerous for democracy.199 
 
Even between the UK and US, intimate intelligence sharing was not always 
forthcoming. Again concerning the Niger ‘yellowcake’ intelligence issue, similarly to 
the UK, the US also did not share all of its intelligence with its closest intelligence 
partners. It appears that the US did not share with the UK or Australia all of its 
information concerning the circumstances and results of Wilson’s fact-finding 
mission.200 The plot of the UK-US intelligence controversy over the Niger 
‘yellowcake’ issue then thickened somewhat. This was as reports noted that National 
Security Advisor (NSA) Condoleezza Rice defended the claim – perhaps with 
reference back to the secret September 2002 SISMI-Hadley meeting (see above) - 
while still admitting it should not have featured in the January 2003 State of the 
Union address.201 The Niger uranium intelligence UK-US differences continued with 
the CIA arguing that the claim was based on faked documents. The IAEA also had 
dismissed those documents as forgeries on 7 March 2003, shortly before the launch of 
the war in Iraq.202  
However, the UK maintained that it had a separate, unshared independent 
source the CIA did not.203 This source was believed to be acquired from GCHQ 
intercepts.204 Although, this claim has not gone uncontested by those in the US: 
‘Drumheller, who oversaw intelligence operations for the CIA in Europe doubts the 
British had something the U.S. didn’t. “No. I don’t think they did”…’205 The Butler 
Report noted that the UK and US intelligence services did not both rely on all of the 
same sources: ‘… It subsequently emerged that the intelligence from one of the US 
sources, a defector associated with the Iraqi National Congress, had already been 
retracted by the time the [US] National Intelligence Estimate [(NIE)] was issued. This 
source was not, however, relied on by the UK.’206 Neither did the Report judge the 
forgeries to have been an issue for UK intelligence as: ‘The forged documents were 
not available to the British Government at the time its assessment was made, and so 
the fact of the forgery does not undermine it.’207 In his now famous July 2003 New 
York Times article (due to the subsequently triggered ‘Plamegate’ affair208), former US 
diplomat Wilson argued adamantly that: ‘It was highly doubtful that any such 
(Niger-Iraq) transaction had ever taken place.’209 Whether ‘true’ or not, SIS preferred 
to let this controversy fade away once it had run its course. 
 
Many questions concerning intelligence still remained unanswered.210 Indeed, did 
the politicians instead over-rely on intelligence for their Iraq war case? Other UK and 
US intelligence differences were highlighted. As Mark Huband, security 
correspondent for the Financial Times, argued: ‘…information accepted by the CIA 
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was often rejected by MI6, and vice versa.’ There were the UK-US differences over 
Iraq, Niger and uranium, meanwhile, reportedly ‘other significant differences 
existed…’ These included regarding the alleged Saddam-al-Qaeda links, and the CIA 
believing Iraq could build a nuclear weapon in a year if there was no intervention, 
while UK intelligence instead believed that it would take at least twice that time. 
Once the war itself was underway, there were considerably differing UK-US views of 
Iraqi military capability and strategy.211 Those were not the only problematic 
concerns. Huband continued:  
 
Herein lies the difficulty for the US and UK governments… [To ‘win’ their 
‘case’ they] had at all costs to highlight the common ground and breadth of 
agreement that existed between them. But to achieve this they used 
material from intelligence agencies whose positions differed on crucial 
issues and whose often opposing views are a normal state for the 
intelligence community. It is these opposing positions that enrich the US-
UK intelligence-sharing process – but which have become the Achilles’ heel 
of the two countries’ political alliance… leaving their political masters to 
utter only partial facts while arguing that the full story cannot be told 
because it is a secret.212  
 
Under the heat of such a scenario, trust rapidly evaporates between the ruler and the 
ruled. 
During the rapid run-up to war in 2002-03, UK and US intelligence were in a 
quandary. The fundamental intelligence differences were a dilemma for the UK and 
US politicians. How could the dilemma identified be resolved? The opposing UK-US 
intelligence and individual UK and US intelligence positions had to be considerably 
tidied and brought to a consensus. As Wilkie claimed: ‘Wolfowitz at one point 
explained the US government’s approach to Iraq as the product of a bureaucratic 
consensus among the relevant US bodies. On reflection this is only one-third of the 
whole story, because the official British and Australian cases for war were 
themselves the product of a consensus with the US, in which the US set the terms.’213  
In the final effect and outcome of the UK-US intelligence liaison, differences had 
to be pushed into the background. The full context had to be omitted to help smooth 
out obstacles to agreement. During the building of a supportive case, a counter-
productive process of acontextualisation was undertaken, albeit perhaps not always 
consciously. However, of course reality is never so sterile. The differences, doubts 
and caveats existing at the important and micro/narrow quartet of levels of relations 
(operational/tactical and individual [as professional]/personal levels) in both the 
UK and US were substantially reduced and/or papered over through their 
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containment. As already demonstrated, these micro/low levels are even more 
acutely important in the world of intelligence, where specifics and details matter 
substantially. By contrast in wider, generic political UK-US relations, macro/broader 
considerations thrive, and they can be (politically) manipulated with less damaging 
consequences. Arguably, ‘fudging’, agreeing to disagree on particular points 
(especially those where convergence was unforthcoming) was another available 
option. This ‘tidying’ was done in order for greater UK-US agreement at the 
macro/higher, more ‘idealistic’, and broader levels (ideological/theoretical and 
strategy/policy levels). However, all these different levels are intricately and closely 
inter-related. They, therefore, cannot be isolated from one another. Otherwise, if the 
macro/high and micro/low levels are (or, equally, become) disconnected, cases 
unravel.  
Artificially over-isolating the different levels unhelpfully contributes to the 
making of an insecure case. A flawed policy is the final outcome. In the hierarchy of 
levels (as illustrated in Chapter 2 [4.1]), instead of necessarily being more ‘flattened’ – 
resulting in greater equalization between all the different levels and their input - the 
macro/higher levels dominated. This was over and above, and at the expense of, the 
micro/lower, ‘foundation’ or more ‘realistic’ levels – especially when and where 
intelligence customer/consumer own analysis and assessment activities flourished 
(see above [2.4]), and their outcome was then used as a tool for political engineering 
purposes. Furthermore, the macro/higher quartet of levels became increasingly and 
detrimentally disconnected and removed from their empirical bases at the 
micro/lower quartet of levels.  
In the run up to the war in Iraq, the resulting top-heavy case that was 
produced, in all of its disconnected artificiality, toppled over. This serves as a stark 
warning that should be widely heeded in the future. In ambiguous circumstances, 
through a process of enhanced contextualisation, more ‘flattened’ hierarchies and 
closer connections between all the different levels are required in the decision-
making processes, together with more optimised intelligence and security reach 
balances. This allows for the inclusion of more complexity, which is more akin, and 
hence more adaptable, to the chaos of ‘reality’. 
 
[2.7]: Weapons of Mass Distraction? 
The search for Iraqi WMD led by UK and US intelligence was prolonged. By June 
2003, the hunt for Iraq’s supposed WMD was taken over by the US-dominated Iraq 
Survey Group (ISG), headed by Dr David Kay.214 In the ISG, consisting of over a 
thousand-strong, some UK and Australian members assisted, again demonstrating 
their close interactions. Shortly afterwards during a visit to Washington, Blair and 
Bush jointly defended the Iraq war amid the current controversy.215 In a well-
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received speech to the US Congress Blair claimed that history would prove that the 
Iraq war was justified, whether supposed Iraqi WMD were found or not. His 
understanding of history was clearly on an equal par with his understanding of 
intelligence. 
By September 2003, the ISG was still drawing a blank.216 Blix was critical of 
UK-US ‘spin and hype’ after Bush admitted that while, ‘There’s no question that 
Saddam Hussein had al Qaeda ties… We have no evidence that [he] was involved 
with … September 11.’217 Later, however, in September 2006, the Saddam Hussein-al-
Qaeda links were also shown to be unreliable by a Congressional inquiry.218 In its 
conclusions, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) inquiry report 
observed that:  
 
Postwar findings indicate that the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) 
assessment that the relationship between Iraq and al-Qa’ida resembled 
“two independent actors trying to exploit each other,” accurately 
characterized bin Ladin’s actions, but not those of Saddam Hussein. 
Postwar findings indicate that Saddam Hussein was distrustful of al-Qa’ida 
and viewed Islamic extremists as a threat to his regime, refusing all 
requests from al-Qa’ida to provide material or operational support…219 
 
After his capture in December 2003, Saddam Hussein had made clear his distrust of 
‘fanatics’. According to Saddam’s interrogator, FBI Field Agent George Piro, Saddam 
‘considered [Osama Bin Laden] to be a fanatic. And as such was very wary of him. 
He told me, “You can’t really trust fanatics” … He didn’t wanna be seen with Bin 
Laden. And didn’t want to associate with Bin Laden…’220 CBS 60 Minutes 
correspondent Scott Pelley continued, ‘Piro says Saddam thought that Bin Laden was 
a threat to him and his regime.’221 Indeed, even if the evidence available prewar 
could (generously) be argued to be more of an ambiguous nature - and hence 
somewhat more susceptible to becoming scaled-up and exaggerated - according to 
the evidence available postwar, a more compelling case could be made firmly in the 
contrary direction. This was a considerable counter to the claims coming strongly 
from Bush et al concerning the alleged Saddam Hussein-al-Qaeda links.  
Undoubtedly, this was not entirely a narrative of intelligence shortcomings. 
UK intelligence and several people in US intelligence circles were right to have 
remained sceptical of such links prewar and beyond. Meanwhile some further 
‘cherry-picking’ or ‘scaling-up’ of ‘intelligence’ and of alleged claims was again 
suggested – especially in a year when the crop of sources was, and had been 
consecutively for a number of years, poor overall, due to intelligence under-reach.222 
Moreover, again highlighting the deficient intelligence co-ordination, at least in the 
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US, as Drumheller later observed: ‘…There was no one voice in coming out of the 
intelligence community and that allowed those people to pick and choose those bits 
of information that fit what they wanted to know…’223 Meanwhile, in the better co-
ordinated UK intelligence community (albeit in a somewhat distorted manner thanks 
to the better political co-option and collusion that was undertaken), so that overall 
‘one voice’ could successfully be spoken with, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) 
was evidently more sidelined (see below [2.8] and Chapter 6 [1.1]). 
Further linkages between UK and US intelligence were flagged. The UK 
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) reported in September 2003 on the 
intelligence concerning Iraqi WMD. Two brief insights were granted into the UK-US 
intelligence liaison on the issue. It appears that the CIA had some input into at least 
the WMD section of the September 2002 UK dossier, as they were invited to make 
some comments.224 However, in ‘Annex B’ the ISC rejected part of a conclusion that 
had featured in the earlier July 2003 FAC Report: ‘The UK certainly used US 
intelligence, but we do not support the statement that the UK was “heavily reliant” 
on the US, defectors or exiles.’ The ISC report continued by claiming: ‘The UK 
intelligence community had a number of their own reliable sources [such as claimed 
by UK intelligence on the Iraq and uranium issue], including sources in Iraq.’225 In 
July 2004, the findings in the Butler Report later fleshed out this ISC finding, exposing 
some further flaws with the sources.226 
By early October 2003, the interim report of ISG was produced. The report 
was released amid the continuing political controversy over no Iraqi WMD having 
been found, and the ongoing deteriorating security situation in Iraq postwar. Still no 
Iraqi WMD had been located by the official US-led investigation, although there was 
some evidence of arguably related facilities.227 However, prominent anti-war 
opposition was not quelled. The former UK Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, who had 
resigned from the Cabinet as Leader of the House of Commons on 17 March 2003 in 
protest against the imminent war in Iraq, continued to demand an inquiry into the 
decision for war. US opposition, in the form of General Wesley Clark, a former 
NATO commander in Europe, also continued to voice his disquiet.228 Former chief 
UN weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, again contributed criticism. He simultaneously 
highlighted what was reportedly a SIS ‘disinformation drive [against Iraq] in the late 
1990s… designed to shift public opinion.’ Something SIS claimed was ‘unfounded’.229 
Media speculation concerning the pending outcome of the Senate Intelligence 
Committee inquiry thought it would criticise the CIA and Tenet.230 Demonstrating 
the extent of experimenting with Iraq, Blair on a visit to UK troops in Iraq claimed 
that he saw Iraq as ‘test case’ for dealing with countries with WMD.231 Lessons were 
being learnt, but pursuing a policy of pre-emption had been shown to be as highly 
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problematic as critics had cautioned prewar. By the end of January 2004, the by now 
disillusioned head of the ISG, Dr David Kay, had resigned. The leadership of the ISG 
was then taken over by a former UN weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer, as the 
quest to find Iraq’s WMD continued.232  
UK and US intelligence were keen to attempt a ‘salvage’ job. Further damage 
limitation amid all the messy postwar intelligence fallout was the intent. The results 
of ISG reports looked suitable places on which to operate. According to Australian 
Dr Rod Barton, the special adviser to the ISG, ‘senior figures in British intelligence 
tried to stop the ISG publishing its [next] … report when they realised what it would 
say…’233 Showing UK intelligence interest in the ISG findings that would be 
presented, on 19 January 2004, Martin Howard, the Deputy Chief of Defence 
Intelligence at the UK MoD, had even visited Barton in Baghdad. As Barton observed 
from that meeting, Howard ‘was not very keen on having this report’ or at least not 
yet, that is, not until something ‘substantive’ had been located.234 Barton’s account 
continued, ‘when this [the blocking of the ISG report] failed, [by circa 8 March 2004 in 
an e-mail to Duelfer,] John Scarlett [then still Chairman of the UK JIC]… tried to 
strengthen the ISG report by [suggesting the] inserting [of] nine “nuggets” of 
information to imply Saddam’s WMD programmes were active, despite evidence to 
the contrary.’235 Apparently, the UK intelligence attempts were not alone. The CIA 
also tried to have an input into what content was included in the ISG report - not 
wanting anything in there which might embarrassingly contradict the supposed Iraqi 
WMD claims made in earlier statements by Tenet.236 By 22 March the ‘truncated and 
pointless 20-page’ report was finished.237 Barton resigned in protest shortly 
afterwards. Kay later judged it as, ‘a misleading and anodyne document.’238  
These UK and US intelligence activities were not alone. Less than a year after 
his presentation to UNSC, US Secretary of State Powell was now beginning to 
publicly express some of the doubts he held. Concerning Iraq’s supposed WMD: 
‘…the answer to that question is, we don’t know yet…’239 The CIA’s intelligence was 
criticised by Dr Kay, the recent former head of ISG.240 During a private lunch with 
Bush and other White House staff, Kay was also somewhat critical of UK 
intelligence. As veteran Washington Post journalist Bob Woodward recounted:  
 
Card asked, “You told us about the U.S. intelligence service. Who do you 
think runs a really good intelligence service?”  
“In my experience, it was not the British or the Israelis, despite their 
reputation,” Kay said. MI6 and the Mossad were legends in the intelligence 
world, but Kay said he was not always impressed with the usefulness of 
their product. “In my judgment, the best one is the Chinese.”241  
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The absence of WMD continued to be puzzled over in London and Washington.242 In 
February 2004, there was further criticism from the UK FAC, reminding about other 
pressing security issues, such as counter-terrorism efforts, and alleging ‘blowback’: 
‘The continued failure of the coalition to find WMD in Iraq has damaged the 
credibility of the US and UK in their conduct of the war against terrorism.’243 Within 
days of each other, both the US Government and, following the US lead, the UK 
Government, decided to launch in-depth inquiries into their respective, but not joint, 
intelligence concerning Iraq’s supposed WMD.244 In light of Kay’s admission in front 
of the US Senate Armed Services Committee: ‘It turns out we were all wrong, 
probably, in my judgement, and that is most disturbing…’, the alleged shortcomings 
of intelligence continued to be probed.245 Powell again expressed that he was 
increasingly uncomfortable about the case for war in this postwar phase, adding to 
his prewar disquiet: ‘It was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that 
made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the 
world… [The] absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus; it changes the 
answer you get.’246  
Into 2004, the so-called ‘45-minute claim’ continued to be contentious. It 
emerged that a former intelligence official thought that the information might have 
been ‘misinterpreted’. In February 2004, Blair also revealed to the House of 
Commons that he was not aware which weapons the ‘45-minute claim’ applied to 
when the Commons voted on the war on 18 March 2003.247 Meanwhile, in 
Washington, Rumsfeld denied hearing the ‘45-minute claim’.248 Straw also, at least at 
first, was vague about the term.249 In the dash to disarm Iraq and topple Saddam 
Hussein, it appears that the politicians had missed or glossed over at least some of 
the details of the case that they themselves were keen to make. The key question, 
whether intelligence actually mattered, was again emphasised. What other 
‘intelligence’ details were missed or forgotten, and would those details have 
mattered in altering the course of events by affecting the tipping-point or ‘decision 
shut-off point’ in any manner? Again, the (virtual) ‘irrelevance’ of intelligence to the 
politicians and their decisions taken (at least on occasions) was suggested. As US 
intelligence expert Paul Pillar has observed: ‘What is most remarkable about prewar 
U.S. intelligence on Iraq is not that it got things wrong and thereby misled 
policymakers; it is that it played so small a role in one of the most important U.S. 
policy decisions in recent decades.’250  
There were simultaneously some whiffs of ‘conspiracy’. The case built on 
contentious intelligence arguably helped to serve as a convenient and distracting fig-
leaf for the ‘real’ intentions of UK and US politicians. This was at least until the post-
invasion intelligence ‘fallout’. By turning the general focus onto the alleged 
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intelligence ‘failures’ and their subsequent inquiries, these would then serve as a 
convenient distraction post facto and post bellum. These moves would help to take the 
focus off the politicians and their decisions pertaining to war in both the UK and US. 
Instead, that attention would be re-focussed more fully on the ‘flaws’ of the UK-US 
intelligence world. This focus aided the emergence of suggestions that perhaps some 
further modernisation of UK intelligence structures, processes and procedures was 
necessary in the early 21st century - manifesting its change and reforms under the 
guise of ‘professionalisation’. The actual UK Government response to the Butler 
Report, notably involved the creation of the post of Professional Head of Intelligence 
Analysis (PHIA), with a support team in the Cabinet Office.251 The murky depths of 
multilateral international intelligence liaison interactions, including some of their 
dynamics (positive and negative), were also highlighted. 
 
[2.8]: Intelligence ‘fallout’ – ‘fall-guys’, ‘scapegoats’, and a convenient ‘mask’? 
UK and US intelligence braced itself for the onslaught. A year after the presentation 
to the UNSC, CIA director Tenet defended the increasingly besieged CIA in a speech 
at Georgetown University.252 Blix continued to criticise the intelligence the US and 
UK had on Iraq.253 Israeli intelligence also were criticised by their Knesset oversight 
subcommittee investigation for poor intelligence assessments concerning both Iraq 
and Libya (exposed in the light of the tackling of the A.Q. Khan ‘nuclear network’ in 
2003-04).254 Powell meanwhile continued to distance himself further from the 
arguments that he had made to the UNSC in early February 2003. Doubts also 
emerged regarding the existence of the earlier claimed mobile biological weapons 
laboratories or trailers (see above [2.4]).255 These were the sensational claims based on 
the ‘intelligence’ passed from the increasingly discredited Iraqi defector source 
codenamed ‘CURVEBALL’. Much ‘stove-piping’, caveat jettisoning, and bypassing, 
was in effect in relation to CURVEBALL within the US intelligence community. As 
the SSCI found:  
 
The Committee noted that concerns about the liaison source CURVE BALL 
had been raised in CIA operations cables, but were not disseminated to 
analysts outside the CIA. Despite these warnings, and perhaps in part 
because of their limited dissemination, the Intelligence Community judged 
CURVE BALL to be “credible” or “very credible”. Uncertainties about his 
reliability should have been taken into account by the operations officers 
who provided the judgment of his credibility, should have made the 
analysts who were aware of them wary about relying so heavily on his 
reporting, and should have been noted in the NIE. In addition, these 
concerns should have been passed on to policymakers, who used CURVE 
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BALL’s information publicly… Europe Division officials had relayed 
concerns about the public use of CURVE BALL’s information.256  
 
UK officials later discovered that, rather than having a more sinister germ warfare 
role, the mobile facilities were actually for producing hydrogen for filling weather 
and artillery balloons, as Iraqi officials had themselves earlier repeatedly claimed.257 
More embarrassingly for UK intelligence in particular, it was reported ‘likely that the 
units were … part of a system originally sold to Saddam by Britain in 1987.’258 
Indeed, US intelligence officials apparently knew that the mobile laboratories or 
trailers, by at least 27 May 2003, had ‘nothing to do with biological weapons’.259 As 
Drumheller later cogently argued regarding CURVEBALL’s input:  
 
I think a lot of the preconceptions about the weapons of mass destruction 
and all that were driven by the Iraqi émigré reporting, whether it was from 
the Iraqi National Congress [INC] or others. … Émigré reporting is 
notoriously unreliable … because they always have an agenda… I think 
that [émigré reporting] drove a lot of it.260  
 
Reaching some more into the intricate depths of intelligence specifics and details, he 
continued: 
 
There’s some complications in the Curveball case. [That] is a good example 
of how, had that been an agency [CIA] case handled by us, we would have 
vetted it much, much more before the reporting was put out and given the 
credence that [it] was given. [CURVEBALL] came out as a defector, was 
handled by Defense Intelligence [Agency (DIA)] officers. But that’s nothing 
against Defense Intelligence officers; [there are] great Defense Intelligence 
officers. But we [CIA] have a certain way of doing things that’s built up 
over 50 years. Some people look at that as being cautious. In fact, it’s a 
professional standard that you really have to have.261  
 
The SSCI inquiry again found that, at least at times however, reservations concerning 
sources were passed on through intelligence liaison relationships, for instance, with 
warnings attached to the product: ‘Concerns existed within the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s (CIA) Directorate of Operations (DO) prior to the war about the credibility 
of the mobile biological weapons program source code-named CURVE BALL. The 
concerns were based, in part, on doubts raised by the foreign [German] intelligence 
service that handled CURVE BALL and a third service [probably SIS/MI6 (see above 
[1.0])]…’262  
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Top UK and US intelligence agency personnel began to depart. By early June 2004, 
Tenet had announced his resignation as head of the CIA.263 The CIA Director of 
Operations James Pavitt announced he was retiring.264 Later, in the summer of 2004, 
the Chief of SIS, Sir Richard Dearlove, also retired to become Master of Pembroke 
College, Cambridge.265 By 6 July 2004, to the Commons Liaison Committee, Blair 
finally admitted that WMD might not be found in Iraq: ‘What I have got to accept is 
that I was very, very confident we would find the weapons. I have to accept that we 
have not found them - that we may not find them.’266 
The CIA and its intelligence did not escape some heavy criticism. This came 
from the report produced by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) 
on 7 July 2004.267 The report identified ‘collective group think’.268 In light of this 
alleged intelligence ‘failure’, President Bush promised reform of US intelligence and 
remarked: ‘We haven’t found the stockpiles, but we knew he could make them.’269 
UK intelligence also did not escape judgement. The US SSCI Chairman Senator Pat 
Roberts commented that: ‘It is clear that this group-think also extended to our allies, 
and to the United Nations, and several nations as well, all of whom did believe that 
Saddam Hussein had active WMD programmes. This was a global intelligence 
failure.’270 One commentator, veteran British journalist Tom Mangold, argued: 
‘Never before has the Siamese twin relationship between the CIA and MI6 been so 
roundly condemned. It is unprecedented for Washington to criticise London or vice 
versa…’271 Although Drumheller later qualified this inquiry’s finding somewhat more 
effectively by remarking:  
 
They always say, “Well, all these other European services and all these 
other countries around the world felt the same way.” Well, no, it wasn’t 
exactly the same way. They were all concerned; there was a general fear 
that Saddam was building [weapons] because Saddam was Saddam. … It’s 
the way he kept his enemies inside and outside the country off balance.272  
 
Significantly, the SSCI Report’s evaluation of the ‘British White Paper’ - the first UK 
dossier of 24 September 2002 - remains classified. It continues to be blacked-
out/redacted, at least from public eyes.273 This raises the reasonable question: would 
further discomfort to and within UK-US intelligence relations be caused by the 
public dissemination of that evaluation? 
The general nature of non-proliferation enterprises continued to cast a 
characteristic shadow. At the end of 2001, the global intelligence ambiguity and 
uncertainty concerning the exact status of supposed Iraqi WMD stockpiles and 
associated programmes was apparent. This scenario was coupled with the lack of 
sources in Iraq – especially those that were well-placed and had little to gain from 
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regime change actions, such as UN weapon inspectors.274 In such murky 
circumstances, various intelligence sources were communicated amongst one 
another and were picked by their users/customers. In turn, a paucity of ‘intelligent 
customers’ was evident. Those customers themselves were clearly naïve and 
inexperienced regarding intelligence, exhibiting a demonstrably poor understanding 
of both the strengths and weaknesses/limitations of intelligence, and all it could 
hope to offer. This was as well as them clearly lacking an awareness that was 
cognisant of - and/or, even more damningly, outright dismissing - the surrounding 
complexities and associated dynamics of intelligence, intimately informed by 
carefully heeding contextualisation efforts. Worse still, relying on their strongly held 
assumptions and beliefs, they were largely doing their own analysis and assessment. 
This was in paradoxical contexts where even former White House press secretary 
Scott McClellan could claim, in May 2008, that Bush demonstrated a ‘lack of 
inquisitiveness’.275  
A while later, on 5 June 2008, the US Senate Intelligence Committee released 
its Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence. Marking their last official oversight 
findings on the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD, significantly these two reports 
addressed the themes of ‘Administration Misstatements on Prewar Iraq Intelligence’ 
and ‘Inappropriate Intelligence Activities by the Pentagon Policy Office’. At their 
unveiling, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, John D. (Jay) 
Rockefeller IV remarked: ‘Before taking the country to war, this Administration 
owed it to the American people to give them a 100 percent accurate picture of the 
threat we faced. Unfortunately, our Committee has concluded that the 
Administration made significant claims that were not supported by the 
intelligence…’ He continued: ‘In making the case for war, the Administration 
repeatedly presented intelligence as fact when in reality it was unsubstantiated, 
contradicted, or even non-existent. As a result, the American people were led to 
believe that the threat from Iraq was much greater than actually existed.’276 
Meanwhile, the report on the Pentagon’s activities most significantly found that: 
‘Potentially important information collected during the meetings [held clandestinely 
between Pentagon officials and Iranians in Rome and Paris] was withheld from 
intelligence agencies by Pentagon officials…’, and that ‘…senior Defense Department 
officials cut short internal investigations of the meetings and failed to implement the 
recommendations of their own counterintelligence experts.’277 Against this backdrop, 
many rotten interactions concerning intelligence were being undertaken both inside 
and beyond the Pentagon during the run up to the war in Iraq. 
 
The intelligence gathering net was also cast more widely. When the particular case 
and line of action the US wanted to pursue in Iraq was launched intensively from the 
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end of 2001/beginning of 2002, this tasked not only the US intelligence agencies, but 
also their liaison partner intelligence services across the globe, as US intelligence 
reached out to them. Reporting was then mustered from the few sources each of the 
various national intelligence agencies could scrape together. They produced, 
delivered and communicated anything that was, or was perceived to be, at least 
potentially useful for the US, essentially tailored to the requests. Arguably, the ‘allied 
intelligence’ conferences on WMD held regularly (annually) over time also had not 
helped towards contributing to thwart the collective internationally held suspicions 
from arising concerning the issue of supposed Iraqi WMD.278 Working alongside one 
another in real-time on in-progress analysis was increasingly discredited as shared 
perceptions became overdone. Beyond the confines of these narrower interactions, 
these activities contributed towards stunting essential factors, such as diversity, as 
well as reducing the positions from which intelligence officers could reach out. 
Regarding the so-called ‘global intelligence failure’, this evaluation only 
resonates in part. It is apparent from all the various inquiries that intelligence 
agencies in at least the US, the UK, Germany, Australia, Italy, Israel and Denmark 
had some essentially shared perceptions on and suspicions concerning supposed 
Iraqi WMD. Did intelligence alliance politics fail? Not entirely. While reach deficits 
and excesses appear to have been more pronounced across the board concerning this 
specific example, it appears that intelligence alliance politics did not fail completely. 
Instead, like the military coalition that eventually went into Iraq, the basis was more 
a ‘coalition of the willing’. Subsequently, for better and worse, intelligence liaison 
interactions similarly followed that direction.  
Indeed, in some ways, this example was arguably a ‘success’ for international 
intelligence liaison. This is in that on the whole information was closely shared and 
that intelligence relationships were maintained between countries even when there 
were higher political differences concerning the path, scope and timing of the action 
that was eventually adopted. In some cases, the international intelligence liaison was 
so widespread that it was perhaps too successful, even to an ironic extent, in the 
process partially becoming a ‘victim of its own success’. However, what can be more 
agreed, is that this example of supposed Iraqi WMD nicely exposes the discernable 
operational parameters, limits and dynamics (both positive and negative) of 
international intelligence alliance politics.  
More importantly, amid all the associated fallout, the desirability of 
continuing to have these intelligence interactions was sustained. According to The 
Washington Post, in the summer of 2008, the CIA was having ‘success’ in ‘mending 
[its] fences’ with some of the foreign intelligence liaison partners who had ‘distanced 
themselves’ from the US over the Iraq war.279 As DCI Hayden significantly remarked 
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in July 2008, again effectively illustrating the degree of internationally connected 
intelligence: ‘[We] seek out their ideas, undertake common efforts… We’ve given 
many of them secure phones so they can call me directly.’280 Personal links would 
also continue to perform a demonstrably prominent function. 
Crucially, however, the role of international intelligence liaison and 
intelligence alliances is only to perform part of the intelligence process. Moreover, 
arguably it is only an auxiliary role at that, such as assisting in the gathering of 
intelligence and contributing final analysis input into final intelligence 
assessments/estimates. As the supposed Iraqi WMD example also demonstrates, the 
contribution of such arrangements should not be overextended. Nor should they be 
uncritically assimilated into overall processes. This is, for instance, by jettisoning 
differences and/or weakening or abandoning source verification regimes. Indeed, in 
terms of intelligence outreach, the most optimised and better outreach balances were 
struck at the micro/low levels of UK-US intelligence liaison relations. 
Simultaneously, the worst outreach balances, resulting in more pronounced counter-
productive outreach deficits and excesses, occurred at the macro/higher levels, 
especially in the producer-consumer relationships. 
The intelligence ‘fallout’ continued unabated. By mid-July 2004, there was 
(finally) the public ‘rare’ retraction of pre-war intelligence by SIS. The intelligence 
informing the assessment that Saddam Hussein had still been developing WMD was 
withdrawn, suggesting its unreliability.281 Also recently retired senior UK Defence 
Intelligence Staff (DIS) official, Dr Brian Jones could not reconcile the quantity of 
intelligence on supposed Iraqi WMD he saw, with the quantity that Blair had 
claimed in evidence given to the Hutton Inquiry crossed his own desk.282 Had the 
intelligence WMD experts effectively been sidelined? On occasions, at least, it 
appears that essentially they were.283 This was if only by a form of process short-
circuiting - for example, due to the speed at which machinations were taking place in 
the high tempo lead up to the Iraq war. Intelligence Middle East experts, at least 
occasionally, were similarly out of the loop. As Paul Pillar later observed: ‘As the 
national intelligence officer for the Middle East, I was in charge of coordinating all of 
the [US] intelligence community’s assessments regarding Iraq; the first request I 
received from any administration policymaker for any such assessment was not until 
a year into the war [c.2004].’284  
Critical contextualisation paucities quickly emerged. This was due to the 
bypassing of the ‘functional/thematic’ and ‘regional/geographical’ experts and 
advisers in both the UK/US intelligence and diplomatic communities - for example, 
located in the US State Department and in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO) - during the run-up to the Iraq war, and then again on occasions during 
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its progression. The history of the Middle East region evidently appeared to be 
poorly understood, even ignored and/or discounted by the decision/policy-makers. 
This was along with any knowledge of Middle Eastern culture and their long-
standing sectarian rivalries. The realisation of these issues as being important factors 
then dawned far too late, as the security situation in Iraq continued to rapidly 
deteriorate during 2003 and beyond. This was especially marked amongst those 
occupying the highest political echelons, amid the leaders cloistered in their remote 
home capitals of London and Washington.285 Other observers, however - particularly 
those participants out-in-the-field in Iraq and based on-the-ground in Baghdad and 
Basra - were naturally much quicker at grasping the significance of these issues as 
they more directly experienced them.286 
At least some of the actual intelligence details were demonstrably afforded 
lesser significance than perhaps they should have otherwise received. Indeed, a 
convincing argument could even be made that ‘specialist’ intelligence experts and 
analysts, arguably ‘obsessed’ by specifics and details, were being more sidelined in 
favour of more ‘generalist’ officers performing liaison. In turn, those jobholders were 
arguably less likely to quibble over details, as it was their job to get together, pass on 
information and essentially agree by brokering deals orientated around points of 
convergence. Retired US military Colonel Patrick Lang remarked: ‘They 
[policymakers] wanted only liaison officers… not a senior intelligence person who 
argued with them.’287 Meanwhile, the lack of certainty surrounding Iraq’s WMD was 
again cited.288 In the run-up to the November 2004 US Presidential elections, Bush 
went on the defensive arguing that it was still ‘right’ to go to war in Iraq despite the 
persisting absence of WMD.289 
Defenders of intelligence emerged from the shadows. On the day that the UK 
Butler Report was published (14 July 2004), another former UK Foreign Secretary 
(1989-1995), Lord Douglas Hurd, stepped out from the relative obscurity of 
retirement. He publicly defended the intelligence services. He claimed: ‘Intelligence 
services across the western world are looking for help… Into [their post-9/11 CT] 
effort their political masters threw the spanner of Iraq.’ In this case, ‘offensive’ as 
well as ‘defensive’ intelligence had to be provided. He particularly highlighted their 
‘unenviable’ position: ‘There is always a temptation for politicians to exaggerate the 
importance of intelligence reports because of the glamorous badge of secrecy … The 
intelligence services do not normally take the front of the stage…’ The differences 
between the UK and US positions were additionally emphasised, where he noted 
that: ‘This problem was more acute in Britain than in the US…’ as Blair had a tougher 
political case for war in Iraq to produce, and a more substantial political opposition 
to overcome.290 In trying to acquit their tasks adequately on the political front and in 
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the glare of the public domain, similarly to their US counterparts, the UK intelligence 
agencies had, in part at least, shown themselves to be suffering from some 
shortcomings. They, too, were deemed to be in need of some reform.291 
The Butler Report was critical of UK intelligence on supposed Iraqi WMD.292 
The way it was used by the UK Government also came under-fire. Intelligence was 
stretched to breaking point. Its limitations were not made clear and caveats had been 
removed, for example in the September 2002 UK Government dossier. Essentially, 
the ill-documented and informal sofa-characterised decision-making process in No. 
10 Downing Street was criticised as being unhelpful. It had hints of being more 
‘presidential’ in nature, with implications for the UK Cabinet-style of doing 
government. Moreover, Lord Butler described the ‘45-minute claim’ as an 
‘uncharacteristically poor piece of assessment.’293  
Later, in a Spectator magazine interview in December 2004, Lord Butler 
remarked rather more strongly: ‘I would be critical of the present government in that 
there is too much emphasis on selling, there is too much central control and there is 
too little of what I would describe as reasoned deliberation which brings in all the 
arguments.’294 He also argued: ‘Good government, in my view, means bringing to 
bear all the knowledge and all the arguments you can from inside and outside, 
debating and arguing them as frankly as you can, and to try to reach a conclusion. It 
is clear that politically appointed people carry great weight in the government and 
there is nothing necessarily wrong with that, but if it’s done to the exclusion of 
advice from civil servants, you tend to get into error, you make mistakes.’295 
Concerning the handling of intelligence on Iraqi WMD, Butler noted: ‘The purpose of 
the dossier was to persuade the British people why the government thought Iraq was 
a very serious threat ... Would it [adding a warning about the limitations of the 
evidence] have undermined it? I think it would have; I think it would have 
weakened it.’296 
In the wake of the Report, commentators argued that the recent inquiries in 
both the UK and US were incomplete. This was because of their focus on the 
intelligence agencies and the intelligence itself, rather than also including evaluating 
the activities of the politicians and probing their decision to go to war.297 In front of 
the House of Commons Public Administration Committee later in October 2004, 
Lord Butler denied that the terms of reference of his inquiry had prevented a 
thorough investigation, essentially observing that ‘policy decisions were a matter for 
politicians, not inquiries.’298 Indeed Butler declared: ‘On the political issues, we 
wanted to give people the information but we felt that really the proper place where 
governments should survive or fall is with parliament and the electorate.’299 Sir 
Lawrence Freedman cautioned: ‘This saga warns of how intelligence, when used to 
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serve a wider political purpose, can be corrupted.’300 The case for war had been made 
more on theoretical than on firmer empirical bases. The ‘legality’ of the Iraq war, in 
the absence of a second legitimising UNSC resolution, also continued to rankle and 
be much debated.301 
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, commentators on intelligence in 
the US were rather more dismissive of the Butler inquiry findings. Former CIA 
operative Bob Baer believed that ‘They [the UK and US ‘establishments’] just wanted 
it all to go away.’ While one veteran US intelligence officer, Ray McGovern, declared 
‘It’s just old boys. You’ve had Lord Hutton, Lord Butler. It’s so clubbish.’ Drawing a 
comparison between the recently published US Congressional inquiries and the 
Butler Report, Vincent Cannistraro, a former CIA chief of operations for counter-
terrorism, argued: ‘I can tell you there’s rampant jealously in the CIA, where they 
wish they could have had a report more like Butler’s. It was much more nuanced, 
much more fair.’302  
A ‘Leader’ article published in The Observer newspaper on 18 July 2004 rightly 
highlighted that the Butler Report findings would have to be carefully read and 
digested: ‘On first reading, the report from Lord Butler's enquiry seemed another 
Establishment closing of ranks. By today it is becoming clear that it is a more subtle 
indictment of the processes of British government, the ramifications of which will 
become clearer in the weeks ahead…’ The Leader continued: ‘Butler’s report raises 
for some the question of whether, with proper process and properly caveated 
intelligence, the government would have been able to muster a majority in the House 
of Commons to support the war and of whether government law officers could have 
judged it legal. Without those two pillars, it is argued, we could not have gone to 
war…’303 
In the wake of the UK Butler Report, reform was also prescribed for UK 
intelligence. By 21 July 2004, SIS was conducting an ‘unprecedented inquiry’ into its 
(by now) discredited sources. Showing dismay with its customers, it also sought to 
establish, with providing safeguards, ‘greater control over Downing Street’s use of 
its secret intelligence in future…’, as well as changing some of its practices, including 
agreeing ‘to share information provided by its agents with members of the Defence 
Intelligence Staff.’304 Summarising the problems encountered, the BBC’s security 
correspondent, Gordon Corera noted:  
 
Two central problems areas can be identified… The first was in the collection 
of intelligence… Essentially, the quality control broke down… [and] the 
sources were not properly validated. The checking of their reliability seems to 
have become subjected to the need to produce results… The scarcity of 
sources and the urgent requirement for intelligence also meant more credence 
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was given to untried sources than would normally be the case… The second 
major problem came in the transition from internal [Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC)] assessments to a public dossier. Along the way, the caveats 
and qualifiers got lost… and the warnings that the intelligence… was thin 
never made it… public.305  
 
Despite the revelations about pre-war intelligence, Blair continued to defend the 
war.306 He maintained that the ends would vindicate and still justify the 
methodology deployed. Unsurprisingly, the ‘reality’ to date has been much less clear 
cut than that, suggesting undesirable ends – for example, the dire security situation 
in Iraq with elusive peace and rampant insurgency – co-existing in a more pluralistic 
condition of ‘complex interdependence’ with the intended outcomes, such as the 
removal of Saddam Hussein from power. 
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) finally reported in October 2004. The ISG 
‘concluded it was unlikely that Saddam Hussein had [WMD]. It also concluded that 
he probably meant to make chemical weapons again one day, if sanctions had been 
lifted. “The emphasis is on capability and intention not on immediate threat,” said 
one British official…’307 This was echoed in the findings of the interrogators of 
Saddam Hussein. As FBI Field Agent Piro observed:  
 
[Saddam] told me that most of the WMD had been destroyed by the U.N. 
inspectors in the ’90s. And those that hadn’t been destroyed by the 
inspectors were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq … It was very important for 
him to project that [he still had WMD] because that was what kept him, in 
his mind, in power. That capability kept the Iranians away. It kept them 
from reinvading Iraq…308  
 
Piro also reportedly found that the impetus to develop WMD still prevailed: 
‘Saddam intended to produce weapons of mass destruction again, some day. … “He 
wanted to pursue all of WMD. So he wanted to reconstitute his entire WMD 
program”…’309 The ISG report essentially suggested that the ‘containment’ of Iraq 
had worked, although it was not ‘rollback’ which could only be achieved by regime 
change. Everyone could feel somewhat vindicated by the report. Although, Blair and 
Bush again felt compelled to defend the war.310  
Shortly after the ISG had reported, more UK intelligence was officially 
retracted. In the House of Commons, the UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw formally, 
and finally, withdrew the controversial ‘45-minutes claim’.311 According to 
Woodward in Plan of Attack, ‘Tenet and the CIA had warned the British not to make 
that allegation, which was based on a questionable source, and almost certainly 
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referred to battlefield weapons – not ones that Iraq could launch at neighboring 
countries, let alone American cities. Tenet referred privately to this as the “they-can-
attack-in-45-minutes shit.”’312 Later referring to this passage, the Butler Report noted: 
‘We asked the Chief of SIS [Sir Richard Dearlove], if Mr Tenet had ever mentioned 
his scepticism to him. He said: “There’s no record of them having commented 
negatively on the report and nor does the desk officer at the time recall any come-
back from the CIA.” We asked Mr Tenet directly for a comment but no reply had 
been received by the time that he resigned from office.’313 They, too, did not have the 
authority to compel a foreign liaison service agent to come forward to give evidence 
to the inquiry. 
Allegations of intelligence abuse were sustained. In October 2004, the former 
Deputy Chief of the UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) (1995-99), John Morrison, 
voiced his concern about the use of intelligence. His concerns echoed those earlier 
articulated by Hurd. He argued that at the time of the 1998-9 Kosovo campaign, and 
at least by implication again during the Iraq campaign: ‘I had the feeling… that 
intelligence was being seen as a PR tool and intelligence should really work in the 
shadows, not in the limelight.’314  
Indeed, as had recently been seen deployed vis-à-vis the counter-terrorism 
domain (see Case Study 1 [4.2.i], above), intelligence had significant PR and 
marketable value with the public (or so it was believed). This was a role for 
intelligence that extended considerably beyond being used merely (and most 
legitimately) to inform policy and decision-making. As Pillar later remarked with 
regard to US intelligence: ‘Another problem is that on Iraq, the intelligence 
community was pulled over the line into policy advocacy – not so much by what it 
said as by its conspicuous role in the administration’s public case for war…’315 
Discomfort within and surrounding the UK and US intelligence communities, 
regarding this degree of political collusion, was palpable. Strains were widely 
evident. For Morrison, his personal observation on a BBC Panorama documentary 
programme broadcast in July 2004 that: ‘When I heard… [Blair’s claim that Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq posed a “serious and current threat” to Britain], I could almost hear 
the collective raspberry going up around Whitehall…’316, subsequently resulted in 
his dismissal as the UK ISC’s investigator. 
By January 2005, the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) was re-tasked. The search for 
supposed Iraqi WMD was quietly ended and instead the ISG focussed on helping to 
combat the postwar insurgency in Iraq – by now undoubtedly the dominant task.317 
However, some significant problems involving the intelligence world persisted. 
According to a former US defense intelligence analyst, who served in both Iraq and 
the Pentagon, A.J. Rossmiller, other ‘disconnects’ were readily apparent. He claimed: 
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‘Indiscriminate detention policies cripple strategic efforts in Iraq…’, and, 
emphasising a specific example, he argued: ‘The action units place the responsibility 
on the intel crew to sort out the guys they grab, and intel guys figure that the action 
units bring in only legitimate targets. In that space an innocent individual becomes a 
prisoner…’318 Rossmiller argued compellingly that fixes to intelligence being 
implemented in the wake of the run-up to the Iraq war had to extend further. 
By March 2005, the UK Government released its account of the 
implementation of the Butler Report’s conclusions.319 Intelligence would no longer be 
used so unthinkingly.320 While unsurprisingly in the report the US was not 
mentioned explicitly, a characteristically anodyne insight was granted into 
‘international co-operation’ generally. The report dryly conveyed the conventional 
driving wisdom behind international intelligence liaison that: 
 
International co-operation is essential to countering current terrorist 
threats. UK agencies have built on existing bilateral relationships and 
developed others to ensure that there is extensive international co-
operation. Since 9/11, co-operation, information exchange and personal 
contacts have significantly increased. However, there remain complexities 
and difficulties in these international relationships. The Agencies and 
policy departments are continuing to work to overcome these constraints 
both bilaterally and multilaterally.321  
 
On 31 March 2005, the US Robb-Silberman Commission reported in Washington. US 
intelligence received another critical treatment. As Corera observed: ‘Crucially, the 
absence of new evidence was coupled with a failure to challenge existing 
assumptions… The commission found that dissenting views – of which there were 
some, notably at the State Department – were not given sufficient weight in the face 
of… general consensus.’ More reform of US intelligence was demanded.322 The 
attitude towards sharing within the US intelligence community’s culture was also 
criticised.323 
The continuing poor security situation in Iraq postwar still rankled. 
Reconstruction was obstructed.324 Unusually, some senior UK civil servants 
continued to publicly voice their opposition about how the UK was taken to war. The 
political controversy rumbled on as it gently ebbed away slightly more into the 
background, albeit leaving behind highly visible stains on the reputations of UK and 
US politicians and intelligence services.325 In a leader, The Economist noted: 
‘America’s and Britain’s spying operations both stand cursed at the moment.’326 As 
the security situation in Iraq continues to be bleak - increasingly akin to civil war, rife 
with Shia and Sunni Muslim sectarian violence,327 and as the much-disputed Iraqi 
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violent-death toll continues to rise328 - several questions remain unanswered, or 
unsatisfactorily and incompletely answered. The passage of more time will have to 
take place before history can deliver some fuller answers to those questions.329 
 
[2.9]: Conclusions: evaluating UK-US intelligence liaison on supposed Iraqi WMD 
In 2004, shortly before the Butler Report was released, it was noted in an authoritative 
article featuring in the Financial Times that:  
 
As [UK and US] records are examined, the fortunes of the intelligence 
agencies of the two countries will to some extent rise and fall together. 
While their assessments of the threat posed by Iraq in 2002 did not agree on 
everything, they shared an enormous amount of raw information and co-
operated closely on the analysis. Inevitably, intelligence co-operation across 
the Atlantic will come under intense review.330  
 
However, any internal reviews conducted individually and jointly by UK and US 
intelligence agencies, and politicians themselves, will be heavily classified. This is 
especially the case regarding any observations concerning the liaison dimension, if it 
is even explicitly examined. They are unlikely to be made available to the UK and US 
publics, nor, if unilateral, indeed perhaps to each other. This is despite the 
importance of the issue and several questions remaining unanswered. An oversight 
and accountability gap persists – again, especially concerning liaison questions. 
Intelligence is well known to often be an imperfect ‘science’ and ‘art’. In its 
encompassment, intelligence results in several differences of interpretation.331 The 
doubts and the caveats were there.332 They were especially present and enduring 
amongst the wider and experienced cohorts of the UK and US intelligence 
communities at the lower/micro operational/tactical and individual (as 
professional)/personal levels. For example, this is evident with the concerns 
particularly expressed by former senior UK Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) official, 
Dr Brian Jones, and those of the late WMD expert Dr David Kelly, et al: ‘…Jones … 
told the Independent newspaper the DIS’ “unified view” was for there to be careful 
caveats about assessments of Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons. But they had 
been overruled by the heads of the intelligence agencies. Mr Blair said Dr Jones’ 
concerns had been considered by the head of defence intelligence, who decided the 
dossier’s wording was correct…’333 Inevitably some differences between the UK and 
US intelligence assessments were apparent. But, it appears that - along with the other 
original caveats and doubts - several of these divergences were suppressed and 
removed at more ‘senior’, macro/higher-level meetings. For example, as the BBC 
reported: ‘Mr Blair said the disputed claim over Iraqi weapons strikes within 45 
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minutes was entirely the work of the JIC…’334 Arguably this was done so that the 
intelligence services could fulfill their obligations to their users and customers in 
both Washington and London. In Whitehall ‘mandarin’-speak, they were tasked to 
‘produce’ or ‘deliver’ in harmony with their users’ political agenda. Interestingly, 
again according to the BBC, ‘Analysts in the [DIS] in the Ministry of Defence did 
question the 45-minute claim because of the vagueness… They also raised concerns 
about claims about Iraqi production of chemical agents. But their bosses, who sat on 
the [JIC] but were not intelligence specialists, agreed the DIS experts should not see 
intelligence which came in during the latter stages of the dossier’s drafting and 
which MI6 said overrode their concerns. The late intelligence is now thought to have 
been unreliable…’335  
Overt ‘pressure’ exerted by the politicians in both the UK and US was 
perhaps not necessary per se. The intelligence machines in both the UK and US 
generally worked as they were intended. Arguably sufficient conforming ‘pressure’ 
could come from, at least ‘politically-aware’ or ‘politically-sensitive’, senior 
intelligence managers, in order to fulfil successfully the role that was expected of 
them by their political masters. This is always helpful, especially when there is still a 
career to be remembered and made. As the Butler Report recommended: ‘We see a 
strong case for the post of Chairman of the JIC being held by someone with 
experience of dealing with Ministers in a very senior role, and who is demonstrably 
beyond influence, and thus probably in his last post.’336 In August 2004, Sir John 
Scarlett, Chairman of the JIC during the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq and during its 
immediate aftermath, was ‘promoted’ to ‘C’ of SIS/MI6.337 Actual ‘pressure’ was 
essentially not so needed when perceptions of political/policy and ideological 
desires, and when expectations in the form of the requirements that were provided, 
were enough. As the BBC’s Corera noted: ‘The process was… subjected to the 
“operational imperative to produce results”. In the case of Iraq, Sir Richard Dearlove, 
the chief [‘C’] of SIS until … summer [2004], also made clear there was a “pressure on 
the [Secret Intelligence] Service [(MI6)] to produce” as it tried to ramp up its 
coverage of Iraq from mid-2002.’338  
In this broken context, resplendent with forced disconnects, intelligence 
liaison could not function properly. Consequently, it failed to act as an adequate 
force multiplier. Its power became diverted, together with all the enforced 
distortions. Instead, in these circumstances, it acted more as a false verifier, and in its 
collusion, provided a veritable smörgåsbord of any range of sources, which could 
then be more easily selected in order to conveniently produce the adequate support – 
at least seemingly – for the desired case attempting to be fashioned. This scenario 
also made it easier to bury non-supporting sources, as well as to better obscure the 
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counter-arguments and contradicting facts presented in their reporting. Due to poor 
and/or distorted intelligence management and co-ordination - stemming from trying 
to help advance the proscribed political case, as delineated from up high, without too 
many obstacles posed by properly verified details - governments were able to 
effectively double-cross themselves with their own intelligence. Worse, they were 
able to be effectively double-crossed by inadequately vetted external sources 
(‘CURVEBALL’), perhaps even triple-crossed (Iraq-Niger claims), through variously 
overlapping and fused international intelligence liaison channels in London and 
Washington. The intelligence management process clearly needs to remain neutral, 
de-politicised, and objective, as far as is humanly possible. 
Other areas under stress can be highlighted. The micro/narrow individual (as 
professional)/personal and operational/tactical levels, the most important levels in 
the world of intelligence generally, and indeed more specifically (international) 
intelligence liaison, were essentially bypassed. Or else, they were ‘cherry-picked’ if 
unquestioningly favourable. Albeit in different configurations, this happened in both 
the UK and US - implemented in order to help reach agreement at the 
macro/broader, higher policy/strategy and ideological/theoretical levels.339 The 
enhanced internationalisation of the intelligence liaison helped – seemingly lending 
the case greater credibility, as more foreign liaison partners were able to sign on to 
the overall case being made. This was undertaken in order to try and capitalise upon 
the general flow of intelligence, potentially for gains for themselves. As Ritter 
observed, what the UK and US intelligence did effectively deliver together was more 
of a kinetic ‘shock and awe rollback’ disarmament case, in the form of regime 
change, essentially as they were tasked. This was enacted and Saddam Hussein (the 
target who threatened to provide an ongoing proliferation problem well into the 
future) was successfully removed. The ‘counter-proliferation paradigm’ was 
translated into action. The problem was, however, that its activation was distinctly 
dubious in terms of garnering sustainable and widespread support into the future. 
Specifically on Iraqi WMD, as Blix himself recorded, there is an ‘open 
verdict’. Additionally, on the wider global non-proliferation front, the US-led 
invasion of Iraq, with all the associated whiff of international illegality, without at 
least a second clearly legitimising UNSC resolution, has essentially presented an 
unhelpful ‘message’. We are now in a newer proliferation era, where (as seen 
especially with the A.Q. Khan nuclear network) ‘entrepreneurialism’ is the dominant 
driver. This is together with a commensurate overlooking, even dismissal, of 
moral/ethical dimensions, aspects that should ideally act as a check on proliferation 
activities.340 Strategically, this requires a recalibrated, but not entirely reformed, 
response (see below [3.0]). Intelligence, through efforts towards its greater 
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‘professionalisation’, including vis-à-vis intelligence liaison relationships 
domestically and internationally, similarly clearly needs to be better harnessed, as 
well as be better deployed, to more effectively realise that response in a sufficiently 
adequate manner. 
As in the overarching realm of CT, the highly crucial so-called ‘ideas war’ has 
again been more lost than won (if those terms are sufficiently applicable). This rather 
dubious state of affairs was accomplished through implementing a policy that had 
inadequate sensitivity to the details and subtle nuances of the actual chaos of 
‘reality’. Reversing this troubling trend now needs to be more comprehensively 
implemented - for instance, through greater contextualisation efforts. What 
happened with Iraq arguably serves to suggest to regimes that they should actually 
speed-up WMD programmes, and should increase stockpiles of lethal weapons, 
including conventional ones.341 Actual, unambiguously known possession of WMD 
brings with it the greater national and international security threat of more effective 
retaliation in the form of approaching mutually assured destruction (MAD), as 
witnessed during the Cold War. As seen in the past, it is highly likely that MAD will 
help contribute towards, at least potentially, deterring the US (and the UK) from 
adopting and adapting actions that were taken vis-à-vis Iraq (invasion and regime 
change), and from applying the same actions towards other ‘rogue’ states, such as 
notably Iran and North Korea.342 The passage of more time will have to take place to 
ascertain whether, despite appearances, the invasion of Iraq can even begin to be 
evaluated as having been more of a success in the long-term concerning the issue of 
WMD, and indeed additionally of conventional weapon, N/CP.  
The Iraq war example nicely exposes numerous limits of intelligence. 
Regarding technical intelligence, consisting of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and 
imagery intelligence (IMINT), it could only be used so far. The crucial centrality of 
intelligence liaison and human intelligence (HUMINT), in helping to fill in the 
remaining blanks of the WMD puzzles, was highlighted. This was together with 
exposing all of the associated limitations of liaison, when intelligence sources were 
trying to be stretched and re-configured to fit most desirable frames. With such high 
stakes in play, the onus upon all involved is heightened, and patience and acute 
sensitivity to detail are crucial.343 The more micro operational/tactical and individual 
(as professional)/personal levels are essential. The reliability of the HUMINT 
reporting in such circumstances has to be even more robust and subjected to tougher 
validation criteria and processes, and cannot be rushed or moulded with caveats 
jettisoned. This is not least the case when a policy of pre-emption is being pursued. 
Otherwise, as seen in the Iraq war example, the ‘case’ made on the basis of available 
intelligence ‘evidence’ can rapidly disintegrate and collapse in the wider 
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acontextualised operating environment.344 In the process, even the best meant 
intentions can be destroyed, no matter how passionately - and indeed messianically - 
they are believed and pursued.  
 
 
[3.0]: Overall Conclusions – together delivering effective results?  
 
‘The WMD proliferation landscape is dynamic; our responses must similarly 
evolve…’, so remarked the US State Department in 2005.345 While undoubtedly there 
were episodes of close sharing of WMD intelligence between the UK and US, there 
were also some occasions where each party withheld intelligence from the other, or 
did not share it to its fullest extent. Frequently, here, the ‘third party rule’ was 
invoked. This appears to have been most significantly witnessed concerning the Iraq 
and Niger uranium issue. UK-US intelligence liaison is frequently replete with 
differences of varying degrees of intensity. However, when not over-exerted to the 
point of thwarting joint movements, and when finely balanced with points of 
agreement, these differences can often have a beneficial effect. These can contribute 
towards preventing unhelpful instances of intelligence and security reach excesses 
and deficits within relations.  
With reference to the schools of UK-US relations, similar patterns emerge as 
concerning the UK-US intelligence relations on other ‘functional’ issues, such as CT. 
‘Functionalism’, as the dominant theme, and ‘evangelicalism’, as marginally 
subordinate, both dominate over ‘terminalism’ in the overall ‘complex co-existence 
plurality’. Any instances of ‘terminalism’ appear to be more confined in nature and 
are appropriately evaluated as ‘knocks’. There is a short, sharp impact on relations, 
which may intensely ‘hurt’ in the short-term, but then the pain soon dulls and some 
form of recovery soon sets in. Similarly to actual flesh knocks, bruises can remain. 
However, these tend to help educate both parties on the parameters of the 
relationship. This is rather than instead those knocks being present as long-term 
systemic-affecting, gangrenous wounds. Such a scenario also helps to account for 
why UK-US intelligence relations have endured as effectively as they have done for 
over 60 years at all the different levels. This includes during episodes of generic 
Anglo-American dyspepsia, especially at the macro/higher ideological/theoretical 
and strategy/policy levels, such as over Suez in 1956.  
Indeed, rather like the Suez crisis, Iraq represents more of an unfortunate and 
undesirable ‘blip’ for UK-US intelligence liaison relations. Although admittedly 
figuring as a sizeable blip, this outcome is rather than the Iraq episode representing 
something considerably more fundamental in strategic terms, such as a longer-term 
overawing of relations infused with ‘terminalism’ sentiments.346 Specifically within 
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the domain of UK-US intelligence relations, during this episode, the greatest 
disconnects and areas of stress (shared by both the UK and US intelligence 
communities) were, on the whole, ‘vertical’ in their nature - for example, being 
between intelligence producers and their consumers. This in fact brought the UK and 
US intelligence communities closer to one another, perhaps, as witnessed at times, 
ironically too close. Again, this was rather than the observable disconnects and areas 
of stress being so much more definable in ‘horizontal’ terms transatlantically. 
Complexities must not be allowed to overwhelm the whole system. Similarly 
as to how the effects and outcomes of UK-US intelligence liaison on other functional 
issue-areas can be captured, the effects and outcomes of UK-US intelligence liaison on 
WMD and N/CP efforts are highly complex. They are difficult to unpack, are mixed, 
and frequently remain murky. Are the UK and US together delivering effective 
results? Sometimes and partly – although it is worth remembering that there is never 
complete closure, with N/CP efforts constantly ongoing in multiple directions. These 
efforts continue on several different fronts, including centrally with the ideas and 
messages being propagated.  
Sharing the characteristics of general non-proliferation efforts, the results are 
not static and are ambiguous. Moreover, they remain so. Accordingly, any ambiguity 
detected cannot and should not be automatically labelled ‘failure’. Indeed, that 
condition should not even be evaluated in those terms of ‘success’ and/or ‘failure’. 
This is detrimentally reductionist. At times it appears what can be regarded as 
‘effective results’ - at least in part - are delivered. Although how long-term enduring 
the result from this example will be, and whether it ultimately will ‘successfully’ 
deter and prevent other similar proliferation activities from emerging and 
developing into the future remains to be seen.  
However, at other times, the WMD N/CP efforts can get lost. For example, 
this is largely witnessed over the example of supposed Iraqi WMD and the resulting 
Iraq war and its fallout. This extends to including the continuing dire security 
situation in Iraq and the subsequent failure to secure the peace. Together with other 
essential security strategies - such as CT, counter-insurgency (COIN), and postwar 
reconstruction considerations – WMD non-proliferation strategies appear to have 
become counter-productively dissipated.347 This occurs amongst the overwhelming 
noise of other more pressing and grander political considerations. In the case of Iraq, 
this was notably apparent, for example, with the over-zealous implementation of the 
counter-proliferation paradigm with a push for kinetic ‘shock and awe’ rollback 
‘disarmament’ through regime change and the toppling of Saddam Hussein. This 
was rather than emphasising a more achievable and sustainable gradual rollback 
disarmament strategy.348 Counter-productively, too much kinetic was apparent vis-à-
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vis a stagnant (stalled and stalemate) issue. Instead, it required a ‘soft-slow’ rather 
than a ‘hard-fast’ approach at its attempted mitigation. Indeed, implementing an 
approach more informed by a non-proliferation paradigm would have been more 
useful. This was especially the case in the absence of an immediate genuine threat. 
A convincing argument can be made concerning the ‘irrelevance’ of 
intelligence. This figured at least on occasions, and particularly in the face of a fixed 
policy. Intelligence is essential in the decision-making and decision-implementing 
processes, and can and should have its greatest value then. However, once a 
particular decision has been made - after the tipping-point or ‘decision shut-off 
point’ - it is much more of a challenge for intelligence to continue to perform its 
informing role. It is increasingly difficult to continue to alter the decision that has 
been taken. This was witnessed most starkly in relation to the run-up to war in Iraq. 
A flattened hierarchy, more effectively sampling and attaining input from all the 
different levels closely involved, is essential.  
Enhanced evaluation of these trends is useful. All the levels are closely inter-
related, constantly interacting and negotiating through the means of a ‘feedback 
loop’. Here, again, in terms of information flows, the cybernetics dynamics charted in 
domains such as systems theory can be instructive. No level can be ignored, or over-
detrimentally reduced or suppressed. This is not without great expense to the whole, 
albeit a system, overall framework or structure, decision, or case trying to be made. If 
the higher levels are exerted too much over the lower, foundation levels, there is an 
increased risk of top-heaviness as a consequence. The structure or case becomes 
increasingly groundless, increasing the risk of collapse, and hence failure. 
Phenomena, such as ‘groupthink’, which are inconsiderately exclusive, increasingly 
emerge. Counterproductive traits (extreme conditions) of intelligence and security 
outreach, notably overreach (in terms of the macro/high-levels) and under-reach (in 
terms of the micro/low-levels) - namely reach excesses and deficits – similarly figure. 
By allowing these last dimensions to flourish to a counter-productive extent, 
naturally too much liaison can then compound problems. 
Interestingly, any ‘groupthink’ that appears to have thrived seems to have 
originated considerably more from the top-down, rather than coming from the 
bottom-up. This was especially apparent among the producers and consumers who 
were acting ‘unintelligently’. Consequently, this scenario appears to have been most 
prevalent at the broader and macro/higher ’quartet’ of levels of relations.349 This was 
over, and to a greater extent suppressing, the narrower, micro/lower quartet of 
levels. Pointing towards some further overreach, as well as overstretch, being 
involved, Drumheller argued:  
 
After 9/11, and after the success of the initial battle plan [used in 
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Afghanistan] … because of that, Tenet was right at the heart of the matter. 
He was in every meeting, and they [the policy/decision-makers] depended 
on him because he could speak. He is articulate, and he doesn’t equivocate 
a lot. I think the president liked that. He was able to say, “Yes, we can do 
this; yes, we can do this; we can do that.” It got to the point, actually, that 
that became a problem, because it started to stretch us really, really thin. 
The Directorate of Operations, they always said, “Well, we never say no to 
someone.” It did start to fray some of the fabric…350  
 
Indeed, illustrating the degree of disconnect involved, at the micro/lower 
levels many divergent views existed. Evidently ‘groupthink’, extending to overreach, 
was not prevalent here. At these levels, arguably some more effectively optimised 
outreach balances were being struck. This was where simultaneously (at least some) 
traditional and more professional tradecraft prevailed. According to US intelligence 
scholar Stan Taylor, these findings have even led to some ‘senior analysts in both 
Britain and America [to ridicule the ‘groupthink’] interpretation…’ Meanwhile, so-
called ‘Bureaucratic Pressure Theory’, characterised as ‘“cooking the intelligence to 
fit the decision maker’s recipe”’ is believed to have much more traction in this case.351 
Despite these nuances, all these issues have at least some relevance in the wider 
intelligence world in relation to the process of intelligence analysis. Thus, they are 
still worthy of being explored in this case study, however they are precisely 
conceptualised. 
 At a minimum in theory, and very often in practice itself, the lower/micro 
levels are the ones that matter the most in the world of intelligence. Indeed, they 
should do. At the very least, they should be sufficiently sampled, as well as in a way 
that is able to inform in an ongoing manner. This is because those levels concern 
specifics - such as particular items of ‘intelligence’, sources and operations - and 
routine daily interactions. Moreover, they provide the essential building blocks for 
best facilitating adequate contextualisation – a critical requirement that should not be 
neglected; otherwise there is the increasing risk that dire consequences will ensue 
amid the ‘knowledge failure’. In terms of inclusiveness of the fuller complexities 
(ambiguities and nuances) that exist and are encountered at these micro/lower levels 
or low politics, in the case of Iraq, detrimentally these were more forfeited in the 
pursuit of an over-rigid and set agenda at the macro/higher levels. Although 
simultaneously evident in the overall mix, there was some sufficiently assisting 
complicity coming from the micro/lower levels. This was particularly so from 
perhaps less experienced (extending to even incompetent) operators, with less 
refined (or even abandoned) tradecraft skills, and keen careerists.352  
Ultimately, a distinct decision ‘cut-off’ result was established for never static 
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WMD N/CP efforts that have no one specific end result per se. This is frequently due 
to them being subject to many years of follow-up verification activities. In turn, these 
verification activities also need to (indeed, must) maintain their credibility for 
enduring trust. Critically, as observed, this scenario was not maintained vis-à-vis the 
issue of supposed Iraqi WMD. The verification (or perhaps not) of Iraqi WMD 
disarmament throughout the 1990s, as well as all the associated dances performed by 
all sides involved concerning this issue, can be cited as an example.  
Finally, as the Butler Report remarked: ‘A number of common threads have 
become clear from our examination of each case… [including] the powerful 
multiplier effect of effective international (in many cases, multinational) 
collaboration…’353 Long may it last in a manner complementing unilateral 
intelligence efforts. However, intelligence liaison can be a ‘double-edged sword’ that 
cuts both ways. All the risks and downsides, for instance in the form of reach deficits 
and excesses, also need to be more fully appreciated and accounted for by all parties 
involved. This is especially when navigating intelligence investigations on highly 
complex issues such as WMD N/CP in a dynamic domain where the stakes now and 
for the future are so high, not least while operating in a high-tempo environment 
where operating space is simultaneously condensed. For policy-makers and 
intelligence operators alike, a greater – and more coherent/co-ordinated and indeed 
strategic - emphasis on mainstream economic market mechanisms will help to build 
a more enduring non-proliferation regime.354 Intelligence, when sensibly and 
legitimately used to inform policy- and decision-making, can considerably aid in 
these efforts. This is not least as ‘entrepreneurialism’, with the simultaneous 
overlooking/dismissal of the moral and ethical dimension, has emerged as the 
dominant driver in contemporary WMD proliferation activities.  
 
 
• • • 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
 
‘This is a brave new world for Western intelligence agencies. It will demand in most 
instances close cooperation with the host spy service where the incident occurred or the 
perpetrator can be found. Liaison relationships thus become crucial, doubtless sometimes 
leading to overinvolvement with local brigands like Manuel Noriega in Panama and, 
reportedly, Vladimiro Montesinos in Peru. Nonetheless, there is a long history of Western 
law enforcement dealing successfully with the criminal challenges of mob violence, terrorism, 
and drug trafficking domestically, so there is ample room for collaboration and a sharing of 
spy expertise with the gumshoes. It will just be a different world.’ 
- F.P. Hitz, former CIA Inspector General1 
 
 
[1.0]: The intelligence world and the wider globalised context 
 
The Cold War era was arguably the zenith of ‘realism’. This was the case both in 
international affairs and, more specifically, in the intelligence world.2 The new post-
Cold War era ushered in a time of much soul-searching for intelligence. With the 
demise of the ‘Soviet Issue’, there was increased uncertainty about what the future 
might hold. This was especially apparent in the context of the post-Cold War ‘peace 
dividend’ intelligence budget cuts witnessed in the early 1990s.3  
As the post-Cold War era progressed, the trend of greater international co-
operation emerged. Both generally, as well as more specifically within the field of 
intelligence, this trend became manifest as a response to the continuing general rapid 
globalisation, and to the exponentially increasing ‘complex interdependence’ trends 
proliferating in international affairs.4 Moreover, this trend has been increasing 
particularly rapidly after the events of 9/11 and in the wake of the other terrorist 
attacks, including during the ‘emergency’ and/or ‘war’ conditions fostered by the so-
called ‘War on Terror’/‘Long War’.5 As US intelligence consultant Larry L. Watts 
observed:  
 
The 9/11 attacks accelerated [some already existing post-Cold War] efforts 
to transform the orientation of intelligence services from rivalry, both 
domestic and international, to cooperating against the new threats. This 
was an unprecedented situation for intelligence services where 
considerations of secrecy, trust, and national security made them the 
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strongest bastion of the nation-state and its sovereignty against all other 
states and their institutions.6 
 
In this context, complex trade-offs are increasingly prevalent. This includes the claim 
made by Jusuf Wanandi that: ‘We are locked in a struggle for ideas and beliefs…’7 
Neither can the trade-offs be so easily avoided or postponed. As the UK 
commentator Will Hutton has astutely observed: ‘The lesson for the twenty-first 
century is that the fight for security, prosperity and justice can no longer be won on 
any one nation’s ground. It is international…’ Importantly, he continued: ‘It requires 
a political narrative. It requires courage and leadership…’8 Sustainable enterprises 
for viably tackling the contemporary global security issues continue to need to be 
found. Moreover, they require further development.9 They also need to better build 
upon and adapt earlier ‘older’ lessons, not least those from history, which still have 
at least some relevance.10 In summary, the importance of strategy has been enhanced. 
Indeed, as the Danish political scientist Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen has remarked: ‘We 
have stopped believing in lasting peace, what is left is only strategy – we had better 
be good at it.’11 
 
[1.1]: Complex co-existence plurality: 
Overall, adopting the concept of ‘complex co-existence plurality’ helps to explain 
current developments.12 This is particularly apt when utilising the tool of 
international relations (IR) theory to aid our general understanding, and in order to 
further explain the phenomenon of international intelligence liaison. The ‘complex 
co-existence plurality’ that emerges from empirical research can be readily 
characterised. It appears to consist of the previous Cold War ‘norm(s)’ becoming 
increasingly (but not entirely) outmoded. In its newer definition, the overall realist-
dominated and the more subordinated collective/co-operative/human security-
sympathetic theories’ hierarchy now instead becomes more flattened, and thereby 
somewhat more equalised.13 As Oxford Professor Sir Adam Roberts has argued: ‘If 
there is a single theme that unites what follows, it is recognition, even celebration, of 
a pluralist approach both to the actual conduct of international relations and to the 
academic subject.’14  
The ‘complex co-existence plurality’ also resonates with the ‘hybridisation’ 
aspect of globalisation.15 Together with the exponential breaking-down of other 
traditional boundaries (physical, virtual, analytical and managerial), the different IR 
theory positions simultaneously appear harder to disaggregate than previously. This 
is particularly the case as there is variation in all the different IR theory positions 
discernable at all the different (horizontal) levels of analysis of intelligence liaison at 
the same (vertical) point in time of evaluation (see figure 2, Chapter 2 [4.1]). For 
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instance, in one characterisation, at the high/macro quartet of levels, liberal 
internationalism could be the dominant mode; while concurrently at the 
lower/micro quartet of levels, realism instead dominates.  
Which position ultimately triumphs over the whole particular intelligence 
liaison relationship or ‘system’ therefore continues to remain highly contestable. This 
is especially the case if those analysts from what can be regarded a realist position, 
and equally if those from a liberal internationalist/institutionalist position, both 
pragmatically adopt similar means (modi operandi) to explain practically the same 
challenges and to reach similar end solutions (modus vivendi). Furthermore, this will 
continue to be debatable well into the foreseeable future. This is because in such 
dynamic domains, any ability to determine with greater clarity in a consensual 
manner where one theory begins and another ends is unlikely to be forthcoming. 
Hence, at a minimum, a duality exists across all the levels, extending more plausibly 
to a plurality. 
Evidently each IR theory position individually is not adequate enough. It 
does not provide a sufficiently powerful explanation for what can be observed over 
time at all the different levels of intelligence liaison. An overabundance of realism in 
the increasingly globalised post-Cold War world and within the overarching 
‘complex co-existence plurality’ balance - including resistance to the greater sharing 
of intelligence, and the related consequent over-compartmentalising of intelligence in 
mutually exclusive silos - has repeatedly been found wanting.16 Moreover, it is 
increasingly unsustainable.17 As the Butler Report remarked:  
 
We have … seen evidence of difficulties that arose from the unduly strict 
“compartmentalisation” of intelligence. It was wrong that a report which 
was of significance in the drafting of a document of the importance of the 
dossier was not shown to key experts in the DIS [Defence Intelligence Staff] 
who could have commented on the validity and credibility of the report. 
We conclude that arrangements should always be sought to ensure that the 
need for protection of sources should not prevent the exposure of reports 
on technical matters to the most expert available analysis.18  
 
The ‘blocks’, in the form of some resistance, still remain the case. This is even despite 
the realist paradigm morphing into neo-realism, where perhaps there is some more 
room for accommodation and compromise. As Australian IR theorist Scott Burchill 
has noted: ‘The strength of the realist tradition… [stems from] its capacity to argue 
from necessity.’19 Perhaps this is most apparent vis-à-vis ‘the State’. 
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[1.2]: Under siege, encouraging change, but not overwhelmed: 
While still resilient, ‘the State’ - as the primary actor in international affairs (a central 
pillar of the realist view) - is considerably besieged. This is on all sides, by the 
globalisation-associated breaking down of traditional barriers, and their related 
categories of analysis and management allocation.20 Despite the presence of some 
privatisation trends, intelligence still continues to be substantially linked to the 
State.21 Intelligence, therefore, is also not disconnected from these wider 
developments or unaffected by them. Neither can intelligence overlook them. 
Indeed, the general flow of the overarching globalisation trends even further 
enhances the importance of intelligence, including in a capacity and capability-
extending manner. This is equally the case whether those trends are deemed positive 
and/or negative in their nature. Aware of the increased centrality of its role, in 2007, 
the CIA evaluated the ‘Strategic Environment’ in the following bleak terms:  
 
We operate in an unstable and dangerous world where international 
terrorism, the rise of new powers, and the accelerating pace of economic 
and technological change will place enormous strains on the ability of 
states to govern and will sharply increase the potential for strategic 
surprises.22  
 
Undeniably, in an operating context where threats and issues - and with them 
interests - go from national to regional then global, with there also often being a 
feedback loop to the individual (local), some sort of response is needed.23  
Some responses have been witnessed. Frequently, ‘the State’ tries to maintain 
its primacy against the global concerns.24 These have attempted to be intelligence-led. 
Arguably, these responses also include launching the ‘War on Terror’/‘Long War’:25 
a move in order to tackle the so-called ‘new’ global terrorism, as well as deal with 
‘rogue’ regimes - such as Taliban-dominated Afghanistan (from 2001) and Saddam 
Hussein’s Iraq (from 2003) - and other ‘states of concern’, notably Iran and North 
Korea. Neither can Pakistan be overlooked in Western-led counter-terrorism and 
counter-proliferation efforts. This is particularly because – in all of its globalisation-
empowered ‘entrepreneurialism’ - several contemporary intelligence and security 
investigative roads lead in its direction.26 
Equally, the global concerns require ‘global solutions’.27 As UK Foreign 
Secretary Margaret Beckett declared in a speech in July 2006: ‘…the globalisation of 
economies and the globalisation of threats requires a globalised response – in other 
words multilateralism.’28 If only by its close association with the State, intelligence 
also has quickly recognised, and then increasingly adopted, this last quality (see 
below [2.2]). During the multinational operations especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
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in the domain of intelligence we have also witnessed, as US defence analyst Derek 
Reveron has remarked, that ‘widely disseminated U.S. intelligence has become 
institutionalized… [including] a variety of new partners.’29 
However, sometimes, the State’s reassertion is not always so well judged. At 
times, its responses can be ascertained as being ‘disproportionate’.30 Disappointingly, 
this is often at the expense of human and constitutional rights, privacy and civil 
liberties, both at home and abroad.31 Worse, similarly located publics become 
commensurably disillusioned. This includes their worries about intelligence 
imbalances becoming prevalent, such as being ‘over-spied’ on, as well as their 
concerns that State responses are overly militarised, including the use of rendition 
and intensive interrogation techniques (see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.1.ii-4.1.iii]).32 
 
[1.3]: Evolving ‘norms’: 
The changes to previously existing ‘norms’ are readily perceptible. Clearly, 
intelligence also has not been immune from these general trends. On some occasions, 
perhaps it has even led the way. Former UK intelligence practitioner Michael 
Herman is not entirely wide of the mark when claiming:  
 
From [the globalisation-associated developments outlined above] comes 
the possibility of a new paradigm for intelligence. In the international 
system of (normal) states, it is moving to becoming not a zero-sum contest, 
but a cooperative activity between them, directed against common threats 
and common concerns. Even major policy disagreements … are based on 
shared (or partially shared) evidence; Intelligence has become the material 
of world wide inter-governmental and public discourse. The paradigm of 
cooperative intelligence activity and interpretation was implicit in the 
developments of the 1990s, but with 9/11 and subsequent events it can 
now be articulated.33  
 
However, what exists appears to be more complex. Rather than being so completely 
transformed (in a ‘flattened’ manner), some previous continuity with 
‘older’/traditional and more familiar trends (‘spikiness’) persists in parallel in the 
intelligence world. The prevailing picture is believed to be better conceptualised as 
being essentially the more (but not entirely) flattened and equalised ‘complex co-
existence plurality’, as detailed above (see [1.1]).  
The nature of the overall ‘normal’ ‘complex co-existence plurality’ balance 
depends on circumstances. Moreover, demonstrating its context specificity, its 
calibration varies from intelligence liaison relationship to intelligence liaison 
relationship. For example, the balance struck in the UK-US intelligence liaison 
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relationship is different from that struck in the US-Pakistan intelligence liaison 
relationship. In short, the overall ‘complex co-existence plurality’ balance depends 
on: (i) the nature and details of the eight attributes or variables of intelligence liaison 
(as defined in Chapter 1 [8.0]); as well as (ii) being according to the different ‘complex 
co-existence plurality’ balances that emerge at all the different levels of intelligence 
liaison, (a) at different points in time, (b) in different contexts, and (c) at the different 
points of evaluation.  
The prevailing intelligence paradigm is, therefore, still the functional one of 
optimised reach. More specifically, the intelligence liaison paradigm remains the 
descendant one of optimised outreach - as arguably since time immemorial.34 
Although, today, due to observed phenomena - such as both globalisation and 
glocalisation trends - the intelligence and security reach extends further (wider and 
deeper), and on greater and continuing exponential bases. Here is where change is 
most evident.  
 
 
[2.0]: Placing UK-US intelligence liaison in the wider context 
 
UK-US intelligence liaison inevitably does not occur in a contextual vacuum isolated 
from the general trends. It, too, buys into the exponential outreach in harmony with 
being on ‘a continuum with expansion’ (see below [3.0]). Today, we are also 
operating in a context where, according to one analyst, former CIA operative Charles 
Cogan, intelligence services post-9/11 have become more ‘hunters not gatherers’35 
(external influences and factors). This has especially been seen when implementing the 
counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation paradigms.36  
However, some overarching intelligence imbalances are again readily evident 
within this more specific domain of intelligence activity. The novelist John le Carré 
brilliantly summarised the four key ‘pillars’ of the intelligence world in the title of 
his book: Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy.37 Today, the optimisation (including 
‘professionalisation’) efforts of intelligence continue apace in both the UK and US 
(see Chapter 1 [4.0-5.0]). Moreover, the UK and US (together with other partners) are 
certainly doing the ‘soldiering’, with the deployment of Special Forces (and 
conventional troops) in theatres such as Iraq and Afghanistan, and by conducting 
covert operations across the globe; the UK and US are certainly doing the ‘spying’, 
with the presence of extended surveillance activities. But, are the UK and US doing 
enough ‘tinkering’ (short-term/tactical fixes/engineering activities); and – especially 
- ‘tailoring’ (long-term/strategic fixes/engineering activities)?  
Concerning these last two ‘pillars’, arguably they are not. Moreover, some of 
those efforts that are present, such as most contemporaneously witnessed vis-à-vis 
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Iran, even head unhelpfully in the wrong directions.38 Especially amid the 
higher/macro intelligence functions, opportunities and possibilities can be seized 
more substantially and creatively. Here, more concerted efforts need to be made in 
order to have an appropriately transformative impact on intelligence and the world 
beyond. It is, therefore, particularly these last two pillars, and what they can 
collectively yield, that need to be further exploited into the future by the UK and US 
as the 21st century progresses.  
Greater leadership and vision is also essential in those efforts. This is 
especially necessary as, unfortunately, so far the overarching attempts witnessed in 
the domains of counter-terrorism (Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [5.0]) and WMD non-
/counter-proliferation (Chapter 5: Case Study 2 [3.0]) have generally had mixed 
results. Moreover, distinct shortcomings are apparent. This is not least as the spying 
and soldiering activities have predominated over the tinkering and tailoring activities. 
All these diverse areas now need to be more intelligently refined, as well as to be 
better connected - especially so the intelligence methodology can be better appreciated, 
resourced, and then used, into the future by both the UK and US. 
In this context, together with its prevailing use, intelligence has been (and still 
is) compelled to reform. Or, at least, further change is required. Moreover, rather 
than being resistant, intelligence needs to keep vigilant and evolve at a quicker pace 
than experienced previously.39 This is reflected in the traditional outreach, 
underpinning and sustaining intelligence activities over time, now becoming 
conducted at a higher tempo along the lines of an exponential mode (see, for 
instance, as discussed in Chapter 1 [9.2]). Intelligence also has to become more 
globalised (less nationally compartmentalised) in order to effectively deal with all 
the frequently competing pushes and pulls exerted on it.40 This includes better and 
earlier engagement with the global challenges, not least in the contemporary higher-
tempo and condensed-space operating environments.41  
Having greater international intelligence liaison is central to that process. 
This includes extending to having more outreach in the overt intelligence domain. 
The increased intelligence liaison simultaneously reflects the elements of some 
enduring realist influence. In many cases, this is through developments being 
protected by US (and UK) led agreements embodying the desired outcomes of the 
processes of greater ‘homogenisation’ and ‘international standardisation’ (or at least 
the attempts towards those ends42); as well as, similarly to as witnessed during the 
Cold War era, helping to create proxies attuned to their interests, promoted through 
mechanisms such as national interest-complementing intelligence and security sector 
reform (SSR) initiatives.43   
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[2.1]: Identifying and exploring roots, killing weeds: 
The more combined global interests have emerged for several reasons. Suitably 
reflecting the overall plurality involved, this is either: (i) because US national security 
interests, and those of other countries, have converged; or (ii) they are sufficiently 
harmonisable. This is thanks to the same/similar threats being jointly and directly 
experienced by many states across the world - for example, in the form of the series 
of jihadist-related terrorist attacks witnessed during 2000-05 and beyond. Or else, (iii) 
it is out of convenience - for instance, for countries’ own domestic purposes. Or (iv) it 
is because interests have been compelled to become harmonised and converge by 
top-down coercion from the besieged hegemonic US ‘hyperpower’ - as enunciated by 
the 2001 ‘Bush Doctrine’: ‘either you are with us or against us.’44 The presence of 
coercion also helps to account for the increase in international intelligence liaison on 
counter-terrorism with non-traditional intelligence liaison and/or less-friendly 
partners, such as (at least publicly for a time for the US) Syria.45 Again, there are 
many ‘pushes’ and ‘pulls’ that need to be factored in during adequate 
contextualisation. Moreover, it is detrimentally reductionist to select just one for 
emphasis during analysis. 
Indeed, the presence of the global interests opens up the possibility and 
increases the necessity for greater intelligence liaison on deeper and wider bases. As 
terrorists, traffickers, proliferators and other (organised) criminals have extended the 
reach of their influence, so have security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies. 
This route has been followed in order to (at the least) compensate.46 Today, arguably, 
that intelligence and security reach tries to be extended yet further - to stay ahead, 
and thus better pre-empt, these globalisation-empowered adversaries.  
A more globalised intelligence capability is simultaneously needed. Such 
considerations include one that is able to comprehensively provide a more holistic 
and timely picture of the threats and challenges faced now and into the future. This 
is particularly the case today with many states – notably the US, UK and Australia - 
opting to pursue potentially risky proactive and pre-emptive preventative security 
and foreign policies, which can be further provocative. As Harvard Law Professor 
Alan Dershowitz has observed, pre-emption is a ‘knife that cuts both ways.’47 
Therefore, by applying a greater intelligence methodology, the scenario that 
eventually emerges can be increasingly engineered. Indeed, by doing the enhanced 
engineering, better calibration efforts can be realised, helping to ensure that the 
emergent scenario ‘cuts’ (works) more the way desired in its effects and outcomes. 
Namely, this is more effectively facilitating the condition of ‘operational policy’ so it 
can have the best opportunity to succeed.48 
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[2.2]: Intelligence and globalisation: 
The intelligence world is not isolated from other general trends. Closely associated 
are those observable as burgeoning in the business world. As Brian McKern has 
argued: ‘Managers are much more concerned today with communications laterally, 
across functions and across national boundaries, than with the vertical flows 
associated with the traditional hierarchy…’ Continuing, he remarked: ‘Managers 
have to deal with far greater complexity in the management of business than in the 
past, arising from the more rapid pace of change, the density of communication 
linkages and greater diversity in business lines, geography, personnel, and business 
partners.’49 Meanwhile, on an organisational plane of analysis, as UK intelligence 
scholar Philip Davies notes: ‘The presence of collegial and organic structures in a 
secret service is, in many respects, a counter-intuitive phenomenon… [especially] [i]n 
a field of activity where security and “compartmentalization”… must be 
paramount…’50 Significantly, neither has the intelligence world been divorced from 
further relevant developments, including the general ‘boom’ in the PR (public 
relations) industry.51 Both UK and US intelligence have also been participating more 
in their own so-called ‘PR’ activities. Again, these can be closely associated with the 
outreach activities. 
So, are we witnessing the ‘globalisation of intelligence’? Yes. As the US 
intelligence scholar Loch Johnson has observed: 
 
Indeed as globalization (interdependence) seems to bring in its wake a 
greater incidence of worldwide terrorist, drug, and criminal activity, 
victimized nations have proven more willing to provide some of their 
intelligence findings to one another and – a dramatic change in norms – to 
international organizations, in what Herman refers to as the “globalization 
of intelligence”…52 
 
Even if we adopt a cautious stance, distinct trends emerge. Gradually and unevenly, 
phenomena that can be characterised as being moves that overall add up to being the 
globalisation of intelligence can be seen to be underway. These uneven and 
combined developments are frequently led and determined by the US, and the UK - 
through the prevailing hegemony of the close UK-US (extending to UKUSA) 
intelligence liaison relationship. Or, if adopting more of a sceptic’s stance and 
‘globalisation’ is defined narrowly, at the very least, the globalisation of intelligence 
movements can be seen to be starting to be made. This is notably in the direction of 
greater intelligence sharing and increased co-operation with other countries. 
How calculated or consolidated these ‘globalisation of intelligence’ moves are 
is more of a moot point. This is particularly in terms of what can be conceptualised as 
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an overall coherent and co-ordinated international intelligence liaison strategy. There 
are some pointers that arguably such an approach to an extent has been adopted.53 
Although, several key questions concerning this issue remain unanswered. For 
example: (i) how connected these moves are; (ii) how far they extend; and (iii) how 
far they are being implemented beyond being there perhaps more in rhetorical and 
theoretical terms; as well as (iv) whether they are being implemented in more 
fragmented ways (in disjointed short-term tactical rather than connected longer-term 
strategic manners), is perhaps more debatable.  
Furthermore, other uncertainties persist concerning these ‘globalisation of 
intelligence’ movements. For instance: (i) whether and to what extent such an 
approach is entirely by design; or (ii) has come about more naturally (organically); or 
(iii) essentially by ‘accident’, driven by circumstances - rather than explicitly 
consciously – is considerably harder to unpack. Most likely, reflecting the 
complexities involved, over time the current scenario appears to have arisen through 
a complex pluralistic mixture of all these varying drivers and 
methodologies/approaches, including their different balances. Unevenness is 
therefore again effectively reflected.54 
While mixed, the ‘globalisation of intelligence’ movements (together with 
those of their facilitator, intelligence liaison) are not ambiguous. Admittedly in the 
covert intelligence realm, they tend to extend less widely and deeply. This is 
particularly the times when there is enduring reluctance to surrender the perceived 
sovereignty of ‘intelligence property rights’. These are developments that are 
especially evident mainly at the pluri- and multilateral levels, and especially to those 
actors deemed not so trustworthy. Elements of intelligence protectionism continue, 
with a careful eye to counter-intelligence trends and security anxieties. This is in 
order to maintain some control and to protect sources, as is particularly apparent in 
the domain of HUMINT.55  
In short, gradually the best aspects of intelligence co-operation attempt to be 
traded-off effectively and carefully with the best aspects of intelligence 
protectionism.56 Unsurprisingly in the more overt intelligence realm, the 
globalisation trends have tended to flourish considerably more freely. However, in 
order to have proper utility, these efforts should not be structure-less or be entirely 
uncontrolled. 
Significantly, many of the ‘globalisation of intelligence’ moves appear to be 
being made on rigorous UK-US terms and conditions. This is most perceptible in the 
domain of counter-terrorism, and vis-à-vis intelligence and security sector reform 
(SSR) initiatives (see Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [5.1.iv], above). These contribute towards 
helping to define the operational parameters and towards establishing the 
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intelligence liaison arrangement frameworks. Moreover, these developments are 
shaped, at least in part, by the technological and information-originating factors 
involved. Operating under such constraints again helps to explain these 
developments’ overall uneven advance. This is so that degrees of substantial US – 
and, by close association, UK - control and hegemony over intelligence power can be 
sustained into the increasingly globalised intelligence future.57 At least on occasions, 
moments of unipolarity also wish to be preserved.58 
Some control, however, has been carefully traded-off. This is evident within 
countries’ internationally connected terrorist threat integration/analysis centres, 
such as JTAC in the UK, as well as within arrangements such as the CIA’s ‘Alliance 
Base’ in Paris and Counterterrorism Intelligence Centers (CTICs).59 Moreover, this 
intelligence control trade-off has been done in order to try and meet the more 
pressing higher political requirements of tackling the global threats in potentially the 
most successful manner possible. As Watts has observed: ‘After the Cold War, 
especially after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil, a new wave of 
reform focused more on effectiveness and functional coordination than on control per 
se…’60 Simultaneously, as McKern has noted vis-à-vis the business world, which also 
resonates considerably in the intelligence world: ‘For most industries and for most 
firms, it is no longer possible to depend on a competitive position arising from 
monopoly, location, protection or privileged access to resources or markets…’61  
Again, how far this control has been relinquished to those ends remains 
debatable. Some protectionism in the security sector is simultaneously witnessed as 
at least trying to be maintained. This is as other alternative, and frequently 
traditional, barriers (virtual – ICT firewalls - and physical – border walls, such as 
Israel’s security wall and the US-Mexican border fence) are constructed - in order to 
try and reassert some greater state-centric, and more individualistic, security control 
amid the general erosions.62 
 
[2.3]: Persisting US intelligence hegemony: 
The greater international intelligence liaison (extending to including outreach) 
allows much. Most significantly, it enables the US global hegemony of intelligence 
power and intelligence omniscience to be increasingly realised and maintained.63 Yet, 
all is not as rosy as this scenario might depict. This is because in parallel the US 
hegemony of intelligence power is being increasingly challenged.64 As US 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Henry A. Crumpton observed in January 2006: 
 
Globalization and the related spread of free market economies, liberal 
values and institutions, and a developing global cultural network has 
provided unprecedented advancements in so many areas. This global 
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interdependence, in the long run, will make us all more secure. … Yet, this 
growing interdependence, inexorably linked to technology, poses risks 
because our infrastructure is increasingly more fragile. Our global 
interdependence makes us stronger, but also in some aspects, more 
vulnerable.65 
 
To a greater extent than previously, the US is dependent upon its international 
intelligence liaison relationships, including outreach, for what Rumsfeld called the 
‘scraps of information that people from all across the globe [can provide].’66 This is 
even in order to best sustain America’s traditional general insularity and 
‘isolationism’ qualities. However, essentially the US can substantially continue its 
role of being the hub at the centre and at the top of the collective web of the plethora 
of variously overlapping international intelligence liaison arrangements. Together, 
these provide global coverage/reach and reflect the outcome of the increasing 
globalisation of intelligence. The intelligence power in turn is additionally essential 
for at least attempting to successfully pursue the desired pre-emptive security and 
foreign policies in a suitably timely manner. Moreover, through the diversification of 
intelligence liaison risks, at least some enhanced resilience is provided. This is albeit 
while simultaneously making oversight and accountability activities increasingly 
challenging. More complex trade-offs are encountered. 
 
[2.4]: USA not alone: 
While the US essentially persists as the overall hegemon in the realm of intelligence, 
its ‘friends and allies’ can also gain. In return for greater intelligence power-
sustaining liaison with the US, ‘special’ partners - such as the UK and, to further 
extents than previously, Australia and Canada - can increasingly tap into some of the 
US global hegemony of intelligence power and intelligence resources. This is 
facilitated through their close friendship and alliance with the US. Simultaneously, 
therefore, the collective/co-operative/human security dividends of the US 
intelligence power can then be deployed more widely top-down and paternalistically 
for their benefit.67 In these circumstances, the US can act as a benevolent hegemon. 
Ultimately and primarily, however, that power can be deployed for the US itself. 
This takes place in a context that involves a convenient so-called ‘coincidence of 
interests’. At a minimum, a duality consisting of ‘altruism’ and ‘egoism’, continues 
firmly in place - extending to a plurality when involving their derivatives.68  
Once intelligence is increasingly globalised according to this model, a system 
that operates on more of a globally omniscient basis emerges. Of course it is not 
perfect, and neither should we ever expect it to be. However, this all-/most-seeing 
(or reaching) intelligence arrangement arguably helps to better deliver the ideal type 
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of a more holistic and all-/most-knowing (or optimised reach) improved intelligence 
capability. Again, this is required for pursuing the pre-emptive preventative security 
and foreign policies.  
States and their governments can then focus on pragmatically trying to 
successfully tackle the early-twenty-first century global challenges into the future.69 
This includes in a more a priori and intelligence-informed risk management manner, 
capitalising upon enhanced foresight activities (including scenarios), ‘ahead of the 
curve’ of events to a greater extent, and more firmly doing opportunity management, 
including seizing the architectural and engineering possibilities. These are moves that 
should figure prominently and be on the ascendancy, rather than intelligence and 
security services instead having to merely act increasingly akin to emergency first-
responders, more ‘behind the curve’ of events, and, as a consequence, having to 
adopt more extreme (and hence potentially more contestable) crisis management 
approaches post facto.70 Unfortunately, particularly during the episodes where 
controversial ‘disproportionality’ is observed, the attempted policy efforts can 
flounder.71  
Indeed, these episodes of ‘failure’ can also be measured in terms of the (mis-) 
configurations or (mis-)calibrations of intelligence and/or security reach involved. 
Factors, such as the ‘speed’ of those (and closely related) dynamics’ implementation, 
can be similarly included.72 Richard Popplewell has even appropriately characterised 
these types of episodes as ‘lacking intelligence’, or certainly they lack its informing 
qualities to an adequate enough extent.73  
A model featuring a considerably enhanced intelligence methodology instead 
needs to prevail. As Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War at the 
University of Oxford, reminds us: ‘…security is relative, not absolute.’74 The 
proposed model can be along the lines of a consecutively (or linearly) implemented 
3-step opportunity-generating risk management programme, involving 
appropriately inter-linked (i) problem analysis, (ii) containment, and then (iii) 
rollback (summarised as P-C-R). While prevailing in the domain of counter-
proliferation, for instance, this model can then also be viably used in a range of other 
circumstances - including with regard to counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-
terrorism (CT) enterprises.75 Unless (and/or until) the ‘problem analysis’ dimension 
is considerably enhanced, through better and suitably informing contextualisation 
efforts, the problem solving cannot be commensurably improved. Simultaneously, 
potential ‘solutions’ - for instance, in the form of well-considered strategies - remain 
increasingly elusive. 
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[3.0]: Evaluating UK-US intelligence relations in the early 21st century 
 
Focussing on UK-US intelligence liaison relations is instructive. These interactions 
can communicate several significant details. A useful place to begin is with a 
comparison. Is this a study of contrasts? Partly, but that term is perhaps not the most 
appropriate to use. Neither does it appear to offer the only or indeed the deepest 
analysis that can be rendered. The term ‘contrast’ does not sufficiently capture the 
full complexities and dynamics evidently inherent within contemporary UK-US 
intelligence liaison interactions. Significantly, more contrasts appear to emerge as we 
delve deeper, and examine the micro/lower and narrower quartet of levels 
belonging to the range of intelligence liaison relationships underway between the 
UK and US. This is where affairs especially concern details and specifics - as often 
seen, an important domain in the intelligence world (see Chapter 2 [4.1]).  
Across all levels of analysis in UK-US intelligence liaison relations, values 
appear to have great significance. Here, there appear to be lesser immediate and 
pressing ‘balance sheet’ considerations in terms of the weighing up of the costs and 
benefits of the relations. Moreover, some of the quid pro quo bargains that do feature 
are sculpted at the macro/higher levels, in the form of ‘areas of responsibility’, such 
as in the domains of each country’s respective key expertise - for example, for the 
UK, mainly in the realm of HUMINT, and for the US, mainly in the domain of 
TECHINT.76 This is so that these sorts of interactions do not have to be so worked out 
(other than their implementation) at the micro/lower levels of interoperability and 
interaction on a day-to-day basis; because these ‘deals’ have already been adequately 
determined elsewhere.77  
Overall, the dominance of similarities in UK-US intelligence liaison relations 
appears to be apparent. Differences also figure centrally. However, repeatedly, a 
discernable pattern emerges with regard to the differences. In each of the functional 
issues areas liaised over by the UK and US - whether it is on counter-terrorism, 
WMD non-/counter-proliferation, or joint Special Forces operations – similar 
differences are apparent. These can also be mitigated deploying similar strategies 
across the different issue areas.78 This is suggestive of how negatively leaning 
differences can be smartly dealt with when they emerge. It also provides a roadmap 
for later management techniques of these and associated contested issues as they 
arise in UK-US intelligence liaison relations in the future. 
UK-US intelligence liaison is again better conceptualised as consisting of a 
‘complex co-existence plurality’. Notably, this is one that intimately involves other 
considerations and conditions than merely similarities and differences. For instance, 
UK-US intelligence liaison interactions also include multiple bargains or ‘fudges’. 
These ‘fudges’ consist of situations where agreement is struck to essentially ‘agree to 
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disagree’. In the process, detailed differences held by each party can be mutually 
glossed over or traded-off, resulting in some greater neutralisation. Furthermore, 
these ‘fudge’ scenarios concern episodes where several differences over specifics 
within the liaison, particularly present at micro/lower levels, are considerably 
suppressed or navigated. Or else, they are substantially tidied in order to reach better 
agreement at the macro/higher levels, such as at the strategy/policy level. 
Frequently these compromises are implemented by the UK so that at least some 
degree of ‘access’ (or ‘buy-in’) into the high-level military and/or political US 
decision-making processes can be sufficiently maintained.79 
In the meantime, the operators working at the micro/lower levels would then 
have to engage and produce/deliver essentially whatever the prevailing circumstances. 
With adequate contextualisation more passed over by policy/decision-makers, the 
operators would have to creatively devise ways of solving the problems and 
challenges subsequently experienced ‘on-the-ground’ and ‘out-in-the-field’.80 
Arguably, several of these episodes of ‘fudging’, together with their associated 
negative fallout, were most starkly evident in the run-up to the war in Iraq in 2002-
2003, with much controversy and rancour simultaneously sticking on both sides of 
the Atlantic. This was alongside the (out)reach deficits and excesses in UK-US 
intelligence liaison relations being most emphasised (see Chapter 5: Case Study 2, 
above). Into the future, Iran may form the next test case for the UK and US.81 
Indeed, the labels the ‘good’, the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’, emerge as the most 
appropriate to be adopted for analytical purposes. This is not least to better capture 
the plurality of interactions involved in UK-US intelligence liaison relations. In the 
relations, all of these ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ dimensions feature in parallel. They co-
exist in complex ways. This perhaps allows us to go beyond just observing the mere 
similarities and differences in our evaluations of UK-US intelligence liaison relations 
in the early 21st century.82 By using the ‘good’, ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ ‘lens’ approach, 
deeper analyses can be better attained. This is not least as differences, in all of their 
dynamism, can be both: (i) positive, offering synergistic and complementing qualities 
(‘good, but different’, in overall judgements of their effects and outcomes); as well as 
judged as being (ii) more negative and counter-productively ‘ugly’; and (iii) ‘bad’, in 
their overarching nature, which causes stress. 
‘Continuities’ can also be legitimately raised. They deserve equal 
consideration alongside the ‘contrasts’. Both structurally and culturally, the UK and 
US are still essentially characterisable as being ‘Greeks and Romans’ (see, for 
example, Chapter 4, above). Yet, in conjunction with frequently trying to variously 
address these structural and cultural differences, as observed previously, together 
the UK and US continue to navigate the ‘good’, the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’ more or less 
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effectively in their relations. This is as well as similarly negotiating those 
characteristics in global politics beyond, in other countries across the world. Overall, 
in the contemporary era of globalisation, their interactions continue on the trajectory 
that can be appropriately characterised as being on ‘a continuum with expansion’, 
including across each of the ‘good’, the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’ dimensions.  
 Again drawing upon the schools of generic Anglo-American relations (see 
Chapter 2 [4.1], above), overall ‘functionalism’ repeatedly appears to succeed the most 
in UK-US intelligence liaison relations. This continues to be the case, apart from 
when there are occasionally some more specific operational restrictions that make 
fleeting inroads. Indeed, this overall predominance of ‘functionalism’ perhaps comes 
as an unsurprising conclusion given the centrality of the functional issues driving the 
rationale for relations. At least some ‘evangelicalism’ appears to be another 
dominant mode, performing at least a supporting role to the ‘functionalism’ in 
relations. Sometimes it is even an essential component. This is not least when UK and 
US operators are working literally side-by-side in high tempo/condensed battle 
spaces. As RAF Squadron Leader Sophy Gardner also earlier stressed in the context 
of OPERATION ‘IRAQI FREEDOM’, routine face-to-face interactions - together with 
other tangible, extending to intangible, aspects - clearly matter in UK-US intelligence 
liaison relations (see Chapter 4 [10.0]). Loss of ‘functionalism’ would clearly spell 
serious problems. 
 ‘Terminalism’ is instead much less prevalent. Any ‘terminalism’, when it 
approaches the surface in UK-US intelligence liaison relations, on the whole is 
sporadic. It remains confined to particular episodes of disconnect and restricted to 
specific sectors. Moreover, largely, it is immediately consigned to the background. 
This is where defusing and mitigating efforts are then quickly undertaken. In 
summary, any shortcomings and shortfalls experienced in UK-US intelligence liaison 
relations figure embedded in circumstances where the tackling of the globalised 
security challenges in high-tempo/condensed space environments occupies a higher 
priority position on the considerably homogenised UK and US intelligence, security 
and foreign policy agendas. At least usually, these agenda items hence generally 
override UK and US disconnects in terms of their importance.  
However, observing this last consideration should not prevent the UK from 
taking more of an independent line or stance vis-à-vis the US. In international 
relations, vis-à-vis is not the same as versus. Neither should these two operators be 
conflated. On the whole, the UK and US are broadly exemplary ‘friends and allies’. 
More or less successfully, they will ‘press on’ in this manner into the future. 
Although there have arguably been some lapses on occasions, these have essentially 
been quickly addressed. Their long (and shared) history of co-operating together also 
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readily demonstrates that times of wider and deeper differences/difficulties can be 
overcome. Again, the ‘blip’ in relations surrounding the ‘Suez Crisis’ of 1956 can be 
highlighted as a well-known example, from which recovery was successfully 
accomplished.83 The UK and US will therefore continue to be broadly exemplary 
‘friends and allies’ for the foreseeable future. This is albeit at times in slightly 
reconfigured and recalibrated manners, ideally determined appropriately according 
to the prevailing contexts. 
To enhance UK and US intelligence capabilities, as well as to help prevent 
disconnects from receiving further oxygen, other movements can be readily made. 
As both Sir Stephen Lander and SIGINT scholar Matthew Aid have valuably 
suggested (see Chapter 3 [4.0]), perhaps more energy should be invested in the 
multilateral UKUSA arrangement? This is to better mitigate some of the witnessed 
pressures and difficulties on the more direct bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison 
relationship. The ‘shortcomings’ of UK-US intelligence relations highlighted earlier 
by critics (see, for instance, those outlined in Chapter 1 [10.0]), would simultaneously 
be better addressed by pursuing this more inclusive approach. Through UKUSA’s 
careful widening and deepening over time, a greater number of partners, including 
those in Europe, could be engaged in more of a ‘burden-sharing’ manner on the 
contemporary globalised and transnational threats, that currently and mutually 
confront us all. Indeed, this type of change could even have a transformative effect 
on intelligence. This is because the greater maximisation and exploitation of 
international intelligence resources, along further enhanced ‘need to share/pool’ 
lines, would be better facilitated. Whatever is evaluated and agreed, both within the 
bilateral UK-US intelligence liaison relationship and beyond in the more multilateral 
UKUSA arrangement, there is plenty of scope for future growth. 
The future could be bleaker, however. This is apparent if the trajectory is 
carried on where there appears to be (at least at times) the increasing disconnect 
between the macro/high and micro/low levels of analysis and experience. 
Detrimentally, in such circumstances, the goal of ‘operational policy’ is increasingly 
forfeit (see figure 2, Chapter 2 [4.1]). Instead of being more like coerced firefighters 
and emergency first-responders, intelligence, security and law enforcement services 
in both the UK and US need to return to being more akin to architects and engineers. 
Consequently, a re-think and re-adjustment of policy and strategy is urgently 
required - together with their enhanced generation, for providing some better 
leadership and guidance.84 This is particularly by the US, and, by its close 
association, the UK. Increasingly bankrupt is thinking akin to that reflected in Robert 
McNamara’s claim (from soon after the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis) that, 
‘Today, there is no longer such a thing as strategy, there is only crisis management.’85 
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A mode of strategy/policy is needed that is considerably more intimately tied to the 
considerations as both directly and indirectly encountered and experienced at the 
micro/lower levels, such as at the operational/tactical and individual (as 
professional)/personal levels. An enhanced intelligence methodology is also 
therefore required. This is together with a greater listening to the results it can yield, 
as well as a wider understanding of what intelligence can appreciably offer. Notably, 
this is allowing it to perform an improved informing, rather than so much a leading, 
role. By mid-2007, a degree of re-connecting adjustment appeared to be at least 
beginning to emerge somewhat more effectively, including the UK vis-à-vis the US.86  
However, doubtlessly such efforts can be extended further. Indeed, they need 
to be – both structurally and culturally.87 This is highly evident in 2008, even with the 
recent launch of the UK’s first attempt at producing a National Security Strategy.88 
Failure to address this observed fundamental imbalance will only result in increased 
episodes of policy failure and strategy paralysis in both the UK and US, as well as - 
more worryingly - between them. Again, the overriding end goal of ‘operational 
policy’ will be missed. This in turn will then have increasingly unavoidable and 
damaging consequences with implications for the whole of global civil society, both 
at home and abroad. Significantly, this will feature - and indeed unfortunately 
already has (at least in part on occasions) - in the form of ‘blowback’, that 
detrimentally undermines all of our public safety and security.89 The implications of 
some Bush administration-championed action against Iran are now awaited with 
interest.90 
Ultimately, we would do well not to become complacent. As uncertainties 
proliferate in the wider world, so too do some of those present in UK-US intelligence 
liaison relations. Equally, some other boundaries between the UK and US in the 
realm of intelligence simultaneously become more clearly delineated - for instance, 
with each following some differing laws and ethics in their respective policies and 
practices (see, for example concerning the issue of renditions, as especially discussed 
in Chapter 5: Case Study 1 [4.2.ii], above). Will this last dimension frustrate overall 
UK-US intelligence liaison relations? Unlikely. However, some greater wariness is 
injected, and again these developments will necessitate the greater and more refined 
management of UK-US intelligence liaison relations into the future. Heightened 
vigilance continues to be key. Broader conclusions concerning the phenomenon of 
international intelligence liaison more generally will now be considered. 
 
 
[4.0]: Facilitator dynamics: Sketching international intelligence liaison 
 
A two-dimensional diagram suggestive of how the multidimensional international 
intelligence liaison phenomenon works is portrayed in figure 1 in Chapter 1 [8.1]. In 
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the diagram, an international intelligence liaison relationship in operation in theory 
is displayed. From that diagram, the key framework contributing towards the 
regionalisation extending to the overall globalisation of intelligence through the 
mechanism of international intelligence liaison is represented graphically. Albeit in 
all of its representative simplicity, this model also offers an explanation for how the 
phenomenon of intelligence liaison contributes to the overarching trends. The theory 
articulated here unashamedly paints intelligence liaison, and its contribution 
towards the globalisation of intelligence, in their most ideal form and operation. For 
example, this is logically as they look (and arguably how they should look) in the 
calculations at the highest and macro quartet of levels of intelligence liaison. 
However, distinct limitations remain. In terms of theorising intelligence 
liaison, the analyst cannot get much beyond a general (functional) theory of how 
intelligence liaison operates to attain one that more fully satisfactorily answers the 
core question of why intelligence liaison occurs. This is because too many specifics 
and general considerations feature at all the different levels of intelligence liaison, 
and intimately vary from case to case (see below [4.1]). International intelligence 
liaison is therefore on the whole essentially beyond general theorisation on that 
plane of analysis. Other than to argue that international intelligence liaison occurs 
and is evolving because it is increasingly needed by policy/decision-makers in the 
rapidly globalising context in international affairs, a general theory of international 
intelligence liaison then starts to unravel. This happens as its depths start to be 
explored further, and therefore such theorisation is too vague to be of much greater 
utility than providing an arguably obvious starting premise for understanding the 
phenomenon more comprehensively in generic terms. 
Unsurprisingly, when figuring in reality, intelligence liaison in all its 
dimensions is considerably more complex and messier. Also in reality, it is 
significantly harder extending to (virtually) impossible to capture and unpack neatly 
in overarching terms as the analyst of the phenomenon delves ever deeper. This is 
once particular contexts, and thereby increasing quantities of raw details and 
specifics, get added in during the actual practice of intelligence liaison. And this 
trend is particularly acutely the case at the lower/micro levels. This includes where 
the details and specifics also appear to be more important, perhaps even gaining 
more of a momentum of their own – for example, as was demonstrated during the 
‘CURVEBALL affair’.91 Small wonder then that it is at these lower/micro levels that 
there appears to be greater potential for intelligence liaison to unravel, and for reach 
deficits and excesses, such as under-reach and overreach, to emerge. These are 
developments that manifest themselves further away from even the most alert eyes 
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(and/or grasp) of macro- and even micro-managers. This occurs at essentially less 
monitorable and harder to control depths.  
 
[4.1]: Intelligence liaison theory limits: 
The intelligence liaison phenomenon can only be theorised so far. An overarching 
theory of intelligence liaison resonates most comprehensively at the higher 
ideological and theoretical levels of analysis and activity. Beyond these high levels 
of analysis and degrees of abstraction, due to the highly complex nature of the 
intelligence liaison phenomenon, greater cascades of complexities enter the equation 
at the lower (more micro) levels of analysis and activity. These become increasingly 
apparent when descending from the strategy and policy through to the operational 
and tactical and to the individual (as professional) and personal levels. The fuller 
complexities also emerge particularly clearly when examples of the intelligence 
liaison phenomenon are meticulously probed empirically in case studies.92 
Furthermore, at these lower levels, specifics and details - in the form of particular 
sources and concerning certain operations - increasingly matter. This is acutely so in 
the precise casework and operations-dominated world of intelligence. Here we are 
perhaps more in search of theories about individuals rather than institutions or 
states.  
Indeed, given all the complexities that can be observed, arguably the domain 
of ‘complexity theory’ offers us an attractive explanatory tool. This is especially 
where ‘agent-based models of competition and collaboration’ can be appropriately 
applied in testing when trying to best understand and explain intelligence liaison. 
Moreover, reference can be made to Robert Axelrod’s findings - which can be 
summarised as ranging across: ‘Evolving new strategies’; ‘coping with noise’; 
‘promoting norms’; ‘choosing sides’; ‘setting standards’; ‘building new political 
actors’; and ‘disseminating culture’.93 As explored in this study, all these elements 
evidently resonate with regard to intelligence liaison and the developments 
occurring within its realm. They also allow sufficient scope for taking into account 
the observed complexities at and across the levels of analysis. Therefore, future work 
concerning analysing the intelligence liaison phenomenon could do well by building 
on these conclusions in a systematic manner. However, even here with this powerful 
explanatory theory present, distinct limits remain palpable. Ultimately, as Stafford 
Thomas cautioned in his discussion of intelligence studies: ‘A complete description 
of a phenomenon is never truly possible for the “reality” can never be actually 
duplicated.’94 Yet, despite all these imperfections persisting, at a minimum the key 
framework and the overall guiding principles for the phenomenon can be 
articulated. Finally what can be offered, therefore, is a comprehensive range of 
empirical and interpretive extrapolations concerning the phenomenon of international 
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intelligence liaison. This is along with the key driving considerations. Indeed, these 
findings are appropriately reflective of what international relations (IR) ‘theories’ as 
a whole can generally hope to offer analysts.95 
 
 
[5.0]: How the ‘theory of optimised outreach’ explains intelligence liaison trends 
 
Employing a slightly softer theory ‘lens’ can be most instructive. Set at a broader 
focus, this can be done in the form of employing a slightly more abstract theory of 
optimised outreach. Indeed, deployment of this lens can be powerful, in order to more 
satisfactorily explain the intelligence liaison phenomenon and some of its observed 
dynamics. Its power stems from the premise that a ‘theory of optimised outreach’ is 
not only valuable for explaining the intelligence liaison phenomenon developments, 
but also - through its ‘parent’ of reach - those observed more widely in the world of 
intelligence as a whole.96 Using the ‘theory of optimised outreach’ lens simultaneously 
allows a necessary escape from being overly constrained by all the definitional 
problems and disagreements associated with trying to precisely define the term 
‘intelligence’, and by association, ‘intelligence liaison’.97 Furthermore, adopting this 
lens allows for a more holistic understanding of the intelligence liaison phenomenon. 
Simultaneously, it informs us about other intelligence interactions, and, perhaps 
more significantly, offers an explanation for how intelligence liaison connects with 
the other interactions observed in the intelligence world. This is rather than 
increasingly isolating it and its dynamics artificially from the wider machinations. 
For instance, the central role international intelligence liaison performed as part of 
the wider run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq can be readily observed.98 
Thinking in terms of reach (and that of optimised outreach more specifically 
with regard to intelligence liaison) allows the introduction of its associated 
phenomena or various conditions. These include: overreach, when there is too much 
present;99 and under-reach, when there is too little.100 A viable conceptual framework 
is now tabled for explaining why several developments occur. This framework also 
explains why several developments have occurred, and perhaps even offers tools - in 
the form of suggestions regarding what to look out for or to be sensitive towards - 
for how (out)reach imbalances could try to be better pre-empted, and hence avoided, 
into the future.  
Highlighting this last qualifier, this framework also, therefore, has some 
predictive utility. This is albeit if the presence of some informing hindsight is helpful - 
such as in the form of adopting and adapting insights remembered from ‘lessons 
learnt from history’.101 The setting of requirements can be aided most expeditiously 
by providing a lens through which the challenges and the responses to them can be 
examined; and whereby problematic areas or vulnerabilities can be identified, and 
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then potentially addressed. It is a risk management strategy intended to maximise risk 
resilience and to advance the enhanced minimisation of vulnerabilities. In intelligence 
liaison relationships, if there is too much or too little outreach, some form of 
‘blowback’ is likely to occur. The risk(s) adopted in those domains are thus higher. 
Here, the risk management concerns connect closely with the outreach 
considerations.102 
Further explanation can be offered. If there is overreach, the outreach needs to 
be carefully rolled back. This needs to be done appropriately tuned to the specific 
operational circumstances. For example, this can be accomplished by undertaking 
‘stepping-back’ actions, and by having mechanisms in place so that the stepping-
back can have a meaningful impact (or at least a viable opportunity to inform). This 
can be done with introducing ‘Red-’ or ‘A+B-Teaming’ activities – for instance, a 
useful way to contribute towards addressing intelligence analysis/assessment 
flaws.103  
Other scenarios exist. Alternatively, if there is under-reach, the outreach needs 
to carefully be rolled forward. In the domain of staff/personnel management, such a 
mechanism - for example, the appointment of counsellors by intelligence agencies - 
can be cited, so (at least in theory) employees feel less compelled to vent their 
frustrations more publicly through ‘whistle-blowing’ activities in the media, for 
instance.104 Again, whichever approach is adopted here, it should be appropriately 
tuned to being directly in harmony with the specific operating context. In summary, 
all of these machinations represent the quest for attempting to reach the ‘holy grail’ 
of intelligence liaison: optimum outreach. This will now be explored further. 
 
 
[6.0]: The quest for the ‘holy grail’ of intelligence liaison – optimum outreach 
 
Targets figure prominently in the intelligence world. The overall goal for intelligence 
liaison should be the constant attempt to attain a condition of optimum outreach. 
Today, in the context of globalisation, that outreach features most appropriately in 
an exponentially expanding mode. This is effectively illustrated by the witnessed 
increase in contemporary international intelligence liaison, especially after 9/11.105 
Although, actually attaining an overarching optimum outreach balance will 
essentially remain elusive – even to a frustrating degree. This is as over time reach 
requirements constantly fluctuate, and particularly markedly so at times of ‘crisis’ - 
for example, during the ‘emergency’ times of ‘war’. However, the continuous quest 
for the ‘holy grail’ of optimum outreach, and thus the striking of the best outreach 
balance that can be attained, should not be elusive. This is namely striving for 
optimised outreach. Otherwise, counter-productive traits ensue, such as complacency.  
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Worse can emerge. Poor intelligence liaison tradecraft increasingly becomes 
the dominant theme when the goal of optimum outreach is forfeited, albeit perhaps 
more unconsciously. Business then starts to go increasingly awry in the intelligence 
liaison world, ultimately contributing towards so-called intelligence liaison 
‘failure(s)’. Again, this was effectively demonstrated during the period leading up to 
the launch of the 2003 war in Iraq.106 By pursuing the correctional/adjustment 
activities fastidiously across all the levels involved, better (increasingly optimised) 
outreach balances can be struck overall. This also includes with regard to closely 
connected areas such as privacy, human, civil and constitutional rights and liberties 
considerations. To achieve this optimisation of outreach, as well as ensuring its 
continuity, some form of improved oversight is essential. In the process, problems 
can then be better mitigated in all intelligence-associated interactions where outreach 
features in some form - that is, everywhere. This includes in human-to-human spy 
interactions in the HUMINT domain.107 Analysis and assessment shortfalls, such as 
‘group-think’ and ‘mirror-imaging’ - including ‘blind-spots’ and ‘blanch-
spots’/‘white-outs’ – can be similarly addressed. Moreover, through carefully 
striking and effectively upholding such optimised outreach balances, intelligence 
liaison can be at its most empowering.  
 
[7.0]: Final observations  
 
As Swedish intelligence scholar Wilhelm Agrell argues instructively in his analysis 
about intelligence liaison:  
 
… in theory intelligence liaison should be guided by reason, logic and 
trade-offs. The actual conduct of intelligence liaison might be something 
quite different. The pattern of liaison and the political setting of the 
intelligence relations are at best complicated and full of contradictions, at 
worst irrational, obscure and impossible to comprehend in terms of a 
coherent security strategy.108  
 
As this study has demonstrated, much can be observed, connected and, beyond that, 
at least some of it can be theorised. Also appearing discernable from the findings of 
this study is the proposition that (at least in the covert intelligence realm) 
international intelligence liaison is the mechanism central to the increasing 
‘homogenisation’, ‘international standardisation’ and eventual globalisation of 
intelligence. This is because there are at least attempts towards realising the essential 
collective/co-operative security means of responding to the notoriously difficult 
globalised, and hence globally-shared, security threats of the early twenty-first 
century. Intelligence liaison (extending to outreach) is additionally the mechanism - 
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in its ‘means’ form - for enabling further and deeper intelligence liaison on these 
concerns into the future - in its ‘ends’ or ‘solution’ form. International intelligence 
liaison, together with international outreach activities in the overt intelligence realm, 
therefore offers an incredibly powerful and wide-encompassing tool for conducting 
and managing international relationships. This is as well as the product of those 
interactions. Without it, undoubtedly the foreign policies of states would flounder, 
and interests - whether they are of a national, regional or even global nature - would 
be left unfulfilled. In short, as a tool it offers much. 
By recognising the value of theory (see Chapter 2 [3.4]), this study attempts to 
address the under-theorised condition of the intelligence liaison phenomenon. This 
study presents a theory of international intelligence liaison that is as comprehensive 
as is believed to be possibly attainable concerning the phenomenon. The theorisation 
attempts can only extend so far. The limitations can be highlighted. If the theory of 
intelligence liaison is extended further, then it appears to become over-stretched to 
breaking point. In such circumstances, the theory becomes increasingly top-heavy 
and detrimentally disconnected from being adequately grounded in its (lower) 
empirical bases. This increases the likelihood of it becoming over-exerted, and it 
essentially ‘falling over’ and ‘failing’.  
The generalisability of the theory similarly drops. This happens because 
when intelligence liaison is applied in the cold light of ‘reality’, specific details and 
contexts become increasingly important.109 These factors can then even run counter to 
the general macro higher-level principles. They are also most detectable at the 
micro/lower levels, as the analyst delves into the deeper depths of the particular 
intelligence liaison relationship being scrutinised. The phenomenon of intelligence 
liaison when it is probed in-depth is never as straightforward, or as obvious, as it 
may look superficially or at first. It is here that trying to articulate the dynamics of 
the intelligence liaison phenomenon can be most satisfactorily accomplished through 
the lens of a ‘theory of optimised outreach’. More arguably in contemporary 
circumstances, that outreach can be most appropriately characterised as occurring on 
exponential bases. 
 
[7.1]: The power of international intelligence liaison: 
International intelligence liaison is powerful. Potentially at least, it provides both the 
means and ends for successfully acquiring whatever wants to be achieved or attained 
in politics and international relations. In theory at least, international intelligence 
liaison (extending to outreach) offers policy- and decision-makers a wide-range of 
options in the form of several toolsets and resources. In reality, inevitably specific 
circumstances contribute towards dictating which choices can be made. The selection 
process of the different components of intelligence liaison and how they are used 
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then contributes towards determining what is discernable in the evaluation of the 
effects and outcomes of the intelligence liaison. Intelligence liaison is not entirely rigid 
and inflexible. Nor is it overly centralised without the ability to be informed by 
factors more locally. The finer tuning of the international intelligence liaison 
relationship, and the outreach balances struck therein and indeed beyond, can be 
undertaken. Some essential scope is therefore available for potential adjustments. 
International intelligence liaison (extending to outreach) offers a reservoir of 
possibilities. The ways in which that reservoir is harnessed is key to successfully 
fulfilling requirements and wider goals as fully as possible. At a time when the 
stakes involved in global affairs appear to be ever higher - and the general tempo at 
which they are being played out is ever quicker in increasingly condensed spaces - 
international intelligence liaison (at least potentially) provides one of the most viable 
and far-reaching means, and indeed solutions, for tackling the complex and nuanced 
challenges being confronted. This helps to account for its popularity.  
In short, at least in its most broad overarching form, intelligence liaison is 
worth all the risks that its ‘double-edged sword’-characteristic brings into the overall 
equation of wider intelligence efforts. Furthermore, future intelligence liaison 
movements can be realised on an increasingly global scale. This is most explicitly 
seen with outreach occurring in the parallel overt intelligence realm. Indeed, in some 
areas, that outreach might even feature as some form of intelligence liaison 
trailblazer. This potentially allows for the more formalising of those relations later, 
including their widening and deepening. 
As a ‘code’, intelligence liaison in all of its (dis)guises will never always be 
fully ‘cracked’. Too many unknowns and intangibles are encountered and endure. 
This is especially at the lowest/micro levels of intelligence liaison. Great peril ensues 
in the realms of intelligence and beyond should the considerations at these important 
micro levels be ignored, neglected and bypassed - even ‘cherry-picked’. This was 
starkly seen in the case of the run-up to the 2003 Iraq war and in its subsequent 
fallout, which continues to be experienced in 2008.110  
Finally, the historically enduring phenomenon of intelligence liaison will 
survive. Reflecting trends apparent in the microcosm of UK-US intelligence relations, 
for the foreseeable future, intelligence liaison is most likely to remain essentially on a 
trajectory that can be generally characterised as being on ‘a continuum with 
expansion’. What is more apparent is that intelligence liaison - together with its 
associates, extending to outreach - is so dynamic that it will continue to fascinate. 
This is together with considerably challenging its practitioners and analysts alike 
well into the future. 
• • • 
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Appendix 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The declassified CIA archival documents, listed below (arranged chronologically), 
demonstrate the gradual ‘professionalisation’ process of liaison and its management. 
This includes those developments discernable over time at the micro level, together 
with the ever-present bureaucratic factors involved in such processes. The 
information provided at the end of this appendix (Appendix 1, p.A:vii) gives an 
insight into what a brief search of the UK National Archives at Kew, London, can 
yield from the historical record on the subject of inquiry pursued by this study. 
 
‘U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad’, National Security Council 
Intelligence Directive No. 5 (effective 21 April 1953); 
US Army management of its foreign relations, see, for example, Department of the Army, US Army 
Foreign Science and Technology Center, ‘Army Programs: Utilization of the United 
Kingdom Integrated Officer’, FSTC Circular, Number 11-1 (25 May 1982, expires 1 June 
1983) - particularly where it notes (p.1): ‘It is the responsibility of all persons subject to this 
Circular to treat the UKIO as a FULLY integrated member of FSTC, serving in a position 
normally filled by a US military officer. … Disclosure of classified military information (CMI) 
to the UKIO is limited to information releasable to the UK UP AR 380-10. In the case of the 
UK, this regulation prohibits disclosure of CMI marked NOFORN and information obtained 
from another government for which dissemination to the UKIO would violate the third party 
rule. …’;  
For US internal intelligence community management of foreign liaison, see also ‘Subject: 
Coordination and Reporting of Foreign Intelligence and Intelligence-Related Contacts and 
Arrangements’, US Department of Defense Instruction (23 March 1984). In order ‘to provide 
policy and procedural guidance to implement DIAR 60-28 for coordinating and reporting 
contacts, liaison, and intelligence exchanges by USEUCOM elements with elements of foreign 
governments and international organizations’, see HQ United States European Command, 
‘Policy: International Intelligence Contacts and Arrangements’, Directive Number 40-5 (25 
April 1986). In order ‘to prescribe procedures applicable to the Naval Intelligence Command 
Headquarters and its subordinate commands regarding foreign naval intelligence cooperation’, 
see Commander, US Naval Intelligence Command, Department of the Navy, ‘Subj: 
Foreign Naval Intelligence Cooperation’, NAVINTCOM Instruction 3810.1C (04 January 
1982). All of these documents can be located via the Digital National Security Archive - via 
URL: <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do> (accessed: 13/06/2007);  
See also under the headings ‘Deputy Director for Management Science’ and ‘Intelligence School’, 
on page 17 of an untitled and undated archival document, where it is noted that the intelligence 
school is: ‘Responsible for orientation and general course for new, middle and senior level 
employees; for specialized training in preparation for overseas assignment… and gives ad hoc 
foreign liaison tutorials.’ – via CREST – CIA-RDP83T00573R000200230001-7 (2002/11/07);  
See also M. Baird, Director of Training, ‘Subject: Summer Area Programs’, [Security 
Information] Memorandum to: Training Liaison Officers (17 December 1951) – via CREST 
– CIA-RDP54-00216A000100030003-3 (2006/12/04);  
L.K. Truscott, Jr., ‘Subject: Proposed Revision of NSCID 5 and Counter Intelligence Policy’, 
Memorandum for the Director (27 June 1957) – via CREST – CIA-
RDP85S00362R000600170003-4 (2006/07/27) – particularly where he noted: ‘Specifically with 
regard to counter intelligence, the revision… e. Indicates how liaison on counter intelligence 
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will be carried on with foreign clandestine services and overt government agencies dealing in 
policy matters…’;  
See also the attachment to ibid., ‘Espionage and Counterintelligence’, National Security Council 
Intelligence Directive No. 5 (Draft, 27 June 1957), pp.3-4, para.10: ‘The Central Intelligence 
Agency is responsible for the establishment, conduct, and development of liaison concerning 
clandestine matters with foreign intelligence and security services. Other Departments and 
Agencies may conduct liaison on non-clandestine matters with foreign intelligence and security 
services as required for the proper execution of their missions. However, all liaison which 
concerns or affects clandestine matters shall be coordinated in advance and on a continuing 
basis with the Central Intelligence Agency in order to insure that such relationships are 
beneficial to the over-all clandestine interests of the U.S.’ In another draft dated (27 June 1957), 
in ibid., it is noted on p.4 in (revised) para.11.c. that: ‘The Director of Central Intelligence and 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall establish procedures for the coordination of liaison between U.S. 
military commanders and foreign services concerning clandestine matters.’;  
From Chief Instructor, Clandestine Services Liaison Operations Course to Chief, Operations 
School, via Chief, Headquarters Training, ‘Subject: Final Course Report – Clandestine 
Services Liaison Operations Course No. 14, 14 November-6 December 1960’, Office 
Memorandum United States Government (09 January 1961) – via CREST – CIA-RDP78-
03576A000100030007-1 (2006/12/15);  
‘Subject: Office of Security Statistical Report for FEBRUARY 1964’, Memorandum for Director 
of Security (23 March 1964), p.3, para.5.j-k – via CREST – CIA-RDP78-
04004R000200280001-5 (2003/04/17) – where it notes: ‘j. A register of foreign liaison contacts 
in the United States has been established in the Office of Security. Procedures for the 
maintenance of this register and the reporting responsibilities have been developed and 
established. A proposed Headquarters Regulation implementing this program has been 
submitted. k. A report was prepared for the Executive Director-Comptroller on the security 
aspects of foreign intelligence liaison contacts in the U.S. and forwarded to the Deputy Director 
for Support for signature.’  
As an example of reporting requirements (albeit in rather perfunctory form), see, for instance, Foreign 
Liaison Control Officer, Scientific Intelligence, ‘Subject: Foreign Liaison’, Memorandum 
for the Record (18 November 1965) – via CREST – CIA-RDP71R00140A000100010038-4 
(2000/05/05) – where it remarks: ‘During a conversation last evening at the home of ••• 
requested briefings on the ABM problem and on cybernetics. There was no discussion about 
dates or times.’;  
NIPC Foreign Liaison Control Officer, ‘Attention: Senior Foreign Liaison Control Officer / 
Subject: Monthly Report of Contact with Foreign Personnel – November 1970 / 
Reference: DDI Notice No. 50-100-40, 3 November 1964’, Memorandum for Deputy 
Director for Intelligence (2 December 1970) – via CREST – CIA-
RDP78B05703A000300090003-1 (2004/02/11);  
See also ‘Clandestine Service Support Officers’ Meeting; DDS Conference Room’, Minutes (12 
August 1970) – via CREST – CIA-RDP78-04722A000200010055-5 (2002/09/03) – 
particularly where it notes: ‘2. Items of interest at the DDP Staff Meeting: a. Liaison Visits to 
Washington: DDP requested that field proposals for foreign liaison visits to Washington be 
reviewed very carefully to make sure that they are spaced-out properly and don’t create too 
much of a load on senior agency officials. Chief, FI is the CS coordinator for this purpose.’;  
Acting Director of Current Intelligence, ‘Some Guidelines for Liaison Briefings’, Office of 
Current Intelligence: OCI Notice N 50-94 (21 August 1970) – via CREST – CIA-
RDP79B01737A001000040002-5 (2000/04/17);  
An ‘individual presentation’ lecture entitled ‘Foreign Intelligence Liaison in the DDI’ featured as a 
‘CIA Senior Seminar’, under ‘Block IV: CIA’s Official Relationships’ on Wednesday 19 
April 1972 – document via CREST – CIA-RDP84-00780R005000020027-8 (2003/05/27);  
W.R. Mulholland, ‘Trials, tribulations and some lingering doubts: Liaison Training’, Studies in 
Intelligence, 17, 2 (Summer 1973) – via CREST – CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010006-5 
(2004/12/16);  
‘Minutes: One Hundred Sixty-Fourth Meeting, Room 6E-0708, CIA Headquarters, Tuesday, 22 
October 1974, 1000 to 1200 Hours’, United States Intelligence Board Security Committee: 
SECOM-M-164 (30 October 1974), p.7 – via CREST – CIA-RDP80M01082A000100290002-
2 (2004/03/31) – especially where it notes: ‘(e) ••• CIA, requested the guidance of the members 
as to their perceived needs in the report of foreign, integrated and liaison officers. It was decided 
that an initial report would be desired by all members. This report would list all foreign 
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integrated officers and the agency to which they are assigned. The report would list all foreign 
liaison officers in the Washington area and reflect to which departments and agencies they are 
accredited. Quarterly changes should be in the form of a list of additions or deletions from the 
initial list. If it is determined later that less frequent update reports are needed, then the schedule 
could be adjusted. The CIA member proposed that CIA prepare an initial submission for review 
of the members. The Chairman and members accepted this proposal. To ensure an accurate 
listing, ••• requested members to submit identification of current foreign liaison and integrated 
officers and to submit any changes prior to issuance of the first quarterly report.’;  
‘Subject: Navy Proposed Security Policy Statement on Foreign Intelligence Liaison 
Relationships’, United States Intelligence Board Security Committee / Memorandum for: 
Acting Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community SECOM-D-76 (19 June 1975), 
pp.1-2 – via CREST – CIA-RDP80M01133A000600090006-8 (2004/06/14) – especially where 
it notes: ‘1. Action Requested: … that you sign the attached memorandum to the DCI 
recommending USIB concurrence and DCI approval of Navy’s proposal for promulgation of a 
USIB security policy statement on foreign intelligence liaison relationships. 2. Background: a. 
On 12 May 1975 Admiral Inman wrote to the DCI with a proposal that USIB review and DCI 
promulgate security policy on foreign intelligence liaison relationships. This proposal was 
stimulated by concern generated in some foreign intelligence services about our ability to 
safeguard knowledge of their relationships and material they may provide us. While existing 
policy is generally adequate to protect sensitive sources, the Community does not appear to 
have any established policy on protecting the facts about liaison relationships… c. The Security 
Committee has completed its review. It agrees that such a policy statement would be beneficial 
and accepts the Navy version with but slight changes…’;  
‘Subject: Gifts from Foreign Governments’, Memorandum for: Director of Personnel (8 June 
1976) – via CREST – CIA-RDP79-00498A000500010009-6 (2001/04/05) – especially where it 
notes: ‘In compliance with Headquarters Regulation ••• and PL 89-673, 80 Stat. 952, of October 
15, 1966 (Foreign Gifts & Decorations Act), the following described gifts, valued at less than 
$50.00 each, were received by me from foreign intelligence liaison contacts in the course of my 
official duties…’;  
See also the reply to ibid., (21 June 1976) – via CREST – CIA-RDP79-00498A000500010008-7 
(2001/04/05); ‘Fact sheet on possible amendment to the “Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 
for Fiscal Year 1977” restricting foreign gifts’, Attachment to Memorandum: Subject: Agency 
Policy on Gifts and the Proxmire Amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 1977 (16 June 1976), p.1 – via CREST – CIA-RDP79-00498A000500010006-9 
(2001/08/27) – particularly where it notes: ‘The practice of “gift-giving” to establish 
relationships of trust in foreign intelligence liaison activities could also be affected adversely by 
this provision. If U.S. employees are effectively prohibited from giving or receiving such gifts – 
which generally are personal, ceremonial items – these liaison activities will only be made more 
difficult… The problem with the provision is that employees could not accept the gifts even for 
ultimate turnover to the U.S. Government. To prohibit acceptance of ceremonial and other gifts 
would be a slap in the face to foreign persons and would work against the need to establish 
relations of trust and equality that are necessary to develop productive interchanges. Moreover, 
the requirement that the circumstances surrounding gifts to foreign persons be detailed in an 
annual presidential report to Congress could conflict with the responsibilities of the Director of 
Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods…’;  
‘Subject: Understanding the Agency’, Memorandum for: Assistant to the Director – Review Staff 
(9 September 1976) – via CREST – CIA-RDP79M00467A000300060005-8 (2005/06/01), 
pp.3-4 – particularly where it notes: ‘d. One recommendation, as an example, requires that CIA 
stop giving “support” to foreign liaison services guilty of “systemic violation of human rights.” 
As stated, the recommendation applies only to CIA, although both AID and the U.S. military 
services have relations with many of these foreign instrumentalities as well. And in any event, 
the relationships with these foreign organizations is only one part of a larger U.S. relationship, 
in which the Department of State deals in diplomatic niceties with repressive governments. It is 
also noted that CIA has a traditional policy that there should be “net advantage” in its liaison 
relationships, which complicates interpretation of the word “support” in the SSC [Senate Select 
Committee] recommendation…’;  
CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, ‘Symposium on Creativity, Controls, and Ethics’, 
Seminar Report (29-30 March 1978) – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R000900010043-5 
(2006/10/19) – see especially ‘Appendix D: Recommendations of the Seminar on Ethics and 
Creativity in CIA, Held 11 and 12 November 1976… 2. In Coping With Criticism of CIA 
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Foreign Liaison Relationships, the Agency should: a. explicitly develop for use with the critics 
the best possible case for maintenance of responsible liaison. b. explicitly request interested 
Agency officers to come forward with ideas for new collection techniques to compensate for 
any future losses in liaison information. c. encourage initiatives designed to modify 
objectionable behavior of liaison services.’;  
Report of the Second Seminar on Creativity and Ethics in CIA (c.1977), pp.8-10 – via CREST – 
CIA-RDP80-00473A000700100007-1 (2002/05/20) – especially: ‘Foreign Liaison: The group 
was appalled by the possibility that outside elements – the public, the media, or Congress – 
could eventually force the abandonment of foreign liaison programs, especially if this were to 
be done in a manner dictating which foreign ••• [entire p.9 redacted] – After such a review – 
aspects of which may already be under way – a firm defense should be made wherever the 
Agency is challenged by external elements to alter its liaison relationships, especially to 
Congress and the National Security Council. – More can and should be done in fostering 
creative approaches to alternatives to liaison relationships. We should look now at what we 
would lose in a termination or severe curbing of a liaison relationship and adjust operating 
directives, planning, and activities accordingly to cover that contingency. Our recruiting patterns 
should be targeted with possible liaison loss in mind.’;  
Chief, •••, ‘Subject: •••e Human Rights Factor in Foreign Liaison Relationships’, Dispatch (31 
January 1977), pp.1-3 – via CREST – CIA-RDP80-00473A000800060005-7 (2002/01/08) – 
especially: ‘…Over the years, stations and individual case officers have exerted a measure of 
restraint upon military and security services with which liaison has been maintained and upon 
individuals who have security responsibilities. In that vein, the ••• described below reflect a 
continuing process of which reference is a part, and provide specific guidelines for 
Headquarter’s reporting and for actions to be taken by ••• personnel in the defense of human 
rights… It is important for the conduct of U.S. foreign policy that the [human rights] record 
[reported by the State Department to Congress] be as full and accurate as possible since 
conclusions drawn on the data available may well affect intergovernmental and liaison 
relationships… As noted in ••• quoted below, as human rights implications on liaison 
relationships become evident, “In each case the record of violations will be weighed against 
imperatives of national interest.” The Department of State shares this pragmatic outlook… The 
Human Rights Factor in Foreign Liaison Relationships [dated 11 November 1976]: 1. ••• 
requires that the approval of Deputy Director of ••• be given for the exploration, development, 
or establishment of any ••• liaison and intelligence exchange relationship abroad or ••• or for a 
major change in a relationship. A consideration in any liaison relationship is the Deputy 
Director’s determination that it contributes to or supports the objectives of •••. … The purpose 
of this notice is to alert component chiefs that ••• policy is to consider the record with respect to 
human rights when a determination regarding the nature and extent of each liaison is made at 
Headquarters. In those instances where there is clear evidence of gross violation of basic human 
rights on the part of intelligence or security services, a review will be made to determine if the 
scope and nature of our relationship with those services should be modified. In each case the 
record of violations will be weighed against imperatives of national interest. Efforts by 
personnel in direct contact with foreign intelligence and security services to convey, 
appropriately, this policy of ••• may have a salutary effect in improving respect for human rights 
in countries where the liaison with ••• is important to the host country. Additionally, personnel 
of ••• will not participate, directly or indirectly, in violations of human rights. 3.••• will assist 
the Deputy Director of ••• in making periodic reviews of liaison relationships, taking into 
account all factors that have a bearing on Organizational interests. This will be done in 
coordination with all Directorates as applicable. To comply with this responsibility, ••• will 
collect information pertinent to liaison relationships, corresponding through area components 
with field stations and bases as necessary.’;  
CIA, Center for the Study of Intelligence, ‘Two Seminars on Creativity and Ethics in the CIA’, 
Seminar Report TR/SR 77-02 (15 February 1977), pp.9-11 – via CREST – CIA-RDP82-
00357R000500110004-5 (2006/11/01) – particularly where it notes: ‘The Foreign Liaison 
Relationship: In response to Mr. Knoche’s expressed concern that the Agency may come under 
pressure to drop or alter its foreign liaison arrangements with certain “repressive” governments 
••• and his question as to whether we should creatively attempt now to develop alternative 
collection sources, the group arrived at a dual consensus. One consensus was that the Agency 
needs to muster in the most effective fashion it can the many good points to be made in favor of 
our liaison relations. In brief, these include: -- the fact that our entire clandestine operations in a 
given country often depend on the nature of the liaison relationship. – the fact that we do often 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Appendices 
A : v 
gain useful leverage on a country through the liaison relationship, leverage that is in our national 
interest. – the fact that such relationships do not need to be viewed simply in terms of 
maintaining or not maintaining them. There is room in each for limitations and alterations 
tailored to fit the specific situation. – the fact that such relationships can and should be used for 
good example purposes by showing that our service does not engage in repressive practices. – 
the fact that, contrary to many outside critics, our liaison relationships have not been the seed 
bed for questionable covert action operations. ••• In terms of alternatives for liaison 
arrangements, the consensus of the group was that we can assess rather well at this time what 
we would lose by terminating them, but that the possible substitutes are not very susceptible to 
analysis at this point. It was deemed worthwhile, however, that the appropriate Agency 
management specifically request ideas on substitute collection means from the concerned units 
as well as more broadly in the DO, hoping to garner ideas from officers with varied 
perspectives. … Additional points made on the liaison question included the view by several 
DO officers present that guidelines on these aspects of liaison relationships are insufficient and 
thus have not been disseminated effectively in the ranks, leaving many officers in the dark. The 
need was also suggested for support of those chiefs of station who believe •••.’;  
Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, ‘Subject: Issues and Related Material for 
PRM-11 Task 3 Drafting Group’, Memorandum for: ••• (18 April 1979), see especially ‘III. 
H. Coordinator of Liaison with Foreign Intelligence Services’ in the attached draft titled The 
Roles of the DCI and US Intelligence: An Organizational Analysis, pp.83-87 – via CREST – 
CIA-RDP79M00095A000400010006-4 (2005/04/22) – where it notes: ‘No comprehensive 
national policy has been issued to govern the conduct of US official relationships with foreign 
intelligence and security services. Several aspects of foreign liaison are, however, addressed in 
NSCIDs [National Security Council Intelligence Directive] 2, 5 and 6 and related DCI 
Directives. Some ambiguity results from this piecemeal approach, especially as pertains to the 
respective responsibilities of the DCI, the DIRNSA, and Chiefs of US Missions abroad. 
Relationships with foreign intelligence and security organizations are maintained by several 
departments and agencies within, and outside of, the Intelligence Community to exchange 
intelligence, counterintelligence and related information for mutual benefit. The totality of US-
foreign liaison relationships and information exchanges (intelligence or otherwise) is not now 
under the cognizance, control or management of any single individual or organization in the 
government. A national policy issuance which assigned specific responsibilities and oversight 
for foreign liaison supportive of national intelligence needs would be both desirable and timely. 
The responsibilities of the DCI for coordination of US foreign intelligence activities as 
described in NSCIDs 1 and 2 need to be more clearly defined in relation to State and Defense 
responsibilities set out in NSCID 2. [Details follow, including the following excerpts:]… The 
DCI exercises a predominant foreign liaison coordinating role in clandestine intelligence and CI 
matters… Since NSCID 5 is limited to clandestine matters, it does not address the DCI’s role 
per NSCIDs 1 and 2 in the extensive non-clandestine foreign liaison intelligence exchange 
activities carried out by Defense Department elements and other federal agencies under various 
intelligence and security-related programs. In addition, to clandestine charters, many foreign 
intelligence services have criminal investigation, overt collection, analysis and production 
responsibilities in the context of which US Government intelligence elements need to conduct 
liaison. These factors have caused occasional coordination problems at the field level, primarily 
in areas where major US military commands are located, ••• military intelligence representatives 
have disagreed on the extent of ••• control over information exchanges between the US military 
and host country intelligence components. Such conflicts appear to stem from an inadequate 
understanding of the DCI’s authority and responsibilities on such matters rather than from a 
need for new policies or directives. We would expect such problems to largely disappear in the 
event of more centralized management and oversight of US-foreign intelligence liaison 
relationships and information exchanges.  
Intelligence exchanges and activities with foreign intelligence services in sensitive 
compartmented activities, such as SIGINT and imagery, have required special arrangements… 
normally [involving]… the protection and control of the product of sensitive technical 
operations… In the case of imagery, the DCI’s authorities are specifically set out in special 
Presidential memoranda. These memoranda provide for DCI control over policy and procedures 
for exchange of imagery products with certain ••• zations. Most of this product is military-
related and complex agreements have been worked out with the foreign countries concerned, 
governing the use of this special product… Because of the sometimes confusing lines of 
authority inherent in NSCID’s 5 and 6 with respect to SIGINT activities, problems occasionally 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Appendices 
A : vi 
arise in interpreting what respective roles should be played in the SIGINT field by the DCI and 
the Director of the National Security Agency (DIRNSA). ••• No solution to this problem 
suggests itself at this time but it is one that should be addressed when the NSCIDs are revised 
and updated.’;  
‘Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations’, DDS&T Creativity and Ethics Seminar (26 
April 1977), p.3 – via CREST – CIA-RDP80-00473A000800010015-1 (2001/11/20) – 
particularly where it notes: ‘On foreign liaison, the group concluded that we generally are 
merely following existing, and usually publicly acknowledged, official U.S., relations policy. 
We did recognize, however, that there are situations where the U.S. does not acknowledge 
official relationships with a foreign power yet we, the Agency, are expected to maintain liaison 
associations. Here, we felt, another potential ethical problem could exist.’;  
R.W. Gambino, Chairman, Security Committee, Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Subject: 
Uniform Security Procedures for Foreign ••• Liaison Personnel in the US •••’, 
Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence SECOM-D-680 (12 October 1979) – via 
CREST – CIA-RDP82M00591R000200150024-9 (2005/03/24) – especially where it notes: 
Action Requested: Your approval to circulate for National Foreign Intelligence Board 
concurrence a proposed policy on the subject above. ••• Background: In 1966, the then USIB 
[US Intelligence Board] approved a Security Committee proposal … tasking Community 
agencies to provide CIA, for central indexing as a service of common concern, the names of all 
foreign representatives in the U.S. accredited for liaison ••• and who had access to U.S. 
intelligence. Over the years the quality of Community inputs declined markedly, and CIA 
assessments raised questions about the value of a central index. The Security Committee 
reminded Community agencies of the reporting requirements and asked them to be more 
diligent in response in the interests of testing the value of the policy. The level of response 
suggested that the perceived value was low… The Security Committee has agreed on a 
proposed new Community policy which would: 
a. Eliminate tasking on CIA to maintain a central index of names, and the requirement for 
Community agencies to do national agency checks on foreign liaison personnel and certify the 
results thereof. 
b. Require Community agencies to list with CIA’s Compartmented Information Branch all 
compartmented accesses they grant or sponsor for foreign liaison personnel; to maintain indexes 
••• and to provide both CIA and FBI any adverse security data coming to their attention on such 
foreign personnel…’;  
See also Special Assistant to the DDCI, ‘Subject: Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, 2 
April 1980’, Memorandum for: Executive Committee Members EXCOM 9046-80 (15 April 
1980) – via CREST – CIA-RDP85-00988R000500050031-9 (2003/06/26) – particularly where 
it notes: ‘The Executive Committee met on 2 April 1980 to hear reports and consider the 
recommendations of two Committee-sponsored task forces, one on Release of Information to 
the Department of State and one on Release of Information to Foreign Liaison… ••• Chairman 
of the Foreign Liaison Task Force, reviewed the terms of reference and methodology of his 
group’s study. He confirmed that foreign liaison information exchange was meeting Agency 
goals, but that practices and procedures needed some tightening. Before turning to the task 
force’s specific recommendations, the Committee members commended the group for its 
excellent report. Mr. Carlucci acknowledged that the need for tightening up practices and 
procedures relating to foreign liaison extended beyond the Agency, but Agency procedures 
needed to be addressed first before moving into the Community. Messrs. McMahon and ••• 
discussed the best way to approach the problem in the Community and agreed that a draft DCID 
[Director of Central Intelligence Directive] should be proposed. Some work is underway in this 
area, and Messrs. Carlucci, ••• and McMahon agreed to meet on this topic separately. ••• … 
Recommendation 7 was disapproved with the understanding that DDA [Deputy Director for 
Administration], DDO [Deputy Director for Operations] and NFAC [National Foreign 
Assessment Center] would examine the need for training employees returning from overseas 
assignments on policy and procedural changes, particularly in responsibilities for foreign liaison 
control and clearance procedures… Regarding recommendation 10, Mr. Wortman noted suitable 
space for secure foreign liaison conference rooms adjacent to secondary entrances had already 
been identified. Mr. Kerr reflected NFAC’s view that requiring escorts for all foreign visitors as 
stated in Recommendation 13 would be seen as a slight by some foreign liaison representatives. 
After a brief discussion the Committee approved the recommendation. Recalling earlier 
comments regarding ground work begun on tackling the release of information to foreign liaison 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Appendices 
A : vii 
on a Community basis, the Committee noted that Recommendation 14 had been overtaken by 
events…’;  
••• CSG, ‘To ••• PPG/OS’, Transmittal Slip (16 April 1980) – via CREST – CIA-
RDP87B01034R000500090015-6 (2005/08/02) – particularly where it notes: ‘Remarks: Here’s 
a copy of the revision of DCID 1/10 with memo to DCI showing approval to circulate to NFIB – 
For Registry DCID 1/10 folder when it is returned.’;  
See also the references to the various DCID 1/10 drafts throughout Chapter 1: Introduction [e.g. 8.1];  
‘Subject: Policy on Uniform Security Procedures for Foreign Integrated and Liaison Personnel 
in the United States (This supersedes policy set forth in USIB-D-9.1/11 dated 20 
September 1966)’, Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence Board NFIB-9.1/40 (28 
May 1980) – via CREST – CIA-RDP83M00171R0021002100005-7 (2001/11/08) – where it 
notes: ‘In order to enhance the security of intelligence information, the following uniform 
procedures are established for use within the Intelligence Community in relationships with 
representatives of foreign governments. These procedures apply to all accredited foreign 
representatives, both military and civilian, in the United States who are integrated within or 
serve in a liaison capacity with a member of the Intelligence Community and who have access 
to US intelligence information. 
 2. For purposes of this Policy Statement, a foreign integrated officer is one who occupies a billet 
or slot requiring access to US intelligence information in a host US agency and who functions 
essentially as do US personnel of the host agency. A foreign liaison officer is one who is 
accredited by his government to one or more US departments or agencies, and whose duties 
include representing his own government in the exchange and/or discussion of intelligence. The 
provisions of this statement other than paragraph 3 … need not apply to foreign government 
representatives, civilian or military, who are in the US exclusively for training purposes or to 
foreign representatives in the US who have other than a normal liaison or integrated 
relationship… Security Assurances: … In every instance, there shall be required a written 
security assurance from the foreign government stating that its representative, as defined •••…’;  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Subject: Implementation of Decisions Concerning 
Foreign Liaison’, Memorandum for: Executive Committee Members (8 September 1980) – 
via CREST – CIA-RDP85-00988R000500050019-3 (2003/06/26) – where it notes: ‘Substantial 
progress has been made toward need correction of some basic problem areas in the Agency’s 
conduct of foreign liaison. However, progress has been slowed in implementation of some 
accomplishable actions, and we appear to be marking time on others. I urge you to expediate 
completion of these actions. Where this is not possible, perhaps effective alternative can be 
proposed… Because the nature of most of the pending actions allows for fairly short-term 
accomplishment, please provide me your third progress reports by 1 October…’;  
Security Officer, ODP, ‘Visit of Foreign Nationals to CIA Building’, Memorandum for: Chief, 
Industrial Certification Branch, Office of Security ODP-0-1353 (10 October 1980) – via 
CREST – CIA-RDP83T00573R000300130007-1 (2001/07/12) – particularly where it notes: 
‘The SAFE program people have been advised that visits of Foreign Visitors must be approved 
by the Office of Security and the Foreign Liaison Office and in the future appropriate plans be 
made and sufficient time be afforded for all approvals.’ 
 
 
From the UK National Archives at Kew, London:  
 
‘UK / US intelligence liaison: proposal to regulate future visits by officials to Washington’ (09 
February 1973 - 20 June 1973), UK National Archives (formerly known as the Public Records 
Office - PRO), Kew, class: CAB 163/195. Availability: ‘Closed Or Retained Document, Open 
Description, Retained by Department under Section 3.4 [for more on Section 3.4, see the 
discussion concerning the declassification of records concerning intelligence liaison, below]’ - 
via UK National Archives online catalogue via URL: 
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATI
D=8335325&j=1> (accessed: 15/06/2007);  
See also ‘UK / US intelligence liaison: visits to USA of JIC staff to meet their counterparts in the 
CIA; administrative arrangements and programme for Prime Minister Heath's visit to 
Washington in 1970’ (04 November 1970 - 30 April 1971), UK National Archives, Kew, 
class: CAB 163/167. Availability: ‘Closed Or Retained Document, Open Description, Retained 
by Department under Section 3.4’ - via UK National Archives online catalogue via URL: 
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<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATLN=6&CATI
D=8335297> (accessed: 15/06/2007).  
For wartime UK-US intelligence liaison during the Second World War, see, for example, ‘Liaison 
with the USA 1940-1945’ (01 October 1940 - 28 July 1945), UK National Archives, Kew, 
class: HW 50/13. Availability: ‘Open Document, Open Description, Retained Until 2004’ - via 
UK National Archives online catalogue via URL: 
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/displaycataloguedetails.asp?CATID=8444183&
CATLN=6&Highlight=%2CLIAISON%2CWITH%2CTHE%2CUSA%2C1940%2C1945&acc
essmethod=0> (accessed: 15/06/2007). 
 
 
• • • 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Introduction 
The declassified CIA documents, listed below (arranged chronologically), present us 
with considerable insights into the types of reviews, reports and other management 
tools being employed to try and internally manage US foreign intelligence liaison 
relationships at the highest levels within the CIA. 
 
Letter from Major General D.O. Graham to Rear Admiral E.F. Rectanus on 7 December ?1973 – 
via CREST – CIA-RDP82M00531R000400020009-4 (2005/06/09) – particularly where he 
notes: ‘As you may be aware, Mr. Colby at the 20 November USIB meeting initiated a 
discussion of foreign intelligence liaison relations, indicated that he intended to submit a report 
to NSCIC on the subject, and assigned the action on this to me. For this purpose, I am obtaining 
background material from appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community and would 
appreciate additional material from you on the US Navy’s intelligence liaison relationships, ••• 
…’; 
See also ‘ICS Activities Report No. 1’, DCI/IC 74-0952 (15 February 1974), p.3 – via CREST – 
CIA-RDP78-05343A000200070015-3 (2002/05/08) – particularly where it notes: ‘6. Foreign 
Intelligence Liaison Study: An examination of foreign intelligence liaison relationships is being 
made leading to a report which the DCI plans to send to the NSCIC [National Security Council 
Intelligence Committee] on how current arrangements contribute to US policy and intelligence 
objectives and whether and how they could be improved. The DCI indicated his desire for such 
a report at a USIB [United States Intelligence Board] meeting in late 1973 and asked the 
D/DCI/IC to undertake the study with the assistance of appropriate community elements. 
Contributions are being received and drafting of the report has been started.’;  
‘Minutes: One Hundred Sixty-Fourth Meeting, Room 6E-0708, CIA Headquarters, Tuesday, 22 
October 1974, 1000 to 1200 Hours’, United States Intelligence Board Security Committee: 
SECOM-M-164 (30 October 1974), p.7;  
W.R. Mulholland, ‘Trials, tribulations and some lingering doubts: Liaison Training’, Studies in 
Intelligence, 17, 2 (Summer 1973) – via CREST – CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010006-5 
(2004/12/16) – particularly where he notes (p.23): ‘One of the area divisions of the Clandestine 
Service recently made a detailed survey of its liaison operations, and it is somewhat surprising 
to find that the survey was not very helpful in answering some of the more traditional and 
tiresome questions which bother us all. It did reveal some interesting facts about training, 
however.’;  
See also J.H. Waller, Inspector General, ‘Subject: Terrorist and Counter-Terrorist Activities’, 
Memorandum for: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (13 August 1976) – via CREST – 
CIA-RDP79M00467A002500090028-6 (2002/09/04) – especially where it notes: ‘Inspector ••• 
… has been designated by me as terrorist referent for the Inspection Staff. A lawyer by training 
and a long-time DDO officer with much experience in liaisons as well as foreign operations, 
Mr. ••• is well qualified in this field. 2. This assignment fits into and complements his now-
ongoing inspection project which concerns overseas liaisons with emphasis on the following 
possible problem areas: -- Liaison relationships with intelligence/security services which are 
repressive, abuse civil liberties or offend U.S. moral standards. – CI, counter-terrorist and anti-
drug collaboration with foreign liaison services. – Liaison agreements which could be construed 
as requiring examination in connection with the Case Act [‘Reporting International Agreements 
to Congress under Case Act’ - see URL: <http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/caseact/> (accessed: 
13/07/2007).] – Liaison operations which could be construed as being carried out in [sic.] behalf 
of CIA and are illegal by U.S. law, contrary to Executive Orders or in violation of CIA 
regulations.’;  
Chief, Staff for International Activities, ‘Subject: DDO Training to Foreign Liaison Services in 
CY 1975 and 1976’, Memorandum for: Certain DDO Elements Involved in Training Foreign 
Liaison Services (15 December 1976) – via CREST – CIA-RDP85-00966R000100130001-1 
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(2001/08/09) – particularly where it notes: ‘The Staff for International Activities/••• is 
compiling a record of training programs provided to foreign intelligence and security services 
during calendar years 1975 and 1976. For this purpose, please provide a listing of the training 
programs provided by your element, indicating for each: number of program participants and 
nationality, subject of the training, working days, numbers of trainers involved, and the area in 
which the training was given…’;  
Chief, Staff for International Activities, ‘Subject: Activities of Foreign Liaison Services in the 
U.S.’, Memorandum for: Foreign Liaison Officer, DDA (c.January 1977) – via CREST – 
CIA-RDP85-00966R000100130001-1 (2001/08/09) – where it notes: ‘1. The Directorate of 
Operations is tasked with the preparation of a briefing paper on the activities of foreign 
intelligence and security services in the United States. We have asked our Staffs and Divisions 
to provide certain information on each foreign liaison representative with whom we are in 
contact in Washington, as follows: a. What are you discussing with each representative? b. How 
often are meetings held with each representative? c. With whom does each representative meet 
in the Agency, that is, DDO, DDI or DDS&T? d. What intelligence is exchanged with each 
individual? e. What operational discussions take place? f. What is exchanged in the security or 
CI field? g. What training is given any of these representatives? [sic.] 2. Contributions from the 
other Directorates on items a, b, c, and d on liaison representatives with whom they are in 
contact would make possible a complete study on the nature and scope of foreign liaison in 
Washington…’;  
Chief, Policy and Plans Group, Office of Security, ‘Subject: Activities of Liaison Services in the 
U.S.’, Memorandum for: Executive Officer/DDA (3 February 1977) – via CREST – CIA-
RDP85-00966R000100130001-1 (2001/08/09) – where it notes: ‘1. … please be advised that 
the Special Security Center of the Office of Security meets with foreign liaison officers and 
security officials concerning security policies and procedures relating to the handling and 
utilization of Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and/or technical collection sites or 
operations abroad. These contacts are generally confined to ••• representations. During the past 
nine months there have been two meetings, ••• Generally, their contacts are with liaison officers 
who have relationships with the DDI and/or the DDS&T, as well. There is no exchange of 
intelligence or operational discussion. The contacts deal strictly with security policies and 
procedures which may include some discussion of unauthorized disclosures of SCI material in 
the press. There is no formal training involved, but information and advice in compartmented 
security is provided as required. During the two meetings mentioned, ••• representative were 
permanently assigned to Washington. Both were accompanied by individuals visiting this area 
on a TDY [temporary duty] basis… 3. It should also be mentioned that the Director of Security 
in coordination with the Directorate of Operations has had liaison contact with ••• on matters of 
mutual interest in the counter-terrorism field…’;  
Director, Intelligence Community Staff, ‘Subject: Report of Intelligence Community Views on 
Needed Revisions to Executive Order 12036’, Memorandum for: National Foreign 
Intelligence Council (23 April 1981), pp.8-9 – via CREST – CIA-
RDP84B00890R000300050004-8 (2004/06/29) – particularly where it notes: ‘Issue 6: Should 
the DCI’s authority to coordinate U.S. intelligence relationships with intelligence services of 
foreign governments be limited such that the DCI may only coordinate U.S. liaison with foreign 
clandestine services? Discussion: DoD has proposed certain amendments to the Order which 
would appear to significantly affect the DCI’s foreign liaison coordination authority. The DCI’s 
authority in this area is delineated in section 1-601(g) of the Order, which provides, inter alia, 
that the DCI shall coordinate U.S. intelligence relationships with intelligence services of foreign 
governments. DoD has proposed amending this section to limit the DCI’s coordinative role to 
that of coordinating U.S. liaison with foreign clandestine services. Under the DoD formulation, 
presumably any “intelligence relationship” which is not cast as “U.S. liaison” would not be 
subject to the DCI’s coordination. Moreover, any liaison with foreign intelligence services other 
than “foreign clandestine services” would not be within the purview of DCI coordination 
authority. These presumptions are supported, in part, by a new section 1-1113 of the Order 
which DoD has proposed. That new section would provide that the Secretary of Defense shall: 
“Establish and maintain military intelligence relationships and military intelligence exchange 
programs with selected cooperative foreign defense establishments and international 
organizations.” This provision would enable the Secretary of Defense to conduct “military 
intelligence relationships” with “foreign defense establishments and international organizations” 
without any DCI coordination. DoD believes that it is necessary to have service-to-service 
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Appendices 
A : xi 
intelligence relationships with foreign governments unencumbered by any coordination external 
to DoD. 
The purpose of centrally coordinating foreign liaison relationships is to ensure that U.S. 
intelligence agencies are not played off against one another by opportunistic foreign 
governments seeking to gain advantage over the U.S. and to prevent U.S. intelligence agencies, 
in the conduct of their liaison arrangements and activities, from unwittingly interfering with, or 
undercutting, one another. Dilution of the DCI’s role would undermine such coordination. It 
should be noted that DoD has also proposed a new section 1-1202(j), which authorizes NSA to 
conduct cryptologic liaison relationships. However, NSA cryptologic liaison conducted under 
this section is required to be consistent with the policies and procedures of the DCI. 
Community Positions: DoD supports amendments to the Order which would limit the DCI’s 
foreign liaison coordination authority and expand the authority of the Secretary of Defense in 
this area. The CIA opposes the amendments.’;  
See also some of the other sources cited throughout this study. 
 
 
• • • 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Introduction 
The declassified CIA archival documents, listed below (arranged chronologically), 
provide some insights into accountability/oversight issues – as discussed in Chapter 
1: Introduction [4.1]. 
 
D.P. Gregg, ‘Subject: Meeting with William G. Miller, Staff Director of the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence’, Memorandum for the Record (16 February 1978), pp.1-4 – via 
CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R002100010051-2 (2006/08/18) – particularly where he notes: 
‘On 15 February 1978, in a 90-minute luncheon, a useful exchange was held on the overall 
subject of SSCI’s attitudes towards CIA. … Miller’s central theme… was that although relations 
between the SSCI and CIA are vastly improved over what they were two years ago, there are 
still areas of great concern. He said that the SSCI is not satisfied with the degree of information 
and insight which it now has into our sensitive collection operations or our foreign liaison 
relationships. I remarked that I had been told that the DCI’s April meeting on sensitive sources 
had been highly successful and that he had felt the Committee was satisfied on this score. Miller 
strongly demurred, saying that the Committee believed that the DCI was very new in his job and 
needed more time to get into what is admittedly a difficult oversight issue, i.e. how to increase 
the SSCI’s sense of confidence in our internal review procedures on sensitive collection 
operations. Various ways of approaching this problem were discussed. Miller reacted positively 
to the suggestion that three or four specific sensitive operations could be discussed before the 
Committee (without naming specific sources), outlining for them the review process which had 
been used to judge whether the risks of the operation justified the possible gains. He stressed 
that the SSCI would want to know the degree to which the Department of State and/or 
Ambassador concerned had been brought into the review process… 3. Turning to the subject of 
liaison relationships Miller said there was “deep cynicism” among the Committee about our 
liaison relationships. He said that many members are convinced that CIA uses foreign liaison 
services to do those things which CIA is prohibited from doing by charter or Executive Order. 
He cited the ••• as two examples of this. I said that I would be delighted to go down and talk to 
the staff members on the subject of liaison in order to gain a clearer grasp of what their concerns 
are and how we can alleviate them. Miller said this would be helpful and that he would be in 
touch with me about setting up an appointment… 6. I responded to Miller by saying that I was 
both surprised and disappointed to learn that the SSCI’s attitudes toward the Directorate were 
still as riddled with negative feelings as he indicated. Miller said things were on the upswing but 
that the members had not yet been told enough about our internal review processes or the nature 
of our relations with liaison services to have any sense that the Agency was conducting a broad 
and objective review of the costs and risks of our more sensitive operations. He said “we feel it 
is wrong for threat assessments to be made only by those directly involved.” 7. I suggested that 
what might be helpful was a more informal exchange process with the Committee. I asked if the 
Committee felt that it only wished to be briefed by Deputy Directors or the Director himself. 
Miller replied that the committee would be delighted to be briefed by anyone, particularly those 
directly concerned with operations under review. (It was in this vein that I suggested my 
willingness to brief the staff on the subject of liaison relationships.)… My recent experience 
with an equally sceptical group ••• (FSI [Foreign Service Institute – ‘the Federal Government's 
primary training institution for officers and support personnel of the U.S. foreign affairs 
community’ - see URL: <http://www.state.gov/m/fsi/> (accessed: 14/07/2007).]’ and INR [US 
Department of State: Bureau of Intelligence and Research - see URL: 
<http://www.intelligence.gov/1-members_state.shtml> (accessed: 14/07/07).] group) leads me 
to feel that a more forthcoming posture with the SSCI might gain us more in the long run…’;  
For follow-up on this issue, see, for instance, Assistant Legislative Counsel, ‘Subject: 11 April 1978 
Meeting of NFIB [National Foreign Intelligence Board] Representatives to Discuss 
Procedures for Handling Congressional Inquiries About Foreign Liaison Relationships’, 
Memorandum for the Record (11 April 1978) – via CREST – CIA-
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RDP81M00980R000200030042-1 (2006/08/09) – where it notes: ‘The paper that was produced 
as a result of the 5 April session was reviewed and modified fairly significantly. Essentially, the 
paper limits the authority of program managers to pass only the following information on 
foreign liaison relationships: (1) the identity of the country; (2) U.S. funds, resources and 
manpower devoted to the relationships; and (3) summaries of the product of the relationship. 
Any additional provision of information would be coordinated with the DCI. 2. All parties 
recognized that this apparent hard line will not be very palatable to congressional oversight 
committees and that there will be a steady stream of exceptions. The major objective is to 
attempt to preclude ever providing compendium reports to Congress on any agency’s foreign 
liaison relationships. In the event that there are needs to know more, obviously it will be 
forthcoming… Once the paper is agreed upon by one and all, we will then have the job of 
negotiating it with Congress. Inasmuch as the paper is fairly close to the previous Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence informal agreement with Hank Knoche, former DDCI, I am hopeful 
that we will be able to get them to chop off first; then, with the [SSCI] concurrence in hand, it 
may be easier to convince the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of its 
validity.’;  
See also: F.P. Hitz, Legislative Counsel (CIA), ‘Subject: Reporting on CIA Liaison Relationships 
to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’, Memorandum for: [various] (17 
July 1978), p.1-3 – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R002300050022-8 (2006/11/22) and 
CIA-RDP81M00980R0021000400032-0 (2006/12/12) – where they note: ‘As addressees may 
recall, in November 1977 the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) 
requested that CIA provide a briefing on its foreign intelligence liaison relationships… On 6 
July 1978 Thomas K. Latimer, Staff Director, [HPSCI], asked that the Committee be briefed on 
“written agreements that are essentially government to government agreements which have not 
be reported to Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act.” Mr. Latimer indicated that he and the 
Committee understand that the Agency regards these relationships as both sources and methods 
of intelligence acquisition, but said that the Committee has a responsibility to be apprised of 
formal relationships which carry with them substantive commitments on the part of the U.S. 
Government. He also stated that he was not interested in oral and essentially informal 
arrangements carved out by present or former Chiefs of Stations with chiefs of foreign 
intelligence services… Reporting to HPSCI on written agreements which are essentially 
government to government in nature is probably the absolute minimum to which we will be able 
to limit a briefing on Agency relationships with liaisons. There follows a proposed outline for 
addressees’ consideration in attempting to meet the needs of the Committee while maintaining 
the sense of confidentiality implicit in our relationships with the various foreign liaison services. 
 4. I believe the briefing should be oral and off-the-record (i.e., that no transcript be taken) and 
that it should be stressed throughout the briefing that these arrangements constitute some of our 
most sensitive activities. In addition, it should be pointed out that our reluctance to brief on such 
matters stems from the fact that we could very possibly lose the cooperation of foreign 
intelligence services if they found out that we were briefing Congress on those relationships, 
given the recent Congressional leak record. I propose the following structure for the briefing:  
  a. Types of relationships: 
  SIGINT – Limit geographical descriptions to general areas, i.e. •••. Tell the Committee what 
the nature of these relationships are and how we carry them out. The Committee should be 
briefed in terms of funds expended, passed, material provided, information passed as well as the 
benefits to the USG from these relationships. 
  OPERATIONAL – Again, limit geographical descriptions to general areas and provide the 
Committee with descriptions of the kinds of relationships encompassed, such as Exchange of 
Information (what kinds), Ground Rules (such as), Operations (what kinds and with what 
objectives), as well as the overall benefits to the United States Government. 
  b. This might also be an opportune moment to discuss with the Committee the overall benefits 
of liaison relationships; viz., the value of those relationships to the U.S. intelligence effort, the 
basic philosophical position that there must be net advantage to the USG in order to justify the 
relationship, the kinds of product that emanate from these relationships and concluding with 
some kind of estimate on the number of man-years that these relationships save the USG. 
  c. Once having concluded the opening remarks and briefing, the Committee will most 
probably ask some specific questions which the briefers will have to respond to in as general 
terms as the situation permits… it is worth remembering that the more financially significant of 
these intelligence agreements have already been exposed to the [HPSCI] in the course of budget 
mark-up. 
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  5. Once a briefing package has been worked out, it will have to be coordinated in scope with 
DOD and NSA, both of whom are being tasked with similar requirements. Attached are 
proposed guidelines for NFIB agency responses to Congressional inquiries regarding liaison 
relationships. The proposed briefing is in general consonance with the guidelines…’;  
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management, ‘Subject: Reporting to the Congress on Foreign 
Intelligence Liaison Relationships’, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence 
DCI/IC 78-0620 (undated, c.June-July 1978) – via CREST – CIA-
RDP81M00980R003100020030-3 (2004/05/21) – especially where it notes: ‘Action Requested: 
That you provide verbal guidance to the NFIB on the above subject… Background: As you may 
recall, the Agency reached an understanding with Bill Miller and Senator Inouye in the fall of 
1976 on reporting intelligence arrangements to the SSCI (see copy of guidelines at Tab A). No 
similar understanding has yet been reach with the HPSCI although, as ••• recently phrased it, 
“…we are nudging our way toward it in the House.”… In March OLC [Office of Legislative 
Counsel] learned that DIA was about to send to the HPSCI (at its insistence) a list of all DoD 
bilateral intelligence agreements. This action could have created an awkward precedent in view 
of the fact that the HPSCI request to you of last November for “detailed summaries of all 
intelligence agreements… reached with other nations…” has never been answered. You were 
prepared to brief the Committee in December but the subject did not come up. More recently 
Mike O’Neil, chief counsel for the HPSCI, has expressed renewed interest in this outstanding 
request… The DIA response was eventually modified to take care of most of the CIA and NSA 
concerns. Nonetheless, some Community action seemed called for in anticipation of similar 
requests in the future. … In April a group, representing those NFIB agencies with foreign 
intelligence liaison responsibilities, met to discuss the need for uniform guidelines for handling 
Congressional inquiries regarding such relationships. The group proposed, and their NFIB 
principals agreed, that the Community as a whole should be guided by the following principles: 
  (1) Wherever possible, information about intelligence relationships should be provided only in 
response to requests from committees with intelligence oversight responsibilities. 
  (2) Whenever possible, responses should be to specific queries regarding specific countries or 
services. Information should be limited to the identity of the country and the service, the agency 
working with that service, the general purpose of the relationship and, when necessary for 
oversight purposes, the resources and manpower involved. 
  (3) In the event of allegations of improper activities on the part of the foreign intelligence or 
security service, every effort should be made to provide information bearing on the allegation. 
Where this would depart from (1) and (2) above, the matter should be referred to the DCI who 
will attempt to resolve the matter with the requesting committee or, if no resolution is possible, 
consult with the President. 
  (4) Whenever possible, responses to inquiries concerning liaison relationships (except those 
reported under the Case-Zablocki Act) should be answered orally and off the record… 
Recommendations: It is recommended that … You express your concern for the handling of all 
Congressional inquiries regarding intelligence liaison activities in a secure, uniform and 
coordinated manner, and designate your Legislative Counsel as contact point to be kept 
informed regarding such inquiries on your behalf, especially now while negotiations are under 
way with the committees.’ 
 
 
• • • 
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Appendix 4 
 
 
Introduction 
The declassified CIA archival documents, listed below (arranged chronologically), 
provide some further insights into accountability/oversight issues – as discussed in 
Chapter 1: Introduction [4.1]. 
 
Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management, ‘Subject: Reporting to the Congress on Foreign 
Intelligence Liaison Relationships’, Memorandum for: Director of Central Intelligence (21 
August 1978) – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R001900030005-4 (2006/10/31), CIA-
RDP81M00980R002300050020-0 (2006/07/27) and CIA-RDP80M00772A0004000100026-8 
(2004/09/03);  
Assistant Legislative Counsel, ‘Subject: A/DDO Meeting with Mike Glennon [Senate Foreign 
Relations Legal Counsel] on 4 October 1978’, Memorandum for: Legislative Counsel (29 
September 1978) – via CREST – CIA-RDP81M00980R001800060031-3 (2006/11/20) – 
especially where it notes: ‘Two papers are in preparation. The first, to be read by ••• will be 
based on the subject of foreign liaison relationships generally. It will be based on the attached 
paper done for Senator Inouye in January 1977, with the addition of material on: why liaison is 
such a sensitive source and method; the kinds of training that may be provided to a liaison 
service; and the question of CIA support in the area of funding. … In addition, •••, will be 
preparing material on our justification for declining to answer the McGovern Subcommittee 
staff’s specific questions on our liaison relations with particular foreign intelligence services. 
This explanation… will also make reference to Senator McGovern’s promises to the President 
and DCI … regarding the circumspection with which the Subcommittee’s investigation would 
be conducted, and it will draw upon the rationale to be provided by DDO regarding the 
sensitivity of liaison relationships and the potential for damage, should it become known that 
the Agency was providing specific information on individual relationships to the Congress.’;  
Assistant Legislative Counsel, ‘Subject: Draft Letter to Senate Foreign Relations Legal Counsel 
Michael Glennon’, Memorandum for: ••• OLC: 78-647/18 (26 October 1978) – via CREST – 
CIA-RDP81M00980R003400070021-5 (2004/03/26) – especially where it notes: ‘Please give 
this draft your close scrutiny. It is essential that the information we are providing be as complete 
and accurate as possible within the bounds of sources and methods protection, and that our 
answers do not in any way mislead the International Operations Subcommittee in its 
investigation of foreign intelligence activities in the U.S… Request: Provide a memorandum 
discussing guidelines governing CIA dissemination of information concerning residents of the 
United States to foreign governments. Include an analysis of how these guidelines have changed 
since 1 January 1970. Response: … With respect to dissemination of information, Executive 
Order 12036 essentially carries forward the regulatory scheme of its predecessor… In addition 
to the Executive Order, Attorney General-approved procedures, and an internal implementing 
regulation, CIA has been constrained in what it may provide foreign liaison services, including 
information regarding residents of the United States, by an internal regulation in effect, with 
modifications, since at least 1 January 1970. This regulation provides that information, insofar 
as it may be classified, may not be provided to a foreign government unless a determination has 
been made that to do so would be to the net advantage to the United States “giving 
consideration to such matters as mutual interest, need-to-know, security aspects and the wisdom 
of the proposed release.” The regulation also provides that classified information originating in 
agencies other than CIA will not be released without the consent of the originator.  
  Moreover, Directorate of Operations policy in effect since September 1976 imposes strict 
guidelines on the dissemination of “derogatory information” on United States persons to foreign 
governments even if such dissemination is otherwise permissible under Executive Order. Even 
where information on a non-United States person is considered to be nonderogatory, officials 
authorized to release information to foreign governments are obligated to consider whether the 
release may result in a foreign government’s taking action which could result in social, political 
or economic discrimination against the person.’ 
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Appendix 5 
 
Introduction 
The various sources, listed below, provide some further insights into disclosure 
issues and methodological restraints encountered when dealing with and/or 
researching intelligence liaison relationships – as discussed above in Chapter 2 [2.1.ii]. 
 
‘Minutes – Open Session, June 23’, Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation 
(23-24 June 1997) - via URL: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/adcom/mtgnts/11705.htm> 
(accessed: 26/10/2005) - particularly where it states: ‘Slany noted that a decision for disclosure 
might affect intelligence liaison between two or more parties…’;  
See also ‘Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/10: Security Classification Guidance on 
Liaison Relationships with Foreign Intelligence Organizations and Foreign Security 
Services’, (effective 14 December 1982 – approved for release, May 2002) - via URL: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid1-10.htm> (accessed: 06/11/2005).  
In the archives, see, for instance, right hand column heading ‘Justification for Extension Beyond 
Six Years’, in Directorate of Administration Classification Guide (?c.1970s) – via CREST – 
CIA-RDP87B01034R000200070055-7 (2005/08/15) - especially where it notes: ‘To protect 
sensitive clandestine sources and methods of collecting intelligence which are expected to 
remain sensitive by virtue of loss of informational advantage to the United States over the full 
stated period of classification. The foreign government(s) or international organization(s) 
concerned require that the fact of their cooperation with the United States in making information 
available be kept in confidence. E.O. [Executive Order] 12065, sections 6-103 and 1-303 define 
Foreign Government Information and specify that its unauthorized disclosure is presumed to 
cause at least identifiable damage to the national security. Section 1-402 of E.O. 12065 specifies 
that such information may be classified for up to 30 years; Section 3-404 exempts such 
information from automatic declassification and 20-year systematic review. This justification 
applies for all foreign government information categorized under Section 9b.’;  
Special Assistant for Information Control, ‘Subject: Guidelines Evolved in 
Classification/Declassification Process’, Memorandum for Executive Director Comptroller 
(18 December 1972) – via CREST – CIA-RDP80B01495R000200110025-4 (2006/09/18) – 
especially where it notes: ‘2. Taking [Executive Order 11652] exemptions in the order in which 
they are presented, we have dealt with them as follows: a. Material derived from foreign liaison. 
We have refused declassification on material derived from foreign liaison unless the 
government concerned has acquiesced in the release. We have viewed this concept as including 
materials exchanged between allies in time of war, covering even tactical intelligence. Perhaps 
we have been a little too broad in this last interpretation… We have further protected the names 
of intelligence officers from other services, including foreign… It is apparent that tedious, 
word-by-word review of documents is an expensive and time-consuming process. Where we 
have identified document sets which we intend to proscribe from declassification, we can use an 
initial determination of continued classification as the basis for eliminating the word-by-word 
review…’.  
In the academic literature see, for example, A.S. Hulnick, ‘Intelligence Cooperation in the Post-Cold 
War Era: A New Game Plan?’, The Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 5, 4 
(Winter, 1991-2); M.S. Alexander, ‘Introduction: Knowing your friends, assessing your allies – 
perspectives on Intra-Alliance Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 13, 1 (Spring, 
1998); and G.F. Treverton et al., Toward a Theory of Intelligence: Workshop Report (RAND, 
2006), p.31;  
See also ‘Security Classification Guidance on Liaison Relationships with Foreign Intelligence 
Organizations and Foreign Security Services’, Director of Central Intelligence Directive 
1/10 (effective 14 December 1982 – approved for release, May 2002) - via URL: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid1-10.htm> (accessed: 06/11/2005). Indicative of the high 
sensitivity of their subject matter, these DCIDs come under the section ‘1 - Protection of 
Sources and Methods - Requirements and Priorities’ - via URL: 
<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/dcid.htm> (accessed: 09/07/2007);  
On ‘a continuum with expansion’ | Appendices 
A : xvii 
For earlier versions of these guidelines on how foreign liaison should be managed, see, for example, 
W.E. Colby, ‘Security Policy Guidance on Liaison Relationships with Foreign Intelligence 
Organizations and Foreign Security Services’, Director of Central Intelligence Directive 
(DCID) No. 1/10 (effective 19 November 1975) and G. Bush, ‘Security Policy Guidance on 
Liaison Relationships with Foreign Intelligence Organizations and Foreign Security 
Services’, Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 1/10 (effective 18 May 1976) 
- both documents are available via the Digital National Security Archive, via URL: 
<http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/home.do> (accessed: 13/06/2007);  
See also ‘A different set of questions from [Carter’s running mate, Senator Walter “Fritz”] Mondale 
caused the CIA Director some concern because they raised sensitive policy issues. In some 
cases his queries related to ongoing CIA relationships with foreign liaison services or the 
Agency's operations…’ [Emphasis added] - from Central Intelligence Agency, ‘In-Depth 
Discussions With Carter’, chapter 5 in CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates (22 May 
1996) - via the National Security Archive, based at The George Washington University (GWU), 
Washington, DC, via URL: 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB116/cia/Chapter%205%20--%20In-
Depth%20Discussions%20With%20Carter.htm> (accessed: 08/06/2007);  
See also references to ‘liaison’ in N.R. Kinsman, ‘Protecting CIA’s Interests: Openness and the 
Future of the Clandestine Service’, Studies in Intelligence (Fall/Winter 2001) - via URL: 
<https://www.cia.gov/csi/kent_csi/docs/v44i5a07p.htm> (accessed: 04/09/2006);  
See also the reference to the ‘third party rule’ above in Chapter 1: Introduction [4.1] of this study.  
For which documents have been released concerning foreign liaison (and associated subjects) by the 
CIA, and its declassification policy concerning this area of inquiry, see also the column titled 
‘Supplementary information’ in ‘Notices’, Federal Register, 69, 244 (Tuesday, 21 
December 2004), pp.76449-76450 - document accessed via the CIA Freedom of Information 
Act (FoIA) Reading Room, via URL: <http://www.foia.cia.gov/> (accessed: 13/06/2007);  
See also ‘Presidential Documents’, Federal Register, 60, 76 (Thursday, 20 April 1995) - especially 
where this document notes: ‘Section 1.1. Definitions. … (d) “Foreign Government Information” 
means: (1) information provided to the United States Government by a foreign government or 
governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, with the 
expectation that the information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in 
confidence; (2) information produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint 
arrangement with a foreign government or governments, or an international organization of 
governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, 
are to be held in confidence; or (3) information received and treated as “Foreign Government 
Information” under the terms of a predecessor order…’ (p.19825) and ‘Sec. 4.2. General 
Restrictions on Access. … (g) Consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order, an 
agency shall safeguard foreign government information under standards that provide a degree of 
protection at least equivalent to that required by the government or international organization of 
governments that furnished the information…’ (p.19837).  
In the UK case, retained documents are covered by ‘Section 3.4’ (see Appendix 1, above, that refers to 
documents in the UK National Archives). ‘Section 3.4’ refers to Section 3 (4) of the UK Public 
Records Act (1958). This states: ‘Public records selected for permanent preservation under this 
section shall be transferred not later than thirty years after their creation either to the Public 
Record Office or to such other place of deposit appointed by the Lord Chancellor under this Act 
as the Lord Chancellor may direct: Provided that any records may be retained after the said 
period if, in the opinion of the person who is responsible for them, they are required for 
administrative purposes or ought to be retained for any other special reason and, where that 
person is not the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chancellor has been informed of the facts and given 
his approval.’ (p.3 - emphasis added) - via URL: 
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/documents/public-records-act1958.rtf> (accessed: 
16/06/2007);  
See also Intelligence Records in The [UK] National Archives (London: 17 August 2005) - via URL: 
<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/catalogue/Leaflets/ri2026.htm> (accessed: 16/06/2007);  
See also C. O’Reilly, ‘SOCA, so good?: Carina O’Reilly speaks to Bill Hughes, the director-
general of SOCA, on the agency’s achievements in tackling organised crime during its first 
year of operation’, Jane’s Intelligence Review (01 August 2007) - particularly where ‘Hughes 
says that it is [the] desire for partnership that has led [SOCA] to avoid publicity: “[SOCA] has a 
low media profile on the basis that while you are singing your praises, you are switching off a 
lot of your partners…”’ 
